The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is the premier relief group working with Iraq’s displaced. They focus upon those who have lost their homes since the February 2006 Samarra bombing that is credited with starting the sectarian war. The IOM’s latest report notes that Iraq’s displaced still face many problems, and that the country’s provinces, especially Baghdad will face an increasing number of returns, which they may not be ready for.
The IOM believes that around 282,251 families, approximately 1.6 mill people, have been displaced since February 2006, with another 250,000 families becoming refugees. The IOM’s numbers mirror closely those of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). They recorded 202,018 families displaced before 2006, equaling 1,212,108 people, and 265,499 families losing their homes afterward, totaling 1,552,003 individuals. (2) Baghdad, Diyala, and Ninewa saw almost 90% of the displacement after the Samarra bombing.
The IOM has recorded about 58,110 post-Samarra families that have gone back so far, amounting to 348,660 people. That’s 10.9% of the families that have lost their homes. Of the returnees 6% were refugees, 3,659 families, and 94% were displaced, 54,451 families. According to the UNHCR’s figures, overall 40% of the displaced have returned since the beginning of the war in 2003. The two heaviest periods of returns were immediately after the invasion when 55,429 came back in 2003 and 291,997 did so in 2004, and then from 2008 to the present. 221,260 people returned in 2008, and 154,850 have from January to September 2009 as well. Like the post-Samarra families, the majority of those coming back have been internally displaced. In total, 703,190 have been internal refugees, compared to 426,156 who arrived from other countries.
The mix of displaced and refugees coming back varies from province to province. In Irbil, 103 families returned, and 100% of them were refugees. Muthanna was very similar with 64 families coming back, 88% of which were from abroad. In comparison Basra has seen 500 families return, 100% of which were displaced. In Ninewa 1,732 families have come back, along with 110,843 to Diyala, 99-98% of which were displaced. Baghdad has seen the most returns, 33,521 families. Of those, 69% came from within Baghdad province, 24% were from other provinces, and 6% were from abroad.
Post-Feb. 2006 Families Returning To Iraq – IOM
Baghdad: 33,521
Diyala: 10,843
Anbar: 5,553
Tamim: 3,873
Ninewa: 1,732
Maysan: 626
Basra: 500
Babil: 306
Karbala: 298
Najaf: 221
Salahaddin: 189
Wasit: 123
Dhi Qar: 108
Irbil: 103
Muthanna: 64
Qadisiyah: 44
Dohuk: 6
The reasons for displacement and return follow some broad trends. First, 58.1% have been displaced for one year or more. The major reasons for leaving their homes were being forced from their property, 23.6%, general violence, 14.3%, and armed conflict, 13.6%. Conversely, improvement in security is the main reason for families coming back. 43.17% said it was better security in their area of origin, 32.48% said it was a combination of better security and difficult conditions where they were, and just 12.98% said it was only problems with where they currently lived. Those difficulties include high rent, poor shelter, and lack of jobs and services. Those going back to Baghdad cite getting their old jobs back, help with transportation, repair to their homes and property, access to services, and wanting to put their kids in school as their main motivations. Of those that have gone back 61% said they feel safe all of the time. Almost half, 49%, said they had good housing conditions, while 34% said they were bad. In Baghdad, Diyala, Tamim, and Anbar, 42.5% said their homes were partially or completely destroyed.
The returnees also face a variety of problems. One is lack of jobs. 44.5% said they were able and employed, compared to 33.5% who said they were able and unemployed, and 22.0% who claimed they were unfit to work. While 98% say they had their ration cards, only 40% said they had regular access to the system, 54% said they had intermittent access, and 6% said they had no access at all. The government is also offering $840 for families that return. Only 44% of returnees have registered for the money however, and of those only 39% have gotten it. Other issues mentioned to the IOM were fuel, 44%, and health care, 42%.
Of those families that are still displaced, the majority say that they want to return. 52.7% said they wanted to go back to their homes, 25.1% said they would integrate where they were, and 19.7% said they would settle somewhere else. The problem the IOM pointed out was if conditions stayed the same or got better than Baghdad, Diyala, and Ninewa provinces could receive a lot more returning families. The question is what will happen then? The government does not have the capacity to deal with all the property claims that arise with large-scale returns. They have not been able to provide for those families that have come back, and have no real policy to deal with them overall. That could start a whole new crisis with thousands of families coming back, but not finding the support and housing they require, and not being able to provide for themselves.
UNHCR Numbers On Displacement And Returns
Displaced 2003-2009
Pre-2006: 202,018 families, 1,212,108 individuals
Post-2006: 265,499 families, 1,552,003 individuals
TOTAL: 467,517 families, 2,764,111 individuals
Returns 2003-2009
2003: 9,237 families, 55,429 individuals
2004: 48,655 families, 291,997 individuals
2005: 25,689 families, 154,155 individuals
2006: 28,355 families, 170,235 individuals
2007: 13,541 families, 81,420 individuals
2008: 39,280 families, 221,260 individuals
Jan.-Sep. 2009: 28,630 families, 154,850 individuals
TOTAL: 193,387 families, 1,129,346, 40% of total displaced
SOURCES
International Organization for Migration, “Assessment of Return to Iraq,” 11/3/09
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Return Update Iraq September 2009,” November 2009
Sunday, November 15, 2009
Friday, November 13, 2009
How Did Kirkuk Become Such A Divisive Issue? A Portrait of The City In 2003
The Pre-War Situation
As recent events have shown, Kirkuk remains one of the outstanding issues in Iraqi politics. Not only does it have a national dynamic between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad, but a local one between Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and Christians who live there and are all arguing over who has the right to control it. How did it get that way? A portrait of Kirkuk and Tamim province immediately after the U.S. invasion helps explain at least a part of the story.
In the weeks just before the war began in March 2003 hundreds of Kurds were being driven out of Kirkuk by Saddam’s forces. The goal was to prepare for the American invasion and suppress the Kurds who were expected to help them. This followed a long trend of Baghdad trying to change the demographics of the area. Saddam’s Anfal campaign that started in the 1980s, and his Arabization policy that displaced around 150,000 Kurds, Turkmen, and Assyrian Christians were the most famous examples, but the Iraqi government had been trying to move Arabs into Tamim since at least the 1950s. It’s believed that up to 350,000 Kurds and Turkmen were forced to leave as a result. The population was also changed by the fact that Kirkuk was the hub of the northern oil industry that attracted workers from around the country.
This has led to all kinds of claims to the city by each of the three major ethnicities there. For example, the Kurds say they were and are presently the majority, while the Turkmen point to the 1947 census that showed they were the largest group. A reporter from PBS’ Frontline that entered Kirkuk right after the invasion said that at that time the Kurds were 45% of city, Turkmen 25%, and the remaining 30% were split between Arabs and Christians.
Human Rights Watch warned in late March 2003 that Kirkuk was a disaster waiting to happen. They said unless the U.S. made plans for all of the people that were expected to return to the province after being pushed out by Saddam there would be a crisis. U.S., Turkish, and Iraqi opposition officials actually did meet that month, and said they would set up a committee to deal with northern Iraq, but it never materialized. This was no different from the rest of Iraq, where the U.S. also failed to adequately plan for the post-war situation.
Kirkuk During The U.S. Invasion
As soon as the U.S. war began in March 2003 Iraqi forces began abandoning their positions along the border with Kurdistan. This opened the road to Kirkuk, which the Kurds had promised the Americans they would not enter. The melting away of Saddam’s army was too tempting however, and the Kurdish peshmerga rushed to fill the vacuum. Looting was immediately reported in northern Tamim as the Kurds took out their anger at the Iraqi government. The situation was completely fluid and under Kurdish control, as there were only 2,000 U.S. paratroops in all of northern Iraq, and 50 Green Berets with the frontline peshmerga.
On April 10, the Iraqi forces withdrew from Kirkuk after heavy U.S. bombing, and Kurdish militiamen and civilians moved in. This set off alarm bells in Turkey that was afraid of Kurdish independence. Ankara warned that they would send in their troops if necessary to prevent that from happening, and the Turkish Foreign Minister demanded that observers be sent in at the minimum. He later talked to Secretary of State Colin Powell to get assurances that the Kurds would not be in control of Kirkuk.
Pillaging began in the city as well. There were lines of trucks and cars going back and forth from Irbil and Sulaymaniya to Kirkuk, full of looted goods. While most of the stealing appeared to be happening in Kurdish and government areas, the Turkmen claimed that they were being victimized by the Kurds as well. A day after Kirkuk fell, the Turkmen even held a demonstration against the looting. U.S. soldiers said they were powerless to stop it because they did not have control of the situation, very similar to what happened in other Iraqi cities after the fall of the government. The U.S. commander in Tamim later said that his unit had no plans for dealing with Kirkuk when they went into the country. They were originally tasked with just protecting the oil fields in the province, and were to stay out of the city. They were compelled to break those orders when Kirkuk descended into chaos.
Because of pressure from Washington and Turkey, the Kurdish leadership announced that the peshmerga would withdraw from Kirkuk. At the same time though, Kurdish police from Sulaymaniya were entering the city to assert law and order, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) was attempting to take over the administration. A contingent from the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade also arrived, and Ankara sent in a small group of Turkish Special Forces as observers.
