New Security Statistics For Iraq April 1 to July 21, 2009

The new Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) quarterly report to Congress has been released and includes new details on the security situation in Iraq. The report has a calendar recording the number of Iraqi casualties by day. It notes that while the number of monthly attacks has stayed at a low level from January to July 2009, mass-casualty attacks have led to an increase in Iraqi casualties. June 20-24 was the deadliest period recorded in the second quarter of 2009 with 136 Iraqis killed and more than 300 wounded in bombings. As noted several times before, attacks and deaths dropped in the second half of 2008 as the January 2009 provincial elections neared. The average number of security incidents for example, went from 1,715.5 from July to September 2008 to 323.0 from January to March 2009. From April to July 24 there was a slight increase to an average of 396.7 attacks per month. This is the new ebb and flow of violence in Iraq, which closely follows major political events.

Below is the statistics provided by the SIGIR.

Iraqi Casualties (Killed/Wounded) and Major Attacks 4/1/09-

7/21/09

April 09 – 435 killed/Avg: 14.5 killed per day

			6	9	5	3
12	44	11	15	5	8	8
5	4	0	11	2	2	3
13	13	3	10	81	75	8
9	3	2	61	9

4/15/09 11 killed in bombing Kirkuk

4/23/09 60 killed in suicide bombings in Baghdad and Diyala

4/24/09 60 Iraqis and Iranian pilgrims killed and 125 wounded by 2 suicide bombers in Baghdad

4/29/09 16 killed and 45 wounded in 3 car bombings in Baghdad

May 09 – 305 killed/Avg. 9.8 killed per day

					8	3
8	13	4	18	5	2	5
4	12	7	6	10	2	8
16	3	5	48	29	7	4
11	11	12	9	8	14	7
9

5/6/09 11 killed and 44 wounded in 2 car bombings in Baghdad

5/11/09 11 killed in car bombing in Kirkuk

5/20/09 35 killed and 72 wounded in car bomb in Baghdad

5/21/09 20 killed and 33 wounded by suicide bombers in Baghdad and Kirkuk

June 09 – 624 killed/Avg. 20.8 killed per day

	9	2	13	1	3	9
8	11	3	36	14	3	6
6	9	1	0	0	6	271
8	80	0	57	0	15	14
0	9	30

6/10/09 26 killed in car bomb in Nassirya

70 killed and more than 200 wounded in attack in Kirkuk

6/22/09 14 killed and 60 wounded in attacks in Baghdad and Abu Ghraib

6/27/09 13 killed in motorcycle bombing in Baghdad

July 1-21/09 – 447 killed/Avg. 21.2 killed per day

			4	35	11	3
25	15	3	40	52	0	6
35	11	1	55	21	0	5
0	10	115

7/8/09 31 killed and wounded in two bombings in Mosul

7/9/09 52 killed or wounded in attacks in Tel Afar, Mosul, Baghdad and Kirkuk

7/20/09 10 killed in attacks in Mosul

7/21/09 15 killed and 100 wounded in attacks in Baghdad

Total Number of Attacks In Iraq April 1, 2008-July 21, 2009 From U.S. Military - Least To Most Violent

Province	Total Attacks 4/1/08-7/1/08	Total Attacks 7/1/08- 9/30/08	Total Attacks 10/1/08- 12/31/08	Total Attacks 1/1/09- 3/20/09	Total Attacks 4/1/09- 7/21/09
Muthanna	2	1	1	1	2
Karbala	1	4	0	1	15
Najaf	4	1	2	1	22
Kurdistan (Dohuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniya)	3	6	3	1	26
Dhi-Qar	17	21	7	4	7
Qadisiyah	17	7	9	2	29
Wasit	34	8	9	8	7
Maysan	12	43	39	24	13
Basra	108	26	11	11	18
Babil	81	54	62	17	15
Anbar	275	209	162	53	92
Tamim	248	245	184	73	129
Diyala	537	533	251	123	122
Salahaddin	717	482	374	138	150
Ninewa	1,041	924	511	219	454
Baghdad	2,221	867	713	293	486
TOTALS:	5,318	3,431	2,338	969	1,587
Avg. Per Month	1,772.6	1,715.5	1,169.0	323.0	396.7

SOURCES

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, - "Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 1/30/09

-"Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 7/30/09

- "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress," 10/30/08

- "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress," 4/30/09

Governors, Heads of Councils, and Ruling Coalitions In Iraq's Provinces

More information is now available on the ruling coalitions that took power after the 2009 provincial elections. Here’s a rundown of governors and heads of councils, (and where possible their deputies), the parties that are now in control of the fourteen provinces that held balloting in January 2009, and the election results. After each is a short note about the motivations behind the coalitions. At the end is a comparison with the 2005 balloting. The three provinces of Kurdistan will not have provincial voting until the new Kurdish parliament drafts their own election law, while balloting in Tamim is indefinitely postponed because of political disputes.

The 2009 voting dramatically changed the face of provincial politics. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law List displaced the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council across most of southern Iraq and Baghdad. New parties also emerged such as the Awakening of Iraq and Independents led by Sheikh Abu Risha in Anbar and the Al-Hadbaa List in Ninewa. They represented the return of Sunnis to local politics after they largely boycotted the 2005 elections. Despite the fact that nationalist and local parties did better than those based upon ethnosectarian identity/politics, Shiites still largely voted for Shiites, Sunnis for Sunnis, and Kurds for Kurds. The 2009 results are also setting the stage for the 2010 parliamentary balloting as everyone is strategizing in relation to Maliki, the big winner. Some want to run with him to ride his coattails into power, while others are hoping to unseat him.



The numbers before each province refer to the numbers on the map above

13. Anbar
Governor Qaseem Muhammad – Independent - Awakening of Iraq and Independents – Sheikh Abu Risha
Head of Council Jassem Mohammed Hamad – Iraqi National Project – Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq
Ruling Coalition
Awakening of Iraq and Independents
Iraqi National Project
4 other parties
Election Results – 29 seats
1. Awakening of Iraq and Independents – Sheikh Abu Risha: 8 seats
2. Iraqi National Project – Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq: 6 seats
2. Alliance of Intellectuals and Tribes – Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi: 6 seats
4. National Movement for Development and Reform – Jamal al-Karbouli: 3 seats
5. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 2 seats
5. Iraqi Tribes List – Sheikh al-Hayes: 2 seats
5. Iraqi National Unity: 2 seats
Notes: Formed to kick the Iraqi Islamic Party out of office

10. Babil
Governor Salman Hassan al-Zarkani – Independent Trend of the Noble Ones - Sadrists
1st Deputy Governor Iskander Wattout – Civil Society List
2nd Deputy Governor Sadeq al-Mhanna – National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari
Head of Council Kadum Majid Tuman – Independent Trend of the Noble Ones - Sadrists
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Civil Society List
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones
Iraqi National List
National Reform Party
Election Results – 30 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 8 seats
2. Al-Mihrab Marty List – SIIC: 5 seats
3. Independent Trends of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 3 seats
3. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats
3. Civil Society List: 3 seats
3. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
3. Independent Justice Association: 3 seats
8. Independent Ansar List: 2 seats
Notes: Babil, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah are all anti-Supreme Council coalitions put together by State of Law

1. Baghdad
Governor Salah Abd al-Razzaq – State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki
2nd Deputy Governor Kamil Saeed al-Saeedi – State of Law
Head of Council Kamil al-Zaydi – State of Law
Deputy Head of Council Thamir Riyad al-Addad – State of Law
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Election Results – 57 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 28 seats
2. Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Hashemi: 7 seats
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 5 seats
3. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 5 seats
5. Iraqi National Project – Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq: 4 seats
6. Al-Mihrab Marty List – SIIC: 3 seats
7. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats
8. Christians: 1 seat – through quota
8. Mandeans: 1 seat – through quota
Notes: With a majority State of Law needed no coalition partners

6. Basra
Governor Shitagh Abbud – State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki
Deputy Governor Nizar al-Jabiri – State of Law
Head of Council Jabbar Amin – State of Law
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Election Results – 35 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 20 seats
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5 seats
3. Gathering of Justice and Unity: 2 seats
3. Independent Trends of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 2 seats
5. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 2 seats
5. Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi: 2 seats
7. Fadhila Party: 1 seat
8. Christians: 1 seat – through quota
Notes: With a majority State of Law needed no coalition partners

7. Dhi Qar
Governor Taleb Kazem Abdulkarim al-Hassan – State of Law- Prime Minister Maliki
Deputy Governor Abdulhadi Mohan – State of Law
2nd Deputy Governor Haydar Bunyan - ?
Head of Council Qusai al-Ibadi – National Reform Trend – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari
Deputy Head of Council Abdulhadi Mohan – State of Law
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones
National Reform Trend
Election Results – 31 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 13 seats
2. Independent Trends of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 7 seats
3. Al-Mihrab Marty List – SIIC: 5 seats
4. National Reform Trend: Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 4 seats
5. Fadhila Party: 2 seats
Notes: Babil, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah are all anti-Supreme Council coalitions put together by State of Law

3. Diyala
Governor Abdulnasir al-Muntasirbillah – Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Hashemi
Deputy Governor Furat Mohammed – Diyala Coalition – SIIC
Head of Council Taleb Mohammed Hassan – Kurdish Alliance – KDP-PUK
Ruling Coalition
Iraqi Accordance Front
Kurdish Alliance
Diyala Coalition
Election Results – 29 seats
1. Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Hashemi: 9 seats
2. Iraqi National Project – Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq: 6 seats
2. Kurdish Alliance – KDP-PUK: 6 seats
4. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
5. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 2 seats
5. Diyala Coalition – SIIC: 2 seats
7. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 1 seat
Notes: Puts together coalition partners from parliament that shut out State of Law

11. Karbala
Governor Amaleddin Majeed Hameed Kadhem – State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki
Deputy Governor Abbas al-Musawai – Independent Trend of the Noble Ones - Sadrists
Deputy Governor Youssef Majid al-Habboubi –Independent
Head of Council Hamid al-Musawi – Independent Trend of the Noble Ones
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Hope of Rafidain
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones
Youssef Majid al-Habboubi
Election Results – 27 seats
1. Youssef Majid al-Habboubi – Independent: 1 seat
2. Hope of Rafidain – Parliamentarian Yunadam Kanna - Christians: 9 seats
2. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 9 seats
4. Al-Mihrab Marty List – SIIC: 4 seats
4. Independent Trends of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 4 seats
Notes: Habboubi won the most votes in the election, but because he ran independently and not part of a list, he only got 1 seat on the council. Babil, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah are all anti-Supreme Council coalitions put together by State of Law

5. Maysan
Governor Muhammed al-Sudani – State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki
Head of Council Hashim al-Shawki – Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Al-Mihrab Martyr List
Election Results – 27 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 8 seats
1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 8 seats
3. Independent Trends of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 7 seats
4. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 4 seats
Notes: State of Law could’ve formed another anti-SIIC coalition here but instead decided to join with them

8. Muthanna
Governor Ibrahim Salman al-Mayali – Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC
Head of Council Abd al-Latyif Abbas al-Hasani – Al-Mihrab Martyr List
Ruling Coalition
Al-Mihrab Martyr List
Local lists
Election Results – 26 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 5 seats
1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5 seats
3. The People’s List: 3 seats
3. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats
4. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 2 seats
4. Gathering of Muthanna: 2 seats
4. Independent National List: 2 seats
4. Gathering of Iraqi Professionals: 2 seats
4. Gathering of Middle Euphrates: 2 seats
Notes: Muthanna’s council was split between the State of Law and the SIIC, but Dawa member Ibrahim Salman al-Mayali switched sides at the last minute to give the Al-Mihrab Marty List the majority. Al-Mayali became governor as a result, and State of Law walked out on the council

12. Najaf
Governor Adnan al-Zurfi – Independent - State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki
Head of Council Fayad al-Shamari – State of Law
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Locals
Election Results – 28 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 7 seats
1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 7 seats
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 6 seats
4. Loyalty to Najaf: 4 seats
5. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 2 seats
5. Union of Independent Najaf: 2 seats
Notes: State of Law dropped possible coalitions with the Sadrists and SIIC and joined with local lists to take this council. The Supreme Council and Sadrists sued in response

14. Ninewa
Governor Atheel al-Najafi – Al-Hadbaa List
2nd Deputy Governor Hassan Mahmoud Ali – Independent – Al-Hadbaa List
Head of Council Faisal Abdullah al-Yawir – Al Hadbaa List
Deputy Head of Council Wild-dar Zebari – Al Hadbaa List
Ruling Coalition
Al-Hadbaa List
Iraqi Islamic Party
Election Results – 37 seats
1. Al-Hadbaa List: 19 seats
2. Ninewa Brotherhood List – PUK-KDP: 12 seats
3. Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi: 3 seats
4. Shabaks: 1 seat - through quota
4. Christians: 1 seat - through quota
4. Yazidis: 1 seat - through quota
Notes: Al-Hadbaa is a new Sunni party that emerged in the voting, running on Iraqi nationalism and anti-Kurdish sentiments. The Kurdish parties are boycotting the council as a result

9. Qadisiyah
Governor Salim Husayn – State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki
Head of Council Jubeir al-Juburi – State of Law
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Iraqi National List
Election Results – 28 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 11 seats
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5 seats
3. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
3. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats
5. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 2 seats
5. Islamic Loyalty Party: 2 seats
5. Fadhila Party: 2 seats
Notes: Babil, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah are all anti-Supreme Council coalitions put together by State of Law

2. Salahaddin
Governor Mutashar al-Aliwi – Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Hashemi
Head of Council ? - Iraqi National List - Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi
Ruling Coalition
Iraqi Accordance Front
Iraqi National List
Election Results – 28 seats
1. Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Hashemi: 5 seats
1. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 5 seats
3. Iraq National Project – Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq: 3 seats
3. National Project of Iraq: 3 seats
5. Group of Intellectuals and Scientists: 2 seats
5. Iraqi Turkmen Front: 2 seats
5. Front of Liberation and Building: 2 seats
5. Salahaddin Patriotic List: 2 seats
5. Brotherhood and Peaceful Coexistence: 2 seats
5. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 2 seats
Notes: Province went to Sunnis after the Kurds ran it before because of the 2005 boycott, and shut out State of Law

