Too Many Costs and Corruption To Develop Iraqi Economy

While on a trip to Ninewa province, Planning Minister Ali Baban said that the government had too many costs and too much corruption to develop the economy. The Minister noted that of the $58.6 billion in the 2009 budget, 80% went to operational costs such as salaries, pensions, and the food ration system, leaving only 20% for investment in infrastructure and development. He said that wasn’t near enough to finance the amount of projects Iraq needed. Another major problem he mentioned was the rampant corruption in the government. This was just seen at the beginning of September 2009 when the Deputy Transport Minister was arrested for trying to extort money from a foreign security firm. The official wanted a bribe to ensure that the company would get its contract renewed, and was caught trying to take $100,000 from them. A government official also told the Azzaman paper in June that $4 billion was unaccounted for in the budget.

Together, the problems of corruption and rising government costs are starving Iraq of the money needed to rebuild after years of wars, sanctions, and occupation. The Planning Minister called on the Iraqi private sector and foreign investors to help, but that’s not likely to happen soon. Iraq’s business sector is very small, and investment is just beginning. The instability and lack of an investment law has kept many foreign firms away as well, although some are slowly entering Iraq. Services and business are likely to suffer as a result, leading to more dependence upon the government and petroleum to keep the Iraqi economy going.

SOURCES

Abdulzair, Kareem, “$4 billion unaccounted for in this year’s Iraqi budget,” Azzaman, 6/25/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Minister says govt. unable to cover projects, eyes private sector,” 9/3/09

Levinson, Charles, “Leaders have vision of burgeoning Baghdad,” USA Today, 9/9/08
- “Safer Iraq draws foreign investors,” USA Today, 9/9/08

Reuters, “Iraq deputy transport minister arrested for graft,” 9/3/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/09

Iraq's Provinces Still Having Budget Problems

Iraq's eighteen provinces are still struggling with their finances this year. In 2008 when the price of Iraqi crude was soaring, Iraq's budget increased with it. Iraq's governorates signed dozens of new development projects as a result. Few of those were finished however, so the bills rolled over into the new fiscal year. That coincided with a collapse in world oil prices with the recession. That means the new provincial councils elected in January 2009 are now faced with the outstanding obligations of their predecessors, leaving little to no funds for their own plans.

In 2008 Iraq's parliament passed a $49.9 billion budget. Later in the year a supplemental budget was added to that for a total of $72.2 billion. That was a post-war high, and almost equal to the 2007 $41 billion and 2006 $34 billion budgets combined. Flush with money, Iraq's provincial councils went out and signed a large number of reconstruction contracts. 2008 was an election year with balloting due at the beginning of 2009, so many politicians wanted to show that they were doing something to get re-elected. At the end of the year, the world economy collapsed and so did the price of petroleum. As a result Iraq's 2009 budget was reduced to $58.6 billion even though parliament knew that amount would cause a deficit. Again, campaign politics probably played a role in that decision.

All of Iraq's eighteen provinces had their budgets cut this year. In 2008, the governorates got a total of $5,861.3 million for their capital budgets that goes towards infrastructure and investment. For 2009 they are scheduled to receive $4,113.1 million, a $1,748.2 million decrease.

Capital Budgets By Province

Provinces	2007/% Spent	2008/% Spent	2009
Anbar	$107 mil/3.7%	$183.33 mil/69%	$112.4 mil
Babil	$127 mil/49%	$200.67 mil/58%	$134 mil
Baghdad	$560 mil/31%	$883.3 mil/12%	$551.1 mil
Basra	$195 mil/21%	$306.67 mil/37%	$201 mil
Dhi Qar	$138 mil/40%	$216.67 mil/38%	$142.6 mil
Diyala	$100 mil/N/A	$168 mil/18%	$103.7 mil
Karbala	$71 mil/41%	$113.33 mil/33%	$77.8 mil
Kurdistan	$1,560 mil/95%	$2,528 mil/N/A	$1,952 mil
Maysan	$76 mil/51%	$120 mil/79%	$80 mil
Muthanna	$52 mil/19%	$83.33 mil/36%	$56.2 mil
Najaf	$588 mil/64%	$143.33 mil/95%	$92.9 mil
Ninewa	$226 mil/26%	$356.67 mil/7%	$235.6 mil
Qadisiyah	$64 mil/39%	$133.33 mil/25%	$86.4 mil
Salahaddin	$93 mil/34%	$146.67 mil/49%	$97.2 mil
Tamim	$91 mil/34%	$143.33 mil/54%	$99.4 mil
Wasit	$83 mil/41%	$134.67 mil/50%	$90.8 mil
TOTAL	$4,131 mil	$5,861.3 mil	$4,113.1 mil