As the looting was being brought under control, there were the first reports of Arabs being expelled from the city and surrounding rural areas. Divas, a middle class neighborhood in Kirkuk that was built for Iraqi army officers was found largely abandoned after Kurds told them they had 24 hours to leave or be shot. On orders from local PUK officials, 2,000 members of the Shamar tribe who had been moved into Tamim in 1973 with the promise of free land by the government were also forced out of four villages. A PUK official in a neighboring town said this was part of his party’s policy to remove all the Arabs that moved into the province under Saddam. Senior PUK leaders denied this claim however.
Most Arabs actually fled before the U.S. invasion even began. According to interviews conducted by Human Rights Watch, the main reasons why they left were to escape the U.S. bombings and fighting, fear of the Kurds’ revenge, and a belief that much of the property they occupied actually belonged to the Kurds. Many relocated to Kirkuk at first, but then moved south. There were already refugee camps full of Arabs just a week after the fall of the city, and those who tried to return to their homes said Kurdish civilians and peshmerga stopped them.
The Turkmen were also singled out. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) gave an eviction notice to the Iraqi Turkmen Front’s headquarters in Kirkuk on April 13. The party said that the KDP warned them that there would be trouble if they didn’t leave.
Post-War Kirkuk
By May there were sporadic outbursts of violence between the different ethnic groups in Tamim. In that month, around 500 Arabs from the town of Hawija attacked the Kurdish part of Kirkuk, starting 36 hours of fighting. Five people were killed in the process. The cause was Kurdish harassment of some Arabs at a market and a bridge in the city two days beforehand. The Kurdish police also reported that Arabs had killed four Kurds in another neighborhood, and 40 people had been wounded since the fall of the city. American troops were later shot at in Hawija, showing that some elements were also mad at the U.S. for how things were going.
That anger increased when the Americans put together a governing council in Tamim. On May 25, a 300-member assembly of local leaders elected 30 delegates to the council. The Kurds, Turkmen, Arabs, and Christians got six delegates each, plus there were six independent members. That council went on to pick a governor. The day the council was seated the U.S. arrested five Arab members saying that they were Baathists. Two days before American forces arrested two other Arab leaders on the same charges. The Kurds ended up winning the mayor of Kirkuk, and got the majority of seats on the council when the Americans gave them five of the six independent positions.
In August 2003 violence flared up between Turkmen and Kurds. On August 22, Turkmen held a parade for a rebuilt Shiite shrine in the town of Tuz Khumato, south of Kirkuk. They got into an argument with Kurdish residents, who then tried to destroy the shrine with rocket-propelled grenades. The Turkmen rioted, burning down a police station. Eight Turkmen were killed as a result, two by U.S. forces. The Turkmen were mad at the Kurds and the Americans beforehand because they had appointed a Kurdish mayor and chief of police, even though the Turkmen were a majority there. The next day, Turkmen held a protest in Kirkuk that also led to rioting. Three Turkmen were killed, 15-20 demonstrators and police were wounded, and Kurds set about attacking Turkmen statues in the city. There the Turkmen were accusing the Kurds of flooding the city to create a majority to take it over, while Kurdish officials accused the Turkmen of being manipulated by Turkey.
These bursts of violence continued for the rest of the year, with no one willing to back down. On November 20, the PUK headquarters in Kirkuk was bombed and the Islamist Ansar al-Islam was suspected of being responsible. A month later demonstrations and counter-demonstrations by Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen for and against federalism in Kirkuk led to a shootout on December 31 leaving five dead. U.S. raids were also turning up illegal weapons in all of the major political parties’ offices including those of the KDP, PUK and Turkmen Front, as all sides seemed to be gearing up for a fight.
The Kurdish parties were also trying to create facts on the ground to support their call for Kirkuk to be annexed by Kurdistan. They encouraged people to move back to Kirkuk, and even offered money to each family that did. Once there, these returnees tended to live in tent camps or squatted on government property. By March 2004, there were around 25,000 Kurds living in these conditions. None of them said they’d gotten any money from the Kurdish parties however, and they were desperate to find work, and were relying upon the government food ration system. There were thousands more still in Kurdistan who said they would not go back unless they knew they had housing and jobs. Others said they were simply too poor to make the trip. While many of these people had a legitimate desire to return to Kirkuk, the Kurdish parties were also manipulating them in their attempt to rest control of the city for themselves.
There were Turkmen and Arabs in a very similar situation. Turkmen were also attempting to return to Kirkuk, and were forced to live in tent camps too, as well as Arabs that had fled the city before the invasion. By 2004 the Mahdi Army was organizing Shiite Arabs and Turkmen in the city against the Kurdish claims, and threatening people to not leave.
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was very worried about the situation. Paul Bremer, the head of the CPA, was so concerned that he talked twice with Kurdish leaders asking them to drop their claims to Kirkuk, but to no avail. In September 2003 for example, the Kurdish President and head of the KDP Massoud Barzani said that all Arabs who had moved to Kirkuk and other Kurdish areas since 1961 had to leave. The CPA was panicking as a result, and did not offer any assistance to any of the Kurds that returned to Tamim, fearing that it would legitimize the Kurdish strategy.
By early 2004 the situation in Kirkuk and Tamim province were quickly deteriorating just as Human Rights Watch had warned about before the opening of hostilities. Reports of Arabs being expelled by Kurds after the fall of Kirkuk didn’t capture the fact that the majority had fled even before the war started. By June 2003 the Kurdish parties had cracked down on many of their members and there were no more stories of displacement. Much more important were the occasional flashes of violence, and the growing dispute over the governance of Kirkuk and Tamim. A year after the invasion, Kirkuk had grown from a local and regional problem to a national one as insurgents and the Mahdi Army were operating in the city, and the CPA was being drawn in. It seems that the divide and conquer strategy of Saddam Hussein was so effective that it continued to play out even after he was disposed. The Kurds, Turkmen, and Arabs were so tied up in their conflicting claims to Kirkuk that cooperation was nearly impossible. The lack of U.S. forces in the north also created a security vacuum that left every group to fend for itself, and the absence of U.S. planning for post-war Iraq allowed the PUK and KDP to become the de facto sovereigns of Kirkuk and many surrounding areas through their police and control of the administration. The subsequent years have only increased these divisions in the city, just as it has become more of an issue in Iraqi politics.
SOURCES
Badkhen, Anna, “Kurds evicting Arabs in north Iraq,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/19/03
Baker, Luke, “Ancient Rivalries Vie for Dominance of Iraq’s Kirkuk,” Reuters, 2/5/04
BBC, “Kurds flee Iraqi town,” 3/15/03
Bruni, Frank, “A Nation At War: Northern Iraq; Turkey Sending Military Observers to Watch Kurds; U.S. Warns Against Further Moves,” New York Times, 4/11/03
Chivers, C.J., “A Nation At War: In The Field – Kirkuk; Iraqis Abandon Post And Kurds Advance,” New York Times, 3/28/03
- “A Nation At War: In The Field l Northern Iraq; Kirkuk on the Horizon, and a Falcon and Shells Nearby,” New York Times, 4/2/03
- “A Nation At War: Northern Front; Attention Now Shifts to the Role of the Kurds,” New York Times, 4/10/03
- “A Nation At War: Northern Iraq; Paratroopers Find Suspicious Warheads and Rocket Parts in Kirkuk,” New York Times, 4/13/03
- “A Nation At War: The Kurds; Kirkuk’s Swift Collapse Leaves a City in Chaos,” New York Times, 4/11/03
CNN, “U.S. reinforcements arrive in Kirkuk,” 4/10/03
Fleishman, Jeffrey, “Kirkuk Rises to Uneasy Freedom,” Los Angeles Times, 4/12/03
Human Rights Watch, “Claims in Conflict,” 8/2/04
- “Iraq: Impending Inter-Ethnic Violence in Kirkuk,” 3/27/03
- “Iraq: Killings, Expulsions on the Rise in Kirkuk,” 4/14/03
Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, “IDP News Alert: 16 April 2003,” 4/16/03
- “IDP News Alert: 23 April 2003,” 4/23/03
IRIN, “IRAQ: Focus on IDPs in Kirkuk living in poor conditions,” 3/1/04
Kiley, Sam, “IRAQ: The Road to Kirkuk,” Frontline, May 2003
Mite, Valentinas, “Turkomans Say Kirkuk’s Growing Kurdish Population A Threat,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 11/13/03
Mufti, Hania, Stover, Eric, “Troubles in Kirkuk,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/30/03
Oppel, Richard with MacFarquhar, Neil, “After the War: Southern Iraq; 3 British Soldiers Are Killed in Basra Attack,” New York Times, 8/24/03
PBS Frontline, “Interview Col. William Mayville,” Beyond Baghdad, 2/12/04
Rhode, David, “A Nation At War: The North; As Kurds Move Into Kirkuk, Arabs Fear Revenge,” New York Times, 4/11/03
Sachs, Susan, “A Region Inflamed: Attacks; Truck Bomb Kills 5 in a Pro-U.S. Kurdish Stronghold in Northern Iraq,” New York Times, 11/21/03
Travernise, Sabrina, “After The War: The North; Kurds Celebrate Election of Mayor in Kirkuk,” New York Times, 5/29/03
- “After The War: Northern Iraq; U.S. Detains 5 Suspected Baath Loyalists at Kirkuk Elections,” New York Times, 5/25/03
- “Aftereffects: The North; Arabs and Kurds Clash in Kirkuk, and at Least 5 Are Killed,” New York Times, 5/18/03
Tyler, Patrick, “A Nation At War: Combat; Allies Widen Hold on Iraq; Civil Strife on Rise,” New York Times, 4/11/03
Voice of America, “Iraqi Kurds Return to Kirkuk,” 5/29/03
Washington Times, “Insurgents stir up strife in Kirkuk,” 5/17/04
Wong, Edward, “The Struggle for Iraq: Northern Iraq; Back From Exile, Kurds Demand Political Power and Reparations for Seized Property,” New York Times, 1/19/04
As recent events have shown, Kirkuk remains one of the outstanding issues in Iraqi politics. Not only does it have a national dynamic between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad, but a local one between Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and Christians who live there and are all arguing over who has the right to control it. How did it get that way? A portrait of Kirkuk and Tamim province immediately after the U.S. invasion helps explain at least a part of the story.
