U.S. Military And Intelligence Counts Of Iraqi Deaths

For the longest time, the United States claimed that it was not keeping track of deaths in Iraq. Eventually during the Surge in 2007, the military began releasing charts on casualties, but they lacked specifics. In October 2010 the Associated Press (AP) found that the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) had posted figures on Iraqi deaths. Later, Wikileaks released thousands of American intelligence reports that mentioned fatalities. These are just the latest figures on the human costs of the Iraq war, and should be compared to the other organizations that have tracked deaths.

The Associated Press discovered that CENTCOM put up numbers of Iraqi deaths on its website in July 2010 with little fanfare. The military claimed that 76,939 Iraqis had been killed from January 2004 to August 2008. That broke down to 63,185 civilians and 13,754 members of the security forces. Another 121,649 people were wounded during that period. There was no explanation of how the figures were arrived at, but AP speculated that they were based upon the charts that the Defense Department began releasing during the Surge in 2007.

In October, Wikileaks publicized thousands of U.S. daily intelligence documents from Iraq. The Guardian’s Data Blog culled through the papers and put together a chart on monthly casualties from January 2004 to December 2009. The Guardian found 83,300 Iraqi deaths for those six years and 176,382 wounded. Another 23,984 enemy combatants were also killed. For the time period covered in the CENTCOM posting, the Guardian noted 74,830 deaths, 2,109 less than the military’s.

Comparing Iraqi Death Counts (2004-2009)

Other organizations that track Iraqi deaths found much higher numbers initially, but then were in general alignment with the intelligence reports. In 2004 for example, the intelligence papers had 3,812 deaths. That compared to 16,894 by the Brookings Institute, and 10,834 by the Iraq Body Count. In 2005, the U.S. counted 8,993 deaths, which was close to icasualties’ 8,225. Icasualties only relies upon Western sources however, and notes that it misses many fatalities. In comparison, Iraq Body Count had 15,031 deaths and Brookings had 20,163. From 2006-2009 though, the numbers were roughly the same. For instance, in 2009 Brookings had 3,000 deaths, Iraq Body Count 4,681, the U.S. military 2,891, and icasualties 3,119. In total, from highest to lowest, the Brookings Institute had 100,481, Iraq Body Count 92,318, U.S. intelligence 83,300, and icasualties had 54,866 fatalities from 2004-2009. A simple explanation for the differences early on between the U.S. and private organizations, and then their later congruence could be that the Americans were not systematically keeping track of deaths from 2004-2005, but then made it a priority afterward.

	Brookings Institute	Iraq Body Count	U.S. Intelligence Reports	Icasualties
2004	16,894	10,834	3,812	N/A
2005	20,163	15,031	8,933	8,225
2006	30,514	27,850	31,253	18,655
2007	23,550	24,677	28,041	18,938
2008	6,360	9,245	8,310	5,929
2009	3,000	4,681	2,891	3,119
Grand Totals	100,481	92,318	83,300	54,866

The Iraq War has had a devastating affect upon the country. Fortunately, the sectarian civil war ended, and although bombings and assassinations are still a daily occurrence, they are nowhere near what they were before. The numbers from CENTCOM and Wikileaks provide important new details about the cost of the conflict. They should be analyzed and compared to the other sources available to provide a fuller account of just how many people have died in this tragedy.

SOURCES

Fadel, Leila, “77,000 Iraqis killed from 2004 to August 2008, U.S. military says,” Washington Post, 10/14/10

Icasualties

Iraq Body Count

Jakes, Lara, “US military says 77,000 Iraqis killed over 5 years,” 10/14/10

O’Hanlon, Michael, Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 11/30/10

Rogers, Simon, “Wikileaks Iraq: data journalism maps every death,” Data Blog, Guardian, 10/23/10

Wikileaks Documents Show Continued Saudi Opposition To Shiite Rule In Iraq

Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah has refused to normalize relations with Iraq over fears of Shiite rule and Iranian influence (Britannica Blog)

Included in the recent Wikileaks release of U.S. State Department cables were several discussions between American diplomats and Saudi and Iraqi officials about Iraq-Saudi relations. Those talks disclosed the continued problems between the two Arab governments. The Saudis were weary of democracy, believing it turned Iraq over to the Shiite majority who were seen as being pro-Tehran. They therefore supported Sunni parties and tribes in the March 2010 elections. The Iraqis on the other hand, believed that the Saudis were trying to undermine the government and create sectarian tensions. This set of strained relations has been present ever since the U.S. invasion in 2003.

