Saturday, March 28, 2015
Friday, March 27, 2015
U.S.-Iranian Rivalry Behind Iraq’s Tikrit Operation
At the start of March 2015, Iraqi artillery began firing on
Dour, Salahaddin south of Tikrit in the opening salvo of the operation to free
Tikrit. The attacking force was 30,000 strong, with Hashd al-Shaabi, also known
as Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) the majority of the fighters. Quick
progress was made with the towns around Tikrit taken and the city itself
surrounded. When it came to assaulting the urban core however improvised
explosive devices, snipers, and mounting casualties held up the attackers. That
led to a debate between the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Prime Minister
Haider Abadi on one side and Iran and its allies within the Hashd on the other
over how to proceed, and specifically on whether to invite Coalition air
strikes. This brought up the larger political rivalry between Tehran and
Washington over who was going to play the leading role in Iraq.
Iran originally wanted the Tikrit operation to show that it
and its partners in Iraq could take a major city without U.S. assistance.
Tehran and its partners within the Hashd were formulating the Tikrit plans
largely on
their own, when Prime Minister Haider Abadi got wind of it. The Iraqi
Security Forces were then added, but they would only be around a third of the attackers.
Tehran had played a pivotal role in several earlier campaigns in places like Amerli
in Salahaddin, Jurf
al-Sakhr in Babil, and Jalawla and Sadiya
in Diyala. Now having helped the Iraqi forces regain the initiative the
Iranians wanted a major victory, and that would be Tikrit, the second large city
taken by the Islamic State after the fall of Mosul in June. Tehran wanted to be
in the lead without American participation, and to have forces friendly to it
such as the Badr Organization, Asaib Ahl Al-Haq and Kataib Hezbollah be in the
vanguard of the attack so that they could claim all the glory and political
capital from the impending triumph.
In the first week of the operation there was steady
progress, but that stalled when central Tikrit was reached. In quick procession
the towns around Tikrit fell
such as Dour, Alam, Albu Ajeel, and the suburbs of the city itself were
penetrated. Iran was right there on the front providing
drones, artillery, air
strikes, and advisers. The United States was also not
involved because of Iran’s leading role. However by the second week of
March the advance slowed, and a halt
was called. An Iraqi army captain told Niqash that neither the security forces
nor Hashd were prepared for the urban fighting they found themselves in, and
that IS had laced the area with IEDs and snipers, and were carrying out
counterattacks in the surrounding villages throwing the government’s forces off
balance. There were also reports of mounting casualties as well. McClatchy
Newspapers heard that up to 1,000 men had been killed since the start of
the operation, while the Washington
Post went to Najaf cemeteries where an estimated 40-60 bodies were being
buried a day during the height of the fighting, which would be roughly 500-800
dead alone over two weeks. That set off a heated debate between the parties
involved in the attack on how to proceed
There were two camps on how to finish off the Tikrit
operation. On the one hand, Iran and its allies wanted a frontal assault upon
the city and to keep the Americans out. This was repeatedly made clear by Badr
Organization head Hadi Ameri who consistently
went to the press to not only criticize the
American led Coalition for not truly being an ally of Iraq, but the Iraqi army
as well calling them weaklings for
wanting Washington’s assistance. In comparison Ameri repeatedly praised
the Iranians
for everything that they had done. On the other hand Samarra Operations Command
head General Abdul Wahab al-Saadi publicly called
for Coalition air strikes. Prime Minister Abadi sided
with the general, and a formal request for aid was made. That led to
reconnaissance flights over the area on March
24, and then attacks the next
day. This was a major defeat for Iran and its allies whose whole purpose in
launching the offensive was to take the city without the Americans. The
inability to take Tikrit however led to a stalemate, which could not be
maintained without all sides losing credibility. That opened up the opportunity
for the Americans to enter the fray.
U.S. support was not without conditions. Washington requested that
the Abadi government have the Hashd refrain from entering Tikrit and have the
ISF lead the charge instead. Several
of the Hashd forces acquiesced such as Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, Kataib Hezbollah, and
Moqtada al-Sadr’s Peace Brigades claiming
that they did not trust the Americans. This was a political victory for Washington.