Note: The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) gave several different numbers for the 2008 capital budgets for the provinces and the amount spent. The latest figures provided by the SIGIR from a January 30, 2009 report were the ones used.

Not only that, but the incoming provincial councils found that their predecessors' spending left them with nothing. In Dhi Qar for example, 600 projects had to be put on hold because there was no money for them. Sometimes these deals were very questionable. The head of the reconstruction committee in Qadisiyah recently reported that the previous council issued $43 million in frivolous contracts tied up with tribal politics, corruption, and political favors. As reported before, many members of the former provincial governments are being charged with corruption since the January election.

Even without those problems, Iraq's provinces have had a very hard time spending all of their money. Last year, Najaf did the best spending 95% of its $143.33 million capital budget, while Ninewa, one of the most violent areas of the country, only spent 7% of its $356.67 million capital budget. Those numbers only tell part of the story however, as provinces that expended a lot like Maysan did not spend it well. For 2008 they spent 79% of their capital budget, but that only completed 41 of 241 projects. Some of the causes of these difficulties are lack of capacity, lack of trained staff, inexperience, and corruption. With many brand new politicians taking office it's likely that these issues will continue.

SOUCES

Aswat al-Iraq, "41 out of 241 projects implemented in Missan," 12/30/08

- "Diwaniya previous Council proscribed $43 million," 8/26/09

- "ID75bn in supplementary budget for Thi-Qar," 7/26/09

Department of Defense, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," June 2009

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, "Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 7/30/08

- "Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 1/30/09

- "Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 7/30/09

Joint U.S.-Iraq-Kurdish Patrols Okayed In Ninewa Objected To In Kirkuk

August 2009 saw a sharp increase in mass casualty bombings across Iraq. After Baghdad, Ninewa was the hardest hit. On August 9 a suicide bomber struck a mosque in Mosul killing 23 and wounding 130. The next day two truck bombs hit the village of Khazna in eastern Ninewa killing 20 and wounding 110. Finally, on August 13 a suicide truck bomber attacked a café in Sinjar killing 20 and wounding 35.

Tensions were already high in the province due to the divide between the Kurdish Ninewa Fraternal List and the ruling al-Hadbaa party, and the two sides blamed each other for the violence. In response the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq General Ray Odierno suggested creating joint U.S.-Iraqi-Kurdish patrols in Ninewa. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the head of the Fraternal List initially welcomed the idea, and on September 1, 2009 it was announced that the joint operations would go ahead in the Mosul suburbs, the capital of Ninewa. The Americans have already set up similar patrols outside of Kirkuk in Tamim province, and are seen as a way to foster cooperation between Arabs and Kurds, so they could be a positive move in Ninewa as well since things have only gotten worse there politically since the January 2009 provincial elections.

In neighboring Tamim however, Arabs have protested against expanding the program to Kirkuk itself and other parts of the province. On September 3, the Arab bloc on the provincial council said they would conduct a boycott if joint patrols were created within the city of Kirkuk. Then on September 5, 500 people in the town of Huweija demonstrated against the patrols being formed across the rest of the province. The Arabs are probably afraid that the policy will give the Kurds a larger presence in Tamim and Kirkuk then before, and thus upset the delicate balance between groups.

