The New National Alliance And Other Political Maneuverings

Today, August 24, 2009 the new Iraqi National Alliance was announced. This was the long-awaited revised version of the United Iraqi Alliance, which was the largest vote getter in the 2005 elections. The new grouping includes the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), the Sadrists, former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Party, the Dawa-Iraq Party, and two Sunni figures, Sheikh Hamid al-Hayes of the Anbar Salvation Council and Khalid Abd al-Wahhab al-Mulla from Basra. It appears that the new list was unable to convince the Fadhila Party to join. In July 2009 they said they would not, and in August claimed they were going to form their own list, the Alliance for Integrity and Development. More importantly, the National Alliance did not include Prime Minster Nouri al-Maliki’s Dawa Party.

Dawa was said to be involved in negotiations right up to the last minute of the press conference of the new list, but couldn’t get their demands met. Maliki was asking for a majority of seats in the alliance and a promise that he would be their sole candidate to be prime minister, which the other parties objected to. The National Alliance however did leave the door open to Maliki joining the list at a later date.

As reported before, Maliki’s main reason for flirting with rejoining the alliance after running separately with his own State of Law List in the 2009 provincial balloting, was to secure the top post in the country. While Maliki was considered the biggest winner in the 2009 election, a breakdown of the results show that he was in no position to hold onto the prime ministership if he ran alone again. Of the fourteen provinces that held elections, Maliki’s State of Law only won majorities in two, Baghdad and Basra, and even then, came away with 38% and 37% of the vote respectively. Overall, State of Law won 15.1% of the ballots and took 27.5% of the 440 seats up for grabs. That was hardly a hold on the electorate to ensure that he be re-elected. In comparison, the new National Alliance members walked away with 17.1% of the vote and 27.7% of the seats.

January 2009 Provincial Election Results Comparison
Maliki’s State of Law: 15.1% of vote, 121 seats, 27.5%
SIIC’s Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 6.6% of vote, 58 seats, 13.1%
Sadrists’ Independent Free Movement List: 6.3% of vote, 41 seats, 9.3%
Jaafari’s National Reform Party: 4.2% of vote, 23 seats, 5.2%
Iraqi National Alliance members together: 17.1% of vote, 122 seats, 27.7%

This leaves the Prime Minister in a quandary because there are few other major parties left for him to align with. The Fadhila Party and Dawa have not gotten along. The State of Law List did not include it in any of its ruling coalitions after the 2009 provincial elections, and Fadhila had a poor showing in the voting. Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha of the Awakening and National Independents List has repeatedly expressed a desire to run with Maliki in 2010. The al-Hadbaa Party of Ninewa, the Change List in Kurdistan, and Mithal al-Alusi’s Ummah Party may also be new partners. Those together would still probably not deliver a plurality of the vote. Maliki flirted with allying with parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq’s National Dialogue Front after the 2009 balloting, but was attacked for it by the other Shiite parties who claimed Mutlaq was a Baathist. Mutlaq is now in discussions with former speaker of parliament Mahmoud al-Mashhadani of the National Dialogue Council, Vice President Tariq Hashemi of the Iraqi Islamic Party, former Prime Miniser Iyad Allawi of the Iraqi National List, and Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani of the Constitution Party to form a new alliance. Bolani is said to be a candidate for prime minister, so it’s unlikely that Maliki would want to work with this grouping. After that there are only a plethora of smaller parties that tend to have very localized support.

Iraqi politics are in a state of flux. The Shiites along with the other ethnosectarian groups are fragmenting into smaller parties as the 2009 elections showed. This makes it much harder to form winning coalitions. Maliki may have to cobble together an ad hoc group of parties and hope for the best if he wants to be prime minister again. Even if he ran with the National Iraqi Alliance there was no guarantee he would hold onto the spot as the SIIC was only hoping to ride Maliki’s coattails back into power and then drop him afterwards. After the 2010 vote is completed and negotiations begin for a ruling coalition, the Prime Minister will also have to contend with the fact that the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (KDP) alliance is set against him, along with many in the Islamic Party. No matter what then, Maliki is facing an uphill battle after his spate of military and political victories in 2008 and 2009.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “New Iraq political coalition in the offing,” 8/24/09

Associated Press, “New Shiite alliance excludes Iraqi prime minister,” 8/24/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Fadhila party announces new alliance for next elections,” 8/10/09
- “Sunni leader envisions alliance with Maliki in next polls,” 7/26/09

Domergue, Jeremy and Cochrane, Marisa, “Balancing Maliki,” Institute for Understanding War, June 2009