There was even some gloating by U.S. defense officials who told the Wall
Street Journal, that Iran and the Hashd’s plans had been defeated, and that
the U.S. was hoping that this would convince Baghdad that Tehran was not enough
to defeat the insurgency and that closer cooperation was needed with the
Americans. This was just one round in a much larger play for power within Iraq
between the two countries.
The rivalry between the Americans and Iranians in Iraq is
far from over. Iran might have faced a setback in Tikrit, but the Iraqi
government does not have the forces to conduct major operations on its own. It
needs the manpower of the Hashd, and especially those aligned with Iran who
have some of the best weapons and experienced fighters, many of which are
veterans of the Syrian war. Likewise, air strikes can weaken the insurgency,
but no ground can be taken with planes. The U.S. is hoping that in the long run
its training missions can build up the Iraqi army so that it can be in the lead
in security operations, but that is months away. In the meantime that means
that all of these groups need to at least have some sort of division of labor
to turn back the insurgency. That was already suggested when the Tikrit
operation first began with Washington officials talking about playing a larger
role in Anbar and with the Kurds in the north, while Iran was in the lead in
Diyala, Baghdad, and Salahaddin. At the same time, the two powers are playing
for the long run to see which country will have the prominent role in Iraq
after the war is over. That outcome is yet to be seen, and the differences
between the two will come out many more times before the conflict is finished.
SOURCES
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim and Salama, Vivian, “After US
airstrikes, Iraq troops start final push for Tikrit,” Associated Press, 3/26/15
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim and Yacoub, Sameer, “Iraqi commander
slams US, hails Iran in fight against ISIS in Tikrit,” Associated Press,
3/14/15
Alsumaria, “The attack on Tikrit, four axes with the
participation of 500 fighters of her sons,” 3/26/15
Barnard, Anne, “Iraq’s Drive Against ISIS Reveals Tensions
With U.S.,” New York Times, 3/3/15
BBC, “Iraq crisis: Tikrit push ‘no longer led by Shia
militias,’” 3/26/15
Beale, Jonathan, “Battle for Tikrit key to Iraq’s future,”
BBC, 3/23/15
Coles, Isabel, “Iranians play role in breaking IS siege of
Iraqi town,” Reuters, 9/1/14
Dunlop, W.G., “Iraqi army says coalition raids needed in
Tikrit battle,” Agence France Presse, 3/15/15
El-Ghobashy, Tamer and Barnes, Julian, “Iran Backs Iraq
Military Campaign to Reclaim Tikrit From Islamic State,” Wall Street Journal,
3/2/15
Habib, Mustafa, “Why The Iraqi Army Is Stuck On The
Outskirts of Tikrit,” Niqash, 3/26/15
Hameed, Saif, “Iraq special forces advance on Tikrit, U.S.
coalition joins fight,” Reuters, 3/26/15
Hewrami, Sirwe, “Shiite militia commander: No Kurdish force
took part in Saadiya liberation,” Rudaw, 11/26/14
Karim, Ammar, “Iraq militia chief slams army ‘weaklings’
over Tikrit strikes,” Agence France Presse, 3/22/15
Mably, Richard, Nakhoul, Samia and Parker, Ned, “Iraq
request for U.S.-led Tikrit air strikes ‘imminent’: diplomat,” Reuters, 3/24/15
Al Mada, “Abadi plans to unify the crowd under his
leadership and efforts to engage the international coalition in the battle for
Tikrit,” 3/21/15
- “Ameri: 100 Iranian experts providing “unrequited”
assistance,” 3/10/15
Morris, Loveday, “Iraq’s victory over militants in Sunni
town underlines challenges government faces,” Washington Post, 10/29/14
- “Iraqi offensive for Tikrit stalls as casualties mount,”
Washington Post, 3/16/15
Morris, Loveday and Ryan, Missy, “U.S. forces begin
airstrikes in Tikrit, where Iran-backed militias are in lead,” Washington Post,
3/25/15
Al Mustaqbal, “Washington recognizes the role of Tehran and
warns of sectarian strife,” 3/4/15
Nissenbaum, Dion and Barnes, Julian, “U.S. Surveillance
Planes Aid Fight by Iraq, Iranian-Backed Militias for Tikrit,” Wall Street
Journal, 3/24/15
Nordland, Rod and Al-Jawoshy, Omar, “3 Shiite Militias Quit
Iraqi Siege of ISIS Over U.S. Air Role,” New York Times, 3/26/15
Prothero, Mitchell, “Operation to retake Tikrit from Islamic
State stalled by heavy casualties, discord,” McClatchy Newspapers, 3/20/15
Rudaw, “PMF leader Amiri: ‘the US cannot protect Iraq,’”
3/19/15
Salama, Vivina and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Coalition official:
US-led force providing surveillance flights over Islamic State-held Tikrit,”
Associated Press, 3/24/15
Salih, Mohammed, “Iran gathers power in Iraq as US further
sidelined,” Al Monitor, 3/17/15
Thursday, March 26, 2015
Iraq: Confident In PM And Government, But Hesitant About Economy
Gallup just released a new public opinion poll of Iraqis
that was conducted at the end of 2014. 1,003 Iraqis from all of the country’s
provinces were asked three questions about their confidence in the new Prime
Minister Haider Abadi, what they thought of the government overall, and their
opinion of the economy. Both the premier and government got high marks, but
many Iraqis believed that the economic situation in the country was deteriorating.