4. Wasit
Governor Lateef Hamad al-Tarfa – Independent
Head of Council Mahmoud Abdulrida Talal – Al-Mihrab Marty List – SIIC
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Al-Mihrab Martyr List
Election Results – 28 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 13 seats
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 6 seats
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 3 seats
3. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
3. Iraqi Constitutional Party – Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani
Notes: Another province where State of Law gave up an anti-SIIC coalition to work with them

2009 1st Place Finishes – Provinces
State of Law (Maliki) – Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiyah, Wasit
Iraqi Accordance Front (Hashemi) – Diyala, Salahaddin (tied)
Iraqi National List (Allawi) – Salahaddin (tied)
Awakening of Iraq and Independents (Sheikh Abu Risha) – Anbar
Al-Hadbaa List - Ninewa
Youssef Majid al-Habboubi - Karbala

2009 Governors By Parties – Provinces
State of Law (Maliki) – Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Maysan, Najaf, Qadisiyah
Iraqi Accordance Front (Hashemi) – Diyala, Salahaddin
Al-Mihrab Martyr List (SIIC) - Muthanna
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones (Sadrists) - Babil
Awakening of Iraq and Independents (Sheikh Abu Risha) – Anbar
Al-Hadbaa List: Ninewa

2009 Heads of Councils By Parties - Provinces
State of Law (Maliki) – Baghdad, Basra, Najaf, Qadisiyah
Al-Mihrab Martyr List (SIIC) – Maysan, Muthanna, Wasit
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones (Sadrists) – Babil, Karbala
Kurdish Alliance (KDP-PUK) - Diyala
National Reform Trend (Jaafari) - Dhi Qar
Iraqi National List (Allaqi) - Salahaddin
Iraqi National Project (Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq) – Anbar
Al-Hadbaa List: Ninewa

2005 1st Place Finishes – Provinces
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council – Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar (tied), Karbala, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiyah
Kurdistan Democratic Party – Dohuk, Irbil, Tamim
Kurdistan Democratic Party & Patriotic Union of Kurdistan – Ninewa, Salahaddin
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council & Dawa – Diyala
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan - Sulaymaniya
Sadrists – Maysan, Wasit
Fadhila Party – Dhi Qar (tied)
Iraqi Islamic Party (Hashemi) – Anbar

2005 Governors By Parties – Provinces
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council – Babil, Baghdad, Dhi Qar, Diyala, Karbala, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiyah
Kurdistan Democratic Party (Kurdish President Barzani) – Dohuk, Irbil, Tamim
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (President Talabani) - Sulaymaniya
Kurdish Alliance (Barzani and Talabani) - Salahaddin
Independent (Backed by Kurdish Alliance) – Ninewa
Sadrists - Maysan, Wasit
Iraqi Islamic Party (Vice President Hashemi) – Anbar
Fadhila Party – Basra

2005 Provincial Election Results

Anbar – 41 seats
Governor Mamoun Sami Rashi al-Awani – Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi
Iraqi Islamic Party: 29 seats
Independent Iraqi Group: 8 seats
Reconciliation and Liberation Bloc: 4 seats

Babil – 41 seats
Governor Salim al-Mesalmaoui – SIIC
Faithful Iraqis Association – SIIC: 25 seats
Al-Rasul Association: 6 seats
Imam Ali Society: 6 seats
Security & Reconstruction: 2 seats
Babil Independent Association: 2 seats

Baghdad – 51 seats
Governor Hussein al-Tahan – SIIC
Baghdad Nation – SIIC: 28 seats
Baghdad Peace – Dawa – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 11 seats
Fadhila Party: 6 seats
National Democratic Alliance: 2 seats
Iraqi Communist Party: 2 seats
National Independent Cadres and Elites – Sadrists: 1 seat
Iraqi Independent al-Bayan Gathering: 1 seat

Basra – 41 seats
Governor Muhammad al-Waili – Fadhila Party
Islamic Basra – SIIC: 20 seats
Fadhila Party: 12 seats
Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 4 seats
Dawa Party – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats
Iraqi Independent List: 2 seats

Dhi Qar – 41 seats
Governor Aziz Kadum Alwan al-Ogheli – SIIC
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 11 seats
Fadhila Party: 11 seats
Dawa – Iraq Organization: 10 seats
Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 2 seats
Islamic Movement of the 15th of Shaaban: 2 seats
Iraqi Communist Party: 2 seats
Iraqi Independent Gathering: 2 seats
Independent Coalition for the Care of Democracy: 1 seat

Diyala – 41 seats
Governor Raad Hameed al-Mula al-Tamimi – SIIC
Coalition of Islamic & National Forces in Diyala – SIIC & Dawa – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 20 seats
Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi: 14 seats
Kurdish Arabic Turkmen Democratic Coalition – Diyala Governorate – KDP-PUK: 7 seats

Dohuk – 41 seats
Governor Tamar Ramadan – Kurdistan Democratic Party
Kurdistan Democratic Party: 33 seats
Kurdistan Islamic Union: 4 seats
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 4 seats

Irbil – 41 seats
Governor Ali Nikzad – Kurdistan Democratic Party
Democratic Voice of Kurdistan List – KDP: 23 seats
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 16 seats
Kurdistan Islamic Union: 1 seat
Islamic Group of Kurdistan: 1 seat

Karbala – 41 seats
Governor Uqeil al-Khazaali – SIIC
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 21 seats
Fadhila Party: 5 seats
Shiite Political Council: 2 seats
Democratic Progressive Gathering: 2 seats
Independent Council of Tribal Sheikhs & Notables of Karbala Governorate: 2 seats
Iraqi Democratic Current: 2 seats
Independent Unified List for the Governorate of Holy Karbala: 2 seats
Democratic Meeting for Holy Karbala: 2 seats
Democratic Meeting for Holy Karbala: 2 seats
Independent Intellectuals Gathering: 2 seats
Dr. Abbas al-Hasnawi: 1 seat

Maysan – 41 seats
Governor Adil Mahwadar Radi – Al-Hussayni Thought Forum – Sadrists
Al-Hussayni Thought Forum – Sadrists: 15 seats
Islamic Unified Front – SIIC: 6 seats
Dawa – Iraq Organization: 5 seats
Fadhila Party: 4 seats
Al-Rida Center for Culture & Guidance: 3 seats
Gathering of the Independent Sons of Maysan: 2 seats
Iraqi Republican Group: 2 seats
Dawa Party – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 1 seat
Maysan Democratic Coalition: 1 seat
Shiite Political Council: 1 seat
Independent National Islamic Congregation: 1 seat

Muthanna – 41 seats
Governor Muhammad ali-Hassan Abbas al-Hassani – SIIC – Killed August 2007
Governor Ahmad Marzouq Salal – Dawa – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 8 seats
Fadhila Party: 6 seats
Al-Furat al-Awsat Assembly: 6 seats
Islamic Independent Society: 5 seats
Dawa Party – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 4 seats
Gathering for al-Muthanna: 4 seats
Allegiance Coalition: 3 seats
Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
Iraqi Communist Party: 2 seats

Najaf – 41 seats
Governor Asad Abu Gilel al-Taie – SIIC
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 19 seats
Loyalty to Al-Najaf: 9 seats
Banner of the Independents: 4 seats
Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
Fadhila Party: 2 seats
Allegiance Coalition: 2 seats
Iraq Future Gathering: 2 seats

Ninewa – 41 seats
Governor Usama Yousif Kashmula – Independent – Killed July 2004
Governor Duraid Kashmoula – Independent
Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan - KDP-PUK: 31 seats
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 5 seats
Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi: 2 seats
Council of the United Clans of Mosul: 2 seats

Qadisiyah – 41 seats
Governor Khalil Jalil Hamza – SIIC – Killed August 2007
Governor Hamid al-Khodari – SIIC
Martyr Of the Sanctuary Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim – SIIC: 20 seats
Shiite Political Council: 5 seats
Dawa Party – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats
Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
Fadhila Party: 3 seats
Independent Brotherhood – Sadrists: 3 seats
Dawa – Islamic Organization: 2 seats
Loyalty to Iraq Coalition – Sadrists: 2 seats

Salahaddin – 41 seats
Governor Hamed Hamood Shekti al-Qaisi – List of the Unified Democratic Coalition in Salahaddin Governorate – KDP-PUK
List of the Unified Democratic Coalition in Salahaddin Governorate – KDP-PUK: 8 seats
Liberation & Reconciliation Gathering: 6 seats
Iraqi Turkmen Front: 5 seats
Coalition of the Iraqi National Unity: 5 seats
Unified List: 4 seats
Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
Dawa Party – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats
National Iraqi Gathering: 3 seats
National al-Resalyoon List – pro-Sadrist: 2 seats
Gathering of Independents in Salahaddin: 2 seats

Sulaymaniya – 41 seats
Governor Dana Ahmed Majid – Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 28 seats
Kurdistan Islamic Union: 5 seats
Islamic Group of Kurdistan: 5 seats
Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq: 3 seats

Tamim – 41 seats
Governor Abdulrahman Mustapha Fatah – Kurdistan Democratic Party
List of Kurdistan Brotherhood – KDP: 26 seats
Iraqi Turkmen Front: 8 seats
Iraqi Republican Group: 5 seats
Islamic Turkmen Coalition: 1 seat
National Iraq Union: 1 seat

Wasit – 41 seats
Governor Latif Hamid Turfa – Sadrists
Iraqi Elites Gathering – Sadrists: 31 seats
Shiite Political Council – SIIC-Dawa: 4 seats
Gathering of the Independent in Wasit: 3 seats
Iraqi Communist Party: 2 seats
Democratic Iraq Gathering: 1 seat

SOURCES

Abdullah, Muhammed, “sectarian polarization in diyala,” Niqash, 4/20/09

Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “4 blocs to contest the results of Diala council votes,” 4/12/09
- “Atheel Nejefi elected as Ninewa governor,” 4/12/09
- “Babel council elects independent engineer as governor,” 4/18/09
- “Baghdad’s second deputy governor elected,” 4/20/09
- “KA, IAF agree to share leading posts in Diala,” 2/24/09
- “Karbala governor assumes duty after republican decree issued,” 4/19/09
- “New Baghdad governor elected,” 4/12/09
- “New Diala governor elected,” 4/11/09
- “New governor picked for Anbar,” 4/11/09
- “New provincial council’s head, deputy selected in Thi-Qar,” 4/16/09
- “Presidential decrees to appoint governors of Thi-Qar, Babel,” 4/22/09
- “Wassit governor, provincial council chief elected,” 4/15/09
- “Zaydi unanimously elected to chair Baghdad provincial council,” 4/8/09

Barzanji, Yahya, “New candidate emerges among Iraq’s Kurds,” Associated Press, 5/2/09

Hamid, Nirmeen, “anbar’s Islamic party and tribes vie for power,” Niqash, 12/12/08

Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008

Meyerson, Thomas, “Provincial Governments in Southern Iraq,” Institute for the Study of War, 5/28/09

Reilly, Corinne and Abbas, Ali, “Kurdish-Arab tensions continue to grow in northern Iraq,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/14/09

Al-Sa’dawi, Ahmad, “post-election analysis: real change or more of the same?” Niqash, 2/19/09

Shadid, Anthony, “New Alliance In Iraq Cross Sectarian Lines,” Washington Post, 3/20/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, "Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 7/30/09

Visser, Reidar, “After Compromise on Kirkuk, Finally an Elections Law for Iraq’s Governorates,” Historiae.org, 9/24/08
- “Iraq’s New Provincial Councils: A Mixed Picture North of Baghdad, Unexpected Complications in the Centre and the South,” Historiae.org, 4/13/09
- “Maliki Suffers Setbacks as Samarrai is Confirmed as New Speaker and More Governors Are Elected South of Baghdad,” Historiae.org, 4/19/09
- “Mixed Outcome for Maliki as Muthanna and Najaf Elect New Governors,” Historiae.org, 5/1/09

"It's Time for the US to Declare Victory and Go Home" Says U.S. Officer In Baghdad

This paper by Col. Timothy Reese, the head of the U.S. advisory command in Baghdad has been making the rounds of Iraq reporters and hands and got into today's New York Times. Here's the full text of his report.

It's Time for the US to Declare Victory and Go Home

Col. Timothy R. Reese, Chief, Baghdad Operations Command Advisory Team, MND-B, Baghdad, Iraq:

As the old saying goes, "guests, like fish, begin to smell after three days." Since the signing of the 2009 Security Agreement, we are guests in Iraq, and after six years in Iraq, we now smell bad to the Iraqi nose. Today the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are good enough to keep the Government of Iraq (GOI) from being overthrown by the actions of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the Baathists, and the Shia violent extremists that might have toppled it a year or two ago. Iraq may well collapse into chaos of other causes, but we have made the ISF strong enough for the internal security mission. Perhaps it is one of those infamous paradoxes of counterinsurgency that while the ISF is not good in any objective sense, it is good enough for Iraq in 2009. Despite this foreboding disclaimer about an unstable future for Iraq, the United States has achieved our objectives in Iraq. Prime Minister (PM) Maliki hailed June 30th as a "great victory," implying the victory was over the US. Leaving aside his childish chest pounding, he was more right than he knew. We too ought to declare victory and bring our combat forces home. Due to our tendency to look after the tactical details and miss the proverbial forest for the trees, this critically important strategic realization is in danger of being missed.

Equally important to realize is that we aren't making the GOI and the ISF better in any significant ways with our current approach. Remaining in Iraq through the end of December 2011 will yield little in the way of improving the abilities of the ISF or the functioning of the GOI. Furthermore, in light of the GOI's current interpretation of the limitations imposed by the 30 June milestones of the 2008 Security Agreement, the security of US forces are at risk. Iraq is not a country with a history of treating even its welcomed guests well. This is not to say we can be defeated, only that the danger of a violent incident that will rupture the current partnership has greatly increased since 30 June. Such a rupture would force an unplanned early departure that would harm our long term interests in Iraq and potentially unraveling the great good that has been done since 2003. The use of the military instrument of national power in its current form has accomplished all that can be expected. In the next section I will present and admittedly one sided view of the evidence in support of this view. This information is drawn solely from the MND-B area of operations in Baghdad Province. My reading of reports from the other provinces suggests the same situation exists there.