In the weeks just before the war began in March 2003 hundreds of Kurds were being driven out of Kirkuk by Saddam’s forces. The goal was to prepare for the American invasion and suppress the Kurds who were expected to help them. This followed a long trend of Baghdad trying to change the demographics of the area. Saddam’s Anfal campaign that started in the 1980s, and his Arabization policy that displaced around 150,000 Kurds, Turkmen, and Assyrian Christians were the most famous examples, but the Iraqi government had been trying to move Arabs into Tamim since at least the 1950s. It’s believed that up to 350,000 Kurds and Turkmen were forced to leave as a result. The population was also changed by the fact that Kirkuk was the hub of the northern oil industry that attracted workers from around the country.
This has led to all kinds of claims to the city by each of the three major ethnicities there. For example, the Kurds say they were and are presently the majority, while the Turkmen point to the 1947 census that showed they were the largest group. A reporter from PBS’ Frontline that entered Kirkuk right after the invasion said that at that time the Kurds were 45% of city, Turkmen 25%, and the remaining 30% were split between Arabs and Christians.
Human Rights Watch warned in late March 2003 that Kirkuk was a disaster waiting to happen. They said unless the U.S. made plans for all of the people that were expected to return to the province after being pushed out by Saddam there would be a crisis. U.S., Turkish, and Iraqi opposition officials actually did meet that month, and said they would set up a committee to deal with northern Iraq, but it never materialized. This was no different from the rest of Iraq, where the U.S. also failed to adequately plan for the post-war situation.
Kirkuk During The U.S. Invasion
As soon as the U.S. war began in March 2003 Iraqi forces began abandoning their positions along the border with Kurdistan. This opened the road to Kirkuk, which the Kurds had promised the Americans they would not enter. The melting away of Saddam’s army was too tempting however, and the Kurdish peshmerga rushed to fill the vacuum. Looting was immediately reported in northern Tamim as the Kurds took out their anger at the Iraqi government. The situation was completely fluid and under Kurdish control, as there were only 2,000 U.S. paratroops in all of northern Iraq, and 50 Green Berets with the frontline peshmerga.
On April 10, the Iraqi forces withdrew from Kirkuk after heavy U.S. bombing, and Kurdish militiamen and civilians moved in. This set off alarm bells in Turkey that was afraid of Kurdish independence. Ankara warned that they would send in their troops if necessary to prevent that from happening, and the Turkish Foreign Minister demanded that observers be sent in at the minimum. He later talked to Secretary of State Colin Powell to get assurances that the Kurds would not be in control of Kirkuk.
Pillaging began in the city as well. There were lines of trucks and cars going back and forth from Irbil and Sulaymaniya to Kirkuk, full of looted goods. While most of the stealing appeared to be happening in Kurdish and government areas, the Turkmen claimed that they were being victimized by the Kurds as well. A day after Kirkuk fell, the Turkmen even held a demonstration against the looting. U.S. soldiers said they were powerless to stop it because they did not have control of the situation, very similar to what happened in other Iraqi cities after the fall of the government. The U.S. commander in Tamim later said that his unit had no plans for dealing with Kirkuk when they went into the country. They were originally tasked with just protecting the oil fields in the province, and were to stay out of the city. They were compelled to break those orders when Kirkuk descended into chaos.
Because of pressure from Washington and Turkey, the Kurdish leadership announced that the peshmerga would withdraw from Kirkuk. At the same time though, Kurdish police from Sulaymaniya were entering the city to assert law and order, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) was attempting to take over the administration. A contingent from the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade also arrived, and Ankara sent in a small group of Turkish Special Forces as observers.
As the looting was being brought under control, there were the first reports of Arabs being expelled from the city and surrounding rural areas. Divas, a middle class neighborhood in Kirkuk that was built for Iraqi army officers was found largely abandoned after Kurds told them they had 24 hours to leave or be shot. On orders from local PUK officials, 2,000 members of the Shamar tribe who had been moved into Tamim in 1973 with the promise of free land by the government were also forced out of four villages. A PUK official in a neighboring town said this was part of his party’s policy to remove all the Arabs that moved into the province under Saddam. Senior PUK leaders denied this claim however.
Most Arabs actually fled before the U.S. invasion even began. According to interviews conducted by Human Rights Watch, the main reasons why they left were to escape the U.S. bombings and fighting, fear of the Kurds’ revenge, and a belief that much of the property they occupied actually belonged to the Kurds. Many relocated to Kirkuk at first, but then moved south. There were already refugee camps full of Arabs just a week after the fall of the city, and those who tried to return to their homes said Kurdish civilians and peshmerga stopped them.
The Turkmen were also singled out. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) gave an eviction notice to the Iraqi Turkmen Front’s headquarters in Kirkuk on April 13. The party said that the KDP warned them that there would be trouble if they didn’t leave.
Post-War Kirkuk
By May there were sporadic outbursts of violence between the different ethnic groups in Tamim. In that month, around 500 Arabs from the town of Hawija attacked the Kurdish part of Kirkuk, starting 36 hours of fighting. Five people were killed in the process. The cause was Kurdish harassment of some Arabs at a market and a bridge in the city two days beforehand. The Kurdish police also reported that Arabs had killed four Kurds in another neighborhood, and 40 people had been wounded since the fall of the city. American troops were later shot at in Hawija, showing that some elements were also mad at the U.S. for how things were going.
That anger increased when the Americans put together a governing council in Tamim. On May 25, a 300-member assembly of local leaders elected 30 delegates to the council. The Kurds, Turkmen, Arabs, and Christians got six delegates each, plus there were six independent members. That council went on to pick a governor. The day the council was seated the U.S. arrested five Arab members saying that they were Baathists. Two days before American forces arrested two other Arab leaders on the same charges. The Kurds ended up winning the mayor of Kirkuk, and got the majority of seats on the council when the Americans gave them five of the six independent positions.
In August 2003 violence flared up between Turkmen and Kurds. On August 22, Turkmen held a parade for a rebuilt Shiite shrine in the town of Tuz Khumato, south of Kirkuk. They got into an argument with Kurdish residents, who then tried to destroy the shrine with rocket-propelled grenades. The Turkmen rioted, burning down a police station. Eight Turkmen were killed as a result, two by U.S. forces. The Turkmen were mad at the Kurds and the Americans beforehand because they had appointed a Kurdish mayor and chief of police, even though the Turkmen were a majority there. The next day, Turkmen held a protest in Kirkuk that also led to rioting. Three Turkmen were killed, 15-20 demonstrators and police were wounded, and Kurds set about attacking Turkmen statues in the city. There the Turkmen were accusing the Kurds of flooding the city to create a majority to take it over, while Kurdish officials accused the Turkmen of being manipulated by Turkey.
These bursts of violence continued for the rest of the year, with no one willing to back down. On November 20, the PUK headquarters in Kirkuk was bombed and the Islamist Ansar al-Islam was suspected of being responsible. A month later demonstrations and counter-demonstrations by Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen for and against federalism in Kirkuk led to a shootout on December 31 leaving five dead. U.S. raids were also turning up illegal weapons in all of the major political parties’ offices including those of the KDP, PUK and Turkmen Front, as all sides seemed to be gearing up for a fight.
The Kurdish parties were also trying to create facts on the ground to support their call for Kirkuk to be annexed by Kurdistan. They encouraged people to move back to Kirkuk, and even offered money to each family that did. Once there, these returnees tended to live in tent camps or squatted on government property. By March 2004, there were around 25,000 Kurds living in these conditions. None of them said they’d gotten any money from the Kurdish parties however, and they were desperate to find work, and were relying upon the government food ration system. There were thousands more still in Kurdistan who said they would not go back unless they knew they had housing and jobs. Others said they were simply too poor to make the trip. While many of these people had a legitimate desire to return to Kirkuk, the Kurdish parties were also manipulating them in their attempt to rest control of the city for themselves.
There were Turkmen and Arabs in a very similar situation. Turkmen were also attempting to return to Kirkuk, and were forced to live in tent camps too, as well as Arabs that had fled the city before the invasion. By 2004 the Mahdi Army was organizing Shiite Arabs and Turkmen in the city against the Kurdish claims, and threatening people to not leave.
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was very worried about the situation. Paul Bremer, the head of the CPA, was so concerned that he talked twice with Kurdish leaders asking them to drop their claims to Kirkuk, but to no avail. In September 2003 for example, the Kurdish President and head of the KDP Massoud Barzani said that all Arabs who had moved to Kirkuk and other Kurdish areas since 1961 had to leave. The CPA was panicking as a result, and did not offer any assistance to any of the Kurds that returned to Tamim, fearing that it would legitimize the Kurdish strategy.
