Chapter 9 of the U.S. Army’s second volume on the Iraq War focuses upon Iraqi security operations that were launched in the summer of 2008. Instead of being a sign of a new national leadership by the Maliki government the offensives highlighted the continued divisions within the country and Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s first moves towards becoming an autocrat.
In May 2008 Iraq launched Operation Mother of Two Spring in Mosul which was the last urban stronghold of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). In March Prime Minister Maliki ordered an attack upon his political rival Moqtada al-Sadr in Basra that resulted in the defeat of his militia not only there but in Sadr City in Baghdad as well. Going against the insurgency seemed like the next move.
Problems emerged with the forces used. Most of the soldiers were Kurds and the local Arabs called them peshmerga. A National Police brigade was Shiite and mistreated the locals. The U.S. considered the unit was so bad that it was redeployed outside of Mosul. The city and the larger Ninewa province were a disputed area between Kurds and Arabs. Calling the Kurdish army units peshmerga was a sign of that rivalry. The National Police on the other hand were notorious as being a sectarian force that targeted Sunnis. It was such a problem that the U.S. replaced almost every commander in the police.
July marked the beginning of Operation Glad Tidings in Diyala. This was again aimed at the insurgency but ended up going after the Kurds and Sahwa instead. The Americans believed Maliki was arresting Sahwa members to block their emergence as a political force before the 2009 provincial elections. The Iraqi army also told the peshmerga to leave Khanaqin that the Kurds claims as a disputed area. They refused to leave and the U.S. had to broker a compromise.
Things were topped off by a raid in August 2008 ordered by Maliki. He sent the special forces to the Diyala provincial government building to arrest the governor. Instead they detained 2 provincial councilmen, killed the governor’s secretary and wounded 4 others. On the way out they got into a gun battle with the local police backed by U.S. advisors. Ground forces commander General Ali Ghaidan had to intervene to end the confrontation.
Maliki was obviously attempting to assert his authority over Diyala. Going after the Sahwa and governor would strengthen the Shiite forces in Diyala while taking on the Kurds would help his image as an Arab leader in the country.
The special forces raid also marked the premier’s attempt to take over the unit. Maliki took the Counterterrorism Command out of the Defense Ministry and put it under his direct authority. Maliki placed an ally in charge of the force who the U.S. considered sectarian. He was even resented by members of the special forces who called their commander an Iranian. Maliki then promoted Shiites within the force to cement his control. The result was that the U.S. believed the forces were tipping off Shiites before raids so they wouldn’t be caught. The Americans tested their theory by drawing up a series of raids on Shiites and Sunnis. Only the ones on the latter community were executed.
In October 2008 U.S. Iraq commander General Ray Odierno met with PM Maliki about his treatment of the Sahwa. This came after one Sahwa commander died in custody. The prime minister defended his actions claiming the Sahwa were Baathsits and that the deceased was suspected in the 1999 murder of Ayatollah Sadiq al-Sadr. From the start Maliki opposed the Sahwa believing that it was part of a plot by the U.S. and Sunnis to overthrow him. He stood in the way of the formation of the force and then their integration into the government which he succeeded at. The Sahwa were a pivotal force in turning the tide against the Islamic State but then was allowed to wither and harassed by PM Maliki.
The final major event covered in the chapter was a June 2008 bombing in Baghdad’s Sadr City. The target was a meeting of the District Advisory Council and the explosion killed 6 Iraqis, 2 U.S. soldiers, 2 State Department officials and the deputy Provincial Reconstruction Team leader. Ali al-Lami the head of the DeBaathification Commission was implicated. Lami was close to Asaib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH) and the goal of the attack was to kill the new Sadrist head of the council. The Sadr movement was the main rival of AAH. Lami was also implicated in using the DeBaathification Commission’s security team to assassinate Sunnis. After the incident Lami left Iraq for Lebanon where he consulted with Hezbollah.
Two months later Lami was arrested by the Americans. He told them that his mentor Ahmed Chalabi was behind assassinations of former regime members, members of parliament, journalists and that he gave personal information about 450 former Baathists to Shiite death squads. Years later Lami would be killed and his one time allies AAH were suspected as the likely culprits.
SOURCE
Rayburn, Colonel Joel, Sobchak, Colonel Frank, Editors, The U.S. Army In The Iraq War Volume 2, Surge And Withdrawal 2007-2011, Strategic Studies institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2019
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