The general lack of progress in essential services and good governance is now so broad that it ought to be clear that we no longer are moving the Iraqis "forward." Below is an outline of the information on which I base this assessment:

1. The ineffectiveness and corruption of GOI Ministries is the stuff of legend.

2. The anti-corruption drive is little more than a campaign tool for Maliki

3. The GOI is failing to take rational steps to improve its electrical infrastructure and to improve their oil exploration, production and exports.

4. There is no progress towards resolving the Kirkuk situation.

5. Sunni Reconciliation is at best at a standstill and probably going backwards.

6. Sons of Iraq (SOI) or Sahwa transition to ISF and GOI civil service is not happening, and SOI monthly paydays continue to fall further behind.

7. The Kurdish situation continues to fester.

8. Political violence and intimidation is rampant in the civilian community as well as military and legal institutions.

9. The Vice President received a rather cool reception this past weekend and was publicly told that the internal affairs of Iraq are none of the US's business.

The rate of improvement of the ISF is far slower than it should be given the amount of effort and resources being provided by the US. The US has made tremendous progress in building the ISF. Our initial efforts in 2003 to mid-2004 were only marginally successful. From 2004 to 2006 the US built the ISF into a fighting force. Since the start of the surge in 2007 we have again expanded and improved the ISF. They are now at the point where they have defeated the organized insurgency against the GOI and are marginally self-sustaining. This is a remarkable tale for which many can be justifiably proud. We have reached the point of diminishing returns, however, and need to find a new set of tools. The massive partnering efforts of US combat forces with ISF isn't yielding benefits commensurate with the effort and is now generating its own opposition. Again, some touch points for this assessment are:

1. If there ever was a window where the seeds of a professional military culture could have been implanted, it is now long past. US combat forces will not be here long enough or with sufficient influence to change it.

2. The military culture of the Baathist-Soviet model under Saddam Hussein remains entrenched and will not change. The senior leadership of the ISF is incapable of change in the current environment.

a) Corruption among officers is widespread

b) Neglect and mistreatment of enlisted men is the norm

c) The unwillingness to accept a role for the NCO corps continues

d) Cronyism and nepotism are rampant in the assignment and promotion system

e) Laziness is endemic

f) Extreme centralization of C2 is the norm

g) Lack of initiative is legion

h) Unwillingness to change, do anything new blocks progress

i) Near total ineffectiveness of the Iraq Army and National Police institutional organizations and systems prevents the ISF from becoming self-sustaining

j) For every positive story about a good ISF junior officer with initiative, or an ISF commander who conducts a rehearsal or an after action review or some individual MOS training event, there are ten examples of the most basic lack of military understanding despite the massive partnership efforts by our combat forces and advisory efforts by MiTT and NPTT teams.

3. For all the fawning praise we bestow on the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) and Ministry of Defense (MoD) leadership for their effectiveness since the start of the surge, they are flawed in serious ways. Below are some salient examples:

a) They are unable to plan ahead, unable to secure the PM's approval for their actions

b) They are unable to stand up to Shiite political parties

c) They were and are unable to conduct an public relations effort in support of the SA and now they are afraid of the ignorant masses as a result

d) They unable to instill discipline among their officers and units for the most basic military standards

e) They are unable to stop the nepotism and cronyism

f) They are unable to take basic steps to manage the force development process

g) They are unable to stick to their deals with US leaders

It is clear that the 30 Jun milestone does not represent one small step in a long series of gradual steps on the path the US withdrawal, but as Maliki has termed it, a "great victory" over the Americans and fundamental change in our relationship. The recent impact of this mentality on military operations is evident:

1. Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) unilateral restrictions on US forces that violate the most basic aspects of the SA

2. BOC unilateral restrictions that violate the most basic aspects of the SA

3. International Zone incidents in the last week where ISF forces have resorted to shows of force to get their way at Entry Control Points (ECP) including the forcible takeover of ECP 1 on 4 July

4. Sudden coolness to advisors and CDRs, lack of invitations to meetings,

5. Widespread partnership problems reported in other areas such as ISF confronting US forces at TCPs in the city of Baghdad and other major cities in Iraq.

6. ISF units are far less likely to want to conduct combined combat operations with US forces, to go after targets the US considers high value, etc.

7. The Iraqi legal system in the Rusafa side of Baghdad has demonstrated a recent willingness to release individuals originally detained by the US for attacks on the US.

Yet despite all their grievous shortcomings noted above, ISF military capability is sufficient to handle the current level of threats from Sunni and Shiite violent groups. Our combat forces' presence here on the streets and in the rural areas adds only marginally to their capability while exposing us to attacks to which we cannot effectively respond.

The GOI and the ISF will not be toppled by the violence as they might have been between 2006 and 2008. Though two weeks does not make a trend, the near cessation of attacks since 30 June speaks volumes about how easily Shiite violence can be controlled and speaks to the utter weakness of AQI. The extent of AQ influence in Iraq is so limited as to be insignificant, only when they get lucky with a mass casualty attack are they relevant. Shiite groups are working with the PM and his political allies, or plotting to work against him in the upcoming elections. We are merely convenient targets for delivering a message against Maliki by certain groups, and perhaps by Maliki when he wants us to be targeted. Extremist violence from all groups is directed towards affecting their political standing within the existing power structures of Iraq. There is no longer any coherent insurgency or serious threat to the stability of the GOI posed by violent groups.

Our combat operations are currently the victim of circular logic. We conduct operations to kill or capture violent extremists of all types to protect the Iraqi people and support the GOI. The violent extremists attack us because we are still here conducting military operations. Furthermore, their attacks on us are no longer an organized campaign to defeat our will to stay; the attacks which kill and maim US combat troops are signals or messages sent by various groups as part of the political struggle for power in Iraq. The exception to this is AQI which continues is globalist terror campaign. Our operations are in support of an Iraqi government that no longer relishes our help while at the same time our operations generate the extremist opposition to us as various groups jockey for power in post-occupation Iraq.

The GOI and ISF will continue to squeeze the US for all the "goodies" that we can provide between now and December 2011, while eliminating our role in providing security and resisting our efforts to change the institutional problems prevent the ISF from getting better. They will tolerate us as long as they can suckle at Uncle Sam's bounteous mammary glands. Meanwhile the level of resistance to US freedom of movement and operations will grow. The potential for Iraqi on US violence is high now and will grow by the day. Resentment on both sides will build and reinforce itself until a violent incident break outs into the open. If that were to happen the violence will remain tactically isolated, but it will wreck our strategic relationships and force our withdrawal under very unfavorable circumstances.

For a long time the preferred US approach has been to "work it at the lowest level of partnership" as a means to stay out of the political fray and with the hope that good work at the tactical level will compensate for and slowly improve the strategic picture. From platoon to brigade, US Soldiers and Marines continue to work incredibly hard and in almost all cases they achieve positive results. This approach has achieved impressive results in the past, but today it is failing. The strategic dysfunctions of the GOI and ISF have now reached down to the tactical level degrading good work there and sundering hitherto strong partnerships. As one astute political observer has stated "We have lost all strategic influence with the GoI and trying to influence events and people from the tactical/operational level is courting disaster, wasting lives, and merely postponing the inevitable."

The reality of Iraq in July 2009 has rendered the assumptions underlying the 2008 Security Agreement (SA) overcome by events - mostly good events actually. The SA outlines a series of gradual steps towards military withdrawal, analogous to a father teaching his kid to ride a bike without training wheels. If the GOI at the time the SA was signed thought it needed a long, gradual period of weaning. But the GOI now has left the nest (while continuing to breast feed as noted above). The strategic and tactical realities have changed far quicker than the provisions and timeline of the SA can accommodate. We now have an Iraqi government that has gained its balance and thinks it knows how to ride the bike in the race. And in fact they probably do know how to ride, at least well enough for the road they are on against their current competitors. Our hand on the back of the seat is holding them back and causing resentment. We need to let go before we both tumble to the ground.

Therefore, we should declare our intentions to withdraw all US military forces from Iraq by August 2010. This would not be a strategic paradigm shift, but an acceleration of existing US plans by some 15 months. We should end our combat operations now, save those for our own force protection, narrowly defined, as we withdraw. We should revise the force flow into Iraq accordingly. The emphasis should shift towards advising only and advising the ISF to prepare for our withdrawal. Advisors should probably be limited to Iraqi division level a higher. Our train and equip functions should begin the transition to Foreign Military Sales and related training programs. During the withdrawal period the USG and GOI should develop a new strategic framework agreement that would include some lasting military presence at 1-3 large training bases, airbases, or key headquarters locations. But it should not include the presence of any combat forces save those for force protection needs or the occasional exercise. These changes would not only align our actions with the reality of Iraq in 2009, it will remove the causes of increasing friction and reduce the cost of OIF in blood and treasure. Finally, it will set the conditions for a new relationship between the US and Iraq without the complications of the residual effects of the US invasion and occupation.

Kurdish Election Results And Implications

The results of the Kurdistan parliamentary elections are in. As expected, the ruling Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Kurdistan Democratic Party’s (KDP) coalition, the Kurdistan List came in first place with 57.34% of the vote. However the new Change List, led by former PUK officials, came in second with 23.57%. The Service and Reform List came in third with 12%. They are a combination of two Islamic groups, which used to be the largest opposition parties, the Kurdistan Islamic Union and the Kurdistan Islamic Group, and two leftist groups, the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party and the Future Party. Kurdistan ran a closed list election, counting all three provinces as a single district. This meant that voters could only pick from lists, and not individual candidates. In that system the parliamentarians are selected by and answer to their party bosses, not the electorate. There were 111 seats up for grabs, but five were set-aside for Christians, five for Turkmen, and one for Armenians. Voters also re-elected Massoud Barzani, the leader of the KDP, to be the region’s president. This election could have far-ranging effects on not only the politics within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), but the rest of Iraq as well.

Kurdish Parliamentary Election Results
111 seats up for election by 24 parties
Kurdistan List 57.34%
Change List 23.57%
Services and Reform List 12%
5 seats for Christians
5 seats for Turkmen
1 seat for Armenians

Kurdish Presidential Election Results
Massoud Barzani – Kurdistan List 69.57%
Dr. Kamal Mirawdeli 25.32%
Halo Ibrahim Ahmed – Progress List 3.49%
Safin Sheikh Mohammed 1.4%
Hussein Karmiani 0.59%

First, the vote is likely to change the power dynamics between the KDP and PUK. Since 1992 when Kurdistan got its autonomy the two parties have had a rough, and sometimes tense, joint rule over the KRG. In the first two elections in 1992 and 2005 the two evenly split their seats 50-50 in the Kurdish parliament. The two also signed a Unification Agreement in January 2006, which divided up the major positions in the region between them. The PUK however, has been breaking apart due to internal struggles for years now. In 2005 a reform wing was formed within the party that wanted greater say in decision-making, more transparency, and a crackdown on corruption. The head of the Change List and former PUK co-founder Nishurwan Mustafa came to head this faction, and eventually left the party in 2006. Dozens of others would join him or be kicked out of the party in the following years. In 2008 for example, a group called the Movement for Democratic Change was expelled from the party, and in February 2009 the secretary general of the PUK, who was also the vice president of the KRG, and several other leading members threatened to quit. PUK leader and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani is also old and ailing. Further weakening the party is the fact that the Change List allegedly won Sulaymaniya in the election, the stronghold of the PUK. All together this has greatly reduced Talabani’s standing in Kurdistan. He and his party may not be able to maintain their equal status with Barzani and the KDP as a result.

Barzani has already hinted at this change in dynamics. Under the Unification Agreement, the PUK is to take over the office of prime minister in the KRG from the KDP. Massoud Barzani’s nephew Nechirvan Barzani currently holds the post, and Iraqi deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih of the PUK is supposed to succeed him. However Massoud Barzani recently asked why the PUK should hold that post.

Barzani may be in an even stronger position if a referendum is held on the new Kurdish constitution. A draft of the document was passed by the Kurdish parliament on June 24, 2009, and gives the president new wide-ranging powers. These include the ability to dissolve parliament, pass and veto laws, remove ministers, and command over the peshmerga. For these reasons the Change List say they are opposed to the constitution and want it revised and have filed a motion in the Iraqi courts, but Barzani says they don’t have the two-thirds necessary in the parliament to do that. Joost Hilterman of the International Crisis Group recently noted that this is a paradox as Barzani is one of the great proponents of federalism and decentralization in Iraq, but is trying to centralize power in the KRG.

Finally, Barzani is one of the main opponents of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, so relations between Baghdad and Kurdistan are not likely to improve anytime soon. Kirkuk is one of the main disputes between them, and yesterday, July 28, 2009, he told the press that he rejected the United Nation’s recommendations on the disputed territories, and that the only solution was for Article 140 to be implemented that calls for a referendum. Earlier in July Barzani warned that Baghdad and Kurdistan were close to war over the issue. The KRG draft constitution also lays claims to all of these areas as part of a historical greater Kurdistan. To add to the problem, Barzani and Maliki have not talked to each other in more than a year. When they were things were no better as Barzani said the Prime Minister smelled like a dictator and was acting like a new Saddam.

The 2009 Kurdish elections look to be bringing good and bad results. On the positive side, Kurdistan will have a real opposition for the first time. That will hopefully make the PUK and KDP more responsive to the voters, develop the region, and reduce their corruption. On the negative side, the ruling parties will still hold control of the top political offices and security forces with the KDP looking to surpass the PUK. If the Kurdish constitution is passed that will cement the KDP’s position as the dominant Kurdish party with Barzani’s expanded executive authority. With this new sense of power and national elections due in January 2010, there is little reason for Barzani to compromise or make amends with Baghdad, maintaining the gridlock in Iraq’s politics.