By early 2004 the situation in Kirkuk and Tamim province were quickly deteriorating just as Human Rights Watch had warned about before the opening of hostilities. Reports of Arabs being expelled by Kurds after the fall of Kirkuk didn’t capture the fact that the majority had fled even before the war started. By June 2003 the Kurdish parties had cracked down on many of their members and there were no more stories of displacement. Much more important were the occasional flashes of violence, and the growing dispute over the governance of Kirkuk and Tamim. A year after the invasion, Kirkuk had grown from a local and regional problem to a national one as insurgents and the Mahdi Army were operating in the city, and the CPA was being drawn in. It seems that the divide and conquer strategy of Saddam Hussein was so effective that it continued to play out even after he was disposed. The Kurds, Turkmen, and Arabs were so tied up in their conflicting claims to Kirkuk that cooperation was nearly impossible. The lack of U.S. forces in the north also created a security vacuum that left every group to fend for itself, and the absence of U.S. planning for post-war Iraq allowed the PUK and KDP to become the de facto sovereigns of Kirkuk and many surrounding areas through their police and control of the administration. The subsequent years have only increased these divisions in the city, just as it has become more of an issue in Iraqi politics.
SOURCES
Badkhen, Anna, “Kurds evicting Arabs in north Iraq,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/19/03
Baker, Luke, “Ancient Rivalries Vie for Dominance of Iraq’s Kirkuk,” Reuters, 2/5/04
BBC, “Kurds flee Iraqi town,” 3/15/03
Bruni, Frank, “A Nation At War: Northern Iraq; Turkey Sending Military Observers to Watch Kurds; U.S. Warns Against Further Moves,” New York Times, 4/11/03
Chivers, C.J., “A Nation At War: In The Field – Kirkuk; Iraqis Abandon Post And Kurds Advance,” New York Times, 3/28/03
- “A Nation At War: In The Field l Northern Iraq; Kirkuk on the Horizon, and a Falcon and Shells Nearby,” New York Times, 4/2/03
- “A Nation At War: Northern Front; Attention Now Shifts to the Role of the Kurds,” New York Times, 4/10/03
- “A Nation At War: Northern Iraq; Paratroopers Find Suspicious Warheads and Rocket Parts in Kirkuk,” New York Times, 4/13/03
- “A Nation At War: The Kurds; Kirkuk’s Swift Collapse Leaves a City in Chaos,” New York Times, 4/11/03
CNN, “U.S. reinforcements arrive in Kirkuk,” 4/10/03
Fleishman, Jeffrey, “Kirkuk Rises to Uneasy Freedom,” Los Angeles Times, 4/12/03
Human Rights Watch, “Claims in Conflict,” 8/2/04
- “Iraq: Impending Inter-Ethnic Violence in Kirkuk,” 3/27/03
- “Iraq: Killings, Expulsions on the Rise in Kirkuk,” 4/14/03
Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, “IDP News Alert: 16 April 2003,” 4/16/03
- “IDP News Alert: 23 April 2003,” 4/23/03
IRIN, “IRAQ: Focus on IDPs in Kirkuk living in poor conditions,” 3/1/04
Kiley, Sam, “IRAQ: The Road to Kirkuk,” Frontline, May 2003
Mite, Valentinas, “Turkomans Say Kirkuk’s Growing Kurdish Population A Threat,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 11/13/03
Mufti, Hania, Stover, Eric, “Troubles in Kirkuk,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/30/03
Oppel, Richard with MacFarquhar, Neil, “After the War: Southern Iraq; 3 British Soldiers Are Killed in Basra Attack,” New York Times, 8/24/03
PBS Frontline, “Interview Col. William Mayville,” Beyond Baghdad, 2/12/04
Rhode, David, “A Nation At War: The North; As Kurds Move Into Kirkuk, Arabs Fear Revenge,” New York Times, 4/11/03
Sachs, Susan, “A Region Inflamed: Attacks; Truck Bomb Kills 5 in a Pro-U.S. Kurdish Stronghold in Northern Iraq,” New York Times, 11/21/03
Travernise, Sabrina, “After The War: The North; Kurds Celebrate Election of Mayor in Kirkuk,” New York Times, 5/29/03
- “After The War: Northern Iraq; U.S. Detains 5 Suspected Baath Loyalists at Kirkuk Elections,” New York Times, 5/25/03
- “Aftereffects: The North; Arabs and Kurds Clash in Kirkuk, and at Least 5 Are Killed,” New York Times, 5/18/03
Tyler, Patrick, “A Nation At War: Combat; Allies Widen Hold on Iraq; Civil Strife on Rise,” New York Times, 4/11/03
Voice of America, “Iraqi Kurds Return to Kirkuk,” 5/29/03
Washington Times, “Insurgents stir up strife in Kirkuk,” 5/17/04
Wong, Edward, “The Struggle for Iraq: Northern Iraq; Back From Exile, Kurds Demand Political Power and Reparations for Seized Property,” New York Times, 1/19/04
Thursday, November 12, 2009
Nir Rosen’s New Take On Iraq – “An Ugly Peace”
In the November/December 2009 issue of the Boston Review, Nir Rosen has a piece called “An Ugly Peace.” In it, Rosen writes about the new status quo in Iraq that was created by the end of the sectarian war and the U.S. Surge, something that he was reluctant to talk about in previous articles. He writes that while Iraq still has plenty of problems such as sectarianism, there are no real challenges to the power of the Iraqi government, and a state of relative stability is beginning to emerge in the country.
Rosen tries to explain how Iraq has come to this new situation. The major reason to him was that the Shiites won the sectarian war. The Mahdi Army, with the implicit and sometimes explicit support of the Iraqi government and security forces were successful in driving large numbers of Sunnis out of central and southern Iraq. Sunni insurgents were also fighting with Al Qaeda in Iraq. By the time the U.S. began the Surge in 2007, many Sunnis were willing to switch sides and work with the Americans for money in the Sons of Iraq (SOI) program to expel the Islamists. U.S. erected blast walls also formalized the new segregation of Iraqi neighborhoods. The success of the Shiites, also led them to turn on each other. The Mahdi Army for example, devolved into several factions, some of which were no better than gangs that preyed on their own communities. In early 2008, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki took advantage of this situation by striking against the Sadrists in Basra and Baghdad, resting control of the streets from them. This helped transform him from a sectarian into a nationalist leader at the front of a newly invigorated Iraqi state.
All of this is generally agreed upon by Iraq observers. What’s new is that Rosen is finally writing about it. This has been a slow transformation. In 2008 for example, he wrote about the Sons of Iraq (SOI) program in an article entitled “The Myth of the Surge” in Rolling Stone that emphasized that the Sons of Iraq were insurgents with blood on their hands, and only a stop-gap measure that was actually increasing violence, and putting off the next battle between Sunnis and Shiites. By April 2009 in “The big sleep” for The National, however, he noted that the Sunnis had actually lost the war, and were done for as a military force. He revealed that back in 2006 Sunni insurgent leaders in Jordan and Syria had told him that they were done for now that the sectarian war had started because they could not beat the numerically superior Shiite militias and Shiite controlled government. Maliki’s arrest of an SOI leader in Fadhil that led to two days of fighting, but no further repercussions also showed that the insurgents were not unified enough to resist the power of the government. In fact, the entire SOI program meant that the former insurgents were publicly known, and denied them the anonymity that would allow them to melt back into the public and return to the insurgency.
Another major change in tone could be seen in Rosen’s opinion of the Mahdi Army. In “Songs for the Mahdi Army” for Mother Jones in December 2008 he wrote about how the Sadrists were a state within a state with their militia and social services. They were a force that could not be ignored, and that they were here to stay, even after the government’s crackdown. By the time of “The Ugly Peace” Rosen was talking about their shortcomings. Whereas before he said that the Mahdi Army attacked Sunnis who were Baathists and militants, now he wrote that the Sadrists were responsible for ethnic cleansing of entire Sunni communities. Sadr had also lost control of parts of his movement, some of which had devolved into gangs. This was a far change from previous reports that gave the impression that Sadrists were everywhere in Shiite communities, the security forces, and the government, and all were loyal followers.
Rosen also seems to have come to the conclusion that Iraq is entering a stage of some type of stability. Back in April 2009 he wrote in “The gathering storm” that while there was no more random violence in Baghdad, that shops were open and customers were out on the streets, that Iraq was rebuilding, and that some displaced and refugees were returning he felt a sense of foreboding of things falling apart once the U.S. withdrew. In “An Ugly Peace” he appears to be arguing that the Iraqis can handle security, and that the Iraqi government is strong enough to stand on its own.
The major problem he sees remaining in Iraq is latent sectarianism. That no longer takes the form of fighting out on the streets, but rather in an emerging Shiite culture in the security forces, and government offices. He found that in almost every Iraqi institution and ministry he went to there were posters of Shiite religious figures hanging from the walls, and Shiite music could be heard. He also mentions the continuing refugee and displaced crisis, corruption and Maliki’s move towards authoritarianism as other issues.
