This year Iraq’s politicians are hoping for a major turn
around in the security situation in the country. A big focus is upon retaking
Mosul the nation’s second largest city and the center of the Islamic State’s
(IS) caliphate in Iraq. Premier Haider Abadi recently said that the city would
be freed soon. Given this pressure the United States decided to announce a plan
to attack Mosul this spring. This garnered a huge amount of press coverage, but
largely missed the fact that the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) would not be ready
for such a large undertaking in just a few months. Rather than revealing the
timetable for pushing IS out of Mosul the United States’ real target was the
Iraqi political class, which has been deeply critical of America’s effort and
to show them that Washington has a plan to defeat the insurgency.
On February
19, the first day of a conference on countering terrorism held by the White
House a member of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) briefed reporters on an
impending Mosul campaign. The official said that a force of 20,000-25,000
soldiers and peshmerga would retake the city in April
or May. This would involve
five army brigades, three peshmerga brigades, three reserve army brigades, a
counterterrorism brigade, and a unit made up of Mosul locals who would hold the
city after it was cleared of insurgents. The eight ISF brigades would all
undergo training by the United States. They would face a force of 1,000-2,000
Islamic State fighters in the city. The American announcement came just three
days after Prime Minister Haider Abadi gave an interview with
the BBC in which he said Mosul would be freed in just a few months with minimal
casualties. He went on to criticize the U.S. led coalition for taking so long
to get involved in the fight against IS. Other Iraqi leaders have made similar
negative comments about the Americans. When the insurgents launched their
summer offensive in June the White House made it clear that it would only
intervene after Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was removed from office. That
took several weeks, which proved to be the most critical period during the
militant surge, as many believed that Baghdad would be besieged after Mosul and
Tikrit fell. That delay made many Iraqis question how much Washington was
committed to Iraq. Some even believe that the U.S.
backs IS. Those types of comments were the main motivation for going public
with the Mosul plan. The White House wanted to let Baghdad know that it was
concerned about reversing the insurgency, and had a strategy in place to do it.
The fact that this was a political move and not a real
timetable was made apparent quickly after the CENTCOM briefing. First the
official said that if the Iraqis needed more time to prepare for the offensive
it could
be delayed. That was an out because the ISF will not be ready in two to
three months. The U.S. is supposed to train roughly 16,000 Iraqi soldiers by
April. As of February it had only put 3,400
soldiers through a basic 6-8 week course. Some of this training has been without
weapons because Iraq’s notorious red tape has delayed their delivery. An
officer in the Iraqi Defense Ministry told Bloomberg
that the 8 brigades would not be ready until August. Second, this process will
take even longer as 20,000-25,000 soldiers and peshmerga are not enough to
assault a city the size of Mosul that has roughly 1-2 million people. In 2004
the U.S. used 10,500 troops to take Fallujah that had a population of
approximately 350,000. Some 3,000-4,000 insurgents opposed them. Rather than
the 1,000-2,000 IS fighters the CENTCOM briefer claimed are in Mosul Iraqi and
Kurdish officials put the figure at more like 10,000. Given the size of the
city and the number of insurgents the Americans will need to train roughly 40,000
Iraqis or more to have a credible chance at success. Third, Mosul is
supposed to be held by former soldiers and police from the city along with local
tribes. In December
2014 members of the Ninewa council said Premier Abadi had given permission to
set up three camps to train this Mosul Brigade, which was supposed to reach
8,000 volunteers. In early January
it was claimed that 4,000 men had shown up at two camps, but then in February
a peshmerga commander was quoted in the Daily Beast saying that there were only
800 Sunnis undergoing training to hold Mosul. That is obviously nowhere near
the number necessary for the job ahead. Finally, at a minimum Salahaddin
province would have to be cleared before the assault on Mosul to secure supply
lines and communication for the ISF that would be coming up from the south.
Currently the ISF and militias in the province are stretched and have not been
able to hold some of their recent victories. Securing that governorate will
take a long time putting another hold on Mosul. American officials have
previously noted many of these issues so they are aware of the challenges
ahead. That was even more evidence that an imminent offensive against the city
was more talk than anything else, and was motivated by other issues like
politics other than the military situation on the ground.
The U.S. is a big player in Iraq, but does not have the same
position it once held. Coming late to the fight against the Islamic State has
led to deep questioning of the Baghdad-Washington relationship by Iraqi elites.
Feeling this heat the Americans made a public relations move by announcing a
plan for Mosul in response to increasing statements by Premier Abadi and others
that the city should be taken sooner rather than later. This is meant to buy time,
as the real attack upon the city is a long ways away. The Iraqi army needs to
be rebuilt, crucial territory needs to be cleared to even reach Mosul, and a
real force has to be recruited to hold the area. That all points to the winter
of 2015 being a more realistic date for this operation than the spring. That
has to be sold to the political leadership by not only the Americans but the
Iraqi Defense Ministry as well, because Baghdad doesn’t seem to be taking into
account the current situation as it talks more and more about expelling the
insurgency from major urban areas.
SOURCES
Abdullah, Dalshad, “Baghdad preparing to liberate Mosul from
ISIS: sources,” Asharq Al-Awsat, 12/10/14
Baldor, Lolita, “Official: Mission to retake Mosul to begin
in April, May,” Associated Press, 2/19/15
Baldor, Lolita and Yacoub, Sameer, “Iraqis worry they won’t
be ready for Mosul operation,” Associated Press, 2/21/15
Barnes, Julian, “U.S., Iraq Prepare Offensive to Retake
Mosul From Islamic State,” Wall Street Journal, 1/22/15
BBC, “Iraq preparing to retake Mosul form Islamic State –
PM,” 2/16/15
Gordon, Michael, “Iraqi Assault to Retake Mosul From Islamic
State Is Planned for Spring,” New York Times, 2/19/15
Gordon, Michael and Schmitt, Eric, “Iraqis Prepare ISIS
Offensive, With U.S. Help,” New York Times, 11/2/14
Knights, Michael, “The liberation of Mosul will have to
wit,” Al Jazeera, 1/28/15
Al Mada, “Nineveh volunteers continue training despite
reluctance to give them salaries or arm them..and the Peshmerga awaiting
coordination with Baghdad,” 1/10/15
McLeary, Paul, “CENTCOM Outlines Battle for Mosul, Doubles
Estimate for IS Dead,” Defense News, 2/19/15
Natali, Denise, “Iraqis bicker over liberating Mosul,” Al
Monitor, 12/29/14
Ollivant, Douglas, “Iraq After The Islamic State: Politics
Rule,” War On The Rocks, 2/18/15
Rosenfeld, Jesse, “Witness to the Bloodthirsty Siege of
Mosul: Kurdish Troops Taking Selfies With ISIS Corpses,” Daily Beast, 2/15/15
Rudaw, “Iraq to build new army bases, train volunteers for
Mosul operation,” 12/26/14
Schmitt, Eric, “Despite U.S. Warnings, Iraqis Push for
Winter Offensive in Mosul,” New York Times, 12/8/14
Sherlock, Ruth, “US admits it won’t be able to train enough
troops in time for Mosul offensive,” Telegraph, 2/20/15
Walcott, John, Sabah, Zaid and Lerman, David, “US rhetoric
collides with Iraqi reality in fight against Islamic State,” Bloomberg, 2/20/15
