Withdrawal Instead of Patience As Center of U.S. Strategy In Iraq

Marc Lynch is an associate professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University, and runs the Abu Aardvark blog as well. In the November/December issue of Foreign Affairs, Lynch has an article, “Politics First,” which is a response to an earlier piece in the journal by Stephen Biddle of the Council on Foreign Relations, and Michael O’Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution. They, like many other Iraq analysts, argue for strategic patience. They believe that the U.S. should keep large numbers of U.S. troops in Iraq until the country completes its provincial and national elections. The argument is that a continued U.S. presence is the key to political change within the country. The Iraqis need U.S. troops to stay until they can work out their difference and reconcile. Biddle, O’Hanlon, and Pollack wrote that the U.S. should not consider drawing down its forces until 2010 at the earliest, and perhaps have half out by 2011. Lynch makes the counter view that the U.S. needs to set a specific withdrawal date to pressure the Iraqis to negotiate over power sharing.

Lynch begins by refuting the strategic patience argument. He says that most American analysts and military officials are right when they point out that Iraq’s improvements are tenuous, but their solutions are wrong. Their policy would mean an open-ended commitment of large numbers of troops waiting for political changes that may never happen. For example, Iraq’s parliament has passed several reconciliation laws, but they are often implemented in ways not originally planned or not at all. The Amnesty Law for example, made the main anti-corruption office in the Iraqi government, the Commission on Integrity, drop more than half of its cases. The largest group affected by the law has been fugitives, people who were wanted, but were never arrested in the first place. The Accountability and Justice Act that was to replace the old DeBaathification process, has only been applied by the Interior Ministry even though the law says it can’t, while the rest of the government has refused to follow it.

Lynch argues that the improved security since the Surge has actually made Iraq’s politics atrophy. Washington believes that the reduction in violence will allow Iraqi politicians to make crucial decisions about reconciliation that will help hold the country together. Lynch writes that Baghdad actually sees no reason to make any deals. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has become complacent because the insurgency has been weakened, his main opponents the Sadrists have been defeated for the meantime, the Iraqi security forces are improving, and the U.S. has given his government an open ended commitment. The upcoming provincial elections set for January 2009 could open up Iraq’s political system, but could also lead to more divisions or the consolidation of the ruling parties. Overall, the Prime Minister is now in a position of strength, therefore why should he compromise?

The major recommendation of the article is that in order to break this deadlock in Baghdad, the U.S. needs to set a withdrawal date. Lynch argues, only when the U.S. announces that it will begin drawing down its forces will Iraq’s political geography change. It will force Iraqi politicians to face their country’s problems, rather than expecting the U.S. to do it for them. That would make Baghdad more answerable to its public, and might force them to come to decisions they might not otherwise. The U.S. might also set some preconditions for its support, something the current White House has refused to do. This might actually become American policy now that the U.S. presidential election is over. At the same time, there is no guarantee that the Iraqi government will change if America withdraws or even if it stays. As Baghdad has become stronger, U.S. influence has weakened. Maliki is already dealing with some of the major issues in the country often times to consolidate his power and that of the central authorities. In the end, Iraqis will decide their future, and it will be up to them whether they want to reconcile or not, no matter what U.S. policy is.

For other analysts’ opinions on Iraq see:

Iraq Needs Real Governance Center for Strategic and International Studies Report Says

Cordesman Interview: U.S. Needs To Stay For The Long Haul In Iraq

Council on Foreign Relations-Brookings’ Experts Call for Patience In Iraq

Council on Foreign Relations and Brookings Institution Experts Voice Their Opinions After Recent Trip To Iraq

Is Iraq Going To End Up Like Eastern Europe?