The State Department papers covered Iraqi-Saudi issues from early 2009 to the beginning of 2010. On March 15, 2009 Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah told President Obama’s counterterrorism adviser John Brennan that he didn’t trust Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and believed that he was an Iranian agent. In July, during a visit by Maliki to Washington, he asked President Obama to get the Saudis to stop interfering in Iraq. The premier said that Riyadh was backing Sunnis and increasing sectarian tensions in the country. On September 24, then U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Christopher Hill wrote the Saudis’ mistrust of Shiites, who they saw as being pawns of Iran, led Riyadh to not only want greater Sunni power, but a weak and fractured government in Baghdad to stave off Tehran’s influence. Maliki told the Americans that he believed part of the problem was that the Wahabi Saudis looked down upon Shiites in general. He cited Saudi clerics who would often make anti-Shiite statements with no responses by the government. Due to these fears and biases the Saudis were giving money and media support to Sunni parties and tribes before the 2010 election to oppose the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and the Iraqi National Alliance, which were the most pro-Iranian forces in Iraq. Several Iraqi officials complained about this interference to U.S. diplomats. On December 14, President Jalal Talabani went to the Americans accusing the Saudis of talking Kuwait out of several agreements with Baghdad. Finally, a February 2010 paper said that Turkey’s Foreign Minister reported that the Saudis were spending large amounts of money on Iraqi political parties because they didn’t want another Shiite led government. 

The comments contained in the State Department cables should be no surprise as Iraq and Saudi Arabia have had rough relations since the 2003 overthrow of Saddam. In 2004 reports started to emerge that Saudi charities were funding the Iraqi insurgency. In 2007, the U.S. military announced that 45% of the foreign fighters coming to Iraq were from Saudi Arabia, and almost half of the 135 foreigners held by American forces were Saudis. Riyadh admitted that their young men were going to Iraq, but claimed that they were doing all they could to stop them. An advisor to Maliki questioned that remark, and countered by saying that the Saudis knew exactly what was happening and were doing nothing about it. During an August 2007 visit by Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, the kingdom claimed that Iraq was the real threat to the region because terrorists there could spread to Saudi Arabia. U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalizad later went on TV and stated that the Saudis were destabilizing Iraq. King Abdullah also refused to meet Maliki, and although the king promised the U.S. to open an embassy in Baghdad at the end of 2007 that has never happened. In April 2009 Prince Turki al-Faisal stated that the U.S. invasion turned Iraq over to Iran, and Maliki responded the next month by accusing the kingdom of not stopping their people from joining the insurgency. As a result, the prime minister said he was giving up on improving relations between the two countries. (1) In February 2010, just before Iraq’s elections, King Abdullah gave Allawi the royal treatment when he visited Riyadh, and then two months later held meetings with Kurdish President Massoud Barzani, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, Vice President Tariq Hashemi, and even the head of the Supreme Council Ammar al-Hakim, but refused to offer an invitation to Maliki. In May the head of Saudi intelligence accused the prime minister of trying to overturn his country’s voting results. 

Finally, the sore relations have held up trade and aid between the two. The Saudis promised $500 million in assistance after the U.S. invasion, but have only delivered a small fraction of that amount. They also initially promised to forgive 80% of Iraq’s debt, which was largely accumulated when Riyadh supported Saddam in the Iran-Iraq War, but then refused to do so. They have not opened the border crossings between the two countries as well, limiting commerce.

Despite Iraqi and American attempts to forge better ties between Baghdad and Riyadh since 2003, the Saudis’ paranoia about Iran and their bias against Shiites, have prevented any thawing of relations. Instead, the kingdom has tried to keep Iraq’s government at bay diplomatically and economically, while both knowingly or tacitly supporting the insurgency, and backing Sunni parties to counter the Shiite ones. This has largely failed to change anything in Iraq, other than gain the ire of the Iraqi government. Unless some kind of nationalist coalition like Iyad Allawi’s comes to power, it seems that the Saudis will continue to give a cold shoulder to Iraq. That has an impact throughout the region, as Iraq will have a hard time gaining full acceptance in the larger Middle East until Saudi Arabia finally comes to terms with the fact that Shiites are going to be running Iraq for the foreseeable future.