The joint patrols when implemented have apparently helped relieve tensions, but they are only a band-aid. American troops are drawing down so the operations can only last for a set amount of time. The bigger problem is the growing divide between the Fraternal List and al-Hadbaa, Baghdad and Kurdistan, and Arabs and Kurds. This needs U.S. mediation, but Washington doesn’t seem to be giving it much priority. Only the American military seems to be taking the initiative, and that’s not enough.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Humdreds protest against proposed US-Iraq-Kurd force,” 9/5/09

AK News, “Kurds welcome Americans Kirkuk proposal,” 8/20/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Arab bloc in Kirkuk threatens to boycott council,” 9/3/09
- “Demonstrations in Huweija against tripartite force,” 9/5/09
- “Iraqi-Kurdish-U.S. security teams in Mosul-source,” 9/1/09
- “Mosul mosque blast death toll up to 38, wounded 90,” 8/7/09
- “Mosul truck bombs casualties rise to 153,” 8/10/09
- “Sinjar suicide blast casualties up to 55,” 8/13/09
- “Truck bombs kill 20, wound 110 in Mosul,” 8/10/09

Graeber, Daniel, “arab-kurdish divide dominating u.s. agenda,” Niqash, 9/1/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09

Juhi, Bushra, “Iraqi Arabs protest US plan for Kurdish patrols,” Associated Press, 9/5/09

Nordland, Rod and Dagher, Sam, “U.S. Will Release More Members of an Iraqi Militia,” New York Times, 8/17/09

Recent Iranian Military Operations In Iraq

As reported before, the Iranian backed Special Groups have resumed attacks in recent months after a short break. August 2009 also saw a number of reports about Tehran’s continued military interference in Iraq. On August 11, two Iranians were arrested in the Khanaqin district of Diyala after having infiltrated into Iraq. Iraqi officials said that other Iranians had recently been arrested in the area smuggling in weapons. On August 19 it was announced that 13-16 Iranian made rockets were seized along with three suspects after an attack on the U.S. base in Basra. This was part of the increase in Special Group activities in the south. Finally, on August 31 there was a story that Iraqi security forces were finding new caches of weapons in southern Iraq, some of which they believed originated in Iran.

The goal of these recent operations appears to be two pronged. First, the attacks in the south are a way for Iran and the Special Groups to let Washington and Baghdad know that they are still around and capable of disrupting things. Second, Iraqi officials loyal to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki think the weapons are going to his political rivals to stir up trouble in the run-up to the 2010 parliamentary elections. Maliki is running on law and order again, so any violence will help complicate that campaign. The increase in attacks in August 2009, for example, although mostly carried out by the insurgency and Al Qaeda in Iraq, made many Iraqis question the government and security forces. Some were also blaming political parties, so the Iranian tactic may backfire. Overall, the scope of this campaign seems far below what Iran has carried out in the past, and aimed at influencing Iraqi politics more than anything else, which has always been the top priority of Tehran.

SOURCES

Ashton, Adam and Issa, Sahar, “Iraqis remaining cool despite attacks on mosques, minorities,” McClatchy Newspapers, 8/14/09

Associated Press, “Iraqi Military Losing People’s Confidence,” 8/15/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “2 Iranians arrested after infiltrating into Iraq,” 8/11/09

Dagher, Sam, “Iranian Arms Seized in Iraq, Officials Say,” New York Times, 8/19/09

Reuters, “Arms Finds In Hitherto Quiet South Iraq Ring Alarms,” 8/31/09

The U.S. Needs To Save Iraq From Itself Says Analyst

Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution has been one of the long-time American commentators on Iraq. He recently wrote a piece for The National Interest journal entitled “The Battle for Baghdad". In it he argues that Iraqis, left to their own devices will destroy the gains made in Iraq since the Surge. He warns that the older political parties that took over after the 2003 invasion are still clinging to power, and are willing to bring down Iraqi democracy to maintain their positions. According to Pollack the only thing standing in the way of this happening is the United States. Even that is endangered because of the moves of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Like most of his think tank counterparts, Pollack is arguing for a long-term American diplomatic and military presence in Iraq to act as peacekeepers and mediators. Without them Pollack believes that Iraqis will only think about their own short-term interests to the detriment of the country.

