Amnesty International And Human Rights Watch Document Government Crackdown On Protesters In Iraq

Human rights groups continue to take stock of the government’s response to the on-going protests in Iraq. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have released three reports recently on what they believe to be abuses by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s administration against activists and the press.

The December 2010 to January 2011 uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt inspired Iraqis to take to the streets. The first occurred on January 30 with two marches in Baghdad. 100 showed up in Firdos Square, where the statue of Saddam Hussein was famously pulled down during the 2003 invasion. While Iraqis wanted to show solidarity with the people of Egypt, they had their own demands as well. They called for better governance, services, and security. Another protest happened in Tahrir Square by the Green Zone, which also mentioned better services, but also demanded that the authorities not evict squatters from public buildings. The next day there was another turnout in the capital.

By the beginning of February things had escalated with the first outbreaks of violence. On February 3, 1,000 people went to the local government building in Hamza, Qadisiyah complaining about poor sanitation and other issues, and began throwing rocks at the offices. Police opened fire to disperse the crowd. By the end of the day, three in the crowd were wounded by gunshots, while four policemen were also injured. Two days later, protesters tried to storm the government building and a police station in the town, and threw rocks and Molotov cocktails. Shots were again fired, leading to the first fatality in the country during the demonstrations. This marked the first time people’s anger boiled over, and guards or security forces overacted by shooting at them.

Since those events in Hamza, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented increasingly repressive measures by the authorities against regular protesters, organizers, and members of the media. On February 13, an activist said he and a group of demonstrations went to Firdos Square in the capital. Soldiers told them that they had to go to another location. The organizer got in an army vehicle to look at the new site. He was dropped off, and arrested by plainclothes men. He was later beaten, and driven to another site where he was tortured, which included the use of electric shock. He claimed that his captors wanted him to confess to being a Baathist, a charge that was then being used by government officials to discredit the protests. The activist was eventually released after a few days, and had to spend two days in a hospital afterward. He was agains arrested on the February 25 “Day of Rage,” taken to a police station, and beaten once more. Beatings and torture are common in Iraqi jails, and a common way to induce a confession. It should therefore come as no surprise that the security forces would use the same tactics against demonstrators when they were brought in. It also shows a general lack of the rule of law in Iraq, and the abuse that has continued since the Saddam days.

The government has resorted to more open forms of intimidation as well. Protesters set up a camp in Tahrir Square, Baghdad to support their Egyptian brethren. In the early morning of February 21, four cars pulled up outside the tents, and attacked the inhabitants with knives and sticks for an hour. The assailants accused the activists of being Baathists, robbed them, kidnapped three of them, and wounded four others. 30 minutes before the assault, the electricity was cut off in the square, and the security disappeared. This was a brutal act meant to break up the protesters’ tent city, and intimidate them so they would not return.

Protesters clash with police during Feb. 25 Day of Rage, Baghdad (Agence France Presse/Getty Images)

February 25’s Day of Rage was the day of nationwide protests in Iraq. The government tried to deter people from attending by arresting its leaders and reporters, and barring coverage of the event. Police picked up an organizer the day before, took him to a police station, and tortured him there. He was held for six days, until he was transferred to an intelligence agency. They finally released him on March 8, with no charges against him. A journalist who had been reporting on the disturbances in Iraq was also arrested on February 24, and said he was electrocuted while in detention. The authorities ended up banning live television coverage of the protests. To make that clear, they raided the offices of Al-Diyar TV in Baghdad, stopped its reporting on the Day of Rage, and dragged off seven staff members. In Karbala, a Reuters correspondent was beaten and hospitalized by security forces. A Radio Sawa reporter in Mosul was also assaulted, and prevented from broadcasting about the protests there. After the day’s events, another journalist was having lunch with his friends in a Baghdad café, when he was arrested and beaten. He was then taken to a camp run by the Army’s 11th Division, interrogated, beaten again, electrocuted, and threatened with rape before he was eventually let go.

As happened before, events during the Day of Rage turned violent. In Mosul for example, people tried to storm the provincial council building, setting part of the offices on fire. Guards used gunfire to disperse the crowd, leading to five people being killed. In total, 39 demonstrators died across Iraq that day. Organizers would later tell Amnesty International that the combination of intimidation, arrests, beatings, shootings, and fatalities would decrease the number and frequency of demonstrations, and how many would show up in the following weeks. The government’s tactics therefore, appeared to be working to some extent.