Fox News, “Iraqi Clan Leader May Hold Key to Lasting Political Stability After U.S. Exit,” 4/4/09

Iraq The Model, “Accord Front Collapses, Sunni Tribes Seek Shiite Allies,” 8/15/09
- “Maliki promises a crackdown that could reach political figures,” 8/23/09

Kazimi, Nibras, “Announcing the ‘New’ UIA,” Talisman Gate, 8/24/09
- “Iraq: Alliances Galore,” Hudson Institute, 7/17/09
- “Iraq: Rumors Swirl,” Hudson Institute, 8/6/09

Londono, Ernesto, “Iraqi Shiite Parties Form Coalition Without Maliki,” Washington Post, 8/24/09

Myers, Steven Lee, “Iraqi Shiite Leaders Create Alliance, Minus Maliki,” New York times, 8/24/09

Parker, Ned, “Maliki remakes himself ahead of elections,” Los Angeles Times, 7/21/09

Parker, Ned and Salman, Raheem, “In Basra, political skirmishing heats up as elections near,” Los Angeles Times, 12/28/08

Shadid, Anthony, “In Iraq, Political Ambiguity,” Washington Post, 4/4/09

Visser, Reidar, “After Sadr-Badr Compromise in Tehran, the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) Is Declared,” Historiae.org, 8/24/09
- “Claiming Nothing Has Really Changed, Fadila Rejects the Offer to Rejoin a ‘Reformed’ UIA,” Historiae.org, 7/17/09

Sons Of Iraq Integration Update

Beginning in September 2008, the United States began transferring control of the Sons of Iraq (SOI) program to Baghdad. The process went in stages with the SOI in Baghdad handed over first, and those in Salahaddin last in April 2009. 88,383 SOI are now on the government’s payroll. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has pledged to give 20% of the SOI jobs in the security forces, and the rest employment in civilian ministries. So far the integration plan has gone in fits and spurts, and does not appear to be on time to meet the goals set by the U.S.

From October 2008 to July 2009 only 6,282 SOI have been given jobs. Of those 4,565 have gone into the security forces, and 1,717 into non-security work. The provincial government in Diyala however announced in early August that it had accepted 8,800 SOI into the workforce. Since the January 2009 elections the Iraqi Accordance Front has controlled Diyala, which has actively allied itself with the SOI there to gain popular support and victory at the ballot box, so it should come as no surprise that so many SOI were taken in there.

In total, 17,423 SOI have gotten jobs since the program was created by the United States during the Surge up to July, with approximately 13,000 joining the Iraqi army and police. From June 2007 to September 2008, before the hand over, 11,141 were accepted by the government with 8,777 getting security jobs and 2,364 other government work. Baghdad has also processed 47,000 questionnaires filled out by the SOI, 3,331 of which were sent to the ministries at the beginning of August.

The U.S. general in charge of the transfer program said that he expected Baghdad to give all 94,000 SOI jobs by the end of 2009. So far however, only around 25% have found employment two-thirds of the way through the year, and there has been a hiring freeze of SOI in the Ministries of Defense and Interior since April because of their budget problems. In its latest report on Iraq to Congress, the Defense Department warned that Baghdad was not on tract to meet its promises.

There have been a number of other problems as well. In March and April 2009 the SOI were not paid because the budget did not originally include their salaries. Even after this mix up was fixed there are still on-going complaints by SOI about not getting paid. This has led to an unknown number of fighters to leave their posts and look for work elsewhere. The government has also carried out a series of arrests of SOI with 41 leaders detained since November 2008 with six released. In May 2009 the SOI and the U.S. registered complaints about this policy and things slowed, but then started again in July. There have also been reports that the SOI have been targeted for kidnappings by local police to be ransomed off, and of families charging SOI members with murdering their insurgent relatives.