This is what Rosen means by his title. There is an ugly peace in Iraq with the Sadrists having lost their standing, the sectarian war is over, but sectarianism remains, and the Sunnis are thoroughly defeated and divided. The Iraqi state and Prime Minister Maliki are asserting their authority, and face no real challengers. These are all major changes in Rosen’s writing who before emphasized that renewed fighting and conflict were always just around the corner. The major problem is that he knew about many of these changes years ago, but didn’t really write about them until now. Having Sunni insurgent leaders saying that they knew they were going to eventually lose back in 2006 was not reported until 2009. The same is true for the Sadrists. Rosen must have known about their fracturing and loss of standing, but chose not to mention it until the end of this year. The real question is what took him so long to change his tune? Was it that he was so caught up in the moment that he didn’t realize the larger transformations occurring, or did his opposition to the U.S. invasion make him emphasize the resistance and chaos in Iraq to make the Americans look bad?
SOURCES
Rosen, Nir, “An Ugly Peace,” Boston Review, November/December 2009
- “The big sleep,” The National, 4/24/09
- “The gathering storm,” The National, 4/10/09
- “The Myth of the Surge,” Rolling Stone, 3/6/08
- “Songs for the Mahdi Army,” Mother Jones, 12/2/08
Rosen tries to explain how Iraq has come to this new situation. The major reason to him was that the Shiites won the sectarian war. The Mahdi Army, with the implicit and sometimes explicit support of the Iraqi government and security forces were successful in driving large numbers of Sunnis out of central and southern Iraq. Sunni insurgents were also fighting with Al Qaeda in Iraq. By the time the U.S. began the Surge in 2007, many Sunnis were willing to switch sides and work with the Americans for money in the Sons of Iraq (SOI) program to expel the Islamists. U.S. erected blast walls also formalized the new segregation of Iraqi neighborhoods. The success of the Shiites, also led them to turn on each other. The Mahdi Army for example, devolved into several factions, some of which were no better than gangs that preyed on their own communities. In early 2008, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki took advantage of this situation by striking against the Sadrists in Basra and Baghdad, resting control of the streets from them. This helped transform him from a sectarian into a nationalist leader at the front of a newly invigorated Iraqi state.
All of this is generally agreed upon by Iraq observers. What’s new is that Rosen is finally writing about it. This has been a slow transformation. In 2008 for example, he wrote about the Sons of Iraq (SOI) program in an article entitled “The Myth of the Surge” in Rolling Stone that emphasized that the Sons of Iraq were insurgents with blood on their hands, and only a stop-gap measure that was actually increasing violence, and putting off the next battle between Sunnis and Shiites. By April 2009 in “The big sleep” for The National, however, he noted that the Sunnis had actually lost the war, and were done for as a military force. He revealed that back in 2006 Sunni insurgent leaders in Jordan and Syria had told him that they were done for now that the sectarian war had started because they could not beat the numerically superior Shiite militias and Shiite controlled government. Maliki’s arrest of an SOI leader in Fadhil that led to two days of fighting, but no further repercussions also showed that the insurgents were not unified enough to resist the power of the government. In fact, the entire SOI program meant that the former insurgents were publicly known, and denied them the anonymity that would allow them to melt back into the public and return to the insurgency.
Another major change in tone could be seen in Rosen’s opinion of the Mahdi Army. In “Songs for the Mahdi Army” for Mother Jones in December 2008 he wrote about how the Sadrists were a state within a state with their militia and social services. They were a force that could not be ignored, and that they were here to stay, even after the government’s crackdown. By the time of “The Ugly Peace” Rosen was talking about their shortcomings. Whereas before he said that the Mahdi Army attacked Sunnis who were Baathists and militants, now he wrote that the Sadrists were responsible for ethnic cleansing of entire Sunni communities. Sadr had also lost control of parts of his movement, some of which had devolved into gangs. This was a far change from previous reports that gave the impression that Sadrists were everywhere in Shiite communities, the security forces, and the government, and all were loyal followers.
Rosen also seems to have come to the conclusion that Iraq is entering a stage of some type of stability. Back in April 2009 he wrote in “The gathering storm” that while there was no more random violence in Baghdad, that shops were open and customers were out on the streets, that Iraq was rebuilding, and that some displaced and refugees were returning he felt a sense of foreboding of things falling apart once the U.S. withdrew. In “An Ugly Peace” he appears to be arguing that the Iraqis can handle security, and that the Iraqi government is strong enough to stand on its own.
The major problem he sees remaining in Iraq is latent sectarianism. That no longer takes the form of fighting out on the streets, but rather in an emerging Shiite culture in the security forces, and government offices. He found that in almost every Iraqi institution and ministry he went to there were posters of Shiite religious figures hanging from the walls, and Shiite music could be heard. He also mentions the continuing refugee and displaced crisis, corruption and Maliki’s move towards authoritarianism as other issues.
This is what Rosen means by his title. There is an ugly peace in Iraq with the Sadrists having lost their standing, the sectarian war is over, but sectarianism remains, and the Sunnis are thoroughly defeated and divided. The Iraqi state and Prime Minister Maliki are asserting their authority, and face no real challengers. These are all major changes in Rosen’s writing who before emphasized that renewed fighting and conflict were always just around the corner. The major problem is that he knew about many of these changes years ago, but didn’t really write about them until now. Having Sunni insurgent leaders saying that they knew they were going to eventually lose back in 2006 was not reported until 2009. The same is true for the Sadrists. Rosen must have known about their fracturing and loss of standing, but chose not to mention it until the end of this year. The real question is what took him so long to change his tune? Was it that he was so caught up in the moment that he didn’t realize the larger transformations occurring, or did his opposition to the U.S. invasion make him emphasize the resistance and chaos in Iraq to make the Americans look bad?
SOURCES
Rosen, Nir, “An Ugly Peace,” Boston Review, November/December 2009
- “The big sleep,” The National, 4/24/09
- “The gathering storm,” The National, 4/10/09
- “The Myth of the Surge,” Rolling Stone, 3/6/08
- “Songs for the Mahdi Army,” Mother Jones, 12/2/08
Wednesday, November 11, 2009
Is The U.S. Committed To Resolving The Kirkuk Controversy In Iraq?
The recent delay of the passage of the 2010 election law showed that Kirkuk remains one of the major unresolved issues in Iraq. There is now talk that the United States will try to deal with the city before it withdraws its troops by the end of 2011.
Joost Hilterman of the International Crisis Group recently wrote a piece in the New York Review of Books where he said that the U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill and commander of U.S. forces in Iraq General Ray Odierno will attempt to work out a deal over the future of Kirkuk after the Iraqi elections, which are set for January 2010. Odierno is especially worried that Kirkuk could be a flashpoint for renewed violence, this time between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government. He has successfully pushed the two sides to create a joint command center to coordinate the work of the local Iraqi forces and the Kurdish peshmerga in Kirkuk, but plans to expand that to surrounding areas has stalled because of politically differences. The local Arabs and Turkmen for example, think that the idea will legitimize the presence of the peshmerga, which they hope will someday leave.
U.S. forces have also returned to the streets of Kirkuk to conduct joint patrols, the first since the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from Iraqi cities. The chief of police in Kirkuk publicly said that the Iraqis could do their jobs without assistance, but privately told the BBC that he still calls the Americans for help with operations. This is another step by the U.S. meant to keep a lid on tensions in Kirkuk.
Iraqis desperately need some outside mediation to deal with Kirkuk. Left to their own devices, Iraq’s politicians could go on for months and months debating the issue. It has already been responsible for delaying two election laws, and Article 140 of the Constitution that called for a census and then referendum on the issue has been all but given up on. The United Nations has been trying to work on the issue since early 2007, but to no avail. The U.S. might be the best and last chance to make forward movement on Kirkuk. While their influence with Baghdad is declining, they still have many friends in Kurdistan, and can act as an honest broker since they have taken no position on the city, other than wanting it resolved. It’s definitely something that needs to be kept an eye on in the coming months.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Iraq-US joint patrols tour Kirkuk City,” 10/22/09
Gatehouse, Gabriel, “US presence remains in divided Kirkuk,” BBC, 10/20/09
Hilterman, Joost, “Iraq on the Edge,” New York Review of Books,” 11/19/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
- “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08
Joost Hilterman of the International Crisis Group recently wrote a piece in the New York Review of Books where he said that the U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill and commander of U.S. forces in Iraq General Ray Odierno will attempt to work out a deal over the future of Kirkuk after the Iraqi elections, which are set for January 2010. Odierno is especially worried that Kirkuk could be a flashpoint for renewed violence, this time between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government. He has successfully pushed the two sides to create a joint command center to coordinate the work of the local Iraqi forces and the Kurdish peshmerga in Kirkuk, but plans to expand that to surrounding areas has stalled because of politically differences. The local Arabs and Turkmen for example, think that the idea will legitimize the presence of the peshmerga, which they hope will someday leave.
U.S. forces have also returned to the streets of Kirkuk to conduct joint patrols, the first since the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from Iraqi cities. The chief of police in Kirkuk publicly said that the Iraqis could do their jobs without assistance, but privately told the BBC that he still calls the Americans for help with operations. This is another step by the U.S. meant to keep a lid on tensions in Kirkuk.
Iraqis desperately need some outside mediation to deal with Kirkuk. Left to their own devices, Iraq’s politicians could go on for months and months debating the issue. It has already been responsible for delaying two election laws, and Article 140 of the Constitution that called for a census and then referendum on the issue has been all but given up on. The United Nations has been trying to work on the issue since early 2007, but to no avail. The U.S. might be the best and last chance to make forward movement on Kirkuk. While their influence with Baghdad is declining, they still have many friends in Kurdistan, and can act as an honest broker since they have taken no position on the city, other than wanting it resolved. It’s definitely something that needs to be kept an eye on in the coming months.