Smaller demonstrations would continue into March and April, and so would acts to suppress them. On March 19, a man who had been publishing a newsletter in support of the protests in Baghdad had his offices surrounded by armed men in plain clothes. He took it as an act meant to scare him. In the same month, soldiers picked up a teenager after attending an event in Baghdad. He was beaten, accused of being a Baathist, and released four days later after he signed a statement saying he would not join another protest. On March 22, a leader in the February 25 Group was arrested and beaten in the capital. On April 8, plainclothes soldiers from the 11th Division arrested him again while he was coming home from a Tahrir Square protest. He was beaten again, and had a stun gun used against him repeatedly. Another organizer from the February 25 Group has been missing since he was detained on April 1. On April 13, security forces raided a union and a women’s organization where the February 25 Group was holding meetings in Baghdad. One member was arrested. These showed the authorities were going after anyone associated with the protests, whether they were supporters, leaders, or just average Iraqis who decided to come out for an assembly.

Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have warned that the government is denying Iraqis their basic rights. Article 38 of the country’s constitution ensures peaceful assemblies. While that has not always happened this year, it cannot excuse the authorities’ actions. Both human rights organizations have collected plenty of evidence of the security forces targeting organizers. They, and regular protesters as well, have faced intimidation, arbitrary arrests, beatings, torture, gunfire, and deaths. Iraq also guarantees freedom of the press, but that has been denied as well for those that have chosen to cover the protests. These have all been attempts to suppress the on-going unrest. They follow Maliki’s strategy of using carrots and sticks against his opponents. The sticks are using the security forces, and the carrots have been conciliatory statements like the premier’s promise to have his ministers perform better in 100-days or be fired. The problem for Maliki is that he doesn’t want to completely ban the protests, at least not yet, because that could give ammunition to his political rivals, some of which have already taken up the cause of the protesters in their feud with Maliki, as well as cost him popular support. As a result, the repression has been applied haphazardly. They appeared to work at first after the Day of Rage, as the number of people joining assemblies went down, but the demonstrators are now making a come back in April. Not only that, but the first calls for the prime minister to step down have been voiced in Baghdad. If those calls grow, they could grain greater traction and be a real threat to Maliki’s power. He therefore has no reason to stop using these harsh tactics, which means more reports of abuse can be expected in the coming weeks and months.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Iraq government tenses up tone against pretests,” 2/24/11   
- “Iraqiya accuses authority of curbing protests,” 4/16/11

Amnesty International, “Days Of Rage, Protests and Repression In Iraq,” April 2011
- “Iraqi activists’ torture allegations spark fears for detained protesters,” 3/10/11

Human Rights Watch, “Iraq Widening Crackdown on Protests,” 4/21/11

Latif, Nizar, “Iraqis step up protests in job and food crisis,” The National, 2/6/11

Ramzi, Kholoud, “protesters attacked in dawn raid,” Niqash, 2/24/11

Tawfeeq, Mohammed, “Protesters in Iraq decry lack of basic services, shortages,” CNN, 2/3/11

Al-Zaman, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, “Demonstrators in Baghdad Demand Al-Maliki Go,” MEMRI Blog, 4/18/11

Iraq’s Trade Ministry Let $57 Million In Vegetable Oil Rot For Years

In early April 2011 the latest case of government ineptitude was revealed in Iraq. The Trade Ministry, which runs the food ration system, was found to have wasted $57 million worth of cooking oil. The ministry took three years to finalize a price, during which time the oil expired. The food ration system has been plagued by such problems since its inception in 1990.

In 2008, Iraq’s Trade Ministry ordered several tons of vegetable cooking oil. At the time, the price for oil had dropped to $600 per metric ton. When the oil was delivered to the Um Qasr port in Basra, the Ministry argued over the price with the suppliers. That took until 2011 to resolve. The government ended up paying $1,800 per ton for a total of $57 million, instead of the asking price of $1,900, for a miniscule saving. In the meantime, the oil was left to rot at the dock, and the Ministry ended up paying $12 million in storage and late feels.