The first question was did people approve or disapprove of
the prime minister. Haider Abadi received a 72% positive rating. This was
across the board with 78% in Baghdad, 78% in the south (Basra, Dhi Qar, Maysan
and Muthanna), 74% in the mid-Euphrates (Najaf, Babil, Wasit, Qadisiyah, and
Karbala), 72% in what Gallup termed the “Sunni Heartland” (Anbar, Kirkuk,
Diyala, Ninewa, and Salahaddin), and 53% in Kurdistan (Irbil, Dohuk, and
Sulaymaniya). That topped Maliki’s numbers who had a 50% approval rating in
May-June 2014 and a 51% in September-October 2013. Maliki got especially low
scores in Kurdistan and the Sunni Heartland with 12% and 30% respectively in
May-June 2014. Maliki was in a two year dispute with the Kurdistan Regional
Government over its oil policy, and his attempt to arrest Finance Minister Rafi
Issawi set off a year long protest movement, which accounts for his low scores
in those two parts of the country. The only area where Maliki did better than
Abadi in the last two surveys was in the Mid-Euphrates where Maliki received
77% and Abadi 74%. Otherwise the country seems pretty happy with the change in
leadership and the premier’s statements about reconciliation appeared to have
won over a majority of every section of Iraq.
Do you approve or disapprove of the way _ is handling
his job as prime minister
Maliki
|
Maliki
|
Abadi
|
|
Sep-Oct 2013
|
May-June 2014
|
Nov-Dec 2014
|
|
Iraq
Overall
|
51%
|
50%
|
72%
|
Baghdad
|
57%
|
54%
|
78%
|
South
|
68%
|
77%
|
78%
|
Mid-Euphrates
|
69%
|
77%
|
74%
|
Sunni
Heartland
|
40%
|
30%
|
72%
|
Kurdistan
|
13%
|
12%
|
53%
|
The second issue in the Gallup poll had to do with the
central government and whether people had confidence in it or not. Again, the
numbers were higher compared to the two previous surveys. For the country
overall, 60% said they had confidence in Baghdad. Even 51% in the Sunni
heartland and 55% in Kurdistan had a good view. In the previous poll from
May-June 2014 only 43% were confident in the government, and 50% in
September-October 2013. In the former approval ratings were as low as 40% in
Kurdistan and 30% in the Sunni heartland. Again, Maliki’s policies were likely
responsible for the low numbers in the 2013 and mid-2014 surveys, and the
change in government has led to new optimism reflected in the newest results.
Do you have confidence in the national government or
not?
Sep-Oct 2013
|
May-June 2014
|
Nov-Dec 2014
|
|
Iraq
overall
|
50%
|
43%
|
60%
|
South
|
54%
|
53%
|
66%
|
Baghdad
|
45%
|
44%
|
65%
|
Mid-Euphrates
|
55%
|
54%
|
63%
|
Kurdistan
|
41%
|
40%
|
55%
|
Sunni
heartland
|
52%
|
30%
|
51%
|
Finally, Gallup asked Iraqis about whether they thought the
economy was getting better or worse. The good feelings expressed in the first
two questions were not replicated in the third where 56% said things were going
badly, with only 37% saying better, and 5% saying the same. In June 2014 Iraqis
were split with 45% saying things were better and the same number saying worse,
while in October 2013 48% said things were worse, and 43% better. The drop in
oil prices, which Iraq is dependent upon, and the subsequent budget problems
the country is going through was likely a major factor. The war and massive
displacement of people, has also increased jobless and poverty rates in Iraq
adding additional pressure to an already troubled economy.