June 18, 2008 Charlie Rose Interview With Vali Nasr of the Council On Foreign Relations, Stephen Biddle of the Council On Foreign Relations, and Michael Gordon of the New York Times

SOURCES

Biddle, Stephen, O’Hanlon, Michael, and Pollack, Kenneth, “How to Leave Behind a Stable Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2008

Cordesman, Anthony, “The Evolving Security Situation in Iraq: The Continuing Need for Strategic Patience,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1/21/08

Lynch, Marc, “Politics First,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2008

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/08

Iraq Needs Real Governance Center for Strategic and International Studies Report Says

Anthony Cordesman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies is one of the leading military analysts on Iraq and the Middle East. In September 2008 he wrote a report on transferring Iraq’s provinces to Baghdad’s control, and its consequences. He notes that while Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has been able to wield the hammer recently in security operations, the Iraqi government still has not proven that it can carry out the more difficult build and hold aspects of a successful counterinsurgency program. That includes reconciliation, and real governance at all levels; something hindered by the deep divisions between Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds.

Iraq’s political system is still developing. The three main groups in Iraq, the Sunnis, the Shiites, and Kurds still have deep disagreements over the future of the country, which hinders the development of the government. Reconciliation is an important and necessary step to overcome these problems. Iraq has passed several reconciliation laws as part of this process, but it is always the implementation that matters.

The Accountability and Justice Law for example, was passed to replace the old Debaathification act from the American Coalition Provisional Authority. As reported earlier, no officials have been appointed to the Supreme National Commission on Accountability and Justice that is suppose to administer it. The government has been using this as an excuse not to follow it, except for the Interior Ministry, which has accepted former officers into the security forces. This is happening despite the fact that the new law says that no ex-Baathists can work for the ministry. It says a lot about Iraqis inability to follow through on legislation it passes when most of the government is ignoring the Accountability and Justice act, but the one ministry that is forbidden from doing so, is. It is no wonder then that this law and others like it have not ameliorated the distrust of the Sunnis.

In early 2009, Iraq is scheduled to have provincial elections, which could also change the country’s political make-up. Cordesman points out, that simply having a vote, doesn’t add authority or legitimacy. What is important is the type of governance that happens afterwards. In Iraq’s case, three elections since the invasion have done little to solve the nation’s divisions.

Voting has not fixed other problems such as the government’s inability to spend its budget and provide basic services. Cordesman doesn’t mention it, but Prime Minister Maliki’s announcements to rebuild Basra, Sadr City, Mosul, Maysan, and Diyala provinces provide perfect examples of the government’s inability to build after security operations have cleared. After each military offensive in those five areas, the Prime Minister said that Baghdad would spend $100 million to help with reconstruction. So far those have been empty promises. In Basra, the governor argued over spending the money. Similarly, in Sadr City, the local council couldn’t agree on contracts. In Mosul, Maysan, and Diyala, nothing has happened. In fact, the U.S. and England are doing whatever reconstruction is happening in Basra and Sadr City because Baghdad has not proven to be up to the task.

On October 3, 2008 Iraq received control of the 12th province, Babil in the south, from the United States. All of Iraq’s provinces are suppose to be turned over to Baghdad by early 2009. These are important steps towards Iraq receiving full sovereignty. However, the provinces are turned over when the number of attacks in each province decreases, not whether the provincial governments are working or whether there is any reconciliation. Cordesman argues that this happens many times whether the Iraqis are ready or not. In the March 2008 quarterly report to Congress, the Pentagon said that the turnover of Basra had been successful, there was less violence, and that the Army and police were in control. That month Maliki launched an offensive against Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army that led to bloody fighting in the city of Basra and across the south.

Cordesman’s conclusion is that while there has been military progress in Iraq, the more important political and economic development has lagged behind. Baghdad has not been able to carry out meaningful reconciliation. The central government and provinces are barely able to provide basic service and spend their budgets. Iraqi elections in 2009 have the opportunity to shuffle the seats of power in the governorates, but they will still be sitting at the same broken table. The U.S. has put too much emphasis on security as a benchmark. Now that that is improving, it is time for Washington and Baghdad to step up their efforts to build Iraq’s infrastructure and government so that it can hold the country together.