Pollack begins with two conversations he had with Iraq politicians after the January 2009 provincial elections. The first was with a group that was opposed to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. They started off assuring Pollack that they had enough supporters for a no confidence vote against the Prime Minister in parliament, but in the end they admitted that Abdul Aziz al-Hakim of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council opposed this idea because it would go against the recent balloting that was in Maliki’s favor. The absence of Hakim’s support was considered a deal breaker. This represents one dynamic of the post sectarian war status quo in Iraq where many of the disputes are now political, and groups abide by the broad rules of the constitution and electoral system. On the other hand, Pollack met with a group of Dawa officials who were sure that Maliki would win in the 2010 parliamentary vote after his victory in 2009. They said the Prime Minister would run on services and security, and blame his opponents for any setbacks, something that’s actually happened recently. On the other hand when these politicians were asked about Maliki creating extra-judicial bodies and going outside standard procedures in the government they attempted to dodge the issues by saying that this was necessary because Iraq’s bureaucracy didn’t work and different political parties controlled the ministries and often didn’t listen to Maliki. This represented the other side of Iraq’s system where many believe that the Prime Minister is acting like leaders of the past and centralizing all authority around himself, which could intentionally or not lead to autocratic rule. To Pollack, this is the ying and the yang of Iraq. On the one hand democracy is taking root however precariously, on the other hand, there are plenty of forces in the country that threaten it.

There are two other issues that Pollack worries about. One is that Iraqi nationalism is making a comeback. This is helping to heal some of the wounds between Sunnis and Shiites created during the sectarian war. On the other hand, Iraqi nationalism is often interpreted as being solely Arab in character and anti-Kurdish. Maliki is playing on this by attempting to militarily confront the Kurds across the disputed territories in the north. There have been several times this has almost turned into shooting, only averted by the presence of U.S. forces. Pollack wonders if Maliki actually resents this outside interference, because he may want a confrontation with the Kurds so that he can rally the Arab public around him. Second, are the old Iraqi parties that have ruled Iraq since the 2005 elections. While he doesn’t name them, he is implying the Supreme Council, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and the Iraqi Accordance Front, all of which either controlled their own militia or had contacts with the insurgency, and used these armed factions to gain political power. Pollack believes that these groups are trying to cling to power, and will do whatever it takes to do so. In the 2010 election for example, they are pushing for a closed list voting system where the electorate only gets to pick from coalitions instead of individuals because this gives party bosses, rather than the public, control over the politicians and government. Pollack thinks both of these are threats to stability and democracy, because Maliki and the old guard parties are only thinking about their own personal gain rather than the future of the country.

Pollack’s solution to all of these problems is a long-term American presence in Iraq. According to him, the U.S. needs to stay to provide support to the government and mediate conflicts. Only the U.S. he writes can help solve the problems between Baghdad and Kurdistan over disputed areas like Kirkuk and federalism. The U.S. needs to make sure that Iraqi prisoners and the Sons of Iraq are treated well. The U.S. needs to push the government to protect minorities. The U.S. needs to pressure Baghdad to increase its capacity and improve the bureaucracy. The Americans need to make sure that party bosses don’t take over the elections, and push for a closed list voting system. The U.S. needs to deal with Maliki’s attempt to centralize power, and corruption. In a nutshell, Pollack believes the U.S. is the only party in Iraq that will think about Iraq. The main lever of influence the U.S. has to achieve this laundry list of items is aid. U.S. advisors still partner with Iraqi units, the security forces are dependent upon the Americans for maintenance and supply, the Iraqi government has U.S. advisors throughout, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams are essential parts of the rebuilding provinces out in the governorates, and the U.S. still provides a large amount of economic aid and advice. All of this assistance needs to be made conditional based upon Baghdad’s compliance with the long list of reforms listed above. This is something many other American think tank writers have argued for over the last few years.

