As more Iraqi
territory has been freed the government has run into a growing problem, how to
secure it all. Most of the local police fled when the Islamic State conquered
northern and western Iraq in 2014. Baghdad never rebuilt most of these forces
due to a lack of planning and money. That led to ad hoc solutions, one of which
was the tribal and local Hashd. These units are small and disparate, and
usually linked to tribes, politicians and parties seeking political and
economic power. In Anbar and Ninewa these forces have run into increasing
problems, undermining security in the process.
In Anbar province
there are various tribal Hashd forces in each major town and city. In total,
they employ around 25,000 men at arms. These tribal forces are not officially part
of the Hashd. Many of their leaders have talked about becoming part of the ISF,
but that hasn’t happened. In Haditha for example, there are two different
units. Ramadi has several different ones mostly based upon the neighborhoods.
In Fallujah, the Albu Issa tribe controls the security forces. Each one of
these groups wants to get paid by the government, and receive pensions and
weapons. Some want to get involved in reconstruction, and the money that comes
along with it. Baghdad for example, has contacted an American security firm to
control the main highway through Anbar. Different Hashd units wanted that job. A senior tribal Hashd member told Niqash that many of the
forces are corrupt, while another complained they didn’t always take orders
from the government. These various units are lightly armed so they can’t really
fight the insurgency, but only do holding duties. They lack the training to
carry out police work. Yet, in many areas they are the only security available.
When so many different forces are put together with no real plan, no command
and control, led by sheikhs and politicians this is the inevitable result.
Ninewa is facing a very similar situation.
There are around 30
different Hashd units in Ninewa. Some of these are run by politicians like ex-Governor
Atheel Nujafi’s Ninewa Guards. Others are based upon political parties like the
Ninewa Plains Protection Units connected to the Assyrian Democratic Movement.
Others are tribal. The Ninewa government would rather have the police, but just
as in Anbar, Baghdad didn’t make any plans for their reconstitution, and is
only just now talking about re-instating some while trying to create a brand
new force that could take years. That has left most of the province and Mosul
to these local forces. Again, there is no coordination between them, and many
are in open competition with each other. There are various stories of them
taking part in crimes as well. Ninewa councilman Hassan al-Sabawi blamed Hashd units for robberies, kidnappings and killing people in Mosul.
Outside the city, tribal Hashd have been accused of extra-judicial killings of
captured Islamic State suspects. In the Qaraqosh district, the Ninewa Plains
Protection Unit arrested six members of the Babylon Brigades on charges of
stealing artifacts. They were turned over to the local police. The Babylon
Brigades then stormed the Ninewa Plains headquarters, took their weapons and
vehicles, and freed their six brethren. Prime Minister Haidar Abadi then ordered the Brigade to leave the area. The Babylon unit denied this story, but
it was reported in several media outlets. These 30 different groups do not work with each other, which
could easily be exploited by the insurgency. Many have political aspirations to
rule their towns and districts. A Ninewa councilman and a Hashd commander each
called the situation “chaotic” because of its ad hoc nature.
The Iraqi government
went on the offensive against the Islamic State without making any political or
security plans for the future. That has led to this hodgepodge of tribal and
local Hashd units in Anbar and Ninewa. Obviously, some type of holding force
was necessary after IS was expelled, but since then there has been no strategy
for what to do with them. No overarching system has been put in place to bring
the various units under any type of unified command or even get them to
cooperate with each other or the Iraqi forces in many cases. The revenge killings
that took place in Ninewa after the liberation of Mosul may also undermine
security in the long run. The political and economic desires of the leaders of
these groups also means they want to turn their armed forces into power and
money. That has led to low level criminality, and could lead to corruption if
they get reconstruction contracts. Needless to say Baghdad’s failure to think
long-term has led to this situation, and there appears no attempt to resolve it
either.
SOURCES
Al-Ayash, Kamal,
“Patchwork Of Loyalties: Anbar’s Tribal Militias Grow Larger, But Powerless And
Divided,” Niqash, 8/15/17
Iraq Newspaper,
“Iraqi Newspaper Reporter: Fierce Battles Between Armed Christian Factions In
The Ninewa Plain,” 7/15/17
- “Iraqi Newspaper
Reporter In Mosul: The Expulsion Of The Babylon Brigades From Mosul Over
Stealing Antiquities,” 7/16/17
Al Mada, “Abadi
intends to re-structure the popular crowd and amend its law to end the
rebellion of some factions,” 7/8/17
- “Fear of reprisals
drives the families of Mosul to tell about their children,” 8/15/17
- “Mosul after two
weeks of liberation: We warn of the dangers of Daash in the desert of Anbar,”
7/27/17
- “Ninewa is
perplexed by 30 tribal groups holding liberated lands,” 7/21/17
Salloum, Saad,
“Armed disputes reveal Iraqi Christians’ discord,” Al Monitor, 8/15/17
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