FOOTNOTES

1. Agence France Presse, “No More Gestures To Saudi Arabia – Iraqi PM Maliki,” 5/28/09

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “No More Gestures To Saudi Arabia – Iraqi PM Maliki,” 5/28/09
- “Saudis rebuff Iraq over insurgency,” 5/30/09

Dagher, Sam, “Anti-Saudi tide rises in Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor, 8/9/07

Dunne, Charles, “Iraq Going Forward: Threats to its Sovereignty, Prospects for its Future Role in the Middle East,” Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations, College of William and Mary, 4/13/09

Epstein, Rafael, “US blames Islamic charities for funding Iraq attacks,” ABC Radio, 10/22/04

Gause, F. Gregory, “Iraq 2012: The Regional Context,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4/3/08

Gordon, Michael, “Meddling by Neighbors Adds to Iraq’s Woes,” New York Times, 12/5/10

Hill, Christopher, “The Great Game, In Mesopotamia: Iraq And It’s Neighbors, Part I,” U.S. Embassy, Baghdad, 9/24/09

Jeffrey, James, “U/S Burns’ February 18 Meetings With U/S,” U.S. Embassy, Ankara, 2/25/10

Kaysi, Danial Anas, “The Saudis go to Baghdad,” The National Interest, 4/30/10

Kelley, Matt, “Allies fall short on Iraq aid pledge,” USA Today, 1/30/08

Laessing, Ulf, “ANALYSIS-Saudi wants bigger role in Iraq to counter Iran,” Reuters, 8/2/10

Lynch, Marc, “Iraq and the Gulf on the rocks,” Marc Lynch Blog, Foreign Policy, 6/2/09

Oppel, Richard, “Foreign Fighters in Iraq Are tied to Allies of U.S.,” New York Times, 11/22/07

Parker, Ned, “The Conflict In Iraq: Saudi Role In Insurgency,” Los Angeles Times, 7/15/07

Raphaeli, Dr. Nimrod, “Western Countries Cancel Iraqi Debt, Gulf Countries Don’t,” Middle East Media Research Institute, 5/15/08

Rubin, Alissa, “Iraq Tries to Prove Autonomy, and Makes Inroads,” New York Times, 4/15/09

Sabah, Zaid and Tyson, Ann Scott, “Security Pact on Iraq Would Set U.S. Exit,” Washington Post, 12/11/07

Trend, “Experts: Saudi Arabia has few pressure levers for next Iraqi Government,” 4/16/10

Youssef, Nancy and Strobel, Warren, “U.S., Saudi Arabia have drifted apart,” McClatchy Newspapers, 8/2/07

Sadr Tries To Reconcile With League Of The Righteous One More Time

In early December 2010 an official from the Sadr Trend announced that they were attempting to reconcile with the breakaway League of the Righteous. A delegation was going to Basra to start the talks. The Sadrists wanted the League to rejoin the movement, give up violence, and join the political process. The League is one of the main Special Groups that were put together by Iran, and include many former Mahdi Army fighters and commanders. This was just the latest attempt of many by Moqtada al-Sadr to re-unite his movement.

The League of the Righteous was formed in 2006. Qais Khazali is their leader. He was a student of Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, Moqtada’s father, who was killed by Saddam Hussein in 1999. Khazali and several other clerics kept the Sadrist movement alive after Sadr’s death. Following the 2003 invasion Khazali became a commander in the Mahdi Army. After the second Najaf uprising in 2004, Khazali refused to follow the cease-fire, and continued attacks upon the Coalition. In 2005 Sadr and Khazali made up, and he was given a senior position within the movement. The next year Iran selected Khazali to head the Special Groups that it was putting together of Shiite militiamen and Sadrists. Khazali’s group became the League of the Righteous.

In March 2007 Khazali was captured in Basra for planning several high profile attacks upon Coalition forces, including a daring raid on Iraq’s Finance Ministry in Baghdad, in which four Britons were kidnapped. In January 2010 Khazali was released after extended negotiations over releasing the British captives. During the talks Khazali promised to renounce violence and join politics. Most of League’s fighters were also released from prison at the same time. After Khazali was freed however, he went to Iran and broke off talks.