There is one major impediment to overcome to actually achieving this according to Pollack, Prime Minister Maliki. The Prime Minister seems to have an inflated sense of the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces and is playing politics with the U.S. presence. Maliki thinks that the Iraqi forces are going to be ready sooner rather than later so he wants to cut many of the public ties with the U.S. like joint patrols with U.S. forces and the blast walls in Baghdad. More importantly he is pushing for a referendum on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to coincide with the 2010 parliamentary vote. This will give Maliki a powerful tool to run on so he can portray himself as the leader that got the Americans to leave Iraq. He can also use it against his opposition since many support a longer stay for U.S. forces to protect against Maliki’s excesses. If the Iraqi public votes down the SOFA, a definite possibility, than Pollack is afraid U.S. influence will end that election day. A main priority then should be Washington lobbying Maliki to move the referendum to some other time.

Therein lies a major problem with Pollack and others who take this line of argument for a long-term U.S. role in Iraq. There is no real reason for Maliki to change the referendum date because holding it the same time as national balloting will benefit him the most. He has already given up many forms of American military assistance since the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from Iraq’s cities, and that is the greatest piece of leverage the U.S. holds. Iraqi domestic politics is a much greater force now than U.S. influence. The White House therefore, could make all kinds of assistance conditional, and the Iraqis might still not listen. Iraq may turn out to be the prodigal son for the United States, but Pollack and others can’t seem to let go. Ultimately, they seem afraid of Iraqis running their own affairs. Pollack in “The Battle for Baghdad” just happens to be the most explicit in voicing this opinion.

SOURCES

Biddle, Stephen, “Reversal in Iraq,” Center for Preventative Action Council on Foreign Relations, May 2009

Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq: A Time To Stay?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7/30/09

DPA, “Al-Maliki courts Iraqi Sunni tribal leaders,” 8/11/09

Nagl, John and Burton, Brian, “After the Fire: Shaping the Future U.S. Relationship with Iraq,” Center for a New American Security, June 2009

Nordland, Rod, “Bombs Hurt Maliki Case That Iraq Can Guard Itself,” New York Times, 8/21/09

Pollack, Kenneth, “The Battle for Baghdad,” The National Interest, September/October 2009

Maliki On The 2010 Campaign Trail

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has been in full campaign mode for several months now anticipating the January 2010 parliamentary elections. The themes he is promoting are largely the same ones he used in the 2009 provincial vote: security, services, nationalism, and one new one, getting the Americans to leave Iraq. After Maliki’s State of Law List rode to victory in the governorates’ balloting it seemed like Maliki was assured of returning to the prime ministership using these issues. Since then, Maliki has run into a series of problems in his run for re-election, but he may still have one ace up his sleeve.

After Maliki’s crackdown on the Sadrists beginning in March 2008, the Prime Minister seized the limelight of Iraqi politics. He claimed that he had secured Iraq by getting rid of the Mahdi Army militia. This of course, ignored the work of the U.S. forces and the Surge, but he was more than willing to take credit for their sacrifices. His move gained support from both Shiites and Sunnis, and the name of his new list, State of Law, showed his new position. Attacks and deaths across Iraq took a large drop in the run up and aftermath of the January 2009 elections as well. By the summer Maliki was calling for the removal of blast walls along major thoroughfares in the capital.

The Baghdad bombings however, smashed Maliki’s successful campaign. On August 19, 2009 two truck bombs struck Iraq’s Foreign and Finance Ministries in Baghdad. 101 were killed and 1203 were wounded. These were the most devastating attacks since 2008. The Prime Minister was forced to rescind his order on the blast walls, and called for a renewed effort to secure the country. The bombings exposed the false sense of security that Maliki had helped create. The insurgents are a shell of their former selves, and are not a threat to overthrow the government, but they are still quite capable of spreading terror in Iraq’s major cities. In response, Maliki has blamed Syria, while the State of Law governor of Baghdad has accused Saudi Arabia of complicity in the bombings. This was the first chink in Maliki’s armor.