Baghdad has always viewed the Sons of Iraq program with ambivalence. The fighters were mostly former insurgents organized by the United States without any role played by the Iraqi government. Shiite politicians have often complained about them being infiltrated by militants, denigrated their role in improving security, and said they are only relevant to the Americans. This lack of concern and the normal bureaucratic delays in the government has held up their integration into the Iraqi government. It’s very unlikely that all of them will get jobs by the end of the year, especially with the country’s budget problems holding up all new hiring. That will mean Washington will have to lobby Maliki to include their pay in the next budget as well. Since Iraq’s parliament takes months to pass anything that could leave the SOI without pay for several months all over again. Even then it seems unlikely that Baghdad has the will or capacity to take in all these former fighters. Ultimately, many will probably have to look for work on their own or end up on the unemployment line.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “3,331 files of Sahwa fighters referred to concerned ministries,” 8/2/09
- “8,800 Sahwa council personnel absorbed into Diala’s security apparatus,” 8/9/09

Clark, Dave, “Some US-backed Iraqi militias plotting attacks: VP,” Agence France Presse, 4/14/09

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2009

Dolan, Jack and Issa, Sahar, “Iraqi militiamen frustrated that promised jobs haven’t materialized,” McClatchy Newspapers, 5/20/09

Al Jazeera, “Iraq’s unpaid Awakening Council,” 8/8/09

Nordland, Rod, “Arrests of Sunni Leaders Rise in Baghdad,” New York Times, 7/30/09

Nordland, Rod and Rubin, Alissa, “Sunni Fighters Say Iraq Didn’t Keep Job Promises,” New York Times, 3/24/09

Parker, Ned, “Corruption plays key role in Iraqi justice,” Los Angeles Times, 6/29/09

Rasheed, Ahmed and Cocks, Tim, “Some U.S.-backed Iraqi fighters desert posts,” Reuters, 5/6/09

Russo, Claire, “Countdown To Diyala’s Provincial Election: Maliki & The IIP,” Institute for the Study of War, 1/30/09

Santora, Marc, “Iraq Arrests 2 Sunni Leaders, Raising Fears of Violence,” New York Times, 5/19/09

Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/09
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09

Major Problems Found With Iraqi Oil Ministry

Iraq Oil Report recently had an article on a 2008 audit done of the Iraqi Oil Ministry, which found massive on-going problems. The depth of the difficulties touched upon every aspect of the Ministry from its bureaucracy to its oil operations to its business dealings. Here is a rundown of the audit’s main findings:

1. There is a lack of control over accounts and receipts

2. As of December 31, 2008 only one-third of Iraq’s plan to install meters on its oil industry had been completed

3. The North Oil Company burned 1.4 million barrels of oil condensates because it couldn’t sell it

4. The state-run oil companies re-injected 605,000 barrels of oil back into the fields damaging them

5. There were 698,000 unaccounted for barrels of oil which were believed to have been stolen

6. The Ministry recorded 6 million less barrels of oil than the South Oil Company claimed it produced

7. The Ministry put $3 billion in oil revenues in an Iraqi bank that was supposed to be deposited in Iraq’s oil account in the New York Federal Reserve Bank

8. The Ministry was fined $24.4 million for delinquent carrier loading

9. It hasn’t collected $26.2 million from Shell for reducing its shipping costs

10. It hasn’t collected $9.1 million from oil sales to Jordan

Iraq depends upon oil for over 85% of its revenue. Although Iraq has the third largest petroleum reserves in the world, its oil production has been hobbled by years of wars and sanctions, which severely limited investment and maintenance leaving much of the infrastructure old and deteriorating. The Oil Ministry claims it needs $75 billion to reach its potential. In the meantime, Iraq has been roundly criticized for its haphazard, and contradictory oil plans. The country doesn’t have a strategic vision for developing its oil and natural gas, the Oil Ministry lacks trained and qualified personnel, equipment, and services, and oil legislation has been deadlocked in parliament for years because it is one of the major disputes between Baghdad and Kurdistan. The 2008 audit just adds to this already long-list of difficulties Iraq is facing with its most precious resource.

SOURCES

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09

Lando, Ben, “Mixed review,” Iraq Oil Report, 8/16/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/09

Iraq Becoming The Forgotten War In America’s Media

A July 2009 report by the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism chronicled the dramatic drop in media coverage of Iraq in the United States. The Pew Center keeps track of the top ten stories in America in its “New Coverage Index.” Based upon this information they charted how U.S. TV, radio, newspapers, and the internet have covered Iraq from 2007 to July 5, 2009. In the first quarter of 2007 Iraq was the top story in America, receiving 22.3% of all media coverage. After that, the number of stories dropped going from 15.5% of all stories in 2007 to 3.6% in 2008 to 2% in the first half of 2009.