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Iraq-US joint patrols tour Kirkuk City,” 10/22/09
Gatehouse, Gabriel, “US presence remains in divided Kirkuk,” BBC, 10/20/09
Hilterman, Joost, “Iraq on the Edge,” New York Review of Books,” 11/19/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
- “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08
Tuesday, November 10, 2009
The Changing Face of Violence In Mosul
Mosul remains the second most violent city in Iraq after Baghdad. Almost everyday there are reports of drive by shootings, assassinations, or bombings. Still, there has been a slight decline in casualties since 2007, and a change in the nature of the fighting there.
The problems in Mosul began in 2004. Immediately after the U.S. invasion in 2003 the 101st Airborne Division under the command of General David Petraeus was able to pacify the city by using strong security measures, funding reconstruction projects, and getting all the major parties in the area to join the local council. When his troops left, the city was turned over to Iraqis who were not up to the job. This vacuum allowed insurgents to set up shop in 2004. Mosul became an important way station for Baathists and Al Qaeda in Syria to transfer money, supplies, and foreign fighters into Iraq. By 2005 Al Qaeda was largely in control of the western half of the city, and security deteriorated as a result.
The U.S. responded by asking the Kurdish peshmerga to move into Mosul to help with security. They took up residence in the largely Kurdish western half of the city, while Kurdish army units were deployed in the surrounding areas of Ninewa province. This facilitated the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) taking over the local administration, and after the 2005 elections, they came to control the provincial council as well due to the Sunni Arab boycott. This created ethnic tensions between Arabs and Kurds, and more violence.
By 2008 Mosul had become the last urban bastion of the Iraqi insurgency. During the Surge in 2007 hundreds of militants were forced north to escape the increase in U.S. forces, and moved to Mosul. The ethnic divide there proved a fertile environment, as the insurgents increasingly portrayed themselves as the protectors of the Arabs against the Kurds. Security statistics show the changed environment. In the last three months of 2007 attacks and casualties were actually decreasing. In October 2007 there were an average of 1.51 attacks per day, resulting in 2.87 deaths and 5.83 wounded, compared to just 0.96 attacks per day, 1.58 deaths and 1.25 wounded by December. That averaged out to 1.26 security incidents per day, 2.52 deaths, and 3.73 wounded for the last three months of 2007. By the first half of 2008 that increased to 1.89 security incidents, 2.90 deaths, and 6.92 wounded.
The presence of so many insurgents in Mosul led to several Iraqi and U.S. offensives, with few results. Beginning in February 2008 U.S. forces began setting up combat outposts throughout the city, and erecting blast walls to try to control the movement of insurgents, as Iraqi forces created a Ninewa Operations Command after Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki promised a “decisive battle” against Al Qaeda in the city in January. Deaths only decreased marginally, while the number of wounded increased dramatically over the next two months. They went from 3.34 deaths per day in February 2008 to 2.76 by April, while the number of wounded went from 2.75 to 7.60 during that same period. The problem was that rather than fighting, the militants instead chose to hide amongst the population, and adopted hit-and-run attacks.
Frustrated, in May Prime Minister Maliki announced Operation Lion’s Roar/Mother of Two Springs, but by August he admitted that it was a failure. Casualties actually increased in the two months after the offensive was launched going from 2.12 deaths per day, and 1.51 wounded in May to 3.58 deaths and 4.48 wounded by July. Following attacks on Christians in the city in October, U.S. and Iraqi forces launched Operation Mother of Two Springs II, and then Operation New Hope in February 2009. In October Operation Ninewa Wall was begun, which is almost exclusively Iraqi. Maliki also increasingly played up tensions with the Kurds, to try to rally the Sunni population of Mosul behind him to some success.
Casualties finally took a noticeable drop beginning in November 2008, but the security operations were not the cause. Rather it was the changing political situation in Mosul and Ninewa overall. In 2008 the al-Hadbaa party was formed to run in the 2009 provincial elections. The party was a coalition of Mosul elites, tribal leaders, and independent Kurds. Most important for the security situation, many Baathists and militants came to support the party as well. At the same time, the nationalist and Baathist factions of the insurgency were able to rest control of Mosul from Al Qaeda who had been losing ground in Iraq since the Anbar tribes turned on them beginning in 2005. These groups in turn, decided to try the political route after they boycotted the 2005 elections. The pending U.S. withdrawal was also a factor as many Sunni Arabs were afraid of greater Shiite domination after the Americans left, so they wanted to try to get positions in the government before that happened. Al-Hadbaa leaders were able to broker a cease-fire with the insurgents as a result, and the party ended up winning control of Ninewa in January 2009. Since then they have been able to forge a marriage of convenience with Maliki as both support a strong central government, and want the Kurdish peshmerga out of Mosul and Ninewa in general.
All of these factors led to a marked change in attacks in Mosul. Before armed clashes and shoot-outs were common in the city, along with all the bombings. Beginning in late 2008 through 2009 however, most attacks were drive by shootings, assassinations, house invasions, and still the bombs. The number of deaths went from 2.63 per day in the second half of 2008 to 1.97 in the first half of 2009, while the average number wounded dropped from 5.48 to 4.49 over the same period. From September to October the number of wounded also saw a noticeable drop.
Even with all of these changes Mosul remains a very dangerous place. Al-Hadbaa’s victory has increased tensions with the Kurdish Fraternal List that are boycotting the provincial council. That on-going ethnic divide provides a continued rationale for violence by some. In October 2009 Mosul still saw 66 attacks, 60 deaths, and 82 wounded. Until the problems between Arabs and Kurds are settled there, it will remain a largely war-torn city, unable to experience the slow return to normality that the rest of the country is beginning to experience.
The problems in Mosul began in 2004. Immediately after the U.S. invasion in 2003 the 101st Airborne Division under the command of General David Petraeus was able to pacify the city by using strong security measures, funding reconstruction projects, and getting all the major parties in the area to join the local council. When his troops left, the city was turned over to Iraqis who were not up to the job. This vacuum allowed insurgents to set up shop in 2004. Mosul became an important way station for Baathists and Al Qaeda in Syria to transfer money, supplies, and foreign fighters into Iraq. By 2005 Al Qaeda was largely in control of the western half of the city, and security deteriorated as a result.
The U.S. responded by asking the Kurdish peshmerga to move into Mosul to help with security. They took up residence in the largely Kurdish western half of the city, while Kurdish army units were deployed in the surrounding areas of Ninewa province. This facilitated the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) taking over the local administration, and after the 2005 elections, they came to control the provincial council as well due to the Sunni Arab boycott. This created ethnic tensions between Arabs and Kurds, and more violence.
By 2008 Mosul had become the last urban bastion of the Iraqi insurgency. During the Surge in 2007 hundreds of militants were forced north to escape the increase in U.S. forces, and moved to Mosul. The ethnic divide there proved a fertile environment, as the insurgents increasingly portrayed themselves as the protectors of the Arabs against the Kurds. Security statistics show the changed environment. In the last three months of 2007 attacks and casualties were actually decreasing. In October 2007 there were an average of 1.51 attacks per day, resulting in 2.87 deaths and 5.83 wounded, compared to just 0.96 attacks per day, 1.58 deaths and 1.25 wounded by December. That averaged out to 1.26 security incidents per day, 2.52 deaths, and 3.73 wounded for the last three months of 2007. By the first half of 2008 that increased to 1.89 security incidents, 2.90 deaths, and 6.92 wounded.
The presence of so many insurgents in Mosul led to several Iraqi and U.S. offensives, with few results. Beginning in February 2008 U.S. forces began setting up combat outposts throughout the city, and erecting blast walls to try to control the movement of insurgents, as Iraqi forces created a Ninewa Operations Command after Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki promised a “decisive battle” against Al Qaeda in the city in January. Deaths only decreased marginally, while the number of wounded increased dramatically over the next two months. They went from 3.34 deaths per day in February 2008 to 2.76 by April, while the number of wounded went from 2.75 to 7.60 during that same period. The problem was that rather than fighting, the militants instead chose to hide amongst the population, and adopted hit-and-run attacks.
Frustrated, in May Prime Minister Maliki announced Operation Lion’s Roar/Mother of Two Springs, but by August he admitted that it was a failure. Casualties actually increased in the two months after the offensive was launched going from 2.12 deaths per day, and 1.51 wounded in May to 3.58 deaths and 4.48 wounded by July. Following attacks on Christians in the city in October, U.S. and Iraqi forces launched Operation Mother of Two Springs II, and then Operation New Hope in February 2009. In October Operation Ninewa Wall was begun, which is almost exclusively Iraqi. Maliki also increasingly played up tensions with the Kurds, to try to rally the Sunni population of Mosul behind him to some success.
Casualties finally took a noticeable drop beginning in November 2008, but the security operations were not the cause. Rather it was the changing political situation in Mosul and Ninewa overall. In 2008 the al-Hadbaa party was formed to run in the 2009 provincial elections. The party was a coalition of Mosul elites, tribal leaders, and independent Kurds. Most important for the security situation, many Baathists and militants came to support the party as well. At the same time, the nationalist and Baathist factions of the insurgency were able to rest control of Mosul from Al Qaeda who had been losing ground in Iraq since the Anbar tribes turned on them beginning in 2005. These groups in turn, decided to try the political route after they boycotted the 2005 elections. The pending U.S. withdrawal was also a factor as many Sunni Arabs were afraid of greater Shiite domination after the Americans left, so they wanted to try to get positions in the government before that happened. Al-Hadbaa leaders were able to broker a cease-fire with the insurgents as a result, and the party ended up winning control of Ninewa in January 2009. Since then they have been able to forge a marriage of convenience with Maliki as both support a strong central government, and want the Kurdish peshmerga out of Mosul and Ninewa in general.