Another issue Maliki ran on in the 2009 vote was for improved services. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and Sadrists controlled most of the south and Baghdad after the 2005 elections, but did a poor job running them. Maliki promised to rectify this. The problem was that Iraq’s 2009 budget was drastically slashed with the drop in oil prices due to the world recession. The 2008 budget in comparison was a record high due to the skyrocketing price of petroleum that year. There was no way the provinces were going to get more money than the previous year then. Not only that, but the old provincial governments signed a large number of contracts for development projects in 2008 due to their growing budgets, which rolled over to 2009 and tied up all the money available for the new governorate councils. As reported before, most of the provinces are reporting deficits this year as a result. Maliki has tried to deflect the matter by blaming his opponents for the lack of services.

Finally, the Prime Minister has linked his nationalist stance with the withdrawal of the American forces. Maliki seems over confident in the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces. Before the passage of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) he was hoping that the Defense and Interior Ministers would say that the Iraqi forces were ready to assume complete control of internal security, but instead they said they needed at least three more years. He went ahead with the SOFA that set a December 31, 2011 pullout date for the Americans. In the implementation law it called for a referendum, originally set for July 30, 2009. That didn’t happen, but Maliki is now pushing for that to occur in conjunction with the 2010 election. That would give Maliki a powerful tool to run with, as he is not as strong as he once was with security and services, and most Iraqis want the Americans to leave. It’s also helpful that the some of his main opponents, the ruling Kurdish parties and the Iraqi Islamic Party want to have the U.S. stay to be a guarantor against Maliki using the security forces against them. Since Iraqi nationalism is on the rise, it will be hard for any of these parties to run for the SOFA, and if they do, Maliki is likely to ravage them for doing so.

As of now Maliki is not in as strong a position as he was after the 2009 vote. Iraqi perceptions of the security situation have seemingly changed after the Baghdad bombings. The central and provincial governments are incapable of improving services with the large budget cuts. In both instances, Maliki is blaming others, foreigners and the opposition respectively, to deflect attention away from his own shortcomings. What the Prime Minister still has going for him is Iraqi nationalism and growing anti-Americanism. For now, Maliki is still at the center of Iraqi politics. He’s also much better known, more popular with the electorate, and has a clear message compared to his opponents. Who for example, will run the new National Iraqi Alliance? Will anyone see them as anything but a sectarian Shiite coalition without the Prime Minister? The problem is he doesn’t hold a plurality, let alone a majority of votes. With five months to go before the parliamentary elections, plenty of things could change, and that’s symbolic of the state of Iraqi politics at this period in time.

SOURCES

Arraf, Jane, “Baghdad governor: Sunni MPs may be arrested for bombing,” Christian Science Monitor, 8/23/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Deficit in Baghdad provincial council’s budget,” 6/13/09

Buzbee, Sally and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq handing out cash to people on the streets,” Associated Press, 7/12/08

Dagher, Sam, “2 Blasts Expose Security Flaws in Heart of Iraq,” New York Times, 8/20/09

DPA, “Al-Maliki courts Iraqi Sunni tribal leaders,” 8/11/09

Gwertzman, Bernard, “Reappraising U.S. Withdrawal from Iraqi Cities,” Council on Foreign Relations, 8/25/09

Hauslohner, Abigail, “In Iraqi Politics, the Sunni-Shi’ite Divide Recedes,” Time, 1/14/09

Howard, Michael, “Baghdad tears down security barriers,” Guardian, 6/10/09

Iraq The Model, “Maliki promises a crackdown that could reach political figures,” 8/23/09

Knights, Michael and Ali, Ahmed, “Putting Iraq’s Security Agreement to the Vote: Risks and Opportunities,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy,” 8/24/09

Pollack, Kenneth, “The Battle for Baghdad,” The National Interest, September/October 2009