U.S. Media Coverage of Iraq - % Of All Stories
1st quarter of 2007 22.3%
2nd quarter of 2007 14.8%
3rd quarter of 2007 16.1%
4th quarter of 2007 8.7
2007 15.5%
1st quarter 2008 5%
2nd quarter of 2008 4.4%
3rd quarter of 2008 3%
4th quarter of 2008 2.1%
2008 3.6%
1st quarter 2009 2.4%
2nd quarter 2009 1.7%
1st half of 2009 2%

The main job of U.S. news agencies is to report what’s going on. The major source of this information is the government. When Washington stopped talking about Iraq in 2007 with the debate on withdrawal ending and General Petraeus’ testimony to Congress over, so did America’s news. By 2009 Iraq had become the forgotten war in the press. In March Iraq did not make the top 10 news stories in America for an entire month for the first time. By June Iraq was not in the top ten of any of the four major media sources, TV, radio, newspapers, or internet for the four full weeks of the month. The recent withdrawal from Iraq’s cities on June 30, 2009 led to a short spike in coverage to 6.6% of news stories for the week of June 29 to July 5, but otherwise, the war will continue to fade from the headlines. During time of conflict, the media’s main job is to inform the public. America’s news companies have abrogated this role in Iraq.

SOURCES

Jurkowitz, Mark, “Why News of Iraq Dropped,” Pew Research Center’s Project For Excellence In Journalism, 3/26/08

Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, “Iraq – The Incredible Shrinking Story,” 7/9/09

Sartor, Tricia and Jurkowitz, Mark, “Iraq War Coverage Plunges,” Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, 3/25/08

New Iraqi Survey On Security

The latest edition of the Pentagon’s Measuring Stability and Security In Iraq report to Congress includes a public opinion poll of Iraqis done in April 2009 on security. The results showed that Iraqis felt that security in their neighborhood was good, but that they had apprehensions about the rest of the country, and that the Iraqi Security Forces had widespread support.

A majority of respondents said they felt secure in their neighborhoods and provinces, but less so in Iraq in general. 76% said security was calm in their neighborhood, and 60% said the same about security in their province. 90% said that security was the same or better in their neighborhood over the last six months. These numbers were relatively unchanged since August 2008. When asked about Iraq in general however, only 31% said security was calm. This was a 10% increase from August 2008. In November 2007, 23% felt that security was calm in the country. When asked whether they felt safe traveling outside their neighborhood only 42% said yes, largely unchanged since November 2007 when 39% said yes. A majority however, 56%, said they felt that the country was stable. These numbers reflect the new status quo in Iraq. The sectarian war ended in 2007, and the crackdown against the Shiite militias was over by the fall of 2008. That has led to relative stability in most Iraqis’ lives. There is still violence though, which could be the reason why so many are unsure of the security situation across the entire country, and have reservations about leaving their immediate area.

Said security was calm in neighborhood
April 09 76%
Jan. 09 77%
Oct. 08 76%
Aug. 08 73%

Said security was same or better in neighborhood over last 6 months
April 09 90%
Jan. 09 90%
Oct. 08 89%
Aug. 09 91%
Nov. 07 82%

Said security in province was calm
April 09 60%
Jan. 09 57%
Oct. 08 57%

Said security in Iraq was calm
April 09 31%
Jan. 09 29%
Oct. 08 28%
Aug. 08 21%
Nov. 07 23%

Said security was the same or better in Iraq in last 6 months
April 09 86%
Jan. 09 86%
Oct. 08 79%
Nov. 07 81%

Said Iraq was stable
April 09 56%
Jan. 09 51%
Oct. 08 45%
Nov. 07 38%

Said felt safe traveling outside of neighborhood
April 09 42%
Jan. 09 42%
Oct. 08 42%
Aug. 08 37%
Nov. 07 39%

One of the main changes in the security situation in Iraq has been the increasing size and abilities of the Iraqi security forces to conduct day-to-day operations, and the public’s confidence in them. In all the questions about the Iraqi Army and police, respondents had positive views. The same could not be said of the U.S. military that seemed to be considered in low regard, and tribes, militias, and other groups were largely not considered relevant to providing security. 72% said they felt secure around the army, and 75% said they were winning the war against terrorists. In contrast, in November 2007 only 51% said they felt safe around the army, and 52% said they were winning. 66% said they felt secure around the police, and 65% said they were winning against crime. 79% responded that the either the army or police were responsible for security in their neighborhood. The security forces were also trusted more than the local, provincial or national governments. A major change between the April 2009 survey and the October 2008 one was the complete disappearance of trust in militias and armed groups. This is important not only for the development of the Iraqi forces, but for the U.S. withdrawal as well, as security will eventually be turned completely over to Baghdad’s control, and they need the support of the public to operate effectively.