Do you think the economic conditions in Iraq as a
whole are getting better or getting worse?
Oct 2013
|
June 2014
|
Dec 2014
|
48%
getting worse
|
45%
getting worse
|
56%
getting worse
|
43%
getting better
|
45%
getting better
|
37%
getting better
|
6%
same
|
6%
same
|
5%
same
|
SOURCES
Owen, Travis and Fakreddine, Jihad, “Iraqis Have High Hopes
for New Prime Minister,” Gallup, 3/19/15
Wednesday, March 25, 2015
Islamic State Enters The European Drug Trade
It has often been said that the Islamic State (IS) operates
like a mafia. The group has been largely self-sufficient since 2005 relying
upon a number of criminal activities to fund itself. After its recent success
in Syria and Iraq it also acquired control of several oil fields that greatly
boosted its ability to raise money. Declining oil prices, Coalition air
strikes, and the loss of two fields recently in Salahaddin has now hurt that
industry. Since the group has such large costs to maintain its forces and hold
over its territory it must now find other sources. There are reports that the
drug trade might be becoming a new money making activity for IS.
Starting in 2014 European law enforcement and intelligence
agencies began reporting that the Islamic State had become a major player in
the continent’s drug trafficking. In October
2014 for example, Spanish intelligence said that IS was importing drugs to
Europe to finance itself. It would smuggle drugs in and then bring back
weapons, foreign fighters and other items to Syria and Iraq. The next month,
Russia’s Federal Drug Control Service told
the press that IS was supplying nearly half of Europe’s heroin with its
main drug source being Afghanistan. The head of the agency, Viktor Ivanov said
that this was a renewable resource for IS. A later report in March
2015 claimed that IS was making $1 billion annually from this illicit trade.
That amount seems far too high, but it is undoubtedly making a lot if it has
gained an important hold on the narcotics trade.
The Islamic State needs money and lots of it to maintain its
control over Iraq and Syria. It needs to pay fighters, provide pensions to the
families of its dead, run factories and deliver services. For years now it has
relied upon criminal activities to pay for itself. Getting involved in the drug
trade would be in line with that history, and more importantly, could provide a
huge amount of funds. It is also extremely hard to crackdown upon given its
illegal nature. If the Spanish and Russian reports are true, it has already
become a major player. IS has proven amazingly resourceful throughout its life,
and has constantly sought new ways to fund itself, and narcotics might just be its
latest endeavor.
SOURCES
Paraszczuk, Joanna, “Russia Claims IS Supplying Half Of All
Afghan Heroin Coming To Europe,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 11/26/14
Sharkov, Damien, “Islamic State Use Drug Trade to Bankroll
Their Jihad, Says Spanish Intelligence,” Newsweek, 10/20/14
Timothy, Odultolu, “ISIS Earns $1 Billion Dollars Annually
For Delivering Afghanistan Heroin,” Gidi Post, 3/8/15
Tuesday, March 24, 2015
Security In Iraq 3rd Week Of March, 2015
Reported violence was slightly down in the third week of
March, 2015 in Iraq. Attacks were roughly the same as the previous week, while
casualties dropped. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Kurdish peshmerga continued
their offensives in eastern Anbar and southern Kirkuk respectively, but the
major operation in Tikrit stalled and has been on hold as reinforcements were
called up, and a debate appeared to be underway between all the involved groups
on how to proceed.
There were 141 security incidents reported in the press. The
real number is much higher. That was very close to the previous week when there
were 133, and down from the first week of the month when there were 172. That
averaged out to 21.2 reported attacks per day, down from 23.3 in February, and
26.2 in January.
For the week Baghdad had the most incidents with 51, followed
by 28 in Salahaddin, 20 in Anbar, 19 in Ninewa, 8 in Kirkuk, 7 in Diyala, 5 in
Babil, and one each in Basra, Irbil and Maysan. Irbil was a rare occasion, and
was the result of the Islamic State firing rockets into the province on March
15, but luckily nothing was hit. Basra was also struck by a truck bomb on March
18 killing 12 and wounding 30. This was the first time southern Iraq was hit
by any type of vehicle borne bomb since Najaf at the end of October 2014.
