Musings On Iraq

Kurdistan Democratic Party About To Assume Kurdish Premiership

2012-01-31T07:28:00.002-08:00

The long awaited transfer of power over the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) premiership is about to happen. In January 2011, it was announced that the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) would be taking the prime minister’s position from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Nechirvan Barzani of the KDP who held the position previously will replace current Premier Barham Saleh. Saleh had a tough two years in office, with his PUK party facing defections, the emergence of the Change List opposition group, and demonstrations in its base province Sulaymaniya.

Nechirvan Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party is about to return as the Kurdish prime minister (KRG)

The transfer of power between the two ruling Kurdish parties has been talked about for months. In November 2011, a leading member in the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) said that the two parties would swap the premiership. Then on January 16, 2012, the KDP officially announced that Nechirvan Barzani would return to be prime minister. Members in the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) wanted to hold onto the position for four years, just as Barzani did previously, but that did not happen.

Barham Saleh (KRG)

Barham Saleh originally took office in 2009 at a disadvantage, because of the change in fortunes for his PUK. Before, Saleh was the deputy premier to Nouri al-Maliki, and the number three man in the PUK hierarchy. By 2009, the PUK was losing its standing vis-a-vis the KDP. It was facing internal divisions, and defections. Then in July 2009, Kurdistan held regional parliamentary elections and the new Change List, which was formed by ex-PUK members won in Sulaymaniya, the PUK’s base. The voting solidified the KDP as the stronger of the two ruling parties. Afterward, KDP members discussed ending its 50-50 split of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) administration with the PUK, and perhaps even denying Saleh the premiership. The transfer between Nechirvan Barzani and Saleh went ahead anyway in August. The PUK and KDP had been roughly equal beforehand, and had a series of power sharing agreements, which divided power between the two in Kurdistan. As part of that, the two parties would switch the premiership every two years. The loss in standing by the PUK would change that relationship, and that put Saleh in a tough position even before he became the new KRG premier.

Thousands protested in Sulaymaniya in 2011 until the government put an end to them (Matt Willingham)

In his two years in office, Saleh faced even more challenges. There were reports that he wanted to replace Kurdish Natural Resource Minister Ashti Hawrami for example, because he disagreed with his oil policies, but he was overruled by the KDP. More importantly, in February 2011, protests broke out in Sulaymaniya. As a result, Saleh was called before the Kurdish parliament for questioning about the demonstrations, and survived a no confidence vote. (1) Saleh said that he agreed with all of the protesters’ main demands, and privately wrote a letter to Iraq’s President and PUK head Jalal Talabani saying that their party was not able to deal with the public’s outrage. Saleh allegedly offered to resign, and said that the KRG needed deep political reform and a change in ministers. The KRG ended up using force to break up the protests in April. During Saleh’s two years in office, the regional government continued to go after journalists and media outlets that criticized it as well. Saleh had a difficult two years. While he sometimes spoke of change within the Kurdistan region, the government showed no real signs that it was willing to do so. In fact, its authoritarian side was revealed when it cracked down on demonstrators, and went after the media. The KDP and PUK were not willing to let go of power or even allow citizens to openly criticize it for that long whether in the streets or in the press.

Nechirvan Barzani will now become the new KRG prime minister. There will be changes in the cabinet, but no real difference in policies. Politics are still dominated by the KDP and PUK who rely upon a huge bureaucracy, patronage system, and tribal and family ties. Even with the emergence of the Change List and other opposition parties, this hold on power has not really been shaken. When Barzani last took office in 2006 he was also facing public discontent over corruption and other issues, but did nothing substantive about it. What Barzani’s assumption of power will mean is that the KDP will solidify itself as the main Kurdish party as it will hold both the premiership and the presidency in the KRG. Otherwise, the status quo will be maintained in the region.

Saleh’s time as the KRG’s prime minister will go down as a turbulent one. His PUK lost standing in the region, which led to it losing seats in the regional parliamentary elections and protests in its base of Sulaymaniya. He was not able to reverse these trends, and gain more support for his party. Now he gives way to Nechirvan Barzani who will further entrench the KDP’s power. Rather than ushering in a new administration and new policies, Barzani will simply be more of the same.