Said they felt secure around Iraqi Army
April 09 72%
Jan. 09 70%
Oct. 08 65%
Nov. 07 51%

Said Iraqi Army was winning battle against terrorists
April 09 75%
Jan. 09 72%
Oct. 08 70%
Nov. 07 52%

Said felt secure around police
April 09 66%
Jan. 09 62%
Oct. 08 61%
Nov. 07 53%

Said police winning against crime
April 09 65%
Jan. 09 61%
Oct. 08 61%
Nov. 07 60%

Who was responsible for security in your neighborhood?
Police 40%
Army 39%
Tribes 6%
Sons of Iraq 3%
Neighbors 2%
Religious leaders 2%
U.S. 2%
Militias 0%

Who did you trust to protect you? – April 09
Army 87%
Police 83%
Provincial government 74%
National government 72%
Local government 66%
U.S. 27%

Who did you trust to protect you? – October 2008
Army 85%
Police 81%
Provincial government 68%
National government 66%
Local government 64%
U.S. 26%
Armed groups 12%
Militias 12%

The Pentagon’s April 2009 survey had roughly the same results as a poll conducted by the international news agencies the BBC, ABC, and Japan’s NHK from March 2009. Both groups found an overwhelming majority of Iraqis felt safe and secure in their neighborhoods, but had questions about the situation in the rest of the country. Respondents in both surveys also said they had confidence in the Iraqi security forces to do their jobs, and felt that they were winning. Both of these polls were taken before the recent wave of bombings however. While overall deaths have gone up and down, the constant attacks and publicity take a psychological toll and could change perceptions. Those create reality for people, and could change opinions about the security situation. If it does, the first victim could be Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who is running in the 2010 parliamentary election on the claim that he has brought security and stability to Iraq.

SOURCES

BBC, ABC, NHK, “Iraq Poll February 2009,” 3/16/09

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2009
- “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008
- “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” September 2008

Obama Administration Needs A Real Iraq Strategy

Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies is one of the leading military analysts on Iraq. Every month he authors a few reports on the subject, and at the end of July issued a short paper on the short-comings of the Obama administration called “Iraq: A Time To Stay? The US Needs an Exit Strategy, Not Just an Exit.” Cordesman thinks the Obama White House is solely focused upon withdrawing, and isn’t adequately planning for a long-term Iraq policy afterward.

June 30, 2009 was the beginning of the American pull out of Iraq. That was when U.S. forces withdrew from Iraq’s cities. Until today’s slew of bombings in Baghdad, things were going better than expected. What will come next is Cordesman’s main concern. The U.S. needs to leave behind a stable Iraq that can defend itself. There are still some major barriers to overcome before this can happen. Those are continued development of the Iraqi security forces, the Arab-Kurd divide, political divisions, fighting insurgents and Special Groups, and the development of Iraq’s economy. Cordesman believes that the Obama White House will fail if it doesn’t adequately manage this situation properly. They have to come up with a sustainable strategy for Iraq that switches emphasis from a military led effort to a civilian one.

There are several policies Cordesman suggests that could help with this process. First, American trainers need to remain in Iraq for the long-term until the Iraqi forces are self-sufficient. Second, the U.S. needs to work with the United Nations to try to moderate the Arab-Kurdish disputes, something that could take years to resolve. Aid needs to be sustained, and used strategically to push for reforms in the Iraqi government and economy, as well as alleviate differences. Fourth, Iraq’s economy needs serious investment and reform. The U.S. could help by providing business models for Iraq’s oil and agriculture sectors, as well as getting an investment law passed in parliament. Last, the White House needs to prepare the Congress and the American public for a lasting relationship with Iraq so that these policies can be implemented.

Cordesman’s sees some planning going on in the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad for this change, but none in Washington. According to him, this is mostly happening on the military side in Iraq. The civilian agencies in comparison are caught up in short-term goals such as finishing on-going projects instead of planning for the future. In the U.S. Cordesman sees no leadership by the Obama administration on Iraq. This seems like a strong call for action, but one that may not be heeded. According to members of the Tamim provincial council, when Vice President Joe Biden talked to them this year, he told them that development aid was coming to an end since the U.S. had such a large deficit. There are plans to cut the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams that work in each province by more than half. While administration officials are talking about the need to mediate the Arab-Kurd dispute and Kirkuk, there is no strong push by the U.S. to actually do something. Whenever a U.S. role is mentioned, it appears to be going on quietly behind closed doors, when this needs to be a major policy push before U.S. forces are out and America’s influence fades even more. The Americans are not the solution to everything, but they can definitely help in selected areas like governance, development, security, and the Baghdad-Kurdistan dispute. With domestic issues taking a precedence, and emphasis switching to Afghanistan in foreign affairs, the Obama administration may not have the time, focus or patience to deal with Iraq adequately. The White House talks about Iraq every now and then, but actual action seems lacking.