Those attacks led to 299 deaths and 503 wounded. Again, the
actual statistics are higher than what gets in the press. The dead broke down
to 1 Sahwa, 8 Hashd al-Shaabi, 32 Peshmerga, 62 ISF, and 196 civilians, while
the injured were 5 Sahwa, 36 Hashd, 50 Peshmerga, 58 ISF, and 354 civilians. By
province that broke down to 92 killed in Salahaddin, 74 in Baghdad, 50 in
Anbar, 37 in Ninewa, 24 in Kirkuk, 12 in Basra, 5 in Diyala, 4 in Babil, and
one in Maysan. The third week’s totals were down from the previous one’s 348
killed and 656 injured.
For the month there have been an average of 48.5 killed per
day and 83.1 wounded. That was down from February’s 61.7 dead and 95.8 injured,
and January’s 74.4 fatalities and 93.3 wounded. This continued the trend of
casualties declining since the summer.
Violence
In Iraq By Week Jun. 2014-2015
Date
|
Incidents
|
Dead
|
Wounded
|
Jun 1-7
|
228
|
612
|
1,020
|
Jun 8-14
|
234
|
1,889
|
890
|
Jun 15-21
|
177
|
804
|
755
|
Jun 22-28
|
207
|
740
|
800
|
Jun 29-30
|
59
|
127
|
236
|
JUN
|
905
|
4,172
|
3,701
|
Jul 1-7
|
203
|
526
|
651
|
Jul 8-14
|
214
|
577
|
628
|
Jul 15-21
|
230
|
444
|
1,009
|
Jul 22-28
|
224
|
589
|
801
|
Jul 29-31
|
66
|
163
|
230
|
JUL
|
937
|
2,299
|
3,319
|
Aug 1-8
|
270
|
1,122
|
885
|
Aug 9-14
|
180
|
710
|
1,152
|
Aug 15-21
|
150
|
731
|
499
|
Aug 22-28
|
156
|
523
|
798
|
Aug 29-31
|
59
|
125
|
289
|
AUG
|
815
|
3,211
|
3,623
|
Sep 1-7
|
169
|
616
|
751
|
Sep 8-14
|
168
|
467
|
731
|
Sep 15-21
|
170
|
625
|
794
|
Sep 22-28
|
157
|
396
|
576
|
Sep 29-30
|
49
|
126
|
287
|
SEP
|
713
|
2,230
|
3,139
|
Oct 1-7
|
175
|
456
|
687
|
Oct 8-14
|
189
|
560
|
880
|
Oct 15-21
|
159
|
499
|
780
|
Oct 22-28
|
160
|
346
|
596
+ 1,230
|
Oct 29-31
|
72
|
574
|
227
|
OCT
|
755
|
2,434
|
3,170 + 1,230
|
Nov 1-7
|
154
|
611
|
828
|
Nov 8-14
|
134
|
470
|
607
|
Nov 15-21
|
139
|
323
|
479
|
Nov 22-28
|
139
|
321
|
640
|
Nov 29-30
|
40
|
206
|
535
|
NOV
|
606
|
1,931
|
3,089
|
Dec 1-7
|
148
|
581
|
482
|
Dec 8-14
|
156
|
233
+ 166
|
444
+ 1,113
|
Dec 15-21
|
133
|
377
|
340
|
Dec 22-28
|
161
|
558
|
494
|
Dec 29-31
|
91
|
117
|
233
|
DEC
|
689
|
2,032
|
3,106
|
Jan 1-7
|
184
|
434
|
464
|
Jan 8-14
|
170
|
730
|
493
|
Jan 15-21
|
182
|
390
|
515
|
Jan 22-28
|
189
|
466
|
894
|
Jan 29-31
|
90
|
288
|
529
|
JAN
|
815
|
2,308
|
2,895
|
Feb 1-7
|
155
|
380
|
688
|
Feb 8-14
|
170
|
406
|
559
|
Feb 15-21
|
165
|
573
|
364
|
Feb 22-28
|
165
|
371
|
687
+ 386
|
FEB
|
655
|
1,730
|
2,683
|
Mar 1-7
|
172
|
372
|
587
|
Mar 8-14
|
133
|
348
|
656
|
Mar 15-21
|
141
|
299
|
503
|
Violence
By Province In Iraq March 2015
Province
|
Mar 1-7
|
Mar 8-14
|
Anbar
|
24 Incidents
71 Killed: 22 ISF, 31 Sahwa, 18
Civilians
77 Wounded: 31 ISF, 46 Civilians
14 Shootings
1 IED