SOURCES

Alaaldin, Ranj, “Troubled times in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Guardian, 7/23/09

Alsumaria, “Results of Kurdistan Presidential and Parliamentary Elections 2009,” 7/29/09
- “Talabani to share power within his party,” 2/18/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “IHEC says initial results to come out in 2 days,” 7/26/09

Carpenter, J. Scott and Ali, Ahmed, “Iraqi Kurds Go to the Polls: Is Change Possible?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 7/23/09

Dagher, Sam, “New Kurdish Leader Asserts Agenda,” New York Times, 7/29/09
- “Opposition Rattles a Governing Coalition in Iraqi Kurds’ Vote,” New York Times, 7/26/09

Danly, James, “The 2009 Kurdish Elections,” Institute for the Study of War,” 7/23/09

Hama-Tahir, Wrya, “Prominent former PUK leader accused of using dissident faction as proxy to settle political scores,” Institute of War & Peace Reporting, 12/5/08

Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “Kurdish election lists,” Niqash, 6/30/09

Khalil, Lydia, “Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Mirage?” Brookings Institution, June 2009

Mahmoud, Amer, “controversy over Kurdish constitution,” Niqash, 7/6/09

Shadid, Anthony, “After Kurdish Vote, Talabani Pledges to Rebuild Party,” Washington Post, 7/29/09
- “Kurdish Leaders Warn Of Strains With Maliki,” Washington Post, 7/17/09
- “Worries About A Kurdish-Arab Conflict Moves To Fore in Iraq,” Washington Post, 7/27/09

Stansfield, Gareth Anderson, Liam, “Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” Middle East Policy, Spring 2009

Synovitz, Ron, “Expert Focuses On Significance Of Iraq’s Kurdish Regional Elections,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 7/25/09

The Return Of The Special Groups

Special Groups was a term coined by the U.S. during the Surge to identify Shiite militants that were supported by Iran and/or were not following Muqtada al-Sadr’s cease-fire decree. After Baghdad’s crackdown on militias in southern Iraq beginning with Basra in 2008, many of these Special Groups were scattered, arrested, or fled to Iran. Now they seem to be making their return. In a July 18 article in the Washington Post U.S. officials warned of a new spate of attacks on American forces by these armed groups. An official named three main culprits, the League of the Righteous, Khataib Hezbollah, and the Promised Day Brigades.

A review of English-language press reports shows that there has been a steady increase in incidents from March to July 2009. 1^st these are only articles from southern Iraq. It’s difficult to determine who is behind many of the attacks in Baghdad. The southern section of the country however has been relatively peaceful, and has been a base of Special Groups and Mahdi Army activities in the past, so any attacks that occur there on the Americans are most likely done by one of these organizations.

In March 2009 there were only a few incidents involving the British in Basra and none with the United States, but since April there have been several attacks aimed at Americans across a variety of southern provinces. In March there were no attacks against American forces in the region. There were two rocket attacks on the English in the Basra airport however. In April things changed when five incidents were reported, and all involving U.S. troops in Maysan, Qadisiyah, Wasit, and Basra. Attacks went up in May to seven and were all concentrated in Basra, Babil, and Wasit. In June incidents went down to four, but again were spread out over the region in Dhi Qar, Muthanna, Basra, and Wasit. From July 1 to 28 there have been eight attacks on Americans occurring in Dhi Qar, Qadisiyah, Karbala, and Basra. The most dramatic was a roadside bomb that went off against U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill’s convoy in Dhi Qar on July 13. In four and a half months there were a total of 26 attacks on U.S. forces, and only a few casualties. While that is not a large amount compared to the more violent areas of the country, it does constitute an increase from earlier in the year.

Iran has conducted a multi-layered political, military, economic, and cultural strategy in Iraq since 2003. Supporting Shiite militiamen is only one part of this, and is aimed at tying down U.S. forces so they don’t attack Iran, and making the Americans pay a price for invading. In the past, when important events came up in Iraq such as the 2009 provincial elections, Iran has limited the amount of weapons and money that it provides to dampen violence so that it might focus upon its more important political goals. Afterwards Special Group attacks and activities have traditionally gone up. That appears to be what is occurring now. This could be a message from Iran that they are still capable of fomenting instability in Iraq and challenging Coalition Forces. Iraqi domestic issues may also play a part in some of these attacks. The League of the Righteous for example, has said that it wishes to participate in the 2010 parliamentary vote, so a few of these incidents may be a way to show that it is still relevant. Others may be conducted by violent gangs, which are active in places like Basra. Whatever the ultimate motivation, the last few months have shown that there are still militants in southern Iraq capable of attacking U.S. forces.

Attacks Against U.S. Forces In Southern Iraq

March 2009 – 0 Total

April 2009 – 5 Total

4/6/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Amarah, Maysan

4/20/09 IED attack on U.S. patrol in Basra

4/20/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Kut, Wasit

4/22/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Diwaniya, Qadisiyah

4/30/09 Sniper killed 2 U.S. soldiers in Amarah, Maysan

May 2009 – 7 Total

5/3/09 Rocket attack near U.S. consulate in Hilla, Babil

5/4/09 IED attack on U.S. patrol in Basra

5/11/09 IED attack on U.S. vehicle in Basra

5/14/09 IED attack on U.S. patrol in Wasit

5/14/09 IED attack on U.S. vehicle in Babil

5/16/09 One U.S. soldier killed in Basra

5/28/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base at Basra airport

June 2009 – 4 Total

6/1/09 Rocket attack on U.S. business in Wasit

6/7/09 Attack on U.S. patrol in Basra

6/16/09 IED attack on U.S. convoy in Muthanna

6/29/09 IED attack on joint Iraqi-U.S. patrol in Dhi Qar

July 1-28, 2009 - 8

7/5/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Diwaniya, Qadisiyah

7/10/09 Rocket attack near U.S. base in Basra

7/13/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Basra

7/13/09 Roadside bomb attack on U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill’s convoy in Dhi Qar

7/17/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Basra

7/20/09 IED attack on U.S. convoy in Karbala

7/20/09 Bomb attack on U.S. convoy in Nassiriya, Dhi Qar

7/20/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Diwaniya, Qadisiyah

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Anti-US Iraqi cleric facing leadership challenge,” Associated Press, 2/20/09

Adas, Basil, “Mahdi Army militia ‘going underground,’” Gulf News, 6/26/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “2 Katyushas land in U.S. camp in Diwaniya,” 7/20/09

- “2 Katyushas land in U.S. forces camp in Diwaniya,” 7/5/09

- “3 MNF soldiers injured in Basra,” 7/17/09

- “3 rockets land near U.S. consulate in Hilla,” 5/3/09

- “4 missiles fall near Echo camp in Diwaniya – spokesman,” 4/22/09

- “Blast in Nasseriya, no casualties, loses reported – U.S. spokesman,” 7/20/09

- “Bomb explodes on U.S. vehicle patrol in Wassit,” 5/14/09

- “British base in Basra rocketed,” 3/13/09

- “Hand grenade targets U.S. patrol, no casualties,” 6/7/09

- “IED explodes near joint convoy in Thi-Qar,” 6/29/09

- “IED targets U.S. convoy in Muthanna,” 6/16/09

- “IED targets U.S. convoy north of Karbala,” 7/20/09

- “IED targets U.S. patrol in Basra,” 5/4/09

- “MNF base in Kut rocketed,” 4/20/09

- “Roadside bomb hits MNF patrol in Basra,” 4/20/09

- “Rockets hit U.S. base in Amara,” 4/6/09

- “Sniper downs 2 U.S. soldiers in Amara,” 4/30/09

- “U.S. base at Basra airport rocketed,” 7/13/09

- “U.S. firm rocketed in Wassit,” 6/1/09

- “U.S. Hummer ablaze in Babel,” 5/14/09

- “U.S. vehicle damaged in IED blast in Basra,” 5/11/09

Gamel, Kim, “US military works to keep out Iraq militia leaders,” Associated Press, 8/6/08

Graff, Peter, "Influence wanes for followers of Iraq's Sadr," Reuters, 11/24/08

Haynes, Deborah, “Hope for British hostages in Iraq after release of Shia militant,” Times of London, 6/9/09

Issa, Sahar and Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 28 May 2009,” 5/28/09

Londono, Ernesto and DeYoung, Karen, “Iraq Restricts U.S. Forces,” Washington Post, 7/18/09

Multi-National Corps – Iraq, “MND-S Soldier dies from combat-related injures (Basra),” 5/16/09

- “U.S. Forces respond to rocket attack in Basra province,” 7/10/09

Peter, Tom, “After setbacks, Sadr redirects Mahdi Army,” Christian Science Monitor, 8/11/08

Reuters, “U.S. ambassador to Iraq unhurt by convoy bomb,” 7/13/09

Rubin, Alissa and Gordon, Michael, “U.S. Frees Suspect in Killing of 5 G.I.’s,” New York Times, 6/9/09

Small Wars Journal, “SWJ Interview with Bing West (Part 1),” 8/14/08

Weaver, Teri, “U.S. troops keeping a low profile in Basra,” Stars and Stripes, 6/1/09

Early Reports On Iran’s Activities In Iraq

One of the first reports that Iran was taking an anti-American stance in Iraq came from a UPI. It quoted a U.S. intelligence source that said in March 2003 Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei, President Mohammad Khatami, and others met to decide Tehran’s policy in the wake of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. They decided to make the U.S. pay a price for invading Iraq. Tehran set about implementing this decision through several means.

On the military side Iran sent in agents, friendly Iraqis, and Hezbollah into several Iraqi cities including Baghdad, Najaf, Karbala, Basra, and Kirkuk to organize against the Americans. 1000s of fighters from the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s (SIIC) militia the Badr Brigade flowed into Iraq after the invasion. At the time, Badr was a formal arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and was also supervised by Iranian intelligence. Later in 2003 there were reports that Hezbollah operatives were also dispatched to Iraq to help as well.

On the political front, Iran made agreements with the Kurds and facilitated negotiations between them and the SIIC. First, Iran and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) agreed upon a non-aggression pact. There were also a series of meetings in the fall of 2001 between the Badr Brigade and KDP and PUK leaders to discuss how to deal with the United States and a post-Saddam Iraq. Iranian intelligence was involved in many of these meetings.

After the invasion, Iran also tried to rally Iraq’s Shiite clerics against the Americans. In late April 2003 Iraqi born, but Iranian based Ayatollah Kadhem al-Haeri issued a fatwa calling on Shiite imams to fill the power vacuum left by the fall of the old regime by taking over administration of Iraq’s cities. Al-Haeri also said clerics needed to oppose the United States. There were several examples of this. In the city of Kut in Wasit province for example, the SIIC took over the city hall and a local cleric Sayed Abbas Fadhil claimed to control the city. His followers staged two protests against the American presence there, and there were several drive-by shooting on U.S. troops as well. Jay Garner, the head of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs, who was the civilian administrator of Iraq at the time, said the events in Kut were all examples of Iran trying to interfere in Iraq.

These early reports show the different sides of Iran’s policy towards Iraq. Not only was it going to use military means to undermine the American presence, but it was also using its extensive contacts with the Iraqi opposition, many of whom had been based in Iran during the Saddam years, and religious ties to Iraq’s clerics to get a foothold in Iraq’s new political order.

For more on Iran’s policy towards Iraq see:

Overview of Iran’s Influence In Iraq

Combating Terrorism Center’s Report On Iran’s Role In Iraq

SOURCES

Ayman, Dr. Hashemi, “A detailed and dangerous report about the Iranian role in the destruction of Iraq,” Homeland Security US.net, 3/19/06

Elkhamri, Mounir, “Iran’s Contribution to the Civil War in Iraq,” Jamestown Foundation, January 2007

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

Phillips, James, “Deter Iranian and Syrian Meddling In Postwar Iraq,” Heritage Foundation, 4/4/03

Pound, Edward, “The Iran Connection,” U.S. News & World Report, 11/22/04

Risen, James, “A Region Inflamed: The Hand Of Tehran: Hezbollah, in Iraq, Refrains From Attacks on Americans,” New York Times, 11/24/03

Smith, Craig, “Iraqi in Iran urges Shiites to take power,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/26/03

Strauss, Valerie, “Pentagon: Ex-Iraqi Leader Aziz Is in Custody,” Washington Post, 4/24/03

Tanter, Raymond, “Iran’s Threat to Coalition Forces in Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/15/04

Kurdistan Lacks Services And Employment

Kurdistan recently held parliamentary elections on July 25, 2009. The main topics in the vote were the rule of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and corruption. Just as important could be the economy. While there are many who tout the relative stability in Kurdistan and its foreign investment, the region actually lags behind in almost all humanitarian and economic indicators compared to the rest of the country.

The Kurdistan Region is made up of three provinces, Dohuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniya. Irbil and Sulaymaniya have over one million inhabitants each, while Dohuk only has around 500,000. Dohuk is also home to over 100,000 internally displaced Iraqis.

Population

Dohuk 505,491

Irbil 1,542,421

Sulaymaniya 1,893,617

Internally Displaced In Kurdistan

Sulaymaniya 36,000

Ibril 62,034

Dohuk 112,392

The relative stability and security in Kurdistan has not provided the population there the opportunities or services one would expect. The employment situation in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is mixed. In Iraq overall 12% of men and 13% of women are without jobs. Men in Irbil and Sulaymaniya do better at 9% and 10% respectively, but in Dohuk 13% of men are lacking employment. Women do far worse however. In Irbil the unemployment rate for them is 16%, followed by 26% in Sulaymaniya and 30% in Dohuk. The percentage of men and women involved in the labor force are also lower in Kurdistan compared to Iraq. In the rest of the country 18% of women and 81% of men are either employed or looking for work. The labor force participation in Dohuk is only 7% for women and 76% for women. Irbil at 12% of women, 77% of men, and Sulaymaniya at 15% of women and 78% of men, only do slightly better.

Unemployment

Iraq: 13% women, 12% men

Irbil: 16% women, 9% men

Sulaymaniya: 26% women, 10% men

Dohuk: 30% women, 13% men

Labor Force Participation

Iraq: 18% women, 81% men

Dohuk: 7% women, 76% men

Irbil: 12% women, 77% men

Sulaymaniya: 15% women, 78% men

In terms of poverty Kurdistan actually does better than Iraq in general. 22% of Iraqis live in the lowest per capita income quintile. Irbil at 15% and Sulaymaniya at 18% do better, although in Dohuk 33% of the population is in the bottom group.

