tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1953410733493889728.post4057356684611439537..comments2024-02-29T12:38:32.191-08:00Comments on MUSINGS ON IRAQ: Reassessing The U.S. Surge, And Recognizing Iraqi Agency In Ending The 2005-2008 Civil War In Iraq, An Interview With New America Foundation's Douglas OllivantJoel Winghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09611810110771744360noreply@blogger.comBlogger15125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1953410733493889728.post-45413603399367772312012-03-10T15:10:40.401-08:002012-03-10T15:10:40.401-08:00bb,
Bremer didn't report to anyone. That was ...bb,<br /><br />Bremer didn't report to anyone. That was part of the problem with the CPA. <br /><br />And again, despite Bush being the CiC, the Pentagon and military continued to plan on withdrawal from 2003-2006 despite what Bush was saying.Joel Winghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09611810110771744360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1953410733493889728.post-69529781275270829342012-03-10T13:45:30.819-08:002012-03-10T13:45:30.819-08:00Sure but Rumsfeld was not the President and CiC, B...Sure but Rumsfeld was not the President and CiC, Bush was. Ultimately they were his calls. From the beginning Bush always said the US would leave a united Iraq with a democratic constitution. Before and at the time of the surge controversary, he insisted on victory. As I recall that was his briefing to Bob Gates? In the event, the insurgency was defeated, a democratic parliamentary constitution was established in Iraq, an Iraqi army was rebuilt from scratch to serve the new state, the Iraqi govt defeated the sadrist challenge, conducted the three general, two provincial elections and one constitutional referendum that cemented the democratic constitution and govt and the Bush Admin negotiated the conditions for withdrawal.<br />Difference can be seen in the approach of his successor. Obama has never set victory as the goal and has never used his pulpit to talk of the inspiration of democracy in relation to Afgha. Quite reverse. If the day comes post-withdrawal that Taliban over-run the country against the wishes of more 90% of its inhabitants then the difference in presidential approaches will be even more pronounced.<br /><br />It's also hard to imagine Bush sitting on his hands in relation to Syria.<br /><br />btw Bremer was the presidential envoy reporting directly to Bush and briefed by him ; not to Rumsfeld.bbnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1953410733493889728.post-78519765605657039382012-03-07T18:08:54.506-08:002012-03-07T18:08:54.506-08:00bb,
When I was talking with amagi we were discuss...bb,<br /><br />When I was talking with amagi we were discussing how Bush would react to events on the ground during the civil war.<br /><br />When you commented, you started talking about Bush's leadership and his role with Iraq policy in general. I responded by talking about the same thing as you notice in my response to you here:<br /><br />"I have a very dim opinion of his handling of the war. What he talked about in public statements, and what actual policy was were usually two different things."<br /><br />Hence my policy discussion about the difference between the Sec. Def./military and Bush. <br /><br />Yes, Rumsfeld wanted to bring out troops right after the invasion, but he did not give up after that. <br /><br />After Bremer disbanded the military in May 03 Rumsfeld and the U.S. military continued to talk and plan for a withdrawal. He brought it up in Oct. 03. for instance, to draw down troops from 130,000 to 100,000 by the summer of 04, then 50,000 by 2005, and then perhaps out by 2006. Another example was in Feb. 05 they again talked about drawing down troops. In Oct. 05 Gen. Casey talked about pulling out troops in 2006. And there are more of these remarks and plans as well. <br /><br />As for disbanding the military, that was not Bush's order, but rather Bremer's, so it had nothing to do with players in Washington trying to undercut Rumsfeld, but rather the haphazard planning or lack thereof in those early occupation years. <br /><br />And you hit on my point exactly, because while Bush was talking about victory and not having any kind of withdrawal plans, Rumsfeld and the military were doing just the opposite, which showed the dysfunction within the administration, which seemed to go from 2001 up to around 2006.Joel Winghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09611810110771744360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1953410733493889728.post-90965039377809555182012-03-07T17:00:18.166-08:002012-03-07T17:00:18.166-08:00Joel - your comment was that Bush had a disconnect...Joel - your comment was that Bush had a disconnect "from what was happening in Iraq", not a disconnect from Defense Secretary. Two different things. <br /><br />It is well documented that Rumsfeld and co were expecting to pull out within six months of invasion. That all changed when Bush's own presidential envoy disbanded the army. Bush and other players in the Admin changed the game on Rummy.<br /><br />On your 2nd point sayi9ng it was the military not the president who decided on withdrawal/not withdrawal: my understanding of how the chain of command works in the US is that the President is the Commander in Chief who ultimately makes these decisions? Or has something changed?<br />Has the military not Obama been making these decisions in Afgha all on their lonesome?bbnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1953410733493889728.post-84906074230204703352012-03-07T08:15:28.035-08:002012-03-07T08:15:28.035-08:00BB,
Two things.