Santora, Marc, “Iraqis Demand Syria Turn Over Suspects,” New York Times, 8/25/09

Sly, Liz, “Iraqi army officers pulled $4.8-million bank heist, police say,” Los Angeles Times, 8/3/09

Al Qaeda Is Not What It Used To Be

On August 25, 2009 Al Qaeda in Iraq’s umbrella organization, the Islamic State of Iraq claimed responsibility for the August 19, 2009 Baghdad bombings which killed at least 101 people. The story has not been confirmed, but it is the only group that has openly said that it is behind the attack. While the bombing caught headlines around the world, it actually belies the true strength of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Once considered the vanguard of the insurgency, the group has since fallen out of favor after the majority of the Sunni population abandoned it in 2006.

Al Qaeda in Iraq has its origins with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Zarqawi was a Jordanian terrorist who after the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan first came to Baghdad, and then settled in with the Kurdish Islamist group Ansar al-Islam in Kurdistan in 2002. He ran his own organization that carried out some of the first mass casualty bombings after the 2003 invasion such as the attack on the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad and the assassination of Mohammed al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council. Having established himself as a leading Islamist terrorist, he then pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden in 2004, and renamed his group Al Qaeda in Iraq. In 2006 Zarqawi was killed, and Al Qaeda central established more direct control. In October 2006 the Islamic State of Iraq was formed. The death of its leader and the formation of the Islamic State were the beginning of the downfall of Al Qaeda in Iraq.

Zarqawi was succeeded by an Egyptian Abu Ayyub al-Masri. He wasn’t half the leader that Zarqawi was, who was known for his hands on approach and ruthlessness. Masri and the Al Qaeda central leadership became worried in 2006 that the United States was about to withdraw from Iraq and leave a power vacuum. This led to the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq, where Al Qaeda attempted to not only claim leadership of the insurgency but the Sunni community in general. Under Zarqawi, Al Qaeda had successfully instigated the sectarian war with the Shiites. This new organization was to provide leadership and protection for the Sunnis in the civil war, but proved completely incapable. Rather than being the vanguard, Al Qaeda and the Islamic State began being blamed for the violence. Many tribes in Anbar province also resented Al Qaeda’s attempts to subvert the leadership of the sheikhs and take over their illegal businesses such as smuggling. Together this led to most of the Sunnis turning on Al Qaeda beginning in the very year that the Islamic State was announced. The Anbar Awakening and the Sons of Iraq were the results. They aligned themselves with the Americans because they now saw them as a lesser evil compared to Al Qaeda in Iraq.

Today Al Qaeda is no longer a threat to the existence of the Iraqi state. They are not considered a leader in Iraqi insurgency either. They have lost most of their urban strongholds with the one exception of Mosul in Ninewa province. The terrorist attacks like the August 19 Baghdad bombings are about all they are currently capable of. They hope to make a return by continually attacking Shiites in the hopes of rekindling the sectarian war, but that has largely failed. The Baghdad bombings appear to be more for show than anything else. The group is attempting to show that they are still capable of going after Iraq’s institutions as well. Still, it is very unlikely that the group will ever attain the status it had in the period from 2003-2006 because of its ideology, rejection by the general populace, and inability to offer anything of real substance besides violence.

SOURCES

Fishman, Brian “Dysfunction and Decline: Lessons Learned From Inside Al-Qa’ida in Iraq,” Combating Terrorism Center, 3/16/09

Roggio, Bill, “al Qaeda’s Grand Coalition in Anbar,” Long War Journal.org, 10/12/06
“Divisions in al Qaeda in Iraq,” Long War Journal.org, 10/13/06

Rosen, Nir, “The Many Faces of Abu Musab al Zarqawi,” Truthdig.com, 6/9/06

Sly, Liz, “Al Qaeda-linked group claims two recent Baghdad bombings that killed 95,” Los Angeles Times, 8/26/09

Zenko, Micah, “Foregoing Limited Force: The George W. Bush Administration’s Decision Not to Attack Ansar Al-Islam,” Journal of Strategic Studies, August 2009