A parliamentary committee exposed the case. It blamed the Trade Ministry for the waste, and speculated that corruption might have been involved. Lawmakers called for former Trade Minister Abdul al-Falah al-Sudani and other Ministry officials to appear before the legislature, and answer questions over the purchase. In 2009, Sudani, several of his family members, and top employees were charged with stealing between $4-$6 billion from the Trade Ministry. Sudani was acquitted in 2010, maintaining Iraq’s track record of never successfully convicting a top administrator of corruption. The oil case was just the latest example of the mismanagement that occurred under Sudani.

The vegetable oil was bought for Iraq’s food ration system. It was created in August 1990 during the United Nations sanction period as part of the Oil for Food program. It provides a free basket of food products to almost 90% of the population. It has become increasingly expensive to maintain with the rise in world food prices. Just as important, the government has failed to provide all of the items supposed to be included in the packages, and many times people complain that the goods are inferior or expired.

Iraq’s food rations are the largest in the world. It consumes a huge part of the national budget each year. Unfortunately, the large size of the operation and the money involved has opened it up to abuse, theft, and waste. Former Minister Sudani and his cronies were accused of stealing billions while in office. The vegetable oil case may be one more example of how he ran the program, and cheated the public.

SOURCES

Ibrahim, Waleed, “Iraq may ditch $57 million of food ration cooking oil,” Reuters, 4/16/11

Al Rafidayn, Al Mowaten News, “Iraqi Rationing Card: ‘Light in Weight, Poor in Quality and Late in Distribution,” MEMRI Blog, 4/14/11

AL JAZEERA VIDEO: Iraq's Mosul Protest Met With Deadly Force

Iraq’s Parliament Repeals Article Used To Block Corruption Investigations

In April 2011 Iraq’s parliament ended one of the main barriers to fighting corruption in the country. That is Article 136B of the Iraqi Criminal Code. The article allows ministers to stop investigations, and has been used more and more in recent times. It’s yet to be seen whether this is part of a real effort to counter the widespread corruption in the country, or just another cosmetic move meant to look like the government is doing something.

On April 18, 2011 Iraq’s parliament ended Article 136B of the Iraqi Criminal Code. The article allows ministers and other top officials to end investigations of their own offices. In the first half of 2010, Article 136B was used 95 times. That was more than all of 2009 when it was employed 54 times. A recent example of its use was when former Interior Minister Jawad Bolani used 136B to stop the inspector general of his own ministry from looking into the purchase of fake bomb detectors. Although the article is employed in only a relatively few of the hundreds of investigations going on within Iraq each year, it does show the country’s top officials personal interest in blocking corruption cases.

This is the third time that the government has rescinded Article 136B. The previous times, it was eventually brought back. That’s because there is no real will within Baghdad to address this pressing issue. Many of the ministers run their offices like personal fiefs to dish out jobs to their friends, family, and followers. Nepotism and patronage leads to stealing and other nefarious practices. Article 136B has allowed these practices to continue with the personal protection of top officials. Baghdad is currently under pressure from the streets to deal with corruption. That was probably a driving factor behind 136B’s repeal. The authorities now have to use this new freedom to prosecute and convict top criminals, something that has never happened since 2003, otherwise this move is simply window dressing meant to appease the public rather than bring about any real change.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraqi parliament removes barrier to corruption inquiries,” 4/18/11

Commission of Integrity, “CoI Key achievements and indicators from January 1, 2010 To June 30, 2010,” 7/28/10

Office of Investigations, “Commission of Integrity Annual Report for 2009,” Commission of Integrity, 8/9/10

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/10

Iraq Revises Its Unemployment Figures

In April 2011 Iraq’s Planning Ministry released new numbers for the country’s unemployment rate. This was the first time the official figures had been revised since 2007. The Ministry puts the jobless rate at the same level today as before the war.

Iraq’s Planning Ministry said the unemployment rate was 23% in 2011. Underemployment was 43% in rural areas and 21% in urban ones. Together, roughly 55% of the workforce was either out of work or not working enough. The last time the government issued official figures on the matter was in 2007. Then it said the unemployment rate was 17.6% and underemployment was at 38.1%. Combined together, those figures equaled 55.7%, the same as 2011. That shows that the overall labor market in Iraq has not changed much in the last four years.