Poverty - % Living In The Lowest Per Capita Income Quintile

Iraq: 22%

Irbil: 15%

Sulaymaniya: 18%

Dohuk: 33%

Where the KRG lags behind is in education. Kurdistan has higher illiteracy rates, with 43% of women and 21% of men in Dohuk, 40% of women and 20% of men in Sulaymaniya, and 44% of women and 18% of men in Irbil in this situation, compared to 24% of women and 11% of men nationally. This is due to lower education levels. In Iraq 47% of women and 31% of men have less than a primary education. In Dohuk the rate is 65% of women and 49% of men, followed by 64% of women and 49% of men in Sulaymaniya, and 64% of women and 42% of men in Irbil.

Illiteracy

Iraq: 24% women, 11% men

Irbil: 44% women, 18% men

Sulaymaniya: 43% women, 20% men

Dohuk: 43% women, 21% men

% With Less Than A Primary Education

Iraq: 47% women, 31% men

Irbil: 64% women, 42% men

Sulaymaniya: 64% women, 49% men

Dohuk: 65% women, 49% men

Services are also worse in the KRG. Kurds receive much less electricity than the rest of the country. 55% of Iraqis have more than 11 hours of power cuts per day or are not connected to the power network at all. In Kurdistan more than 80% of the population in all three provinces experience these difficulties. Kurdistan is also lacking in sanitation. 26% of Iraqis are not connected to the sanitation system. Dohuk is close to the national average at 28% not being connected, but Sulaymaniya at 38% and Irbil at 48% don’t do as well.

Electricity – More Than 11 Hours of Power Cuts Or No Connection To Network

Iraq: 55%

Irbil: 84%

Sulaymaniya: 88%

Dohuk: 85%

Not Connected To the Sanitation Network

Iraq: 26%

Dohuk: 28%

Sulaymaniya: 38%

Irbil: 48%

Since 2003, Kurdistan has been one of the most stable parts of Iraq due to its tight security, limits on migration, and domination by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). These two ruling parties however, have not been able to take advantage of that to provide jobs, education, or services to the population. Instead the PUK and KDP have been more interested in maintaining their control, and building up their two major strongholds, the cities of Irbil and Sulaymaniya. Outside of those urban areas the rest of the KRG has been left underdeveloped. This was the first year that this became an issue when Kurds went to the polls. Even then, the PUK and KDP seem to have maintained their control of the KRG. If the elections lead to an actual opposition however, those two parties may finally begin serving the population rather than themselves because now they actually have to compete for the loyalties of the people.

SOURCES

Dagher, Sam, “Strong Showing Seen for Kurdish Challengers,” New York Times, 7/26/09

Danly, James, “The 2009 Kurdish Elections,” Institute for the Study of War, 7/23/09

Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Dahuk Governorate Profile,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, April 2009

- “Erbil Governorate Profile,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, July 2009

- “Sulyamaniyah Governorate Profile,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, July 2009

Oil Revenues Up, But Too Late For Iraq’s Provinces

In June 2009 Iraq had the highest oil revenues of the year, yet that has not helped Iraq’s provinces, which are facing massive budget deficits. That’s because it took five months for the country to reach the petroleum price set in the 2009 budget, and oil exports have still not achieved their target. 2008 was also a boom year for Iraq’s oil industry, and the provinces made large commitments to development projects as a result. Now that’s all coming back to haunt them.

The Oil Ministry announced that it earned almost $3.175 million in oil exports in June 2009. A barrel of Iraqi crude sold for an average price of $64.37 that month. Those were both highs for the year. The 2009 Iraqi budget called for 2 million barrels a day in exports at $50 each to earn an average of $3 billion a month. May 2009 was the first month that Iraq earned over $3 billion, and Iraqi oil sold for over $50. Exports have still not officially met their mark however.

This has led to a large budget deficit, which is playing out in Iraq’s provinces. Several have announced huge money shortages that are hindering their development projects. The head of the construction and development committee in Basra told Niqash that it had a 97 million dinar deficit. This was holding up development projects, and the province was waiting for the central government to bail them out. Basra is in the process of firing local officials to try to save money. The Maysan council said that they couldn’t start any new projects because of their money problems. Council members said they received 94 billion dinars from Baghdad, but have 250 billion dinars in outstanding contracts from the old council. They too were hoping for additional money at the end of this year from the central authorities. The chairman of Karbala’s reconstruction and planning committee announced that it had a 164 billion dinar deficit. In the previous month, the new governor of Anbar stated that his province owed $181 million from 2008. Baghdad, the most populated governorate in the country said that it was 155 billion dinar short. These deficits were a result of smaller budgets allocated in 2009, and large contracts signed when Iraqi oil prices were high in 2008 that are still being paid for.

Iraq needs billions to rebuild after years of wars and international sanctions. The country is almost completely dependent upon oil to garner revenues, so development goes up and down with the price of crude and its exports. Financial rules, which allow the Central Bank and Finance Ministry to refuse to use the large surpluses leftover from previous years, also hamper budgeting and spending. Until the oil industry is straightened out and reaches its potential, something that is not assured, the country will probably never earn enough to meet its large needs, and reconstruction will go boom and bust with the price of crude.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “2009 budget deficit to hinder new projects in Missan,” 7/11/09
- “Deficit in Baghdad provincial council’s budget,” 6/13/09
- “ID164 billion budget deficit in Karbala,” 7/21/09
- “Iraq’s oil exports reach $3.17m in June 2009,” 7/22/09

Lando, Ben, “Iraq oil exports, revenue up,” Iraq Oil Report, 6/29/09

Niqash, “niqash meets anbar’s new governor,” 6/18/09

Al-Wazzan, Saleem, “still no public services in basra,” Niqash, 7/22/09

Provincial Reconstruction Teams To End By 2011?

One of the positive changes made during the Surge was to dramatically increase the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq. Early attempts at reconstruction in Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) were characterized by huge, multi-million dollar projects without regard to security, cost, or the needs of Iraqis. The PRTs tried to reverse these trends by focusing upon small-scale projects that were coordinated with local Iraqis and government officials. The PRTs always struggled with staffing, coordination, and early on security was an overriding concern, which limited their ability to operate out in Iraq’s governorates, but there were eventually 14 teams and 10 Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams that worked alongside U.S. combat brigades.

Now that may be coming to an end. U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Christopher Hill said he wants to reduce the number of PRTs down to six in the coming years, and have them replaced by Non-Government Organizations. A July 2009 report by the State Department’s Inspector General also suggested that the PRTs be terminated by 2011 to cut the department’s costs. These announcements are worrying PRT officials, some of whom are going back to old U.S. habits of funding large projects in an effort to spend all their money before they are closed down. Other team members are worried this will be a waste, and undermine the more successful grassroots work that the PRTs were known for.

Iraq relies in large part on U.S. reconstruction outlays because its own bureaucracy lacks the means and capacity to spend most of their own investment money. Putting an end to the PRTs, and pushing huge infrastructure projects as their last gasp could be the worst of both worlds. As U.S. commitment to Iraq’s development comes to a halt, the last vestiges of this effort may end up adding little to a country with such great needs.

SOURCES

Ackerman, Spencer, “As Troops Withdraw, Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Teams to Change Director Expects Phase-Out by 2011,” Washington Independent, 3/11/09

Flaherty, Anne, “Study: Reconstruction teams face funding, staffing troubles,” Associated Press, 4/17/08

Madhani, Aamer, “Envoy to Iraq has message of tough love,” USA Today, 7/21/09

Robson, Seth, “Iraq reconstruction funds may be squandered,” Stars and Stripes, 7/11/09

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09
- “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Government,” 7/30/07

Strobel, Warren, “Report: Big cuts needed at huge Baghdad embassy that Bush built,” McClatchy Newspapers, 7/22/09

Will Iraq Ever Have Reconciliation?

As Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki visited the United States in July 2009 President Obama repeated the common refrain that he hoped that there would eventually be reconciliation in Iraq. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy issued a report on this very topic on July 17 entitled, “How This Ends: Iraq’s Uncertain Path toward National Reconciliation.” In it, authors Michael Eisenstadt and Ahmed Ali document the steps that the American and Iraqi governments have followed to try to achieve this goal, and find their efforts lacking, and the prospects of making amends unlikely.

Reconciliation is important in countries that have recently gone through armed conflict. It provides greater stability and lessons the chances of a return to chaos. Successful reconciliation processes in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, Mozambique, South Africa, and Uruguay all shared the following steps:

1. Some form of truth telling
2. Recognition that all groups in the country are fellow citizens
3. Compensation programs and trials for some
4. Public peace events

Iraq has had some of these, but also gone against others. A major problem is that the United States and various Iraqi groups do not have a shared vision of what reconciliation means.

America’s policies have changed over time, and been a mixed bag. At first, U.S. efforts were focused upon making up for their own early mistakes. This included integrating Sunnis into the security forces and politics after the Coalition Provisional Authority disbanded the Iraqi Army and initiated deBaathification, and paying compensation to families that were harmed by the military. The U.S. has also stressed ethnosectarian power sharing through the passage of laws, and mediation between Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds. Norwegian Iraq expert Reidar Visser has argued that this is a misreading of Iraqi politics and maintains differences in the country rather than helps heal them. Not only that, but the results of these early strategies were very poor. Few laws pushed by the U.S. have been passed for example, and the ones that were have not been implemented as planned. During the Surge, the American forces began working with insurgents and militiamen that were willing to give up fighting in a bottom-up approach. This was much more successful, and directly led to the decrease in violence. At the same time, the U.S. has not been able to link many of the groups they worked with to the Iraqi government such as the Sons of Iraq.

Many of Baghdad’s policies on the other hand, have been interpreted as retribution or done for political gain. Examples of the former were deBaathification and the trial and execution of Saddam Hussein, and cases of the latter were the moves by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. In June 2006 Maliki announced a 24-point plan that included amnesty, conferences, changes in deBaathification and the constitution, compensation, punishment for war criminals and terrorists, and the creation of a national dialogue council. Baghdad did compensate victims of the former regime, and passed an Amnesty Law and Accountability and Justice Act, which replaced the old deBaathification process created by the Americans. The Amnesty Law has only freed a few thousand prisoners, and has mostly been used for public relations purposes, while the Accountability Act has never been implemented. Baghdad created the Supreme Committee for Dialogue and National Reconciliation, which works with tribes, civil groups, political parties and religious leaders, but it has no staff, and parliament cancelled its funding. There is also the much more important Follow-Up Committee for National Reconciliation that vets former officials and soldiers to be re-integrated, and works with the Sons of Iraq, Tribal Support Councils, and the displaced. Both are headed by Maliki confidants, and have been accused of supporting the Prime Minister’s personal agenda. Sunnis in parliament also set up the National Reconciliation Committee to follow their vision. It mostly works to free Sunni prisoners. The government has integrated several thousand former soldiers and officers into the security forces or pays them pensions. There have also been examples of local reconciliation. The rest of Baghdad’s goals have been largely unmet, and led to accusations about the government’s intentions rather than helped heal wounds.

Eisenstadt and Ali finish by saying that reconciliation in Iraq will take years, and may never occur in a meaningful fashion. The problems are large and many. First, the major Iraqi political parties are based upon ethnosectarian politics, and could lose power if they give that up. Second, there is still fighting in Iraq, and a World Bank study on conflicts found that almost 50% of countries coming out of civil wars fall back into them within five years. Third, there is little consensus in Baghdad on major issues such as oil, and politics are fragmented, which makes it hard to conduct negotiations or find partners. Fourth, there is a lack of accountability as many militants are involved in politics and security with no regret for their past deeds. Fifth, many conflicts and fighting took place within communities, not just between them, which has never been resolved. Sixth, many groups still talk about revenge, and see things in zero-sum terms. Seventh Iraq has been in the throes of elections since 2008, which makes compromising more difficult. Last, Iraq’s neighbors have all interfered in its internal affairs, and continue to do so to this day such as Iran. These problems may never be overcome, which is why the authors are so pessimistic about the country’s future. Iraq’s government will continue, but without resolving some of these large and pressing concerns, it’s unlikely that major changes or legislation will be implemented, which are a necessity to pull the country out of its current predicament.

SOURCES

Biddle, Stephen, “Reversal in Iraq,” Center for Preventative Action Council on Foreign Relations, May 2009

DeYoung, Karen, “Obama Calls on Iraq to Foster National Unity,” Washington Post, 7/23/09

Eisenstadt, Michael and Ali, Ahmed, “’How This Ends’: Iraq’s Uncertain Path toward National Reconciliation,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 7/17/09

Visser, Reidar, “Biden, US Policy in Iraq and the Concept of Muhasasa,” Historiae.org, 7/6/09

Implications of the Kurdish Elections On Iraq’s Parliamentary Vote

Special voting for the Kurdistan Regional Government’s third parliamentary elections began July 23, 2009. Phesmerga, patients, and prisoners were eligible to vote in this early balloting, while the regular election will be held on July 25. Kurdistan is using a closed list system where voters only get to pick from lists, not individual candidates. The system favors large parties, because smaller ones have to run candidates across the entire region in order to get enough votes to get seats.

The Change List and the Reform and Services List are considered two of the main challengers to the rule of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) that have ruled the region since 1992. How the local election plays out might have larger implications for Iraq overall. Both the Change and Reform lists said they would not run with the ruling Kurdish parties in the January 2010 parliamentary vote unless they dramatically changed their practices. That division could play into the hands of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki

Maliki wants to come out of the 2010 elections assured of maintaining his position as Prime Minister. The KDP-PUK alliance is set against that. If the Change List wins a number of seats in the Kurdish parliament Maliki may reach out to them, and ask them to run together in 2010. The Kurdish Alliance in parliament may be the dealmakers in the formation of any new ruling coalition. Maliki will try all manners to lesson their influence as its likely that he will come out of the January vote with only a plurality of votes as he did in the 2009 provincial elections, and therefore will need to bring in other parties to keep the premiership. Working with the Change List may be one small step in accomplishing this.

For a rundown of the parties and candidates participation in the Kurdish elections see:

Campaigning for Kurdistan’s Regional Parliament Begins

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Massive participation from Peshmerga forces in polling stations in Arbil,” 7/23/09

Carpenter, J. Scott and Ali, Ahmed, “Iraqi Kurds Go to the Polls: Is Change Possible?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 7/23/09

Kazimi, Nibras, “Iraq: Alliances Galore,” Hudson Institute, 7/17/09

Taha, Yaseen, “kurds fear weakness as a result of new disunity,” Niqash, 7/22/09

Have The Kurds Painted Themselves Into A Corner Over Kirkuk?