All of these factors led to a marked change in attacks in Mosul. Before armed clashes and shoot-outs were common in the city, along with all the bombings. Beginning in late 2008 through 2009 however, most attacks were drive by shootings, assassinations, house invasions, and still the bombs. The number of deaths went from 2.63 per day in the second half of 2008 to 1.97 in the first half of 2009, while the average number wounded dropped from 5.48 to 4.49 over the same period. From September to October the number of wounded also saw a noticeable drop.
Even with all of these changes Mosul remains a very dangerous place. Al-Hadbaa’s victory has increased tensions with the Kurdish Fraternal List that are boycotting the provincial council. That on-going ethnic divide provides a continued rationale for violence by some. In October 2009 Mosul still saw 66 attacks, 60 deaths, and 82 wounded. Until the problems between Arabs and Kurds are settled there, it will remain a largely war-torn city, unable to experience the slow return to normality that the rest of the country is beginning to experience.
Monthly Casualties In Mosul – Oct. 2007 to Oct. 2009
Attacks/ Incidents | Avg. # Of Attacks/ Incidents | Deaths | Avg. # Of Deaths | Wounded | Avg. # Of Wounded | |
2007 | ||||||
Oct. | 47 | 1.51 | 89 + 2 Americans | 2.87 | 181 + 2 Americans | 5.83 |
Nov. | 39 | 1.30 | 94 + 1 American | 3.13 | 124 + 1 American | 4.13 |
Dec. | 30 | 0.96 | 49 + 3 Americans | 1.58 | 39+ | 1.25 |
2008 | ||||||
Jan. | 58 | 1.87 | 107 + 6 Americans | 3.45 | 385 + 1 American | 12.41 |
Feb. | 56 | 1.93 | 97 + 1 American | 3.34 | 80 | 2.75 |
March | 64 | 2.06 | 86 | 2.77 | 267 | 8.61 |
April | 67 | 2.23 | 83 | 2.76 | 228 | 7.60 |
May | 42 | 1.35 | 66 | 2.12 | 47 + 3 Americans | 1.51 |
June | 58 | 1.93 | 89 | 2.96 | 253 | 8.43 |
July | 83 | 2.67 | 111 | 3.58 | 139 | 4.48 |
Aug. | 67 | 2.16 | 59 | 1.90 | 113 + 1 American | 3.64 |
Sep. | 80 | 2.66 | 82 | 2.73 | 140+ | 4.66 |
Oct. | 92 | 2.96 | 112 | 3.61 | 188 | 6.06 |
Nov. | 65 | 2.16 | 53 | 1.76 | 249 | 8.30 |
Dec. | 65 | 2.09 | 68 | 2.19 | 181 | 5.83 |
2009 | ||||||
Jan. | 52 | 1.67 | 56 | 1.80 | 56 | 1.80 |
Feb. | 81 | 2.89 | 58 | 2.00 | 111 | 3.96 |
March | 86 | 2.77 | 69 | 2.22 | 169 | 5.45 |
April | 79 | 2.63 | 53 | 1.76 | 191 | 6.36 |
May | 83 | 3.06 | 64 | 2.06 | 164 | 4.70 |
June | 73 | 2.43 | 58 | 1.93 | 123 | 4.10 |
July | 73 | 2.35 | 79 | 2.54 | 169 | 5.45 |
Aug. | 77 | 2.48 | 102 | 3.29 | 171 | 5.51 |
Sep. | 72 | 2.40 | 65 | 2.16 | 60 | 2.00 |
Oct. | 66 | 2.12 | 60 | 1.93 | 82 | 2.64 |
Avgs. | ||||||
4th Qtr 2007 | 38.66/ month | 1.26/day | 77.33/ month | 2.52/ day | 114.66/ month | 3.73/day |
1st Half 2008 | 57.5/ month | 1.89/day | 88.00/ month | 2.90/ day | 210.00/ month | 6.92/day |
2nd Half 2008 | 75.33/ month | 2.45/day | 80.83/ month | 2.63/ day | 168.33/ month | 5.48/day |
1st Half 2009 | 75.66/ month | 2.50/day | 59.66/ month | 1.97/ day | 135.66/ month | 4.49/day |
SOURCES
ABC News, "Iraqi woman and child killed by US fire," 5/11/08
Abouzeid, Rania, "In Mosul, Iraq's Insurgency Refuses to Be Tamed," Time, 3/18/09
Agence France Presse, "Death toll from bombing in Iraq's Mosul rises to 13," 6/3/08
Associated Press, "Al-Qaida in Iraq front group warns it will retaliate vs. US-Iraqi crackdown," 5/27/08
- "Female bomber kills 3 near bus stop in Iraq," USA Today, 3/19/08
- "Iraq: explosion in apartment kills at least 7, wounds 70," 1/23/08
- "Iraqi police: 18 killed in clashes with al-Qaeda," USA Today, 11/10/07
- "Police: Female suicide bomber kills 3 in Iraq," 2/17/08
Aswat al-Iraq, "2 bombs defused in Mosul," 10/26/09
- "2 civilians killed in Mosul," 10/21/09
- "2 civilians wounded in 2 separate incidents in Mosul," 10/5/09
- "2 cops wounded in Mosul blast," 10/5/09
- "2 killed in separate incidents in Mosul," 10/3/09
- "2 unknown bodies found in Mosul," 10/20/09
- "3 killed, 5 wounded in bombing in Mosul," 10/28/09
- "3 policemen killed, officer wounded in Mosul attack," 10/29/09
- "Blast in Ninewa wounds cement company chief," 10/18/09
- "Bomb wounds 2 in Mosul," 10/6/09
- "Children, mother wounded in Mosul blast," 10/12/09
- "Civilian killed in tribal clashes in Mosul," 10/12/09
- "Civilian wounded in IED blast near Mosul," 10/26/09
- "Contractor gunned down in Mosul," 10/12/09
- "District chief escapes attempt on his life in Mosul," 10/19/09
- "Guard killed in crowded souk in Mosul," 10/23/09
- "Gunmen assassinate tribal affairs office chief in Ninewa," 10/19/09
- "Gunmen storm building in Mosul, kill two civilians," 10/26/09
- "Hand grenade injures 4 in Mosul," 10/31/09
- "IED defused in western Mosul," 10/12/09
- "Iraq army kills gunman in Mosul," 10/19/09
- "Iraqi soldier killed, 2 wounded in Mosul," 10/23/09
- "Police kill gunman in northeastern Mosul," 10/2/09
- "Policeman killed, 3 civilians wounded separately in Mosul," 10/22/09
- "Policeman, gunman killed in Mosul," 10/22/09
- "Policeman survives IED blast near his vehicle," 10/18/09
- "Policeman wounded in Mosul blast," 10/13/09
- "Real-estate office owner killed in Mosul," 10/25/09
- "Sticky bomb defused at official building in Ninewa," 10/28/09
- "Sticky bomb kills, wounds 5 family members," 10/7/09
- "Sticky bomb wounds 5 in Mosul," 10/31/09
- "U.S. forces kill civilian, arrest 4 brothers," 10/27/09
- "Vendor, child killed in northern Mosul," 10/21/09
- "Woman killed, 2 civilians wounded by police mistake fire in Mosul," 10/16/09
- "Woman's head found in Mosul," 10/3/09
Brown, Drewn, "U.S. troops setting down roots in Mosul," Stars and Stripes, 2/23/08
CNN, "Bombings kill 11 in northern Ira," 7/7/08
- "Iraq to host Iran leader for first time since nations warred," 1/24/08
Dagher, Sam, "Fractures in Iraq City as Kurds and Baghdad Vie," New York Times, 10/28/08
Dimov, Marina, "Three members of same family murdered in northern Iraq," Visit Bulgaria, 9/12/08
DPA, "Al-Qaeda suspects, tribal policemen, TV presenter killed in Iraq," 6/17/08
- "At least 10 killed, 15 injured in attacks in Iraq," 2/25/08
- "At least 12 killed in Iraq violence," 3/11/08
- "At least 31 killed in Iraq violence, 100 wounded – 3rd Update," 12/25/07
- "At least 59 killed, 76 wounded in Iraqi violence (1st Lead)," 4/15/08
- "At least five killed, three wounded in Iraqi violence – Summary," 2/3/08
- "Christians, churches attacked in Iraq during celebration," 1/7/08
- "Female students kidnapped, US soldier dies in Iraq," 7/6/08
- "Four Iraqi soldiers killed in clashes in northern Iraq (Extra)," 5/7/08
- "Four killed, three injured in attacks in Mosul," 10/21/09
- "Governor of Iraq's Nineveh escapes assassination attempt – Update," 6/7/08
- "Iraq's Islamic Party leader assassinated in Mosul," 8/7/08
- "Nine killed, nine wounded across Iraq (Roundup)," 10/31/07
- "Plane engines, explosives, and another grave found in Iraq – Summary," 3/9/08
- "Policeman, soldier killed in two incidents in Iraq (Extra)," 8/14/08
- "Three killed, 13 injured in blasts in northern Iraq (2nd Lead)," 4/23/08
- "US troops kill nine suspected al-Qaeda members in Iraq," 2/18/08
Al Dulaimy, Mohammed, "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 11 February 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 2/11/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 12 May 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 5/12/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 24 May 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 5/24/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday October 5 2009," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/5/09
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Saturday October 24, 2009
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 4 May 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 5/4/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 23 December 2007," McClatchy Newspapers, 12/23/07
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 26 February 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 2/26/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 7 May 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 5/7/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 10 September 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 9/10/08
Freeman, Sholnn, "At Least 35 Die As Bombers Hit Wedding Convoy," Washington Post, 5/2/08 - "U.S. Deaths in Iraq War Reach 4,000; Green Zone Is Shelled," Washington Post, 3/24/08
Hamilton, Eric, "The Fight for Mosul," Institute for the Study of War, 4/29/08
Hammoudi, Laith, "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 8 September 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 9/8/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 26 October 2009," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/26/09
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 4 September 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 9/4/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 20 October 2009," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/29/09
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 13 October 2009," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/13/09
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 22 April 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 4/22/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 29 April 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 4/29/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 5 March 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 3/5/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 13 August 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 8/13/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 14 October 2009," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/14/09
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 27 August 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 8/27/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 27 February 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 2/27/08
Holden, Michael, "U.S. and Iraqi forces begin al Qaeda action in Mosul," 2/11/08
Hussein, Jenan, "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 28 October 2009," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/28/09
International Crisis Group, "Iraq's New Battlefront: The Struggle Over Ninewa," 9/28/09
Iraq Today, April 2008
- August 2008
- December 2007
- February 2008
- March 2008
- January 2008
- July 2008
- June 2008
- May 2008
- November 2007
- October 2007
- September 2008
Issa, Sahar, "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 5 September 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 9/5/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 14 March 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 3/14/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 22 August 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 8/22/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 19 October 2009," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/19/09
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 20 July 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 7/20/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 1 October 2009," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/1/09
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 7 February 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 2/7/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 10 April 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 4/10/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 17 January 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 1/17/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 18 September 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 9/18/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 20 March 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 3/20/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 24 July 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 7/24/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 7 October 2009," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/7/09
Kadhim, Hussein, "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 9 June 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 6/9/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 14 January 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 1/14/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 29 September 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 9/29/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 3 October 2007," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/3/07
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 6 March 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 3/6/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 11 October 2007," McClatchy Newspapers, 10/11/07