SOURCES

Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq: A Time To Stay?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7/30/09

Dagher, Sam, “2 Blasts Expose Security Flaws in Heart of Iraq,” New York Times, 8/19/09

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2009

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09

Political Parties Playing Into The Hands Of Insurgent Attacks

Ninewa province and its districts

The recent mass casualty bombings in Ninewa have only added to the on-going dispute between the ruling al-Hadbaa party and the Kurdish Ninewa Fraternal List to the point that the U.S. is offering extra troops to help patrol the province. On August 7, 2009 there was a bombing of a Turkmen Shiite mosque in the provincial capital Mosul that killed 38 and wounded 140. On August 10, two truck bombs leveled the town of Khazna, ten miles east of Mosul killing 28 Shabaks and wounding 155. Finally, on August 13 a suicide bomber detonated his device in a café in Sinjar in western Ninewa killing 20 Yazidis and wounding 35.

Ninewa’s minorities have often been caught in the middle of the battle for control between Arabs and Kurds, so it was no surprise when Al Hadbaa and the Kurdish List used the bombings to attack each other. A senior Kurdish politician in Mosul said al-Hadbaa was directly involved in the violence, and that Arabs were trying to ethnically cleanse the Kurds from the province. The Kurdistan Regional Government went farther saying al-Hadbaa was responsible for the deaths of over 2,000 Kurds and the displacement of both Kurds and Christians. Governor Atheel al-Nujafi replied by saying that the bloodshed benefited the Kurds because it justified the continued presence of their peshmerga in the province. The al-Hadbaa controlled provincial council also said the Iraqi army and police should take over security for the entire province and replace the Kurdish forces, an idea rejected by the Kurdish List.

The situation has grown so tense that the U.S. commander in Iraq General Ray Odierno has proposed increasing the U.S. troop presence in Ninewa. He has recently met with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Kurdish President Massoud Barzani about creating joint U.S.-Iraq-Kurdish patrols in the disputed areas of the province. The general said that Al Qaeda in Iraq is exploiting the political differences to carry out their attacks and sow dissension. The U.S. has tried similar things in Tamim province, but has only been successful in the Kirkuk area. While this tactic might improve security, it would only be a band-aid on a growing wound.

What is needed is some kind of power-sharing agreement between al-Hadbaa and the Fraternal List, but they seem intractable. In June 2009, the Sadrists in parliament sent a delegation to Ninewa to try to negotiate between the two sides, but failed. More recently, the Iraqi Islamic Party gave it a go, but neither side was willing to compromise. The United States is now working on the issue behind the scenes.

In the meantime, the inflammatory rhetoric continues, and 16 of Ninewa’s 37 administrative units, which are majority Kurdish, are boycotting the provincial government and threatening to create their own independent administration. The insurgent attacks were meant to incite just such responses, and the two political lists in Ninewa seem to be intent on accommodating them.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “KRG blames Hadbaa for murder of Kurds, displacement of Christians in Mosul,” 8/14/09
- “Kurdish list says Ninewa to see serious escalation if govt. fails to intervene,” 8/15/09
- “Sinjar suicide blast casualties up to 55,” 8/13/09

Al-Badrani, Jamal, “Kurds in troubled Iraqi province threaten to secede,” Reuters, 7/19/09
- “Qaeda stronger as blasts feed Iraqi Kurd-Arab feud,” Reuters, 8/16/09

Dagher, Sam, “Minorities Trapped in Northern Iraq’s Maelstrom,” New York Times, 8/16/09
- “Sectarian Bombings Pulverize a Village in Iraq,” New York Times, 8/11/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09

Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Wed: A Wounded Country,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/23/09

Nordland, Rod and Dagher, Sam, “U.S. Will Release More Members of an Iraqi Shiite Militia,” New York Times, 8/17/09

Reuters, “Iraq bombs kill 50, mostly Shi’ites targeted,” 8/7/09

Shadid, Anthony, “Worries About A Kurdish-Arab Conflict Moves To Fore in Iraq,” Washington Post, 7/27/09

Sly, Liz, “Iraq attacks raise fears of renewed ethnic tensions,” Los Angeles Times, 8/11/09

United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, "Iraq Report - 2008," December 2008