In June 2009 Lydia Khalil issued a report, “Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Mirage?” for the Brookings Institution. In it, she went over some of the major issues confronting the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), one of which was Kirkuk. In the years immediately following the 2003 U.S. invasion, the Kurds were in the ascendancy in Iraq, and set up a legal framework to annex Kirkuk. Both the 2004 Transitional Administration Law and the 2005 Constitution included procedures to add the area to the KRG. The problem is that neither of these was followed through with, and now the central government in Baghdad is stronger and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is asserting his power in the country. The Kurds have not adapted well to this new situation, and instead of adjusting their position accordingly, have clung to their old one and gone on the attack against Maliki. This may have painted the Kurds into a corner, as time is not on their side, and they may end up losing their dream of adding Kirkuk if they do not modify their approach.

The Kurdish leadership calls Kirkuk their Jerusalem, and after the U.S. invasion they set up a process to annex it by legal means. In the 2005 Constitution, the Kurds were able to add Article 140. It called for normalization, a census, and a referendum on the fate of Kirkuk by December 31, 2007. That deadline was extended to June 30, 2008, but that too came and passed and no new date for a referendum has been established. For all intense and purposes 140 is dead because no one else in parliament supports it, but the Kurds. All sides eventually agreed to abandon the article and defer the issue to the United Nations, but the Kurds still talk about implementing 140. On July 15, 2009 for example, KRG President Massoud Barzani said that Kirkuk was a Kurdish city and part of Kurdistan, and that Article 140 would never be disregarded.

At the same time, since 2003 the KRG has been working to create facts on the ground to support their claim to Kirkuk. They set up their own strategy to reverse Saddam’s Arabization policy, where he removed Kurds and Turkmen from Tamim province, home to Kirkuk, and replaced them with Arabs. Immediately after the U.S. invasion the Kurdish peshmerga militia began forcibly removing Arabs from the area. Later a formal process was created where the KRG would pay Arabs to leave the Kirkuk area. Around 8,000, mostly Shiites originally from southern Iraq, have taken up the offer. At the same time, the KRG moved in thousands of Kurds into the area offering money and aid, while intimidated others threatening to take away their jobs and support if they didn’t. The KRG has also changed the borders of Tamim to include more Kurdish towns from neighboring Kurdistan, and changed many signs and schools in the Kirkuk to be in Kurdish instead of Arabic. This altered the demographics and culture of Tamim to ensure that in any referendum Kirkuk would be annexed.

This policy has been ill received by the other groups in Tamim, and caused deep resentment against Kurdish aspirations on Kirkuk. During the 2003 invasion the Kurds swept south into Tamim and took over the top administrative and security duties there. After the 2005 elections, the Kurdish parties were victorious and refused to give the deputy governorship or council presidency to either the Arabs or Turkmen in the province. As a result, by November 2006, the Arabs began boycotting the provincial council. This deadlock was only broken in December 2007 when the Kurds gave 1/3 of the seats on the provincial council to the Arabs, and added an Arab deputy governor in a U.S. brokered deal. This concession did not heal the divisions however, and the Arabs and Turkmen eventually demanded that the provincial council seats be divided into rough thirds with 32% for the Kurds, 32% for the Arabs, 32% for the Turkmen, and the remaining seats for the Christians. The Provincial Powers Act passed in early 2008, and the Provincial Election law also called for power sharing in Tamim, but were never followed through with. Today, the Arabs and Turkmen of Tamim are set against Kurdish annexation. Many Turkmen are in favor of making Tamim an autonomous region, while Arabs want it to be a regular province under the control of Baghdad. Rather than allying with local groups, the Kurds have alienated many of them, and turned others into their political enemies.

With Article 140 deadlocked in Baghdad, and increasing opposition from non-Kurds at the provincial level, the KRG has turned to obstinacy. The Kurds are afraid that if they make any concessions they will lose Kirkuk, and therefore refuse to budge on any of their major demands. The Kurdish Alliance in parliament has also held up major legislation to protest against Article 140 not being implemented. In the KRG, the Kurdish leadership has pushed the issue so much that they are afraid of losing public support if they make any compromises. This stance has only added to the growing Arab-Kurdish divide within the country, because the more the Kurds refuse to make concessions the more opposition they garner. The Kurdish leadership has thus boxed themselves in. They may just continue with their current policy even if it fails, just to save face, and thus keep the status of Kirkuk in limbo.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Barazani: Kirkuk enjoys Kurdistani identity,” 7/15/09

Badkhen, Anna, “Kurds evicting Arabs in north Iraq,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/19/03

Borden, Anthony, “Iraqi Governance Report,” Institute For War And Peace Reporting, August 2007

Chulov, Martin, “Kurds lay claim to oil riches in Iraq as old hatreds flare,” Observer, 6/14/09

Cocks, Tim, “U.N. wants Iraq Kurds to drop Kirkuk vote-diplomat,” Reuters, 7/21/09

Daragahi, Borzou, “Security may trump ethnicity in Kirkuk,” Los Angeles Times, 9/28/07

Farrell, Stephen, “As Iraqis View for Kirkuk’s Oil, Kurds Are Pawns,” New York Times, 12/9/07

Frayer, Lauren, “Kirkuk: Edging out its Arab migrants,” Associated Press, 12/8/07

International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08

Jakes, Lara, “Key UN report to suggest power-sharing plan in Iraq’s divided Kirkuk,” Associated Press, 3/29/09

Khalil, Lydia, “Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Mirage?” Brookings Institution, June 2009

Paley, Amit, “Iraqi Urges Refugees To Stay Put,” Washington Post, 12/5/07

Stansfield, Gareth Anderson, Liam, “Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” Middle East Policy, Spring 2009

Susman, Tina and Ahmed, Asso, “Iraqi Kurds delay Kirkuk vote,” Los Angeles Times, 12/27/07

Warden, James, “Disagreements over Kirkuk’s status could sideline voters,” Stars and Stripes, 7/14/08

The United Nations’ Options For Kirkuk

In April 2009 the United Nations issued its report on Iraq’s disputed territories. The paper offered several possible solutions for Kirkuk. One was revising Article 140 of the constitution to make it a detailed plan, two changing the constitution to make Tamim a regular province, three giving joint rule to Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government over the province, and four making Kirkuk an autonomous region. The United Nations did not mention Kirkuk becoming part of Kurdistan as the Kurds want, nor placing Tamim under the direct rule of Baghdad, something the Arabs of the area advocate. As Joost Hilterman of the International Crisis Group recently pointed out, any settlement to the disputed area will require concessions from all the major groups, and that means the Kurds and Arabs will have to give up their desired outcomes.

So far, the U.N.’s paper has received mixed reviews. The Kurds and Baghdad have gone along with the plan so far, and in June 2009 began quiet meetings mediated by the U.N. and the U.S. Publicly however, the Kurdish leadership is insisting that Article 140 be implemented, even though all groups have agreed to abandon it. This is part of electioneering for the July 25 Kurdish elections. Turkmen in the province support the fourth idea of giving Tamim autonomy. Local Arabs however have rejected the plans claiming that they are biased towards the Kurds. Because there are such deep-seated divisions and distrust amongst these various groups it will take a Herculean effort to overcome them and come to some sort of grand compromise. The U.S. is asking the different parties to give the process a chance, but if Washington doesn’t put its full weight and influence behind them, it’s unlikely that the U.N. alone will be able to do the job. It’s important that Washington does this sooner rather than later because its influence is dramatically decreasing with the withdrawal of its forces.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Barzani: Kurds not to compromise on Kirkuk,” 7/20/09

Cocks, Tim, “U.N. wants Iraq Kurds to drop Kirkuk vote-diplomat,” Reuters, 7/21/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09

Madhani, Aamer, “Envoy to Iraq has message of tough love,” USA Today, 7/21/09

Synovitz, Ron, “Senior Iraqi Visit To U.S. Comes As Federal System Is Tested By Baghdad, Kurd Dispute,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 7/22/09

The Difficulties Of Power Sharing In Kirkuk

The 2008 Provincial Election Law’s Article 23 created a committee to come up with a power sharing deal in Tamim province amongst other things before voting could happen there. Ideas on how to divide up positions amongst the different groups in the province was the only area where the group made some headway. Politicians in Kirkuk actually agreed on a formula for dividing up the top positions in the province. This would lead to a Kurd being governor, an Arab deputy governor, and a Turkmen chair of the provincial council. Less was achieved on the lower positions. There was general consensus of divvying up jobs roughly by thirds with 32% for Kurds, 32% for Arabs, 32% for Turkmen, and 4% for Christians, but the problem was how to actually achieve this throughout the province. While the Kurds hold most of the top positions in Tamim, the Arabs and Turkmen dominate the lower levels, and did not want any of their group to lose jobs. Of the roughly 60,000 government officials in Tamim, 56% are Arabs, 22% are Turkmen, 18% are Kurds, and 4% are Christians. The Arabs and Turkmen were only willing to give up their positions when the current occupants retired, which of course would take a generation or two to achieve, a naturally dead end argument. The Kurds on the other hand were willing to concede some of their high level jobs in return for a fare share in the rest of the province’s government. They wanted Baghdad to assure this agreement, but with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki playing the Kurdish card to gain nationalist credentials in the rest of the country that never happened. The idea of power sharing has not moved forward since.

SOURCES

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09

Al-Khalidi, Diaa, “kirkuk awaits election law,” Niqash, 3/11/09

Fate Of Kirkuk Elections Still Up In The Air

As part of the 2008 Provincial Election Law, balloting in Tamim province, home of Kirkuk, was postponed until a committee could come up with a power sharing plan, and ideas on how voting should take place there. The committee was supposed to have its work done by the end of March 2009, but that was extended to June. By that time the committee had only done a part of its job, and the issue was referred back to parliament.

With parliamentary elections coming in January 2010, Iraq’s legislature and leaders have now begun discussions about what to do with the province. On July 5, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said that he wanted elections in Tamim before the parliamentary vote. That was supported by members of the United Iraqi Alliance and the National Dialogue Front a few days later who proposed a bill that would divide the provincial council into thirds between the Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen, an idea that has been on the table since at least 2008. The Kurdish Alliance and the speaker of parliament Ayad al-Samarraie rejected the idea saying Tamim should follow the 2008 Provincial Election law like the rest of the country. Ideas on voting there have not progressed much further since then, and the draft of the 2009 Parliamentary Elections Law does not include Kirkuk either. Since divisions on the topic run so deep there is little hope for compromise, which could leave the province without new representation indefinitely.

2005 Provincial Election Results In Tamim

Kurdistan Brotherhood 26 seats
Iraqi Turkmen Front 8 seats
Iraqi Republican Group 5 seats
Islamic Turkmen Coalition 1 seat
National Iraq Union 1 seat

In A December 2007 deal, the Kurds agreed to give 1/3 of the seats on the council to Arabs to end their boycott.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Parliamentary parties call to delay demographic census in Kirkuk,” 7/13/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Elections draft law completed without agreeing on Kirkuk – MP,” 7/15/09
- “Lawmakers demand law on Kirkuk elections,” 7/8/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09

Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008

Paley, Amit, “Iraqi Urges Refugees To Stay Put,” Washington Post, 12/5/07

Reuters, “Al-Maliki Wants Kirkuk Poll Before Iraq Vote,” 7/5/09

Al-Sabaah, “President: fair posts’ distribution in Kirkuk,” 2/4/08

More From Musings!

Those who have chosen to have spoken and asked for more from the blog. I don't know how long I can keep this up, but as long as I'm on summer vacation I'll try. From now on I will try to post more than one story a day. Usually there will be one long piece and than one or more smaller ones as well. Sometimes they'll be related, sometimes not. Hopefully people will enjoy the extra pieces.

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” - Chapter 5 ORHA In Baghdad

Chapter 5 of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” report on the American effort to rebuild Iraq highlights the first turning point in the war. The previous chapters went through the uncoordinated planning and faulty thinking that occurred in Washington before the invasion. Chapter 5 covers the U.S. invasion and its immediate consequences. The chaos that ensued would ensure a long-term U.S. occupation of Iraq.

On March 17, 2003 President George Bush issued an ultimatum for Saddam Hussein and his two sons Uday and Qusay to leave Iraq within 48 hours. On March 20 the bombing began, and the next day Coalition ground forces crossed the border into Iraq. Most of the Iraqi military disappeared, but Saddam’s Fedayeen militia began attacks in the south. U.S. General John Abizaid, deputy commander of the Central Command (CENTCOM), looked at reports on how the war was going and predicted in April that the U.S. would end up fighting an insurgency in the country. American forces were concentrated on getting to Baghdad as quick as possible to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction. That meant large cities, and northern and western Iraq were left to themselves for weeks, a situation which would have a negative impact on security later on.

Pre-war planning had been split between military and civilian authorities with little to no coordination. That continued during and immediately after the invasion. Members of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and military engineers moved behind combat forces to assess the situation in Iraq independent of each other. The first place the USAID teams went to was the port of Umm Qasr in Basra on March 27. They found the facilities in poor condition, but were still able to have a British ship dock there the next day to delivery humanitarian supplies. The engineers found the power system and infrastructure falling apart across Iraq. In Baghdad for example, the communication and water system were knocked out shortly after the bombing began, and on April 4, the power died in most of the city. Before the war, planners in Washington believed that after the invasion, the country would still be running, and that reconstruction costs would be minimal, and mostly paid for by Iraqi oil revenues. The assessments of the USAID and engineering teams found that it might cost up to $35 billion to rebuild Iraq. USAID and Retired General Jay Garner, the head of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA), had raised this concern before, but were met with deaf ears by administration officials.

Problems with unity of command even occurred within the ORHA itself. Faced with the dire state of Iraq’s infrastructure, Garner ordered the USAID to begin working on services instead of humanitarian issues. USAID refused, which led to a bureaucratic battle that reached all the way up to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell over who the USAID should answer to. Eventually Garner had to call Powell himself to get the agency to follow his orders.

