tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1953410733493889728.post5401153043676851379..comments2024-02-29T12:38:32.191-08:00Comments on MUSINGS ON IRAQ: How The Failure To Deal With Iraq’s Militias Caused The Breakdown Of The CountryJoel Winghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09611810110771744360noreply@blogger.comBlogger11125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1953410733493889728.post-78977002383208388462010-06-13T00:40:22.489-07:002010-06-13T00:40:22.489-07:00Howdy i'm new on here. I stumbled upon this we...Howdy i'm new on here. I stumbled upon this website I have found It incredibly helpful & it's helped me tons. I hope to give something back and aid other users like its helped me.<br /><br />Thank You, Catch You LaterAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1953410733493889728.post-63920828481945292312010-06-06T23:16:03.273-07:002010-06-06T23:16:03.273-07:00Heya i'm new to this. I stumbled upon this cha...Heya i'm new to this. I stumbled upon this chat board I find It incredibly accessible & it's helped me out loads. I should be able to give something back and help other users like it has helped me.<br /><br />Cheers, Catch You AroundAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1953410733493889728.post-51047340952796794142008-10-18T20:40:00.000-07:002008-10-18T20:40:00.000-07:00I'm not saying there wouldn't be an insurgency, bu...I'm not saying there wouldn't be an insurgency, but Gen. Garner's plan was to get the Iraqi army to do reconstruction and security work right after the war. Some of his aides were talking to Iraqi officers that said they could bring back most of their soldiers. Wouldn't that have made the insurgency a lot smaller and easier to contain if the U.S. had an Iraqi army alongside of it? There would be far less recruits.<BR/><BR/>Also, wasn't much of the army Shiite conscripts? <BR/><BR/>Not speaking for the Peshmerga, but the Badr Brigade was created by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard with the express purpose of creating an Iraqi force to fight Saddam in the Iran-Iraq war. Right after the invasion they got sent in by the Iranians to carry out a wave of assassinations of Baathists and opponents of Iran. <BR/><BR/>Badr also started the killing hundreds of Sunnis supported by some of the security forces, followed by the Mahdi, who raised that number to the thousands that led to sectarian cleansing of swaths of Baghdad. Not all of them were Baathists/AQI.<BR/><BR/>The effort in 2004 by the U.S. and Iraqi government to integrate the militias was halfheated at best. In fact, it had little to no backing, so was a dead end whether the militias wanted to do it or not. <BR/><BR/>Finally, I agree that Maliki's move in Khanaqin was surprising and an assertion of government authority over areas it should be sovereign. On the other hand, I have no idea whether it actually changed the status quo at all. The Kurds still control Khanaqin and a slice of northern Iraq and Maliki can't stay in power without the Kurds behind him anyway, especially now that he's starting to break with the SIIC.Joel Winghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09611810110771744360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1953410733493889728.post-74655067785191383252008-10-18T17:10:00.000-07:002008-10-18T17:10:00.000-07:001/ Is part of the westernocentric premise. If you ...1/ Is part of the westernocentric premise. If you are looking at it from an Iraqi perspective - ie from the point of view of the huge majority of Iraqis who had been persecuted by the Baath - the insurgency was the unsurprising result of the Baath republican guard, Mukhabaret and Fedayeen not having been militarily "defeated" by the US in April 2003. <BR/><BR/>After the actions of the Baath in 1988 and 1991 the shia and the Kurds were under no illusions about the depths of Baath brutality. That is why they formed militias in the first place.<BR/><BR/>It is also why they demanded de-Baathification and the disbandoning of the Baath Army (and would have started an insurgency themselves if Bremer had denied them). <BR/><BR/>After the fall of Saddam the insurgency created and led by the Baath in an alliance with Alqi literally slaughtered tens of thousands of shia - and killed 4000of their Amerian "protectors".