Chapter 5 of the second volume of the U.S. army’s history of the Iraq War focuses upon the summer of 2007. The Americans expanded their operations from Baghdad into neighboring Diyala while there were still differences over the new strategy. Part of that effort to turn tribes and insurgents against the Islamic State of Iraq ran into continued opposition from Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. On the other hand, Iranian backed militias were fighting each other for control of southern Iraq.
In June 2007 the last U.S. units for the Surge arrived in Iraq. Generals Petraeus and Odierno successfully lobbied Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to extend the deployment of all the Suge units so that the campaign could last as long as possible.
During the summer the U.S. combat forces were sent to clear Baquba the capitol of Diyala. Many insurgents had fled there from Anbar and Baghdad. The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) had a strong base in the city controlling many services and having took over several mosques. The situation was made worse by the fact that the Iraqi army and police were sectarian and backed death squads that targeted Sunnis. On June 18 Operation Arrowhead Ripper began in Baquba which proved to be some of the heaviest fighting during the Surge.
In the midst of the Surge there were still doubts about the strategy within the U.S. military. Admiral William Fallon the head of the Central Command (CENTCOM) for instance believed the Surge was a failure. Not only that but he thought General Petraeus was manipulating the president and suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense Secretary Gates intervene and change the policy. In June Fallon sent an admiral to Iraq to assess the situation and formulate a new plan for the Americans to withdraw. Pulling out of Iraq had been the main focus of the U.S. military since 2005 and still had its adherents. The fact that it was a losing policy and that President Bush had decided on a new direction hadn’t sunk in with these officials causing needless arguments and delays.
One of the things that was turning the tide for the U.S. was the sahwa program where tribes and insurgents were convinced to oppose ISI. The Americans hoped these fighters would be rewarded by receiving government employment and thus help with reconciliation. The major barrier to this was the Maliki government which believed the sahwa was a plot by the Americans and Baathists to overthrow the PM. As a result Maliki put the National Reconciliation Committee in charge of integrating the Sunnis which actually blocked many from getting jobs. Maliki and his inner circle had come of age during the Saddam era when the opposition was in constant fear of its rivals, foreign governments and Baghdad. The premier therefore trusted few and always thought there were conspiracies against him. He was also intent upon establishing Shiite supremacy in central Iraq and therefore against giving any concessions to Sunnis.
The Surge was not just aimed against the insurgency but militias as well. In the first half of 2007 they had been increasing attacks upon U.S. forces with support from Tehran. The U.S. led Coalition responded by trying to cut off Iranian supply lines to their Shiite allies. One operation was launched in Wasit and another in Maysan with mixed results. Iran would prove to be a constant thorn in the side of the U.S. which never came up with an adequate means to counter its influence.
Tehran’s support for the militias had unintended consequences as Moqtada al-Sadr and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) used their Iranian weapons on each other for control of southern Iraq. In August for instance Sadr’s Mahdi Army assassinated the ISCI governors of Qadisiya and Muthanna. This culminated in two days of fighting between the Mahdi Army and the Badr controlled police outside the Najaf shrine which spread to Baghdad. Afterwards Sadr announced a ceasefire and a purging of his militia which was fracturing. Sadr had fled to Iran at the start of the Surge and left the Mahdi Army largely to itself. Iran also didn’t trust Sadr because he was considered impulsive and was breaking away factions which it could more directly control. Tehran was being the ultimate manipulator giving armaments to all different groups and playing them against each other while trying to make the Americans pay a price for the occupation of Iraq.
SOURCES
Rayburn, Colonel Joel, Sobchak, Colonel Frank, Editors, The U.S. Army In The Iraq War Volume 2, Surge And Withdrawal 2007-2011, Strategic Studies institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2019
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