Garner faced problems even getting into Iraq himself. General Tommy Franks, head of CENTCOM, was following the military’s plan for Iraq. That saw the U.S. overthrowing the government, securing any WMD, and then turning over Iraq to a civilian authority in six to eight weeks, at which time rebuilding would begin. Garner wanted access to Iraq immediately. Garner flew to Qatar to meet with General Franks where he argued that there was a power vacuum in Iraq that needed to be filled by the ORHA. General Franks reluctantly gave in.

The first place Garner’s staff went to was Basra. There they didn’t have a communication system at first, lacked security because there were too few Coalition troops in the city, and reported the first cases of looting on April 2. The chaos that was being unleashed would setback the work on Basra’s Umm Qasr port for weeks, and lead to skyrocketing costs, a foreshadowing of the overall reconstruction effort in Iraq.

The looting and chaos would quickly spread to the rest of the country. On April 7 looting began in Baghdad. Gunfire, robberies, and murders were reported across the city. All of Iraq’s ministries were stripped, and then burned. The exception was the Oil Ministry, which was protected by U.S. troops. That was because the Defense Department had been tasked with running the oil industry in pre-war planning, and issued orders to protect the building during the invasion. Some ministries even continued to be attacked when the U.S. occupied them. The Health Ministry’s offices for example were burned two or three more times after the Americans re-opened it. Iraq’s three main banks, Rafidain, Rasheed, and the Central Bank had their money and safety deposit boxes taken. Iraqis also began going after the petroleum industry, which lasted for ten weeks from March to May 2003, and caused $943 million in damages. Organized gangs and insurgents would eventually take over the robbing and killing. Some neighborhoods in Baghdad, especially Shiite ones, set up militias for protection. This spread to other areas like Amarah in Maysan where Shiite militias took over the city in the absence of Iraqi administrators and Coalition troops. The U.S. ground forces commander General David McKiernan said there weren’t enough troops to maintain security. He was also constrained by the fact that the invasion plan called for soldiers to continue to push north looking for MWD, leaving Baghdad, and much of southern and western Iraq with no Coalition presence. The result was more instability.

This had four major effects upon the U.S. and Iraq. First, it raised the costs of reconstruction by billions. On April 16, Congress appropriated $2.475 billion for rebuilding Iraq. The U.S. would end up spending $50 billion. Second, the lack of security meant Iraqi weapon depots were looted, which helped arm the insurgency and Shiite militias who would go on to destabilize the country after the invasion. Third, the collapse of the Iraqi government and the poor state of Iraq’s infrastructure after decades of war and sanctions meant that the Americans could not get services up and running, which cost them public support. Finally, the situation on the ground in Iraq would eventually mean the White House would give up its strategy of a quick departure.

Despite these setbacks, the U.S. military and leadership acted as if everything was going according to plan. On April 16 General Franks gave his “Freedom Message” saying that the U.S. would only be in Iraq temporarily, and that an American civilian authority known as the Coalition Provisional Authority would soon take over from the military. On April 21, Rumsfeld, taking the advice of General Franks, cancelled the deployment of 50,000 additional troops to Iraq, and began thinking of withdrawal. General McKiernan and Garner were shocked as they both wanted more troops to handle security.

At the same time, Garner was carrying on with his own policies as well. On April 15 he and Presidential Envoy to the Iraqi opposition Zalmay Khalilzad put together a meeting of over 100 indigenous Iraqi leaders in Nassiriya to discuss forming an interim Iraqi government that would take over from the Americans. On April 22, Garner flew to Kurdistan to consult with the Kurdish leaders on this plan as well, while Secretary Powell sent Khalizad and Ambassador Ryan Crocker to meet with Iraqis in the south. This culminated in a meeting on April 28 in Baghdad that included 250 domestic and exile leaders. They agreed to form an Iraqi government over the next four weeks.

All of the ORHA’s work ended in May. Faced with the instability in Iraq, the White House gave up on Garner. National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld both believed that ORHA had lost control of the situation in Iraq. On May 6, President Bush named Paul Bremer as his Presidential Envoy to Iraq to head a new organization, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Bremer had been contacted by the Defense Department and Vice President Dick Cheney’s office at the beginning of April. Garner had been told when he first got his job that he would eventually be replaced, but he didn’t expect it to happen so soon.

The Bush administration’s planning for Iraq had always been haphazard and disconnected. At any one time before the invasion there were at least two different organizations working on a strategy for post-war Iraq, with little to no knowledge of each other. The White House also often interfered with the effort causing more problems. When the invasion started the U.S. military and the civilian OHRA both thought they would be in charge of post-war Iraq. They worked independently, which didn’t help when the country fell into chaos. That instability led the administration to panic, and abandon its early plan to withdraw from Iraq quickly in favor of a long-term occupation under the CPA. The effects of that decision are still being felt today.

SOURCES

Packer, George, Assassins’ Gate, 2005

PBS Frontline, “INTERVIEWS Elisabeth Bumiller,” Bush’s War, 3/24/08

Ricks, Tom, Fiasco, 2006

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09

Woodward, Bob, State of Denial, 2006

Maliki In Washington

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is in Washington today, July 22, 2009 to meet with President Obama. While there he will attend a conference with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to discuss how to further implement the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which calls for American economic, political, and security support for Iraq. U.S. combat troops are due to depart at the end of 2011, but Baghdad and the U.S. military want advisors and assistance to last far past that date. While that seems to be guaranteed, other forms of aid are not. Then Vice-President elect Joe Biden told the Tamim provincial council on a visit to Iraq in January 2009 that with the U.S. facing a huge deficit and recovery package, Iraq cannot expect much more development money. The State Department’s Inspector General also just released a report saying that the staff at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad should be reduced, and that the Provincial Reconstruction Teams should be ended by 2011. Iraq is no longer the number one foreign policy concern of the United States as it was under the previous administration. That means it will have to increasingly find its own solutions rather than rely upon the U.S. as it has over the last six years.

Quote From Hasan Turan, Tamim Provincial Council Member On Conversation With Then-Vice President Elect Joe Biden During a January 2009 Trip to Iraq

“Biden surprised us with his message. He said the Obama administration will set off with a $1.2 trillion debt and will need to spend an additional $1 trillion to fix the economy. This means that after 2009, there will be no more money for Iraq. There are four principle issues that need to be addressed, including Kirkuk. He said: “If you fail, we will not defend democracy in Iraq. If you choose dictatorship, it’s your choice. As Americans, we don’t like to be humble, but we are forced to be. We have made mistakes in Iraq.”

A former U.S. diplomat who was also at the meeting clarified that Biden meant there would be no reconstruction money for Iraq, but that the U.S. planned to continue military and civilian advisors.

SOURCES

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Alone the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09

Kaplow, Larry, “Maliki’s Fine Line,” Newsweek, 7/21/09

Parker, Sam, “The New Nuri al-Maliki,” Foreign Policy, 7/21/09

Strobel, Warren, “Report: Big cuts needed at huge Baghdad embassy that Bush built,” McClatchy Newspapers, 7/22/09

The Role Of The PUK And KDP On The Eve Of Kurdish Elections

On July 25, 2009 the residents of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) will vote on a new regional parliament and president. While there are real challengers this time in the legislature, the election is unlikely to break the hold the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of KRG President Massoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani have over the region. The two parties have ruled Kurdistan since it gained its autonomy after the 1991 Gulf War. Since the 2003 U.S. invasion, the two once bitter enemies have united to maintain their power.

Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the father of Massoud, was the most prominent leader of the Kurdish independence movement. He formed the Mahabad Republic, a Kurdish state, in 1945, which was later crushed. He fled to Russia afterwards, while his son Massoud went to Iraq. In 1946 Mustafa formed the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and returned to Iraq in 1958, and started fighting against the government with the support of Iran. In the 1960s Jalal Talabani left the KDP, and formed his own Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).

In 1979 Mustafa died and Massoud assumed control of the KDP. He launched his own insurgency against the Iraqi government during the Iran-Iraq War. At the time, the Barzanis and the KDP were based out of Iran, and he and Talabani fought on the Iranian side during the war with Iraq. After the Gulf War Kurdistan gained its autonomy with the help of the United States, and Barzani and Talabani assumed leadership of the region.

In the mid-1990s a civil war broke out between the two parties with Talabani looking to Iran for help, and Barzani turning to Saddam. The Iraqi Army moved into Kurdistan in 1996 at the invitation of the KDP, and crushed the PUK. In 1998 the two sides stopped fighting after 500 civilians were killed.

In the wake of this conflict, two separate administrations were created in Kurdistan, the KDP in Irbil and the PUK in Sulaymaniya. These were informally called Barzanistan and Talabanistan because of the tight control the two families exerted over all facets of life. The judiciary and parliament were the only two bodies that were shared between the two. Otherwise, the two had separate militias, separate security forces, etc. In December 2002, with the U.S. invasion expected, the PUK and KDP signed an accord to end their rivalry, and provide a united front in the new Iraq. This eventually worked out well as the Kurds were able to ensure their autonomy, and a process to annex Kirkuk under the Transitional Administrative Law in 2004 and the Iraqi Constitution in 2005. The Kurds were also able to gain high positions in Baghdad such as Talabani becoming the Iraqi president.

In 2006 the KDP and PUK signed a unification agreement to bring together the two separate administrations. While many officers have been brought together, some of the most important ones, the Finance Ministry, the peshmerga, and the asayesh security forces, have not. There are many members of the old guard in both parties and their peshmerga who are still bitter over the civil war. The militias are also loyal to their political leaders, and not the Kurdish government or Baghdad. The two sides also have different cultures within their administrations, as well as divergent laws, especially on foreign investment, and have not agreed upon how to split revenues. The two Finance Ministries have also made long-term commitments and investments, which have to be completed before the budgets can be unified. These are all reasons why these institutions remain separate.

What the two parties have agreed upon is to maintain their power over the region. The unification agreement gives specific posts in the KRG only to PUK and KDP members for example. The two parties also have extensive patronage systems. For instance, it’s recently been reported that after a four-year hiring freeze the regional government has hired 2,500 new employees just as campaigning started for the Kurdish parliament. Many believe this is a political move to gain more voters in the election. Top positions throughout Kurdistan are also reserved for party members. University presidents, university councils, deans, heads of departments, and scholarships are all connected to the political parties.

Corruption and nepotism are also common complaints about the PUK and KDP. Business deals usually require a high level party official to be completed. The Barzani and Talabani clans have extensive business deals throughout the region, and the latter are said to be worth $2 billion. Family members are also found throughout the government. Massoud’s son Masrour, who is currently the party’s security chief, is going to be the next KDP leader, while his cousin Nechervan is the KRG Prime Minister.

The PUK and KDP’s control of the security forces have also allowed them to go after their political opponents. In May 2009 for example, the Committee to Protect Journalists released a letter to the KRG complaining about lawsuits against and arrests of journalists that criticized the government. The Committee found that while a new law was passed in September 2008 to protect journalists, government officials often use an older law from 1969 to sue reporters who are critical of the KRG. The Committee considered this unjust and a form of harassment. More serious were arrests of journalists and other critical voices, which was detailed in an April 2009 Amnesty International report. In the 2005 elections, the KDP was also accused of attacking the Kurdistan Islamic Union.

These have all become issues with voters in Kurdistan, and even within the ruling parties themselves. In late 2008 a group called the Movement for Democratic Change was formed within the PUK calling for political reform. Talabani kicked them out of the party. Later in February 2009 some of the top members of the party threatened to leave unless the PUK initiated internal reforms to fight corruption, nepotism, and provide greater transparency. Talabani agreed to their demands this time as regional elections were pending, and he couldn’t afford so many high level defections beforehand. Now as a date for that voting has been set, the PUK and KDP are facing their first real political challenge in the regional parliament. Domestic issues are also said to be more important than the Kurds’ dispute with Baghdad or Kirkuk. Voters are demanding better rule, services, and real reform.

Despite this development in the electorate, little is likely to change after the July 25 balloting. More seats will likely go to new parties in the Kurdish parliament, but Massoud Barzani is expected to be re-elected KRG president. The administration will still be run by the PUK and KDP. Their grip on education, business, government finances, and security will remain in place as well. The upcoming vote is an important step for the Kurdish region because a real opposition might be forming, but until the PUK and KDP loosen their hold on power, the status quo is likely to be preserved.

SOURCES

Amnesty International, “Hope and Fear, Human rights in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq,” April 2009

Anderson, Liam, “Internationalizing Iraq’s Constitutional Dilemma,” will appear in The Kurdish Policy Imperative, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2009

Bakri, Nada, “Challengers Face an Uphill Battle in Elections in Iraq’s Kurdish North,” Washington Post, 7/19/09

Butters, Andrew Lee, “Trouble in Kurdistan,” Time, 3/17/06

Elliott, Michael and Calabresi, Massimo, “Inside The Secret Campaign To Topple Saddam,” Time, 12/2/02

Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “kurds seek new political opposition,” Niqash, 7/16/09

Institute for War & Peace Reporting, “KDP Flexes Muscle in Dohuk,” 7/21/09

Khalil, Lydia, “Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Mirage?” Brookings Institution, June 2009

Mahmoud, Shakhwan, “fired and hired for their political beliefs?” Niqash, 7/20/09

Muhammad, Sardar, “KRG presidential candidates,” Niqash, 7/9/09

Simon, Joel, “CPJ alarmed by press violations in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Committee to Protect Journalists, 5/5/09

Americans Think Iraq War A Mistake Even Though Feel Things Better Now

A recent Gallup poll of 1,018 Americans in July 2009 shows that while a majority of Americans think that things are going well in Iraq, about the same amount think that going to war was a mistake. From July 10-12, Gallop conducted a telephone poll of 1,018 Americans. They asked about their perceptions of the Iraq and Afghan invasions, and how they thought things were going now in both conflicts. 56% said things were going well in Iraq, while 58% said the war itself was a mistake.



In the first year and 3 months of the war, Americans perceived things as going well and the invasion worthwhile. In mid-2003 only 27% said the war was a mistake, and the public was almost evenly divided on their perceptions on how things were going with 52% saying things were good, and 47% seeing things going badly. From early 2004 to mid 2008 however, perceptions of Iraq turned negative peaking at 71% saying things were bad in January 2007. The same thing happened with opinions on whether the invasion was a mistake, going from 38% saying yes in mid-2004, to peaking at 63% saying yes in April 2008. Americans have continued to think badly of the invasion from then to the present day, despite a better view of the on-going conflict.