<BR/><BR/>That's why the US and the Iraqi government were unable to deal with militias effectively until after the insurgency had been largely defeated.<BR/><BR/>But westernocentric thinktankers always put the insurgency down to the US "punishment" of the Sunnis. In fact it is the US, including Bremer, who has been indefatigable in representing minority Sunni interests and preserving their rights in order to get a genuine democracy established.<BR/><BR/>The westernocentric thinktankers seem to think modern Iraqi history began when Bush invaded Iraq. Well I guess that's when they started to pay attention.<BR/><BR/>btw Petraeus isn't a "think tanker"!<BR/><BR/>2/ As Ucko's article says the peshmerga and badr militias agreed to to be incorporated into the infant ISF from June 2004 onwards. <BR/>But the militias were hardly going to be brought under government control while ferocious mass attacks on the shia were being made - which did not abate until three years later. <BR/><BR/>3/ The Iraqi govt's limited action against the peshmerga in Diyala was nevertheless significant in that it happened at all.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1953410733493889728.post-67072648411478320572008-10-18T12:37:00.000-07:002008-10-18T12:37:00.000-07:001) I think you’re misreading his argument. He’s sa...1) I think you’re misreading his argument. He’s saying that it was Bremer’s, and the subsequent U.S. and the Iraqi government’s policies of punishing the Sunnis after the invasion rather than looking to reintegrate them that are largely responsible for the insurgency.<BR/><BR/>2) It was Petraeus that came up with the plan to first bring down insurgent violence so that the influence of the Shiite militias could be lessoned. Is he not a westerner?<BR/><BR/>3) Since when has the Iraqi government dealt with the peshmerga? The Diyala episode went largely nowhere other than to flex the government’s muscle, but the Kurds still control the Khanaqin district, half of Mosul and 300 miles of northern Iraq outside of Kurdistan.Joel Winghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09611810110771744360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1953410733493889728.post-72993808744822934902008-10-18T12:14:00.000-07:002008-10-18T12:14:00.000-07:00Interesting, informative and well researched but, ...Interesting, informative and well researched but, typical of westernocentric think tankers, extremely misguided because its perspective is skewed.<BR/><BR/>Its premise is that failing to deal with the militias created the insurgency. In fact it was the INSURGENCY that made it extremely difficult for the US and the Iraqi government to deal effectively with the militias.<BR/><BR/>Once the insurgency had been largely defated, then the Iraqi govt was able to take on the last remaining militia - the mahdhis - and also the pershmerga. And did so with the support of all the major parties in the COR.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1953410733493889728.post-44776127928340959172008-10-16T04:49:00.000-07:002008-10-16T04:49:00.000-07:00Thanks!Thanks!AndrewSshihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12092217847584427587noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1953410733493889728.post-60390545759560345192008-10-15T20:52:00.000-07:002008-10-15T20:52:00.000-07:00This is everything I have from my notes about the ...This is everything I have from my notes about the SOI in Salahaddin.<BR/><BR/>Klein, Joe, “Is al-Qaeda on the Run in Iraq?” Time, 5/23/07<BR/>- Sunni tribes in Nineveh and Salahaddin have also asked to form SOIs<BR/><BR/>Burns, John and Rubin, Alissa, “U.S. Arming Sunnis in Iraq to Battle Old Qaeda Allies,” New York Times, 6/11/07<BR/>- 130 sheikhs in Salhaddin formed own group<BR/><BR/>Roggio, Bill, “1920s Revolution Brigades turns on al Qaeda in Diyala,” Long War Journal.org, 6/12/07<BR/>- Anbar Salvation Council sending out units to Salahaddin, Diyala, Babil and Baghdad<BR/> to fight Al Qaeda and organize Awakening groups<BR/><BR/>Dagher, Sam, “Will ‘armloads’ of US cash buy tribal loyalty?” Christian Science Monitor, 11/8/07<BR/>- In Tikrit US given $1mil to Salahaddin tribe<BR/>- Organized 3000 tribesmen<BR/>- Deputy governor of Salahaddin rival of sheikh working with US and tried to have him <BR/> arrested in October<BR/>- US officers also