Since 2008 Sadr has gone back and forth over whether to reach out to the League and Khazali or not. On March 29, Sadr gave an interview with Al Jazeera where he called for the release of Khazali and hoped that he and his followers would rejoin the Sadr Trend. Khazali however rejected the talks because he was mad at Sadr for agreeing to a cease-fire with the government. In November Sadr tried again, but was rejected a second time. By August 2009 Sadr told the government that they shouldn’t be holding negotiations over releasing Khazali and his men because they rejected politics for violence. Then the next month the Sadrists were back at the table with the League, claiming that they wanted to bring them back to the fold before the parliamentary elections. (1) It was reported that Sadr considered the League a possible threat to his movement’s chances in the vote. Then when Khazali was released in January 2010 he went to Qom, Iran where Sadr resides to hold talks about reconciliation. That didn’t seem to work because in June Sadr called for the League’s members to abandon Khazali and rejoin the Sadr Trend. Those talks and other factors might have been responsible for the split in the League that was reported at that time, with some wanting to go the political route and others believing in continued armed resistance. 

Given the history between Sadr and Khazali it would seem unlikely that the two would finally come to an agreement any time soon. In the last two years the two sides have held talks off and on to no avail. The nature of the disagreement is unknown, but it probably has to do with the uses of violence, the value of joining politics, and how to re-integrate the League and its leadership. The League also split, which probably complicates discussions. Although it hasn’t been mentioned in reports, Iran is likely to oppose any reconciliation as well. The League and other Special Groups still serve as a means to carry out attacks in Iraq, and are more under Tehran’s direct sway than Sadr. Khazali can also be used as a way to divide the Shiite militants, weaken Sadr, and keep the militiamen dependent upon Iran. Those internal and external pressures will be hard to overcome. That probably means more talks, and then statements about irreconcilable differences, and then going back to the negotiating table for the foreseeable future.

FOOTNOTES

1. Awan Daily, “Maliki announced next week, the electoral coalition,” 9/25/09

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Anti-US Iraqi cleric facing leadership challenge,” Associated Press, 2/20/09

Agence France Presse, “2nd UPDATE: Iraqi PM Met Group Behind Kidnap Of Britons,” 8/3/09
- “US sees confrontation with Sadr splinter factions,” 10/12/04

AK News, “Attempt to incorporate al-Haq group in political process,” 12/8/10

Arraf, Jane, “US likely to release insurgent accused of killing five US soldiers,” Christian Science Monitor, 6/11/09

Associated Press, “Baghdad’s blast walls to come down,” 8/6/09
- “Shiite militia may be disintegrating,” 3/21/07

Awan Daily, “Maliki announced next week, the electoral coalition,” 9/25/09

Cochrane, Marisa, “Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Khazali Special Groups network,” Institute for the Study of War,” 1/13/09
- “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009

Cockburn, Patrick, “Revealed: why UK hostages were killed,” Independent, 7/10/09

Dagher, Sam, “Sadr reins in Shiite militiamen, sends mixed signals,” Christian Science Monitor, 3/31/08

Daragahi, Borzou, “Muqtada Sadr’s Mahdi Army militiamen slowly resurface,” Los Angeles Times, 6/28/10

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2009
- “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq June 2010,” 9/7/10

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

Harari, Michal, “Status Update: Shi’a Militias in Iraq,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/16/10

Londono, Ernesto and Fadel, Leila, “U.S. failure to neutralize Shiite militia in Iraq threatens to snarl pullout,” Washington Post, 3/4/10

Nordland, Rod, “Iraqi Group Renounces Violence,” New York Times, 8/4/09

Roads To Iraq, “Al-Sadr’s election campaign, questioning Maliki is the next political crisis,” 12/9/09

Roggio, Bill, “New Special Groups splinter emerges on Iraqi scene,” Long War Journal.org, 8/20/08

Rubin, Alissa and Gordon, Michael, “U.S. Frees Suspect in Killing of 5 G.I.’s,” New York Times, 6/9/09

New Corruption Survey In Iraq

Germany’s Transparency International released a new worldwide survey of corruption on December 9, 2010. “Global Corruption Barometer 2010,” polled over 91,500 people in 86 countries. One of those nations was Iraq. The organization found that Iraqis felt that corruption was worsening.

Iraqi respondents saw corruption in their country as worse than the global and regional averages. “Global Corruption Barometer” reported that 56% of those polled thought corruption had gotten worse in the last three years. In the Middle East 67% of respondents felt that way. That compared to 77% of Iraqis who said graft had increased, 19% who said it stayed the same, and only 4% who claimed it had decreased. 56% of those polled in Iraq said that they had paid bribes for at least one service in the last year, compared to 36% in the Middle East. 