For more on Anthony Cordesman’s writings on Iraq see:

Anthony Cordesman, CSIS Report on Iraqi Forces

Cordesman Interview: U.S. Needs To Stay For The Long Haul In Iraq

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Maliki allocates $100 million for Mosul projects,” 5/18/08
- “Over 7,500 police members sacked this year – official,” 5/29/08
- “Parl’t forms accountability & justice panel next term – MP,” 9/8/08
- “SIIC head, Babel governor take up security,” 10/22/08

Biddle, Stephen, Nasr, Vali, Nash, William, “Political and Security Developments in Iraq and the Region,” Council on Foreign Relations, 6/12/08

Cordesman, Anthony, “Transferring Provinces To Iraqi Control: The Reality And The Risks,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9/2/08

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” September 2008

International Center for Transitional Justice, “Briefing Paper: Iraq’s New ‘Accountability and Justice’ Law,” 1/22/08

Rubin, Alissa and Goode, Erica, “Iraq Struggle Unfolds in Peaceful Protest and Violent Attacks in Sadr City,” New York Times, 4/28/08

Al-Sabaah, “Cabinet allocates $ 100 mln to Diyala province,” 8/7/08

Senanayake, Sumedha, “Iraq: Will Passage Of New Law Appease Sunnis?” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1/15/08

Tavernise, Sabrina, “Shiite Militia in Baghdad Sees Its Power Ebb,” New York Times, 7/27/08

Council on Foreign Relations and Brookings Institution Experts Voice Their Opinions After Recent Trip To Iraq

From May 28 to June 4, 2008 Stephen Biddle, a military expert and advisor to General David Petraeus, and Vali Nasr, a Middle East expert at Tufts University, from the Council on Foreign Relations, and Kenneth Pollack, senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, and Michael O’Hanlon, a national security expert, of the Brookings Institution went on a tour of Iraq. When they came back, they were interviewed by their organizations about what they saw. All came away impressed by the military gains that had been accomplished by the Surge and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s offensives. They also saw the possibility for a re-alignment of Iraq’s politics. At the same time, they had reservations about Iraq’s economy, and the ability of the government to take advantage of the improved security.

The Surge

All four experts believed that the Surge stopped the sectarian war that started in 2006. O’Hanlon and Pollack were two of the earliest to write about the successes under the new military plan. Stephen Biddle has also written extensively about how the surge changed the status quo in Iraq. According to him, the U.S. was able to broker a series of local cease-fires with Sunni insurgents and tribes to quell the violence in central and western Iraq by November 2007. Other groups, such as Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia also decided to largely give up the fight against the Sunnis. What was left was the Al Qaeda in Iraq stronghold in northern part of the country, and the internal Shiite power struggle. Those were settled by Maliki’s offensives in Basra, Sadr City and Mosul. The effectiveness of the Iraqi security forces in carrying out their own operations impressed all four Americans, and they said it was the biggest story of 2008. Sadr’s militia was largely broken up in the process. The U.S. is also attempting to form a Sons of Iraq program in the walled off section of Sadr City that could be a step towards finally breaking up Sadr’s armed wing, just as it did with the Sunni insurgency. Al Qaeda in Iraq on the other hand has largely faded as the main threat to Iraqi security.

All four also said that the U.S. was entering into a new phase of operations in Iraq in 2008. Biddle believes that the U.S. will be more of a peacekeeper now maintaining the cease-fires it has brokered with various groups. Nasr, O’Hanlon, Pollack said that also means transitioning more towards nation building and economic policies. Pollack and O’Hanlon warned this could be a trouble spot for the U.S. if it stays focused upon the older issues like sectarianism, and doesn’t focus upon the new ones. These include what to do with the Sons of Iraq now that security is improving, what to do about Iraq’s refugees and internally displaced, how to remove the blast walls that have been erected throughout the capitol, maintaining the pressure on the Shiite militias, building up the Iraqi military while ensuring that didn’t lead to a coup, and improving the economy. That last point was Pollack’s and O’Hanlon’s greatest concern. All four didn’t see much progress in the government providing basic services to the public. The Brookings Institution members said that on the local level, that meant the U.S. was doing much of the work to provide for Iraqi citizens. Unemployment was also a major problem, and affected many issues such as the future of the Sons of Iraq. The plan is to move many of them towards government work, but there is no guarantee that any of them will get a job. The two didn’t see any real macro-economic development going on, or planning for it. Together, this was a major cause of discontent amongst Iraqis, who largely blamed their government for these shortcomings. This new situation the U.S. finds itself in was summed up well by an American general who told Pollack that progress, “Doesn’t mean no problems; it means new problems.”