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 01 April 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 4/1/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 06 May 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 5/6/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 23 January 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 1/23/08
- "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 24 September 2008," McClatchy Newspapers, 9/24/08
KUNA, "Attack in Mosul leads to injury of 17 people," 6/22/08
Mohammed, Mujahid, "Five arrested after Iraq TV crew murder," Agence France Presse, 9/14/08
Multi-National Corps – Iraq, "MNC-I Soldier attacked during military operations (Mosul)," 11/13/07
- "MND-N Soldiers attacked in Ninevah Province (Mosul)," 2/20/08
- "MND-North Soldiers attacked by small-arms fire (Mosul," 1/26/07
- "Task Force Iron Soldiers attacked in Mosul," 10/31/07
Nagpal, Sahil, "Governor of Iraq's Nineveh province survives assassination attempt," DPA, 6/7/08
Oppel, Richard, "Truck Bomb Kills Up to 16 Iraqis in Mosul," 10/17/07
Partlow, Joshua and Tyson, Ann Scott, "Five U.S. Soldiers Are Killed When Convoy Is Hit in Mosul," Washington Post, 1/29/08
PBS Frontline, "Interview Maj. Gen. David Petraeus," Beyond Baghdad, 2/12/04
Press TV, "Car bomb kills woman in Baghdad," 11/8/07
Reuters, "Bombs hit northern Iraq, forces expect more," 8/13/08
- "Car bomb kills 18 people in Iraqi city," 6/26/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 1," 4/1/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 2," 4/2/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 4," 4/4/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 6," 4/6/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 11," 4/11/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 12," 4/12/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 13," 4/13/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 15," 4/15/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 19," 4/19/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 22," 4/22/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 23," 4/23/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 25," 4/25/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 27," 4/27/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 30," 4/30/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 4," 8/4/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 5," 8/5/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 6," 8/6/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 8," 8/8/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 11," 8/11/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 14," 8/14/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 15," 8/15/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 18," 8/18/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 21," 8/21/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 23," 8/23/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 25," 8/25/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 27," 8/27/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 28," 8/28/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 30," 8/30/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 31," 8/31/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 25," 12/25/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 28," 12/28/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 29," 12/29/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 30," 12/30/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 4," 2/4/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 6," 2/6/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 7," 2/7/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 8," 2/8/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 9," 2/9/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 11," 2/11/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 19," 2/19/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 20," 2/20/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 24," 2/24/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 25," 2/25/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 27," 2/27/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 28," 2/28/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 1," 1/1/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 2," 1/2/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 7," 1/7/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 13," 1/13/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 16," 1/16/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 17," 1/17/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 20," 1/20/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 23," 1/23/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 30," 1/30/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 1," 7/1/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 3," 7/3/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 5," 7/5/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 7," 7/7/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 8," 7/8/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 9," 7/9/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 11," 7/11/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 12," 7/12/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 13," 7/13/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 14," 7/14/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 15," 7/15/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 16," 7/16/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 18," 7/18/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 19," 7/19/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 20," 7/20/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 21," 7/21/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 22," 7/22/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 24," 7/24/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 25," 7/25/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 28," 7/28/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 31," 7/31/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 2," 6/2/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 8," 6/8/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 9," 6/9/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 14," 6/14/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 16," 6/16/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 17," 6/17/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 19," 6/19/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 22," 6/22/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 24," 6/24/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 29," 6/29/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 30," 6/30/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 4," 3/4/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 10," 3/10/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 12," 3/12/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 16," 3/16/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 17," 3/17/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 18," 3/18/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 19," 3/19/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 21," 3/21/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 25," 3/25/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 2," 5/2/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 4," 5/4/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 5," 5/5/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 6," 5/6/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 9," 5/9/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 13," 5/13/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 20," 5/20/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 22," 5/22/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 24," 5/24/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 26," 5/26/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 29," 5/29/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 30," 5/30/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 3," 11/3/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 5," 11/5/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 6," 11/6/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 19," 11/19/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 22," 11/22/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 23," 11/23/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 24," 11/24/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 26," 11/26/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 27," 11/27/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 29," 11/29/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 1," 10/1/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 2," 10/2/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 9," 10/9/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 9," 10/9/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 11," 10/11/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 11," 10/11/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 12," 10/12/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 14," 10/14/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 15," 10/15/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 15," 10/15/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 16," 10/16/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 17," 10/17/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 18," 10/18/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 18," 10/18/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 19," 10/19/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 20," 10/20/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 21," 10/21/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 22," 10/22/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 24," 10/24/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 26," 10/26/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 30," 10/30/07
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 30," 10/30/09
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 1," 9/1/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 3," 9/3/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 9," 9/8/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 9," 9/9/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 10," 9/10/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 13," 9/13/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 17," 9/17/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 18," 9/18/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 20," 9/20/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 21," 9/21/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 22," 9/22/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 23," 9/23/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 25," 9/25/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 28," 9/28/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 29," 9/29/08
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Sept 30," 9/30/08
- "Iraqi, U.S. soldiers kill 14 gunmen in Mosul raids," 11/9/07
- "Kidnapped Iraq archbishop dead-Catholic news agency," 3/13/08
- "Truck bomb explodes near Iraq's largest dam," 12/17/07
Saeed, Samer, "U.S. troops erect walls in Mosul as inhabitants flee," Azzaman, 2/17/08
Surk, Barbara, "Truck bomb destroys key bridge in western Iraq," Associated Press, 10/17/09
Tait, Paul, "Severed heads and bodies found in Iraq field: police," Reuters, 1/29/08
U.S. Department of Defense, "News Release," 12/28/07
UPI, "Iraq violence claims nine lives," 9/12/08
- "Two soldiers die in Iraq car bomb," 7/19/08
Xinhua, "At least 2 killed in suicide truck bombing in N Iraq," 9/22/08
- "Car bomb hits police patrol in northern Iraq," 1/14/08
- "Car bomb kills policeman in northern Iraq," 9/8/08
- "Gunmen blow up 4 houses in N Iraq, child killed," 6/16/08
- "Gunmen kill provincial council member in N Iraq," 11/6/07
- "Head of provincial council survives bomb attack in N Iraq," 12/9/07
- "Insurgents blow up house of Sunni lawmaker in N Iraq," 9/23/08
- "Iraqi soldiers foil suicide bomb attack in Mosul," 4/29/08
- "Policeman killed in gunfire in northern Ira," 9/20/08
- "Policeman killed in shooting in N Iraq," 11/28/07
- "Seven killed in Iraq suicide car bombing," 9/2/08
- "Suicide car bomb injuring 14 in N Iraq," 6/23/08
- "Three policemen killed in insurgents' attack in Iraq," 1/4/08
- "Two people killed in bomb attack in northern Iraq," 5/24/08
- "Two suicide bombers hit police checkpoint in N Iraq," 11/4/07
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