Transparency International also asked about what institutions people felt were corrupted with 1 being not at all, and 5 being extremely. In the Middle East, political parties received the worst ranking at 3.6, followed by public officials with 3.4, parliament with 3.3, police with 3.2, businesses and the judiciary at 2.9, media and education with 2.6, NGOs and religious bodies at 2.5, and the military with the best score at 2.4. In Iraq, political parties were considered the most corrupt as well at 3.9, but after that the results were a little different. Parliament was next at 3.6, the police received a score of 3.2, public officials got 3.1, business 3.0, the military and education 2.8, the judiciary and NGOs 2.6, the media 2.3, and religious bodies were the best at 2.0.

The results of the poll should not be surprising. Back in October Transparency International ranked Iraq the fourth most corrupt country in the world for the second year in a row. Iraq’s main anti-corruption body, the Commission on Public Integrity, has had little affect upon the institutional corruption going on in the country. No senior official has ever been convicted of any crimes, and the average Iraqi has to put up with bribes and graft all the time. “Global Corruption Barometer 2010” is just the latest example of this daily reality in Iraq.

SOURCES

Commission of Integrity, “Annual report for 2008,” December 2009
- “CoI Key achievements and indicators from January 1, 2010 To June 30, 2010,” 7/28/10

Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2010,” 10/26/10
- “Global Corruption Barometer 2010,” 12/9/10

Is A Coup Likely In Iraq?

Iraqi soldiers of the 6th Division (Strategy Page)

With Iraq’s on-going political impasse over forming a new government dragging into its ninth month, some have brought up a military coup in Iraq as a possibility. The latest example was an article by United Press International from December 1, 2010 that said a military take over could happen given the country's history of military rulers. What this piece and others fail to understand is the divided nature of Iraq’s armed forces that make a coup highly unlikely.

A coup in Iraq doesn’t appear a possibility anytime soon because the army lacks cohesiveness. That’s due to the way the United States put the Iraqi forces together. From 2003-2008 the Americans focused upon building up the Iraqi army as quickly as possible. Quantity over quality was the main concern. That meant things like loyalties and political parties placing their followers into the forces were largely overlooked. For instance, after the January 2005 elections, the Shiite and Kurdish parties recruited their followers en masse into the army at both the entry and top levels. That’s how 35,000 former Kurdish peshmerga fighters ended up in the army. The peshmerga are directly under the control of the two ruling parties the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has also been putting his allies into the command structure. That means if a general ordered a coup, not all the forces may follow due to their ethnicity, sect, and political orientation.

Another problem is the institutional divides. There are currently three Iraqi military bodies. There are the Iraqi army brigades, and independent units and commands. The Iraqi army is divided into 14 divisions that come under the Joint Headquarters and the Ministry of Defense. Independent forces are the 56th Baghdad Brigade, the 1st and 2nd Presidential Brigades, and fifteen independent security battalions. They come under the Office of Commander in Chief, which is part of the prime minister’s office. The U.S. and the premier also created a number of operation commands beginning with the Baghdad Operations Command that answers to Prime Minister Maliki. The Office of Commander in Chief and the Operation Commands also bypass the Ministry of Defense and Interior. As one Iraqi officer told the International Crisis Group, this overlapping and often contradictory command structure means there are too many differences and no general that has enough authority to carry out a coup right now.

A coup in Iraq is mentioned every now and then in articles and reports. Writers point to the political divisions that make the government unable to deal with the country’s long-term problems as a reason why some ambitious general may decide to take matters into his own hands. A commander would have to build up the loyalty of a large and powerful force of units to carry out his plans. That would appear to be a difficult task with so many splits within the army, and lack of a cohesive leadership structure. The Iraqi military is developing and hopefully the increasing nationalism will help overcome some of these divisions. Until then the military does not seem a good vehicle to power. As for those that talk about a coup, many appear to want some kind of answer to the country’s endless difficulties. Iraq, with its history of military rule, makes a coup seem like a possible solution to these issues. If they studied the make-up of the Iraqi army, perhaps they would be dissuaded from this line of argument.