In fact, the jobless rate seems to have returned to the same level as before the 2003 invasion. The Iraq Survey Group, going through official Iraqi government papers found that there was an average of 23% unemployment from 1988-2003. In addition, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) estimated 50% unemployment and underemployment in the mid-1990s in the country. At the time, the Iraqi economy was suffering from international sanctions imposed for the 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The state was the major employer then, and many were working useless jobs. The same situation remains today. Instead of sanctions, the war set the economy back, and the government remains the largest employer.

The figures between 2003-2007 are disputed. In November 2003, the Deputy Labor Minister Noori Jafer told the press that he believed that up to 70% of workers were unemployed due to the disbanding of the Iraqi Army, deBaathificaiton, and the closing of state-run companies. The United Nations reported in January 2009 that the unemployment rate was roughly 18% from 2004-2008. In comparison, the government’s Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology claimed that unemployment went from 28% in 2003, to 26% in 2004, to 18% in 2005, and then 15% by 2009. The jobless rate undoubtedly went up immediately after the invasion because of the massive disruption the fall of the regime and the subsequent looting caused. What happened in the pursuing years is far harder to determine since a large portion of the population fled the country or became internally displaced, not to mention the heavy fighting going on across the nation. Those are probably the causes of the discrepancies between the different numbers. Since the sectarian civil war ended in 2008, the government and other organizations should be able to get a much better grip on the issue.

What all the different reports agree upon is that the lack of jobs hits the young and rural areas the hardest. The U.N. found 28% unemployment amongst 15-29 year olds, which was 57% of all those lacking jobs in 2009. The Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology said similar things. According to the Planning Ministry, the rural areas of the country have twice as many people looking for work as the cities. Those show two important trends occurring within the Iraqi economy. First, Iraq has one of the youngest populations in the region. According to the CIA World Factbook, the median age in the country is 21 years old, with 40% of the population 14 years or under. In comparison, the median age in Egypt is 24, and 30 in Tunisia. In Egypt and Libya 33% of the populace is 14 or under, and 23% in Tunisia. That means between 240,000-450,000 people enter the workforce each year with very little chance of making a steady living. The frustration that has caused is currently boiling over with the weekly demonstrations in Iraq. Second, since the fall of Saddam Hussein agriculture has declined due to a number of factors. This has led to a migration of farmers to the towns and cities, and a higher unemployment rate in the rural areas. Both are major problems for the future of the country unless new jobs are created to sustain the growing population of young people.

The latest government figures show that the unemployment and underemployment rate in the country are just about the same as they were pre-2003. After eight years of the invasion, looting, fighting, and displacement, things have finally begun to stabilize. The major problem is that the economy is dependent upon oil, which is not a labor-intensive industry. Farming, which could provide many jobs, is struggling. The government remains the largest source of income, but many of the positions offered are unproductive, and exist to provide patronage for the ruling parties. That’s not working out, and a few Iraqis have begun taking to the streets for the last few months to complain about it. Hopefully with Iraq becoming more stable, and foreign investment increasing there will be a better future. As for now, up to 50% of the workforce is struggling.

SOURCES

Arango, Tim, “Iraqi Youths’ Political Rise Is Stunted by Elites,” New York Times, 4/13/11

Aswat al-Iraq, “COSIT: Unemployment, poverty drop in Iraq,” 12/13/09
- “Iraqi Unemployment Rate Dropped by 15% in 2008,” 1/27/09

Beehner, Lionel, “Economic Doldrums in Iraq,” Council on Foreign Relations, 6/20/07

Cordesman, Anthony, “Transferring Provinces To Iraqi Control: The Reality And The Risks,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9/2/08

Currency Newshound, “Iraq Ministry of Planning confirms 23% poverty rate,” 4/18/11

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq June 2010,” 9/7/10
- “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq September 2007,”
    September 2007
- “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq September 2008,” September 2008

Glanz, James, “In Report to Congress, Oversight Officials Say Iraqi Rebuilding Falls Short of Goals,” New York Times, 10/31/07

Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Iraq Labour Force Analysis 2003-2008,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, January 2009

Iraq Survey Group, “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCIA on Iraq’s WMD,” 9/30/04

Sanders, Edmond, “Lack of jobs pushes Iraqis toward critical mass,” San Francisco Chronicle, 11/2/03

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09
- “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Government,” 7/30/07
- “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/09

United Nations Country Team – Iraq, “The Millennium Development Goals In Iraq,” August 2010

Al-Wannan, Jaafar, “Iraq’s self-sufficiency of wheat reached 50%,” AK News, 4/17/11