1 Suicide Car Bomb
3 Mortars
1 Rocket
|
23 Incidents
58 Killed: 34 ISF, 1 Sahwa, 23
Civilians
147 Wounded: 26 ISF, 8 Sahwa, 113
Civilians
7 Shootings
1 IED
24 Suicide Car Bombs
1 Rocket
3 Mortars
|
Babil
|
5 Incidents
8 Killed: 1 Hashd, 7 Civilians
13 Wounded: 2 Hashd, 11 Civilians
1 Shooting
3 IEDs
1 Sticky Bomb
|
4 Incidents
8 Killed: 1 ISF, 7 Civilians
33 Wounded: 4 ISF, 29 Civilians
4 IEDs
1 Car Bomb
|
Baghdad
|
56 Incidents
75 Killed: 7 ISF, 4 Hashd, 5
Sahwa, 59 Civilians
229 Wounded: 16 ISF, 13 Sahwa, 16
Hashd, 184 Civilians
15 Shootings
30 IEDs
6 Sticky Bombs
1 Car Bomb
3 Mortars
2 Rockets
|
47 Incidents
88 Killed: 5 ISF, 83 Civilians
245 Wounded: 10 ISF, 1 US Soldier,
234 Civilians
15 Shootings
25 IEDs
4 Sticky Bombs
2 Car Bombs
1 Mortar
|
Basra
|
5 Incidents
4 Killed: 4 Civilians
3 Shootings
1 Sticky Bomb
|
-
|
Diyala
|
13 Incidents
17 Killed: 3 Hashd, 14 Civilians
23 Wounded: 3 ISF, 4 Hashd, 16
Civilians
6 Shootings
3 IEDs
3 Sticky Bombs
1 Car Bomb
|
2 Incidents
3 Killed: 2 ISF, 1 Civilian
3 Wounded: 3 ISF
1 Shooting
1 IED
|
Kirkuk
|
1 Incident
1 Killed: 1 ISF
1 Shooting
|
12 Incidents
103 Killed: 1 ISF, 23 Hashd, 26
Peshmerga, 53 Civilians
105 Wounded: 10 ISF, 5 Hashd, 87
Peshmerga, 3 Civilians
8 Shootings
1 IED
1 Suicide Bomber
4 Car Bombs
1 Mine
|
Ninewa
|
31 Incidents
120 Killed: 2 ISF, 118 Civilians
12 Wounded: 12 Civilians
17 Shootings
11 IEDs
|
20 Incidents
18 Killed: 1 ISF, 17 Civilians
10 Wounded: 1 Peshmerga, 9
Civilians
12 Shootings
5 IEDs
|
Salahaddin
|
37 Incidents
76 Killed: 24 ISF, 28 Hashd, 24
Civilians
233 Wounded: 54 ISF, 122 Hashd, 57
Civilians
18 Shootings
14 IEDs
1 Suicide Bomber
6 Suicide Car Bombs
1 Car Bomb
3 Mortars
|
25 Incidents
70 Killed: 61 ISF, 3 Hashd, 6
Civilians
113 Wounded: 98 ISF, 6 Hashd, 9
Civilians
9 Shootings
12 IEDs
3 Suicide Bombers
3 Suicide Car Bombs
|
Province
|
Mar
15-21
|
Anbar
|
20 Incidents
50 Killed: 5 ISF, 45 Civilians
80 Wounded: 8 ISF, 72 Civilians
9 Shootings
2 Suicide Bombers
3 Suicide Car Bombs
4 Mortars
2 Rockets
|
Babil
|
5 Incidents
4 Killed: 2 ISF, 2 Civilians
10 Wounded: 6 ISF, 2 Hashd, 2
Civilians
3 Shootings
1 IED
1 Sticky Bomb
|
Baghdad
|
51 Incidents
74 Killed: 6 ISF, 1 Sahwa, 1
Hashd, 66 Civilians
254 Wounded: 21 ISF, 5 Sahwa, 228
Civilians
13 Shootings
34 IEDs
4 Sticky Bombs
|
Basra
|
1 Incident
12 Killed: 12 Civilians
30 Wounded: 30 Civilians
1 Truck Bomb
|
Diyala
|
7 Incidents
5 Killed: 5 Civilians
4 Shootings
3 IEDs
|
Irbil
|
1 Incident
1 Rocket
|
Kirkuk
|
8 Incidents
24 Killed: 20 Peshmerga, 1 Hashd,
3 Civilians
59 Wounded: 50 Peshmerga, 8 Hashd,
1 Civilian
6 Shootings
2 IEDs
|
Maysan
|
1 Incident
1 Killed: 1 ISF
1 Shooting
|
Ninewa
|
19 Incidents
37 Killed: 12 Peshmerga, 25
Civilians
9 Shootings
4 IEDs
|