1st how is the Defense Secretary...BB,<br /><br />Two things.<br /><br />1st how is the Defense Secretary and the military planning to withdraw from Iraq several times and actually dipping troop levels down when the President is saying that the U.S. would not withdraw and that he wanted victory in the war not an example of disconnect within the administration?<br /><br />2nd the withdrawal plans were not overruled by Bush, but by the military itself. The deteriorating security situation within Iraq, not the president is what made them reverse course each year.Joel Winghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09611810110771744360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1953410733493889728.post-69026239079041774472012-03-07T00:04:12.427-08:002012-03-07T00:04:12.427-08:00As you say -
Rumsfeld and Pentagon always wanted ...As you say - <br />Rumsfeld and Pentagon always wanted to pull out. In fact never expected to be there in any numbers after first 6 months!<br /><br />Bush overuled then, and over-ruled with surge in 2006/07 with the results we see today. Every time, it was Bush who prevailed.<br /><br />I don't expect you to give the president any free kicks, but the facts are there. For heavens sake, the whole task was always to get the Iraqi forces "to the point where they could fight and the US could pull out" ! When this point was reached post April-2008, Bush negotiated the start of the pull out, Joel.<br /><br />Four years and first Iraqi post-occupation democratic election later, I'm sure you read the (somewhat boring) parliamentary <br />outcome on Visser's blog every day?<br /><br />Likely to be a different outcome in Afgha, but then again Obama has never had his sights on victory. Difference in leadership.bbnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1953410733493889728.post-5417143725101514332012-03-06T16:39:02.155-08:002012-03-06T16:39:02.155-08:00I disagree with you on Bush. I have a very dim opi...I disagree with you on Bush. I have a very dim opinion of his handling of the war. What he talked about in public statements, and what actual policy was were usually two different things. For example, he ran for re-election saying that he wanted to stay the course, that he wanted victory in Iraq, and that he was against withdrawing, yet his public slogan, "We stand down as they stand up" was actually a withdrawal plan. It wasn't winning the war, it was getting the Iraqi forces to the point where they could fight, and the U.S. could pull out. In fact, every year since 2003, Rumsfeld and the Pentagon had a plan to withdraw but the deteriorating security situation would not allow them to do anything but temporary dips. Yet despite that being the policy, Bush kept on saying he was against any withdrawal. There are plenty of other examples.Joel Winghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09611810110771744360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1953410733493889728.post-41332834579674727092012-03-06T15:55:12.286-08:002012-03-06T15:55:12.286-08:00Very interesting interview, and it was good to see...Very interesting interview, and it was good to see the part the shia militias played in defeating insurgency being added to narrative. Also good to see Gen Casey receiving his due.<br /><br />A couple omissions on effect of surge: at the end of 2006 the Maliki government was under severe domestic pressure with the Sadrists, Allawi and Accord pulling out of it. I remember the excitement of much of the US commentariat at the imminent demise of PM Maliki. It was Bush's decision to uncomprisingly support Maliki with the surge that saved Maliki's skin, the Iraqi govt ceasing to function and anarchy added to civil war. <br /><br />Second omission - was discussion of Odiorno's surge-enabled concerted military operations in the south of Baghdad in July-Aug 2007 that wiped the insurgent strongholds out and cause the insurgent to collapse in the September.<br /><br />Finally on President Bush: far from having a "a decided disconnect from what was actually happening in Iraq" the reverse was the case. He knew only too well what was happening, hence the double down on the surge. It is true though that he was "committed to his vision of victory" - and he got it. The insurgency was defeated; a constitutional democracy was established in Iraq; the PM he mentored went on to establish control over the Mahdi army and Iraq remains unified today against all predictions, especially from the US commentariat.bbnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1953410733493889728.post-61868451787220963572012-03-01T07:23:19.530-08:002012-03-01T07:23:19.530-08:00Amagi,
I should have added that if my belief that...Amagi,<br /><br />I should have added that if my belief that Bush would not have withdrawn troops was true, and with tribes in Anbar turning against Al Qaeda, the Islamists would not have had free reign in the province. They might not have been rolled back as much, and Anbar might have turned out like Ninewa is today being a base for AQI, but not a threat to the government.Joel Winghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09611810110771744360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1953410733493889728.post-9414042183639855282012-02-29T17:04:46.452-08:002012-02-29T17:04:46.452-08:00Amagi,
