July 2015 marked a dramatic change for the Turkish
government when it agreed to join the U.S. led coalition against the Islamic
State (IS). For the last few years Ankara had ignored IS seeing the government
of Bashar al-Assad as the real threat to the region. Advances by the Kurdish
rebels in Syria and a desire to re-align with the Americans led to the reversal
in strategy. Turkey is using this to its own advantage however as it is more
interested in punishing the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and helping Islamist
rebels in Syria than fighting IS.
On July 24, 2016 Turkey agreed
to work with the Americans against the Islamic State. Turkey’s Foreign Minister
told the press that IS was the “primary national security threat for Turkey,”
and Ankara said that U.S. jets could use the Incirlik Air Base to carry out
attacks upon IS targets. This came after the militants bombed Suruc in Turkey
that left 32 dead and ambushed a Turkish patrol killing one soldier. This was a
major change for President Tayyip Erdogan who had done
nothing about the Islamic State over the last three years, turning a blind
eye to its activities within his country, if not colluding
with it. Erdogan saw
President Bashar al-Assad as the major problem in the region not IS, and had opposed
the Obama administration’s Syrian strategy as a result. Washington had been
lobbying Erdogan to change his position, but to no avail. Ankara finally gave
in for a number of reasons, and used the IS bombing to unveil its new strategy.
As Professor Henri Barkey pointed out in Foreign
Policy, Turkey was afraid it was jeopardizing its relationship with
Washington. The U.S. had sent several delegations to get the NATO ally to join
the war against the Islamic State, and allow the use of its air bases, but
Ankara had turned it down. Not only that, but President Erdogan and Turkish
media outlets had constantly criticized America’s Syrian policy. That led
President Obama to publicly complained about Turkey’s stance towards IS. Turkey
might have felt it had pressed the issue as far as possible, and now it needed
to reconcile.
Another issue was that Ankara was concerned about
Washington’s alliance with Syria’s Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed
wing the People’s Protection Units (YPG). In October 2014, the U.S. started air
strikes to help the Syrian Kurds in Kobani. The Americans then began using YPG
units as spotters for air strikes and even invited a PYD official to join its
operations room in Irbil. That led people back in the U.S. to declare the PYD
as the most effective anti-IS group and lobbied for it to receive aid. The PYD
was an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which from the 1980s to
2013 had fought a low level war against the Turkish government. Ankara in turn
labeled both the PKK and PYD as terrorist groups. The U.S. support for the PYD
was deeply troubling for Pres. Erdogan who attacked
their cooperation. By joining the anti-IS war, he hoped to win back Washington,
while undermining its relationship with the PYD.
The PYD’s gains in Syria was a third factor. The group had
taken over much of northern Syria along the Turkish border. In late 2013 the PYD declared its
intentions to turn this area into an autonomous region called Rojava. Pres. Erdogan
warned that the PYD’s expansion was Turkey’s number one concern, and called the
creation of Rojava a red line. Ankara believed a Kurdish zone in Syria would
embolden Turkey’s Kurds and the PKK. With the backing of the U.S. this could
lead to further PYD expansion in Syria creating more anxiety back in Ankara.
The last reason why Pres. Erdogan changed his policy was
because he wanted to offer more support to Syrian rebels he backs. In May
the Islamic State launched an offensive against the Azaz border crossing with
Turkey, which was being used by Syrian rebels to bring in weapons, supplies,
and fighters. IS was stopped by U.S. air strikes. Ankara was also afraid that
its Syrian allies, which include
groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham, would be pushed out of
these border areas by the YPG. By joining the U.S., Pres. Erdogan was hoping
that he could provide more direct aid to these groups in the hope that they
would overthrow the Assad government.
Since Turkey announced that it was helping the U.S. it said
that it wanted to create a safe zone in northwest Syria. This would be
approximately 68 miles long along the Syrian-Turkish border. Washington backed
this idea because it would include driving the Islamic State out of the area.
Erdogan on the other hand, wants to ensure that the rebels he backs can control
this area and the important border crossings there. It would also not only split
the PYD’s Rojava in two, it would exclude
its YPG forces as well. Washington appears to be turning a blind eye to the
fact that this zone would empower anti-western Jihadists and weaken the PYD. The
Obama administration is probably hoping that it can change Ankara’s stance, as
the creation of this zone is a long-term goal.