Salahaddin
|
28 Incidents
92 Killed: 48 ISF, 6 Hashd, 38
Civilians
70 Wounded: 23 ISF, 26 Hashd, 21
Civilians
15 Shootings
6 IEDs
3 Suicide Bombers
2 Suicide Car Bombs
1 Mortar
1
Rocket
|
Car
Bombs In Iraq March 2015
Date
|
Location
|
Dead
|
Wounded
|
Mar 1
|
|||
Mar 2
|
East
of Samarra, Salahaddin
|
4
|
|
Mar 3
|
South
of Tikrit, Salahaddin
|
4
|
12
|
Mar 4
|
|||
Mar 5
|
Abu
Dishir, Baghdad
Alam
& Tal Ksaiba x3, Salahaddin
|
7
|
37
|
Mar 6
|
|||
Mar 7
|
Bastan,
Anbar
Bani
Saad, Diyala
Tuz
Kharmato, Salahaddin
|
13
|
47
|
Total
|
10
|
28
|
96
|
Mar 8
|
Zoba,
Anbar
Mahmudiya,
Babil
Jamila,
Baghdad
|
10
|
32
|
Mar 9
|
Mullah
Ali x3, Kirkuk
|
5
|
30
|
Mar 10
|
Mullah
Abdullah, Kirkuk
Baiji,
Salahaddin
|
2
|
16
|
Mar 11
|
Ramadi
x17, Anbar
Hurriya,
Baghdad
Diom,
Salahaddin
|
29
|
79
|
Mar 12
|
Saqlawiya,
Anbar
|
3
|
5
|
Mar 13
|
Diom,
Salahaddin
|
6
|
11
|
Mar 14
|
Ramadi
x5, Anbar
|
11
|
14
|
Total
|
34
|
66
|
187
|
Mar 15
|
Ramadi,
Anbar
|
5
|
7
|
Mar 16
|
|||
Mar 17
|
Ramadi,
Anbar
|
||
Mar 18
|
Um
Qasr, Basra
|
12
|
30
|
Mar 19
|
|||
Mar 20
|
Huiysh,
Salahaddin
|
6
|
|
Mar 21
|
Ramadi,
Anbar
Thar
Thar, Salahaddin
|
2
|
8
|
Total
|
6
|
19
|
51
|
After a yearly high of 34 vehicle borne improvised explosive
devices (VBIEDs) in the second week of March, there were just six the third
week. Ramadi continued to be the main target with three detonating there from
March 15-21. Just like previous weeks as well the security forces and Hashd
were the favorite targets with five out of six aimed at them. There were far
more VBIEDs that were launched by the Islamic State but were destroyed before
reaching their target. The totals of 19 dead and 51 wounded from the 6 car
bombs were also probably low as complete numbers for some of the attacks were
not reported.
Just like the previous week both the government and Islamic
State were carrying out major operations in Anbar. The Islamic State continued
its heavy attacks in Ramadi. The government center and Howaz district were
assaulted several times during the week. For example, March 15 Howaz was
hit by a suicide car bomb on an army base, followed by an infantry assault, along with an attack
on the northeast and mortar
fire. The next
day, the northwest was hit, then the Andalus and Dhobat sections were
struck by 2 suicide bombers, a suicide car bomb, followed by an infantry attack
on March
17. The government forces on the other hand, were focused upon carrying out
the second phase of its clearing sweep through the Garma
area. Several
villages were cleared in the process. This operation was started in an
attempt to end indirect fire on Baghdad’s western suburbs. Despite all the
activity the overall situation in the province has been deadlocked for months.