FOOTNOTES

1. Ahmed, Hevidar, “KRG survives confidence vote,” AK News, 3/10/11

SOURCES

Abubkir, Idris, “Gorran will stay opposition in new cabinet,” AK News, 1/24/12

- “Islamic Group leader refutes confiscating govt. premises,” AK News, 2/2/11

Agence France Presse, “Top Iraq Kurd leader offers to resign amid demos,” 4/19/11

Ahmed, Hevidar, “KRG survives confidence vote,” AK News, 3/10/11

Ahmad, Zanko, “demonstrations in sulaymaniyah turn violent but protesters vow to go on,” Niqash, 4/21/11

AK News, “KRG Prime Minister responds to protesters’ demands,” AK News, 3/14/11

Alaaldin, Ranj, “Troubled times in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Guardian, 7/23/09

Ali, Ahmed, “Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: Revival or Mere Survival?” Arab Reform Bulleting, 2/24/10

Aswat al-Iraq, “Fears of potential security vacuum following US troop withdrawal,” 5/15/11

- “Kurdistan Democratic Party insists to apoint Nichervan Barzani to replace Barham Saleh,” 11/20/11

Chomani, Kamal, “Nothing New Under The Sun,” Kurdistan Tribune, 1/25/12

Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “kurdish election lists,” Niqash, 6/30/09

Hassan, Rebin, “Opposition forces leave parliament after raw with parliament speaker,” AK News, 4/4/11

Hiltermann, Joost, “Elections in Iraqi Kurdistan: Results and Implications,” International Crisis Group, 1/1/10

Human Rights Watch, “Iraqi Kurdistan: Growing Effort to Silence Media,” 5/24/11

Katzman, Kenneth, “The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq,” Congressional Research Service, 10/1/10

Knights, Michael, “’Managed Democracy’ Gives Way in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 8/3/09

Mandi, Samira Ali, “Barzani welcomed a statement on the achievements of the reform program in Kurdistan,” Radio Free Iraq, 6/15/11

Natali, Denise, “Stifled Kurdish opposition,” Middle East Channel, Foreign Policy, 2/23/11

National Iraqi News Agency, “KDP names Neijarvan Barzani for the Kurdistan Regional Government Premiership,” 1/16/12

Rudaw, “Source: Salih To Serve As Prime Minister Until 2013,” 6/15/11

Saifaddin, Dilshad, “Protesters dissatisdied with Kurdistan authority vows, says council,” AK News, 3/21/11

Stansfield, Gareth, “Can the Unified Regional Government Work?” Arab Reform Bulletin, June 2006

CNN VIDEO: Iraqis Outraged U.S. Continues To Fly Drones Over Iraq

2012-01-31T07:28:00.001-08:00

CNN FAREED ZAKARIA GPS VIDEO: The War In Iraq: Was It Worth It?

2012-01-31T07:28:00.000-08:00

Iraqi National Movement Ends Its Boycott In Face Of Possible Break-Up Of Party

2012-01-30T07:28:00.004-08:00

Iraqi Natonal Movement spokeswoman Maysoun al-Damlouji announcing the end of the list's boycott of parliament (Reuters)

The Iraqi National Movement (INM) gave up on its boycott of parliament after a meeting on January 29, 2012. Official spokesmen said the decision was made to improve the political atmosphere in the country, and to prepare the way for a planned national conference. Behind the scenes one leader anonymously said that the real reason was that the list was about to break-up if it continued on with its course of action. The party was deeply divided over not attending the legislature and the cabinet. The hopes for a successful meeting of national leaders is also not likely to resolve anything either. That shows that the National Movement has overplayed its hand once again due to its bad leadership.