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Iraqi Politics

Prime Minister Maliki has been the largest beneficiary of this changed status quo in Iraq, unexpectedly to all four. The Iraqi leader has his highest popularity levels so far after the government’s offensives. The question was, what would he do next. They thought that he would use his new standing to expand his political base. This is especially pressing because his Dawa party, which was always small and weak, just broke up into two. One major new constituency might be the discontented Shiites who followed Sadr. With the Mahdi Army weak, and the government establishing control over Sadr City, this is a group that is up for grabs. The main way Maliki can win them over is improving their lives. That was a problem however, as already pointed out, the government doesn’t have the capability to provide services right now. Nasr said he found no real coordination between Baghdad, the provinces, governors, and local councils, and that created a dysfunctional state. In Basra for example, Maliki promised $100 million after his offensive there to rebuild the city, but the governor doesn’t want the money, and the minister of justice that’s in charge of carrying out the plan doesn’t want the job. That opens the door for other parties to move in.

The Shiite Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) is the most likely to gain in this new situation, but they won’t go unchallenged. Nasr talked extensively about how the SIIC has the organization to win elections. He predicted that the SIIC would pick up Basra from the Fadhila party, which has been discredited there. The SIIC would also hold onto the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala. In the rest of the Shiite south the SIIC would have to compete with Dawa, the Sadrists, and more importantly a plethora of new parties. The Dawa and SIIC have not done well running the provinces however. They could focus attention on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) now under negotiation with the U.S. as a way to divert attention away from their own incompetence, and paint themselves as nationalists. The Sadrists would be hard pressed to gain any ground because the experts felt that the movement was falling apart. During the government’s offensives Sadr failed to provide any clear leadership, which left many disappointed with him, and cost him support as well. Some of his rivals also want to finish him off, or at least take away his followers. Many new parties are being established amongst Shiites as well, and they could gain ground in this new environment. Overall, Nasr felt that Shiite politics were fracturing in the run-up to the elections instead of the large parties coalescing. He thought that this was a bad occurrence because it could lead to too many groups running provincial councils, which would make decision making all that more difficult for a government system that barely works as is.

Relations With the U.S. and the Status Of Forces Agreement

The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), that will determine the future relationship between the U.S. and Iraq, was another major issue under debate within Iraq at the time of their visit. The U.S. originally did not want a SOFA, but rather a new United Nations mandate to operate in Iraq. It was Baghdad that insisted upon a formal bilateral agreement to assert its sovereignty. The problem is that such an agreement is widely unpopular amongst Iraqis, and the U.S. made things worse by not planning for the process. Within Iraq, Maliki does not have the support he needs right now to get the agreement passed. Parts of the SIIC and his own Dawa party are against the deal. He needs to unite the Shiites behind him before he can reach out to the Kurds and Sunnis, who have their own ideas on the issue, to have it ratified by parliament. Many Iraqi politicians also think that because Bush wants a SOFA before he leaves office, Baghdad can push the U.S. hard for as many concessions as they want, and Washington will give into them. O’Hanlon and Pollack felt that was a situation where Maliki could use his new political standing to push through an agreement. On the U.S. side, Nasr and Biddle didn’t think that the State Department had made any plans on how to sell the agreement to the Iraqis, which has made the negotiations even harder than they already are.