White, Josh, “U.S. Falters In Bid to Boost Iraqi Business,” Washington Post, 8/24/07

Iraq’s Sadr Launches New Munasiroon Organization

At the beginning of April 2011 Moqtada al-Sadr’s movement announced a new organization, Al-Munasiroon. It is supposed to be a nationwide social group, which will hold peaceful protests and sit-ins. The Sadrists said that they will accept any Iraqi, no matter what their ethnicity or sect, and they do not even have to be part of the trend to join. Its leader is Sheikh Salman Al-Freiji, who led a march in Basra on April 21 to mark Munasiroon’s birth, and to protest against the American presence in the country. Freiji said that their first concern would be supporting the Shiites of Bahrain. Munasiroon is the latest manifestation of the Sadr Trend.

Sadrists portraying a captured American soldier in Basra march April 21 (Reuters)

Sadr march in Basra April 21 (Reuters)

The Sadrists have gone through several re-organizations in the last couple years. In August 2008, Sadr said that he was disbanding his Mahdi Army militia, and creating al-Mumahidoon. There would still be an armed wing, but it would be renamed the Promised Day Brigades. It would be small, secret, and only focused upon fighting the Americans. In contrast, Mumahidoon would deal with education, services, Islamic teachings, social organizing, and politics. The Promised Day Brigades would exist to maintain Sadr’s more militant followers. Many of them had been breaking away since 2004, and joining other militias or the Iranian backed Special Groups. Mumahidoon would allow the trend to keep contact with the Iraqi street, its main base, while also returning to politics, something Sadr had abandoned in 2006 when he boycotted parliament and Maliki’s cabinet. 

Poster announcing new Mumahidoon group in 2008 (Associated Press)

The Sadrists have been successful so far in achieving their new goals. The Promised Day Brigades continue to carry out occasional attacks upon U.S. forces, Sadr has been able to maintain his connection with his base, and Sadr’s politicians did extremely well in the 2009 provincial and 2010 national elections. The new Munasiroon group appears to be another attempt by Sadr to appropriate and perhaps even take over the on-going protests in the country. At the same time, focusing upon Bahrain can allow the movement to distract attention away from the government, which the Sadrists hold a prominent position within, to foreign concerns. What’s complicating matters for Sadr is his recent comments about reviving the Mahdi Army that could threaten renewed violence at a time when Iraq is focused upon politics and the development of the economy. Sadr has made a series of astute decisions after the government came down on his movement in 2008. He can still undo what he’s built though, which he’s done before.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Sadr front launches “Munasiroun” project in support of Bahraini people,” 4/22/11

Chon, Gina, “Radical Iraq Cleric in Retreat,” Wall Street Journal, 8/5/08

Parker, Ned, “In Iraq, Muqtada Sadr’s followers struggle for relevance,” Los Angeles Times, 11/10/08

Peter, Tom, “After setbacks, Sadr redirects Mahdi Army,” Christian Science Monitor, 8/11/08

Roads To Iraq, “Sadr, Iraqiya political preparations for massive demonstration,” 4/8/11

Wong, Edward, “Iraqis Consider Ways to Reduce Power of Cleric,” New York Times, 12/12/06

Continued Protests At Tahrir Square In Baghdad, Iraq

Despite new rules by the Baghdad Operations Command limiting all demonstrations in the capital to three sports stadiums, activists again turned out at Tahrir Square near the Green Zone on April 22, 2011. Protesters called for the release of their relatives from detention, complained about the lack of services, jobs, and corruption within the government, wanted investigations into missing persons, and the withdrawal of U.S. troops. These have all become mainstays of demonstrations across Iraq. So far, it appears that the military’s attempt to limit the protests in Baghdad have failed, and they are not conducting mass arrests of those who continue to gather at Tahrir Square despite threats to do so. 

Soldiers stand guard while Iraqis protest in Tahrir Square, Baghdad, April 22 (Associated Press)

(Associated Press)

Angry family members holding pictures of their arrested and missing relatives at Tahrir Square April 22 (Associated Press)

SOURCES

Associated Press, "Families chant anti-government slogans," 4/22/11
- "Iraqi army soldiers stand guard," 4/22/11

Atwan, Kadhim, “Protesters gather in Tahrir Square in Baghdad,” AK News, 4/22/11