IS has made some small advances in Ramadi over the last few months, but many
neighborhoods remain contested. The government forces remained undermanned as
well, unable to hold territory that it clears.
Baghdad had almost the same number of casualties the third
week of March as the second. There were 74 dead and 254 wounded from March
15-21 compared to 88 killed and 245 injured from March 8-14. Since the start of
the month there has been 89 improvised explosive devices. These are the major
threats to the province accounting for most of the casualties.
Starting last week the Kurdish peshmerga moved out of the
disputed territories into southern Kirkuk in a supporting operation to the one
in Tikrit, Salahaddin. The Kurds have made steady progress with a number of
towns in the Daquq and Bashir area taken. The Hashd forces have also become
involved in these maneuvers. The ultimate goal is to take Hawija, which remains
the main insurgent stronghold in the governorate.
The major news however was in Salahaddin where the Tikrit
operation was put on hold towards the end of the second week of March. The
official reason was for civilians to exit the battle zone and for
reinforcements to be called up. There were also plenty of reports
about divisions between the Iranians, pro-Iranian Hashd groups, the ISF and
Baghdad over strategy and tactics. One is over the role of the United States
led Coalition. The Americans have not been involved because of the large role
played by Iran, which was Tehran’s
plan. The Iranians along with their allies amongst the Hashd wanted to show
that they could defeat the insurgents without the Coalition. As casualties have
mounted and IED fields and snipers have slowed the advance the ISF have been
calling for Washington’s help. The head of the Samarra Operations Command for
example, General Abdul Wahab al-Saadi was quoted in the press on March
15 saying that he asked the Defense Ministry to request Coalition air
strikes. Badr Organization head Hadi Ameri in turn, criticized the
army for asking for that help. Prime Minister Haider Abadi is said to support
the military in this debate. Iran and the Hashd are also reportedly pushing
for a head on assault of Tikrit, while Baghdad and the ISF are looking for an
alternative that could reduce casualties. In the meantime Tikrit remains
surrounded, and when these differences are resolved the city will fall. The
geopolitics of the situation need to be resolved first.
SOURCES
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim and Yacoub, Sameer, “Iraqi commander
slams US, hails Iran in fight against ISIS in Tikrit,” Assocaited Press,
3/14/15
AIN,
"Urgent: 6 volunteers injured in suicide attack in Samara," 3/21/15
Beale, Jonathan, “Battle for Tikrit key to Iraq’s future,”
BBC, 3/23/15
Dunlop, W.G., “Iraqi army says coalition raids needed in
Tikrit battle,” Agence France Presse, 3/15/15
Al
Forat, "Initial Count: Basra truck bombing kills, injures 43
civilians," 3/18/15
Iraq
Times, "Salahuddin operations: the martyrdom and wounding of seven of the
popular crowd in clashes with Daash," 3/21/15
Al Mada, “Abadi plans to unify the crowd under his
leadership and efforts to engage the international coalition in the battle for
Tikrit,” 3/21/15
Morris, Loveday, “Iraqi offensive for Tikrit stalls as casualties
mount,” Washington Post, 3/16/15
NINA, "Breaking News..Military Operations To Liberate
Karma Area Kicked Off," 3/15/15,
-
"The death toll of victims of the indiscriminate shelling of Ramadi by the
IS rose to 16 martyrs and wounded," 3/15/15
- "A number of areas liberated in Karma district of
Anbar province," 3/21/15
-
"Security forces repel an attack by Daash in central Ramadi," 3/17/15
-
"A soldier wounded in center of Ramadi," 3/21/15
Prothero, Mitchell, “Operation to retake Tikrit from Islamic
State stalled by heavy casualties, discord,” McClatchy Newspapers, 3/20/15
Radio
Free Iraq, "15 March 2015," Daily Updates from Anbar, 3/15/15
-
"16 March 2015," Daily Updates from Anbar, 3/16/15
Al
Rayy, "Daash attack thwarted killing six of them in Ramadi," 3/15/15
Salih, Mohammed, “Iran gathers power in Iraq as US further
sidelined,” Al Monitor, 3/17/15
Shafaq
News, "ISIS bombarding the western borders of Erbil with Katyusha
mortar," 3/15/15
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