Iran

Since the Sunni insurgency has been tamed, Iran and the Special Groups have become the main provocateur in Iraq. O’Hanlon and Pollack were actually surprised that they did not hear that much about Iran from U.S. officers during their visit. They thought that the U.S. command in Iraq had a much more sophisticated view of the problem than the discourse going on in the U.S. According to them, the military believes that Iraq’s problems are mostly caused by internal disputes, but that Iran is making trouble in certain areas. Iran is too important a neighbor for Iraq to ever be free of, and Iraqi politicians want good relations. The Brookings Institution experts outlined three possible avenues for the U.S. to deal with Iran. One would be for the two sides to talk and work out their relationship, but they thought this was unlikely. Iran’s leadership was too internally divided to even agree itself on what it wants in Iraq to negotiate with the U.S. Second, the two sides could come to some kind of implicit agreement about their influence within Iraq. Last, Iraqi nationalism could assert itself and lesson Iran’s role in the country. They believed that the U.S. was actually one of the reasons why Iran had gained so much in the country. America had done so much damage to Iraq before the surge, that extremist groups and discontented Iraqis had gone to Iran for help. If new parties are created, military pressure is maintained against the militias, and Iraqis move to the lead more, O’Hanlon and Pollack postulated that could turn people away from going to Iran for assistance. At the same time, Nasr added that Iran lost standing when Maliki went into Basra and Sadr City to clear out Sadr’s militia and the Special Groups. He believes that Iran needs to readjust its policy as well. They could be doing that now with their insistence that Iraq not sign the SOFA with the U.S. This could divert attention away from Iran’s support of violent militias, and focus the public on the Americans instead.

The Future

The Brookings Institution and Council on Foreign Relations experts ended with their closing thoughts on the future of Iraq, with the latter being a bit more pessimistic. O’Hanlon and Pollack emphasized that the American public and politicians need to be informed about what is going on in Iraq because too many people are stuck in the past when Iraq was in the middle of a sectarian war. They believe that the media especially needs to open up the discussion so that America can decide on what it wants to do in Iraq now that the surge is ending and a new president is about to be elected. Biddle and Nasr on the other hand, finished by warning about the major problems the U.S. still faces in Iraq. One, the U.S. relies on a government that still doesn’t work. Second, on their trip they didn’t see much evidence of long-term strategic planning on the part of the U.S. government on what to do next. Instead, everything was focused upon the present, and was a bit haphazard. They pointed to the problems with the SOFA agreement, and what to do with the Sons of Iraq, as examples of the U.S. government not strategizing.

Conclusion

All four experts presented very interesting observations about Iraq. They outlined the military success of the surge, and how the U.S. now needs to deal with the political and economic front. They believe that a new status quo is emerging, but that it is still fragile, and unpredictable with new parties competing with the established ones, and a prime minister, full of confidence, but perhaps unable to capitalize upon his success. They also warned that unless the U.S. begins to focus upon the new issues emerging, the gains in security could be lost. Iraq is no longer in the middle of the sectarian war like it was in 2006-2007. The U.S. is also ending its troop increase this month in July. The coming months and years are just as important, and possibly more, for the future of Iraq than the previous fourteen under the Surge because Baghdad needs to prove that it can maintain the gains made, and O’Hanlon, Pollack, Biddle, and Nasr present important issues that Americans need to consider about what comes next.

SOURCES

Biddle, Stephen, “Patient Stabilized?” National Interest, 2/29/08

Biddle, Stephen, Nasr, Vali, Nash, William, “Political and Security Developments in Iraq and the Region,” Council on Foreign Relations, 6/12/08

Brookings Institution, “Iraq: One Year Later,” 6/13/08

O’Hanlon, Michael and Pollack, Kenneth, “A War We Must Win,” New York Times, 7/30/07

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Defense Analyst Sees ‘Enormous Progress’ In Iraq Security Situation,” 7/1/08

Is Iraq Going To End Up Like Eastern Europe?

At the beginning of April 2008 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held two days of hearings on the future of Iraq. One guest was Yahia Khairi Said from the Center for the Study of Global Governance and Revenue Watch. One of the interesting arguments he made was that Iraq could turn out like Eastern Europe.