warned sheikh might be power and money hungry<BR/><BR/>Zavis, Alexandra, “U.S. courts sheiks in Hussein terrain,” Los Angeles Times, 11/14/07<BR/>- US trying to spread Sunni policy to Salahaddin province<BR/>- Tribes also saw how successful Anbar Salvation front was<BR/>- Anbar easier to organize because one main tribe<BR/>- Salahaddin has 30 tribes and not all agree with Sunni policy<BR/>- Formed Salahaddin Support Council<BR/>- US gave out $5.2 million to tribes, especially around Tikrit<BR/>- 2700 Sunnis organized <BR/>- Roadside bombs dropped 60% in some areas<BR/>- Baghdad has not recognized Salhaddin tribes<BR/><BR/>Katulis, Brian, Juul, Peter, and Moss, Ian, “Awakening to New Dangers in Iraq,” Center for American Progress, February 2008<BR/>10,000 in Ninevah, Salahuddin, Tamim<BR/><BR/>Rubin, Alissa, "Iraqis Blame U.S. for Deaths of 8 Backing American Effort," New York Times, 2/17/08<BR/>- US also killed 6 SOIs and 2 women in Raween, Salahuddin<BR/><BR/>Ali, Fadhil, “Sunni Rivalries in al-Anbar Province Threaten Iraq’s Security,” Terrorism Focus, Jamestown Foundation, 3/11/08<BR/>- March VP Hashemi met with tribal leaders from Salahaddin <BR/><BR/>Senanayake, Sumedha, “Iraq: Future Of Awakening Councils In Limbo, “Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 4/4/08<BR/>- 3/22/08 report Awakening in Al Taji in Salahaddin said the U.S. hadn’t paid them<BR/> in 2 months and threatened to walk out<BR/><BR/>Missing Links Blog, “Reconciliation,” 6/27/08<BR/>- Newspaper said reporters in Adhamiya, Taji, Tikrit, Baquba, Ramadi and Hilla said that <BR/> SOIs have been contacting insurgents and asking to go back to fighting<BR/><BR/>Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraqi Force Development,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2008<BR/>- Salahaddin 54 SOI groups, all Sunni, over 4000 fighters<BR/><BR/>Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/08<BR/>- Northern command (Ninewa, Tamim, Salahaddin) 30,692, March-July 08 up 3,121,<BR/> avg. monthly pay $368<BR/>- U.S. set up Civil Service Corps and Joint Technical Education and Reintergration <BR/> Program to transition SOI<BR/>- U.S. set up JTERP facility in Tikri, Salahaddin province<BR/><BR/>McCallister, William, “Sons of Iraq: A Study in Irregular Warfare,” Small Wars Journal, 9/8/08<BR/>- Government is cracking down on SOI in Diyala and SalahaddinJoel Winghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09611810110771744360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1953410733493889728.post-61856952144198833862008-10-15T19:44:00.000-07:002008-10-15T19:44:00.000-07:00Good point on the SOI vs. Amnesty. Is there any w...Good point on the SOI vs. Amnesty. Is there any word on what the situation with the SOI's in Saladin is? Most of what I've seen has talked about western Baghdad and Baquba.AndrewSshihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12092217847584427587noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1953410733493889728.post-66279063365812137542008-10-15T13:24:00.000-07:002008-10-15T13:24:00.000-07:00I think the amnesty program is just for anyone tha...I think the amnesty program is just for anyone that walks in. Those with criminal charges still have to go to court, but might get some leniency. It's affected insurgents, but those in the SOI haven't gone in, because they don't think they've done anything wrong so I don't think it would work in those other areas. <BR/><BR/>It's that hole thing of sovereignty and power. Insurgents walk in and ask for amnesty are going through the government. The SOI are an independent, American security system.Joel Winghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09611810110771744360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1953410733493889728.post-44047306746707417422008-10-15T05:54:00.000-07:002008-10-15T05:54:00.000-07:00I wonder about the prognosis about working with th...I wonder about the prognosis about working with the Sahwa going pear-shaped in the near future. Western Baghdad and Baquba are going to be problems, but a lot of the news seems to indicate that at least in Saladin, there's a pretty decent program of re-integration and amnesty underway that the central government is behind.AndrewSshihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12092217847584427587noreply@blogger.com