In December 2015 Iraq’s former Finance Minister Rafi Issawi
was convicted in two separate court cases. Issawi last ran afoul of the law in
2012 when his bodyguards were arrested and Issawi was charged with terrorism.
That led to months of protests across a number of provinces that became one of
the major stories in the country for 2013. When Issawi was finally found guilty
in 2015 however it was not for involvement with violence, but for rather
routine corruption.
At the end of 2015 Issawi was found guilty in two separate
corruption trials. First, Issawi was given seven years
for manipulating money exchanges. A few days later Issawi received
an additional one year sentence in a misdemeanor court for appointing relatives
to office and issuing illegal degrees, so people could get government jobs.
There were originally 20 other
charges against him, but those were dropped. One and seven years were
relatively light sentences showing that the charges were not that serious. Like
other top officials, Issawi was treated with kid gloves by the courts, and was
only convicted after he had left office and was out of the country as the
government is not serious about tackling graft and other illegalities. This was
anti-climatic compared to what Issawi went through in previous years.
The last time Issawi was faced with charges it was for
terrorism, and caused a huge controversy that lasted for nearly a year. On December
20, 2012, ten of Issawi’s bodyguards were arrested. A State of Law member claimed
that twenty families in Anbar filed suits against them, which led to warrants
being issued. (1) On December 29,
one of the guards was shown on Al-Iraqiya TV confessing to taking orders from
Issawi’s son-in-law to carry out assassinations with aid from former Vice
President Tariq al-Hashemi. The arrests led to a series of protests
in Salahaddin, Anbar, Ninewa, Diyala, Kirkuk, Babil, Baghdad, and even in the
south in Maysan, Dhi Qar, and Basra initially. In January, Moqtada al-Sadr sent
a delegation
to the protests in Ramadi to express support, and his bloc rejected
an offer by Prime Minister Maliki to assume Issawi’s position as Finance
Minister. Later, these protests took on a sectarian tone as Sunni
demonstrations against Maliki’s Shiite government with a few turning very
militant such as in Fallujah and Hawija, with the latter taken over by the
Naqshibandi insurgent group and the former featuring some Islamic State
supporters. When they started however they were about the prime minister
targeting another one of his opponents, and cut across sectarian and political
lines. They came after Maliki had chased off Vice President Hashemi into exile
the year before on similar terrorist charges, and the premier was pushing the
Kurds over oil and the disputed territories. Issawi was actually aligned with
Maliki beforehand, but then broke with him. Issawi wrote
an opinion piece with Iyad Allawi asking for the U.S to intervene to stop
Maliki from grabbing more power, and called
for a no confidence vote against the premier, which led to the arrest warrants
being issued.
Maliki used the same tactics of intimidation against Issawi
in the past. In December 2011 one of Hashemi’s bodyguards claimed that the vice
president and Issawi ran death squads in Fallujah in 2006. It was later reported
that the bodyguard was tortured to acquire the confession. Maliki had accused
Issawi of involvement with violence the year before as well. In 2010
General Ray Odierno sent a letter to Maliki telling him that U.S. intelligence
had reviewed Issawi’s case and found nothing against him. In 2005-2006 Fallujah
was an insurgent center and Issawi ran a hospital there leading to suspicions
that he must have either cooperated with or been with the militants. Maliki
constantly played upon that background even though the Americans did not
believe there was anything to it.
If the Iraqi government was so committed to taking Issawi to
court for terrorism charges in 2012 and threatened to do so in 2011, what
changed in 2015? The case against Issawi was always a political move by Prime
Minister Maliki. Charging his rivals with involvement with violence would not
only force them out of office, but discredit them with the public as well. With
Maliki no longer premier however, there was no pressure on the courts to follow
through with such a case anymore. Instead, Issawi was found guilty of
corruption charges that any Iraqi minister could have been charged with. Still,
Maliki ultimately won because Issawi’s political career is probably over for
the foreseeable future.
FOOTNOTES
1. Al Rafidayn, “Alfalh: 20 families of Anbar filed lawsuits
against al-Issawi and protection elements Hashemi,” 12/22/12
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- “Sunni demonstrators challenge Iraq’s Shiite-led
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