On January 28, 2012, the major leaders of the Iraqi National Movement (INM) met to discuss their stance towards the government. Those in attendance included Iyad Allawi, Speaker of Parliament Osama Nujafi, Finance Minister Rafi Issawi, and Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq. The major topic of discussion was whether they would maintain their boycott of parliament. At first, the list denied that it would return to the legislature, but the next day it revealed that it actually would. The official explanation was that they wanted to help with the planned national conference of the country’s leaders, which is supposed to work out all of the political differences between the major parties. One senior leader however, told Reuters that it was because the list was about to break-up if it didn’t change direction. The main players within the INM had different positions on how to deal with their problems with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Allawi and Vice President Tariq Hashemi were for leaving the government, and moving into the opposition. Speaker Nujafi and Jamal Karbuli, who leads the Solution Movement within the INM felt that they should stay part of the national coalition, and Deputy Premier Mutlaq was split between the two sides. At the beginning of January, six members of the National Movement also attended parliament, and were kicked out of the INM as a result. The list has always been a large and unwieldy collection of parties. Maliki was able to play upon these differences when putting the government together by giving many of the individual leaders positions within the government to buy them off, while excluding Allawi. The boycott was also ineffective, because the INM did not have enough seats to stop parliament from having a quorum to conduct business. Important laws like the 2012 budget were coming up as well, which all parties will benefit from as they run ministries that they use to dole out patronage and projects to their followers. All together, this put tremendous pressure upon the National Movement to give up its boycott.

The Iraqi National Movement is supposed to have another meeting to decide what to do with not attending the cabinet. That has been poorly followed by the list, with up to five of the nine INM ministers attending the cabinet at one time or another. Again, the ministers hold actual power with large staffs and budgets to administer. Those were too much for the majority of INM members to give up, and thus they went to sessions of the cabinet despite the directions of their list. That boycott is likely to collapse officially as well.

Finally, the hopes of a successful conference are disappearing with every day. On January 27 for example, Moqtada al-Sadr said he would not attend, because he was a religious figure, not a politician. Allawi has called for all of the major leaders to be there, so this was another major setback. Not only that, but there is no reason for Maliki to compromise if the meeting ever takes place. The INM does not have the votes to hold a no confidence vote against him, they do not have the seats in parliament to stop it from holding a quorum, and half the INM ministers are showing up to the cabinet anyway. The National Movement simply does not have any leverage in this dispute with Maliki.

The Iraqi National Movement ended up winning the most seats in the 2010 parliamentary elections, but has been consistently outmaneuvered since then. Its major leaders were each given top positions in the new government, and left Allawi out in the cold hoping for a committee to be formed, which he would lead, but that has been completely dropped. Since then, Allawi has been left to constantly snipe at Maliki, while he barely attends parliament, and spends large amounts of time outside the country. This latest crisis was badly played by the list once again. Its responses to Mailiki’s call for a no confidence vote against Deputy Premier Mutlaq and the arrest warrant for Vice President Hashemi have been completely ineffective. Not only that, but they have shown how deeply divided and fragile the list is. That has left Maliki in the enviable position of simply waiting out the crisis knowing full well that the INM could not keep up its tactics, and in this case, would likely come out even weaker than before. The final episode of this drama has not been played out, but it shows that the party may do better without following Allawi and Mutlaq the next time something like this happen, which it definitely will given the personal animosities amongst Iraq’s leading politicians.

SOURCES

AIN, “Majority of IS members supports withdraw from Government,” 1/26/12

- “MP rules out IS withdrawal from political process,” 1/26/12

Mardini, Ramzy, “Iraq’s Post-Withdrawal Crisis, Update 6,” Institute for the Study of War, 1/27/12

National Iraq News Agency, “BREAKING NEWS Iraqiya decides that its law makers attend Parliament’s session to debate the Budge, General Amnesty Law,” 1/28/12

Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Iraq’s Sunni-backed bloc faces key decision,” Reuters, 1/25/12

- “Iraq’s Sunni-backed bloc to end parliament boycott,” Reuters, 1/29/12

Al-Shummari, Yazn, “Where? Not bothered really – no red lines for Allawi on conference location,” AK News, 1/17/12

Sowell, Kirk, “Inside Iraqi Politics No. 31,” 1/25/12

PRESS TV VIDEO: Iraqiya party ends parliament boycott

2012-01-30T07:28:00.003-08:00

AP VIDEO: Bomb Kills Dozens At Iraq Funeral Procession

2012-01-30T07:28:00.002-08:00

AP VIDEO: Insurgents Kill 7 Police In Iraq

2012-01-30T07:28:00.001-08:00

REUTERS VIDEO: Bomb Blast Strikes Iraq

2012-01-30T07:28:00.000-08:00