SOURCES

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security In Iraq June 2010,” 9/7/10

International Crisis Group, “Loose Ends: Iraq’s Security Forces Between U.S. Drawdown And Withdrawal,” 10/26/10

UPI, “Iraq’s Kurds build up their own army,” 12/7/10
- “Splintered Iraqi military ‘poses dangers,’” 12/1/10

Iraqis Weren’t The Only Ones Concerned About Maliki’s Autocratic Ways; Turkey Too

One of the major reasons why it has taken over eight months now to form a new Iraqi government is because most of the country’s major political parties have been weary of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki returning for a second term. After he launched his operations against the Sadrists and other Shiite militias in 2008, he increasingly concentrated power in his own hands, and became something of an autocrat. There were plenty of articles written in the West that warned of the premier becoming another Arab strongman. The leaked State Department cables from Wikileaks now show that Iraq’s politicians were not the only ones afraid of Maliki staying in power. Two separate American papers showed that Turkey was apprehensive as well about the prime minister.

The Wikileaks documents recorded two conversations between American and Turkish officials about their opposition to Maliki. One memo was after former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Christopher Hill met with his Turkish counterpart in Baghdad on January 31, 2010. The Turkish ambassador said that his country had backed Maliki before, but this time they were going to support his opponents in the national elections. Their reason was because they felt Maliki, “Would focus on increasing his own power and would not be cooperative in resolving outstanding issues.” A second document came from current U.S. Ambassador to Iraq James Jeffrey when he was stationed in Turkey in February 2010. He wrote that the Turkish Foreign Minister said that they were dissatisfied with Maliki, and was afraid that he was getting “out of control.” For those reasons Ankara put its weight behind Iyad Allawi and his Iraqi National Movement in the 2010 parliamentary elections. 

Turkey’s bet in the Iraqi balloting failed, but their worries about Maliki may come true. The premier outmaneuvered Iyad Allawi to stay in power. While his National Movement and the Kurds have put forward concrete demands that Maliki must follower in order to maintain their support, there’s no telling whether he will abide by them, and what they will do if he doesn’t. One thing is for sure, the prime minister will continue to try to place his Dawa members in every facet of the Iraqi bureaucracy as he can to try to control the government. That won’t lesson Turkey’s current good relations with Iraq, but it may lead Ankara to re-think their position on certain issues given Maliki’s stance.

SOURCES

Gordon, Michael, “Meddling by Neighbors Adds to Iraq’s Woes,” New York Times, 12/5/10

Jeffrey, James, “U/S Burns’ February 18 Meetings With U/S,” U.S. Embassy, Ankara, 2/25/10

Parker, Ned, “Machiavelli in Mesopotamia,” World Policy Journal, Spring 2009

Xinhua, “Neighbors wrestle for sway over Iraq following U.S. pullout,” 8/17/10

Iraq’s Oil Exports Little Changed By Work Of Foreign Companies In November 2010

Iraq’s State Marketing Organization announced on December 5, 2010 that the country’s exports barely inched up in November. Last month Iraq exported an average of 1.912 million barrels a day, up from 1.900 million barrels a day in October. Both of those amounts were down from September when the country reached 2.00 million barrels. 

The very modest increase in November was despite international energy companies beginning to work in Iraq. Italy’s Eni for example, said that it had raised oil production at the Zubayr field from 183,000 barrels a day to 201,000 barrels in December. Back in October, Shell claimed output at the Majnoon field had risen to 70,000 barrels a day, up from 45,000 barrels. British Petroleum and China National Petroleum Corporation were also supposed to have boosted production at the Rumaila field by 100,000 barrels during this period. It appears that despite this new work there has been no noticeable change in Iraq’s exports. It may be several more months than before the effect of these foreign corporations are really felt in Iraq.

Iraq Oil Exports Nov. 09 - Nov. 10 (Avg. Million Barrels Per Day)
2009
Nov. 1.92
Dec. 1.91
2010
Jan. 1.92
Feb. 2.05
Mar. 1.84
Apr. 1.80
May 1.88
Jun 1.86
Jul. 1.82
Aug. 1.82
Sep. 2.00
Oct. 1.90
Nov. 1.91

SOURCES

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “Iraq Status Report,” U.S. Department of State, 11/3/10

Cummins, Chip, “Iraq’s Oil Patch Opens the Spigot,” Wall Street Journal, 11/11/10

Davis, Andrew, “Eni, Partners Reaches Key Production Target at Zubair Oil Field in Iraq,” Bloomberg, 12/5/10

Reuters, “Iraq oil exports rise in Nov. to 1.912 mln bpd-SOMO,” 12/5/10