I think you misread me a bit about Anbar. ...Amagi,<br /><br />I think you misread me a bit about Anbar. I didn't downplay the role of the U.S. in helping the tribes in Anbar fight Al Qaeda. I was just pointing out that as early as 2005, some insurgent groups and tribes were already changing their opinion of working with the hardcore Islamists, and by 2006 some Americans were beginning to recognize this divide as well. Both of those trends were obviously exploited very successfully under the Surge. <br /><br />However, in Baghdad I don't think Al Qaeda had a chance in the long run because the Shiite militias plus elements of the security forces were going to overwhelm them with pure numbers no matter what, and I think that was the most important struggle at that time, far more than Anbar. <br /><br />On the matter of whether Maliki would have taken on Sadr without the surge, I would say that the premier would have had a confrontation with Sadr eventually. I don't know if it would have been like Charge of the Knights however. Remember by 2007, Maliki had largely moved away from depending upon Sadr's political support, so that allowed the prime minister more freedom of action. <br /><br />On withdrawing forces, I can't see Bush backing down. He had a decided disconnect from what was actually happening in Iraq, and was committed to his vision of victory even though people like Rumsfeld were actually talking about getting out as quickly as possible. <br /><br />Even if the Surge had not happened, I don't see the President agreeing with the withdrawal crowd. If anything, he would have probably kept troops levels at what they were instead of increasing them if the Surge had not happened.Joel Winghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09611810110771744360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1953410733493889728.post-79074676321601817492012-02-29T16:34:41.863-08:002012-02-29T16:34:41.863-08:00Joel,
Respectfully, I must disagree. By the end o...Joel,<br /><br />Respectfully, I must disagree. By the end of 2006 the tribes had begun to turn on al Qaeda, that much is true, but American protection was crucial during the following year to galvanize opposition and demonstrate that taking on al Qaeda was a realistic possibility. It was at precisely this time that the Americans became "the strongest tribe," as Bing West puts it, and it was only due to close collaboration with American forces at that time that decisive defeat of al Qaeda was accomplished. You can argue that much of this started pre-Surge, but the Surge would serve to consolidate those gains. Without this American support, I would argue, defeat of al Qaeda was not at all assured, and they may well have been able to establish a terrorist state in Anbar that could perpetrate massive violence on the Shia population of Iraq, which, in turn, could provoke tremendous retribution from militias. Indeed, although Maliki may have deliberately avoided American support in Charge of the Knights, could he have gotten away with crushing Sadrist influence without the American backing that the Surge signified?<br /><br />As to the speed with which American troops may have exited in the frequently invoked "cut & run" scenario, we cannot ever know. I can tell you, though, at the time, vivid images of the Fall of Saigon played in my mind. Once America signalled its general disinterest in doubling down on their aims in Iraq, I don't know exactly how much influence they could possibly wield. It wouldn't take a massive helicopter airlift to signal to all involved that the Americans were no longer reliable partners (not that they ever were, particularly).<br /><br />In any event, I think al Qaeda came much closer to establishing some semblance of their perverse Caliphate than you give them credit for, and had they enjoyed continued success, I think the radical reaction from the Shia population would have made 2006 look like a dress rehearsal and the Iraq War would have deepened into something a lot closer to the Lebanese Civil War. Whoever gets however much of the credit for preventing it, I think you and I can agree that it is incredibly fortunate that such a conflict never came to pass, and the chances of returning to those days are extremely remote.amaginoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1953410733493889728.post-40156683530786782622012-02-28T14:13:07.666-08:002012-02-28T14:13:07.666-08:00Amagi
Personally, I think the civil war would hav...Amagi<br /><br />Personally, I think the civil war would have ended on its own no matter what the policy of the U.S. was. In 2006 I was arguing that the Iraqis needed to kill themselves for a little longer, and eventually they would tire of it, and the fighting would subside. Small sheikhs in Anbar for instance, were already turning on Al Qaeda in Iraq as early as 2005, and the U.S. forces started working with some of them in 2006. According to Iraq Body Count, deaths peaked at the end of 2006, and were declining before the Surge even started, more evidence that the war between Iraqi groups was making a turn. <br /><br />Even if things like the Iraq Study Group were followed, it still would have taken months if not years to pull U.S. forces out. Those troops were also trying new tactics as Ollivant pointed out under Gen. Casey. The Americans would not just have packed up and gone, so they would have still been influencing events in the country. <br /><br />Overall, Baghdad's demographics would have changed more, but places like Anbar would probably end up the same if the Surge had not happened.Joel Winghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09611810110771744360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1953410733493889728.post-89488646980743289602012-02-28T10:45:20.432-08:002012-02-28T10:45:20.432-08:00Another excellent interview. Thank you for this.