In the meantime, Ankara has gone after the PKK in Turkey and
Iraq. The Turkish government announced that it arrested
more than 1,300 people accused of terrorism after the Suruc bombing. 847 of
those were linked to the PKK, while only 137 were associated with the Islamic
State. Turkey has also launched daily air strikes and artillery barrages on PKK
areas of southern Turkey and in Iraq’s Kurdistan. Millet press reported on August
3 that there were 75 bombings of PKK targets and only 3 IS ones. The PKK
and Kurdish press said these strikes have killed 16 PKK members, 2 Party of
Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK) fighters, the PKK’s Iranian affiliate, and 9
civilians, and wounded 13 PKK and 16 civilians. On the other hand, Turkey claimed
it killed 260 PKK and wounded another 400 by August 1. On July
27, an Obama administration official blamed the PKK for these attacks,
because it killed two Turkish policemen it accused of collaborating with IS on
the Suruc bombing. Likewise, on July
28 Turkey called an emergency meeting of NATO, which also endorsed Turkey’s
new campaign. Its targeting shows that Ankara’s main goal is the weakening of
the PKK and PYD. As part of its deal with Washington, Pres. Erdogan cannot bomb
the PYD, but it can go after its brethren the PKK. That way he hopes to apply
pressure on the Syrian Kurds. As Dr. Neil Quilliam and Jonathan Friedman
mentioned in an article
for Chatham House, Turkey is not opposed to Kurdish autonomy in principle. It
has forged a very close relationship with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in
Iraq, which talks about Kurdish independence all the time, and spurred
Kurdistan’s economic growth by allowing it to build its own pipeline to the
Turkish port of Ceyhan. What Erdogan would like is to become the hegemon of the
Kurds. The Kurdistan Regional Government for example, has become almost
completely dependent upon Turkey economically via its pipeline. Turkey’s new
attacks are likely focused upon the same goal to punish the PKK into
submission, and in turn get it to limit the PYD’s expansion in Syria.
Turkey is using the U.S. to further its own goals vis a vis
the Syrian rebels and PKK-PYD. Ankara wants to increase its support for the Syrian
rebels, who it hopes will overthrow Pres. Assad, cajole the Syrian and Turkish
Kurds into being pliant clients, while regaining the Obama administration’s
favor. Washington on the other hand, believes that it can temper Pres.
Erdogan’s goals over the long term, while using Turkish bases to hit IS in the
short run. That seems like wishful thinking on America’s part as Turkey has
always followed its own path. President Obama only has a little more than a
year in office, and the next administration will likely have a different
approach to the Islamic State, Syria, and Iraq. The Turkish government can wait
this out, and work on its own goals at the same time making Obama’s strategy and
the PKK-PYD the losers.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “30 Turkish warplanes in new strikes
against PKK in northern Iraq: reports,” 7/30/15
- “Some 260 PKK members killed in Turkey air strikes:
report,” 8/1/15
Barkey, Henri, “What’s Behind Turkey’s U-Turn on the Islamic
State?” Foreign Policy, 7/29/15
Barnard, Anne, “Turkey’s Focus on Crushing Kurdish
Separatists Complicates the Fight Against ISIS,” New York Times, 7/28/15
BBC, “Iraqi Kurds warn PKK amid Turkey air strikes,” 8/1/15
- “Turkey’s air force hits IS and PKK in Syria and Iraq,”
7/25/15
Chulov, Martin, “Turkey sends in jets as Syria’s agony
spills over every border,” Guardian, 7/25/15
DeYoung, Karen and Sly, Liz, “U.S.-Turkey deal aims to
create de facto ‘safe zone’ in northwest Syria,” Washington Post, 7/26/15
Guvenc, Duygu and Prothero, Mitchell, “Turkey vows to fight
Islamic State, calls it ‘primary threat,’” McClatchy Newspapers, 7/24/15
Kafanov, Lucy, “Turkey’s ‘risky’ two-front war: political
opportunity for Erdogan?” Christian Science Monitor, 7/29/15
Kurd Press, “Two Turkish soldiers killed, 31 injured in PKK
suicide attack in Agri,” 8/2/15
Millet, “Turkey Violate Peace Deal, Cross Kurdistan Region
Border and Bomb PKK,” 7/25/15
- “Turkey’s Primary Target Revealed: 75 Warplanes Bombed
PKK, Only 3 Warplanes Bombed ISIS,” 8/3/15
- “Turkish Authority Arrest Dozens of Kurdish Youth in the
Kurdish Cities,” 7/25/15
NINA, “PKK criticizes the attitude Kurdistan province
regarding the Turkish shelling of its sites,” 7/28/15
Nissenbaum, Dion, “U.S., Turkey Agree to Keep Syrian Kurds
Out of Proposed Border Zone,” Wall Street Journal, 8/3/15
Osgood, Patrick, al-Najar, Kamaran, Smith, Daniel, Van
Heuvelen, Ben and Lando, Ben, “UPDATE: Pipeline sabotage halts Turkey exports,”
Iraq Oil Report, 7/29/15
Quilliam, Dr. Neil Friedman, Jonathan, “Syria Safe Zones
Will Undermine US Fight Against ISIS,” Chatham House, 7/29/15
Reuters, “Turkey Launches Heaviest Strikes On Kurdish Rebel
Targets Yet,” 7/29/15
Rudaw, “PKK says 3 more fighters killed in Turkish
airstrikes Saturday,” 7/27/15
- “President Barzani Slams PYD in Syria, Rejects Autonomy
Declaration,” 11/14/13
- “Turkey bombarding PKK targets in Iraqi Kurdistan’s
Mergasur district,” 7/27/15
- “Turkish shelling injures Kurdish civilians,” 7/25/15
Sly, Liz, “Turkey strikes Kurdish militants in Iraq, ends
truce of more than 2 years,” Washington Post, 7/25/15
Spencer, Richard, “For Erdogan, Turkish assault is about
containing the Kurds as much as fighting Isil,” Telegraph, 7/25/15
Voice of America, “NATO, Turkey in ‘Solidarity’ on IS, PKK
Strikes,” 7/28/15
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