According to Said, after the Iron Curtain fell in Eastern Europe a series of reformers took power. They tried to push for change, too fast in many cases, but didn’t prove to be good at actually running a government. Many ended up losing power to former elites and bureaucrats. In Russia for example, the reformer Boris Yeltsin gave way to former KGB officer Vladimir Putin, as many Russians chose security and autocracy over the instability and uncertainty of democracy. Putin brought back elements of the Communist regime, sans the Communist Party.

Said postulated that Iraq could turn out the same way. After the U.S. invasion, the American run Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) attempted widespread reforms of Iraqi society that were greatly resented such as de-Baathification, disbanding the army, closing state-run industries, etc. The CPA gave way to an Iraqi government run largely by exiles. None of them have proven competent at running a government. Prime Minister Maliki’s rule suffers from a lack of qualified personnel, corruption, sectarianism, and an inability to provide basic services. Said argued that these exiles might lose power eventually over the next series of elections to former Iraqi officials that the public believes can bring stability, as happened in Eastern Europe. As examples, he points to the military that hasn’t matured yet, but could play a role in politics in the future, and the midlevel bureaucrats that are trying to make the government work.

Alternatively, Said put forward two other possible scenarios for Iraq besides the return of the old order. Those consisted of continued rule of the exile parties and a disintegration into warlordism. In the first, the Dawa, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and Kurds would maintain their ruling coalition without popular support, shut out opposition, decentralize the country through federalism, and require a large U.S. military presence to protect them. In the second, the U.S. would withdraw and Iraq would fall apart into fiefdoms ruled by local warlords with no real central government power.

Finally, Said said that the U.S. should try to limit the rise of authoritarianism if Iraq were to go the way of Eastern Europe. His four points to achieve this were a 1) U.N. Resolution to solve the dispute over Kirkuk that would relieve tensions in northern Iraq, 2) A new oil law that shares revenues to try to build back Iraqi unity, 3) Free and fair elections that will allow new forces such as the Sunni Sons of Iraq a voice in Iraq, and challenge the rule of the exile elites that currently run the government, and finally 4) Get more countries and the U.N. involved in Iraq because the U.S. supports the ruling parties.

Said’s ideas are very original and depart from the major analogies that are usually made about Iraq. The Administration and war supporters have often used post-World War II Germany and Japan, and increasingly South Korea, as their models. There the U.S. fought wars, helped build the countries up into healthy democracies, and maintained a long-term troop presence. The Japan and German models ignore the fact that they had a history of democracy before the U.S. occupations and were also industrial nations with in tact bureaucracy and businesses to build upon after the war. South Korea went through years of autocratic rule supported by the U.S. before it became a democracy. That actually follows Said’s model, more than the one argued by the White House. None of the three had large scale fighting and insurgencies like Iraq either. Opponents of the war have said that Iraq could turn out like Yugoslavia or Vietnam. In Vietnam the U.S. sent troops under a questionable incident, the Gulf of Tonkin, and ended up being defeated by an insurgency and North Vietnam. Yugoslavia broke apart into separate countries due to sectarian and ethnic fighting. Like the supporters’ analogies, neither of these seems to fit Iraq. The Sunni insurgency was fought by a minority group that lost power after the invasion, and the majority has flipped sides to now work with the U.S. Islamism has failed to be as strong a motivator as communism proved in Vietnam. The Sunnis never got the kind of support the Viet Cong got from North Vietnam, Russia and China as well. The sectarian fighting in Iraq never got as bad as to threaten the break up of the country, as happened in Yugoslavia. Public opinion polls of Iraqis consistently show that they overwhelmingly object to the idea as well.

SOURCES:

ABC, BBC, ARD, and NHK, “Iraq Poll March 2008,” 3/14/08

Said, Yahia, “Political Dynamics In Iraq within the Context of the ‘Surge,’” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4/2/08
- “Stability in Iraq, Putin Style,” Huffington Post, 4/7/08