...Another excellent interview. Thank you for this.<br /><br />The one question I feel that should have been asked is what Mr. Ollivant believed the probable outcome would have been, had the US Surge never occurred.<br /><br />While I don't disagree with any of his points, and believe that indeed the lion's share of credit for arresting violence in 2008 goes to the Iraqis (as it must), I think there is a strain of thinking in the "New Orthodoxy" that the Surge was unnecessary or counterproductive (clearly Mr. Ollivant does not believe this, but I can recall reading other commentaries that do). It seems to me that while the surge may not have been the /causal/ factor in the decline of violence, without it the reduction would have been less pronounced and much more drawn out. In particular, I believe Operation Arrowhead Ripper in the north seriously degraded Al Qaeda operational capacity there (although it was in no way decisive), and that campaign was a direct result of the Surge.<br /><br />Had the Surge not taken place, and US forces were instead removed (as some politicians were discussing at the time and many citizens demanding... and something that would have been a distinct possibility under a Kerry administration), I believe the slaughter would have continued to escalate into a full-scale exsanguination of the Sunni community and we would see a very different political arrangement than we do today (however dysfunctional it remains).<br /><br />I make this argument for the same reason Mr. Ollivant makes his: so we don't draw the wrong conclusions militarily. It's true that we don't want to attribute too much to the Surge, but it's equally important that we don't attribute too little.amaginoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1953410733493889728.post-8154409582538914052012-02-27T13:14:34.644-08:002012-02-27T13:14:34.644-08:00Mojo, indeed, insurgents forced out Shiites from n...Mojo, indeed, insurgents forced out Shiites from not only Baghdad, but Anbar, Diyala, etc. What the article was talking about however, were the factors that led to the end of the civil war, one of which was the militias, and parts of the security forces and government coming back with a vengeance and clearing out many Sunnis. Basically the insurgents started the process of sectarian cleansing, and the militias and parts of the government finished it.Joel Winghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09611810110771744360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1953410733493889728.post-56853403021429471552012-02-27T10:26:25.456-08:002012-02-27T10:26:25.456-08:00"By mid-2008, the demographics of the capital..."By mid-2008, the demographics of the capital had been completely changed by the civil war. Only a few mixed neighborhoods remained (yellow), while the majority of city had become Shiite (green) with Sunnis pushed to the central western region (red). This was due to the ethnic cleansing of Baghdad by Shiite militias and some parts of the Iraqi security forces"<br /><br />Was it not also due to Shia being evicted from Sunni majority or mixed neighborhoods? It's interesting how some people forget the ethnic cleansing of Shia from Sunni neighborhoods. Two of my uncles were evicted from their homes in <a href="http://iraqimojo.blogspot.com/2009/11/sectarian-segregation-of-baghdad.html" rel="nofollow">Amriya</a> in 2005. But the impression I get from this article is that Shia militias and ISF pushed Sunni Arabs out of their homes.Iraqi Mojohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14348791832474839472noreply@blogger.com