When broken down by political views, a majority of Republicans still think the war was worthwhile, while a majority of Democrats and Independents disagree. Only 26% of Republicans think the war was a mistake, while 59% of Independents and 78% of Democrats have the opposite view. This partisan difference is obviously due to the fact that a Republican administration initiated the war.

While Gallup thinks the more positive view of events in Iraq today are linked to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq’s cities that only occurred in June 2009 when opinion changed for the positive back in mid-2008. A more likely cause is the drop in violence and the dramatic decline in reporting about the war that began in 2007. That still has not reversed the generally negative view of the invasion. Unless there is a dramatic reversal of events, these views will probably persist until 2011 when combat troops are due to depart Iraq. Americans will think that the country has improved, but that the Bush Administration should’ve never invaded in the first place.

SOURCES

Newport, Frank, “Americans Upbeat on Progress in Iraq, Afghanistan, Gallup, 7/16/09

Companies Exporting Oil From Kurdistan Without Getting Paid

In May 2009 Iraq’s Oil Ministry said that the Kurds could export oil from two of their fields. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) considered this a major victory in its running battle over oil contracts with Baghdad. The problem is that the Oil Ministry still says the Kurds’ deals are illegal, and refuses to pay the oil companies while accepting the profits from the added exports. The oil companies working in Kurdistan say that they expect to get paid eventually, but if they don’t it could undermine the Kurds’ oil policy.

On May 8 Baghdad said the Tawke and Taq Taq oil fields in Kurdistan could begin exporting through the Kirkuk-Turkey pipeline. That began on June 1. Norway’s DNO International operates the Tawke field, which is currently producing 40,000 barrels a day, while the Swiss-Canadian Addax Petroleum and Turkey’s Genel Enerji run the Taq Taq field, and are pumping 20,000-40,000 barrels a day. The problem now is who and when will the companies be paid. When the Oil Ministry allowed the exports they said that they would not compensate the companies because they considered the Kurdish oil deals illegal. That means the KRG must pay DNO, Addax, and Genel Enerji. Currently Kurdistan gets 17% of the Iraqi budget, but they have to pay the companies 18-20% of the oil profits. Many oil experts believe that the KRG could not sustain that rate for very long, meaning something needs to be worked out with Baghdad eventually.

An oil analyst told Reuters that the Oil Ministry will eventually come up with a payment plan, but can’t right now because of the political divisions between Baghdad and Kurdistan. That seems unlikely. The problems between the Kurds and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki are increasing, and will continue to as the January 2010 parliamentary elections near. Maliki has stood by his Oil Minister who has condemned the independent oil deals signed by the KRG. The current situation also favors Baghdad as it is getting the profits from the Kurdish exports with no costs. If something isn’t eventually worked out it could undermine the Kurds’ independent oil strategy, which would be fine by Maliki. In the meantime compensating these companies looks to be a political football with no clear resolution in sight.

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Norway’s DNO warns internal disputes over Iraq oil could hurt investment in region,” 6/11/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Kurdistan oil exports to help reduce budget deficit-lawmakers,” 5/23/09

Ciszuk, Samuel, “Follow the money,” Iraq Oil Report, 5/28/09
- “No clarity on Iraq-KRG oil export flap,” Iraq Oil Report, 5/13/09
- “Taq-Taq aim is 180K bpd despite no export rights,” Iraq Oil Report, 3/25/09

Hafidh, Hassan and Swartz, Spencer, “Iraq Ends Ban, Allows Kurds to Export Oil,” Wall Street Journal, 5/11/09

Hilterman, Joost, “Kurdish crude bails out Baghdad,” The Argument Blog, Foreign Policy.com, 5/13/09

Hoyos, Carola and Khalaf, Roula, “Kurdish exports resume despite Iraqi impasse,” Financial Times, 5/27/09

Ibrahim, Waleed, “UPDATE 4-Kurds say will launch oil exports, Iraq denies,” Reuters, 5/8/09

Reuters, “DNO says no pay schedule in place for Kurdish oil,” 7/17/09
- “Iraq Kurds to start Tawke crude exports June 1,” 5/8/09

Visser, Reidar, “Norway’s Oil Industry and the Partitioning of Iraq,” Historiae.org, 12/7/05

Iran’s Role In The Revival Of The United Iraqi Alliance

On July 16, 2009 Al-Hayat newspaper reported that Moqtada al-Sadr visited Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) in his Tehran hospital. Sadr said he was interested in rejoining the United Iraqi Alliance, which the Sadrists left in September 2007. The new alliance is due to be announced later this month according to a Supreme Council member. In February 2009 Sadr issued a statement saying that he would come back to the Alliance as long as it was renamed, the SIIC was no longer leading it, and that it was non-sectarian. Those talks fell apart in May when the Sadrists said they would run independently in the January 2010 parliamentary vote. The change in the Sadrists' position could be due to the influence of Iran, which is applying strong pressure upon the leading Shiite parties to re-unite and run together in the next round of balloting in Iraq.

One of the main goals of Tehran is to ensure friendly Shiite rule in Iraq so that it never becomes a rival again. Following this Iran wants the main Shiite parties to be united during elections, so they stay in power. In 2005 Iran helped put together the United Iraqi Alliance, and gave them printing presses, advisors, broadcast equipment, and stuffed ballot boxes. Since the January 2009 provincial elections, Iran has been pushing for the Alliance to be revived. In January, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki ran his own State of Law List, which trumped the Supreme Council in most of southern Iraq. Iran was afraid of further fracturing by the Shiites, and began pressuring them to run together in 2010.

Iranian officials began traveling to Iraq shortly after the provincial vote. On February 11, Iran’s Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki came to Baghdad to mediate between the estranged Dawa Party and SIIC. On March 2 Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, the head of Iran’s Expediency Council came to Iraq for five days. He was followed by the speaker of Iran’s parliament Ali Larijani who came at the end of that month.

Domestic Iraqi politics also played into this Iranian policy. In early 2009 the Supreme Council and their allies in parliament were threatening a no confidence vote against Maliki. The Prime Minister was forced to reach out to them to stop this from happening. Their price was for Maliki to rejoin the United Alliance. This appealed to Maliki, because if he was given the leadership position in the list it could help his chances of maintaining his office. The SIIC was also hoping to ride Maliki’s coattails back into power after their loses in the provincial councils. There is still a lot of mistrust between the two, but mutual ambition appears to be bringing them back together with ample pressure from Tehran.

May 2009 saw a renewed drive by Tehran and SIIC leader Hakim to get the Shiite parties back together. On May 13, Hakim publicly announced that he wanted the United Alliance reformed. The chairman of the SIIC Humam Hammudi was given responsibility for re-organizing the List, while Ahmad Chalabi was tasked with bringing back the old members of the Alliance.

Most of the negotiations for the revival of the Alliance occurred in Hakim’s Tehran hospital where he is undergoing cancer treatment. On May 14 Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Hakim. Six days later Ibrahim al-Jaafari of the National Reform Trend and Iraq’s Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari came to Hakim’s hospital. Hakim also met with Hadi al-Amiri, the head of the Badr Organization. At the end of the month Maliki flew to Tehran to consul with Hakim. Iran’s Foreign Minister Mottaki was present. Maliki then met with Supreme Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei who also pressured him on the United Alliance.

These moves have apparently paid off for Iran for now. On June 19, al-Hayat reported that Maliki and the SIIC had agreed to revive the United Iraqi Alliance. It would now be called the Coalition of the State of Law, and the Prime Minister would be its leader. Sadr’s meeting with Hakim this month, almost completes the original line-up of the Alliance. If these parties do run together it would be a big victory for Iran’s policy, and a step backwards for Iraq. In the 2009 vote, Iraqi nationalism made a revival. The re-birth of the United Alliance would be a return to the sectarian politics of the past. Early reports that the new election law will also maintain the 2005 closed list system where voters only get to vote for lists and not individual candidates is another sign that the major parties are more interested in maintaining their positions rather than advancing the country’s interests. The leading Shiite parties also do not seem to have any problems with playing along with Iran, as long as it helps them win.

SOURCES

Allam, Hannah, Landay, Jonathan, and Strobel, Warren, “Is an Iranian general the most powerful man in Iraq?” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/28/08

Alsumaria, “Al Sadr agrees to reengage in Coalition,” 7/16/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Elections draft law completed without agreeing on Kirkuk – MP,” 7/15/09

Barzegar, Kayhan, “Iran’s Foreign Policy in Post-invasion Iraq,” Middle East Policy Council Journal, Winter 2008

Domergue, Jeremy and Cochrane, Marisa, “Balancing Maliki,” Institute for Understanding War, June 2009

Elkhamri, Mounir, “Iran’s Contribution to the Civil War in Iraq,” Jamestown Foundation, January 2007

Gwertzman, Bernard, “Iraq at Crossroads Amid U.S. Disengagement,” Council on Foreign Relations, 6/30/09

Kaplow, Larry, “Iraq Steps Out of Iran’s Shadow,” Newsweek, 6/6/09

Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Sat: The I’tilaf is Back!” IraqSlogger.com, 6/19/09
- “Iraq Papers Wed: Oil Contracts in Jeopardy,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/16/09

Parker, Ned, “Sadr’s bloc quits Iraq’s ruling coalition,” Times of London, 9/16/07

Press TV, “Iraq’s Maliki at Hakim’s bedside in Tehran,” 5/31/09

Al-Sharqiyah Television, “Iraq roundup: Al-Sadr Trend mediates in Ninawa; security incidents,” BBC Monitoring Service, 6/14/09
- “’Special groups’ leaders arrested in Iraq; political, security roundup,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/15/09
- “US troops start withdrawal from Al-Sadr City; Iraq roundup,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 5/29/09

5 Revolutionary Guards Members Let Go By U.S.

On July 10, 2009 the U.S. released five Iranian operatives that had been in custody for two and a half years. They were let go under the Status of Forces Agreement, which says all prisoners held by the U.S. must be freed or turned over to the Iraqis by 2011. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki requested that the Iranians be released, and he met with them before they were turned over to the Iranian embassy in Baghdad. The Iranians were originally rounded up as part of an American plan to break-up Tehran’s lethal support of Shiite militias that missed Iran’s main goal in Iraq.

On January 11, 2007 the U.S. raided the Iranian Liaison Offices in Irbil and arrested the five Iranians. At that time President Bush ordered that Iranian agents operating within Iraq be killed or captured. The office was a local headquarters for the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force. At the Irbil airport the Kurdish peshmerga stopped the Americans from arresting two other Iranians, who were the real target of the operation. The five captured at the Liaison Office were junior offices, while the two that got away at the airport were Mohammed Jafari, the deputy on the Iranian National Security Council, and General Minojahar Frouzanda, the head of the Revolutionary Guards’ intelligence service. Jafari and Frouzanda were on an official visit to Kurdistan, and met with Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barzani. The Kurds immediately protested the detentions, and demanded that the 5 Iranians be released. The U.S. refused saying they were involved in attacks on American and Iraqi forces.

Iranians had been operating in Kurdistan for twenty years, and had offices in Irbil and Sulaymaniya. The two ruling Kurdish parties were based in Iran during Saddam’s time, and both fought on the Iranian side during the Iran-Iraq War. It was at that time that the Revolutionary Guards began operating out of Kurdistan.

The offensive against Iran’s Qods Force began the month before. In December 2006, the U.S. arrested Iranian General Mohsen Chirazi and Colonel Abu Amad Davari. They were arrested in the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s (SIIC) compound in Baghdad. The two had invitations to be in Iraq from Pres. Talabani. Chirazi was the number three man in the Qods Force, and the highest Iranian captured by the U.S. Both were released a week later after protests by Iraqi officials.

Again, it was no surprise that Iranians were found at this location. The Supreme Council was created by Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, and recognized Ayatollah Khomeini as their leader. The SIIC’s militia the Badr Brigade was an official arm of the Qods Force, and fought on the Iranian side during the war like the two Kurdish parties. In fact, Chirazi and Davari were at the SIIC compound to meet the leader of the Badr Brigade when the Americans arrested them.

Later in September 2007, the U.S. arrested the Iranian trade delegate in Sulaymaniya. Iraqi President Talabani protested again and demanded his release. The Kurds claimed the Iranian had been in town for a week working on a new border crossing between Kurdistan and Iran. The Iranian was Mahmud Farhadi. He was a commander in the Qods Force Ramadan Corps. The Corps was one of four created to operate within neighboring countries. The Ramadan Corps set up three regional commands along the Iraqi border known as Nasr, Zafar, and Fajr, to deal with different parts of Iraq. Farhadi was in charge of the Nasr command. He was probably in Sulaymaniya for what the Kurds said as the Qods Force is also in charge of economic ties with Iraq.

When the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003 it was seen as a great threat and opportunity by Tehran. They sent in their operatives and friendly Iraqi parties to shape the facts on the ground to their advantage. The SIIC had been able to win over the Americans before the war, and became the main Shiite party they supported. The Qods Force helped put together the United Iraqi Alliance, which won the most seats in the 2005 parliamentary elections, and broke the deadlock to put Nouri al-Maliki into office in 2006. This was all to ensure Shiite rule in Iraq, and maximize Iranian influence. At the same time, the Qods Force began funneling money and weapons to any and all Shiite militias that would fight the Americans to hold them down in Iraq so that they wouldn’t attack Iran, and hopefully eventually make them leave. The arrest of the Iranians was aimed at that military effort. While the U.S. was successful in arresting some Qods Force members and the militias they supported, it’s questionable whether these had any real effect upon Iran’s support for Shiite militants. That didn’t really seem to change until Maliki’s crackdown in Basra in March 2008. More importantly, the U.S. never addressed Tehran’s political policy, and in fact supported the SIIC, the most pro-Iranian Shiite party, and helped integrate their Badr Brigade into the Iraqi security forces. In forging this strategy, the Bush administration got caught up on the security situation, and ignored Iran’s main goal, to ensure that Iraq never became a rival again by putting their allies in power. While the Americans were understandably mad at having to release these five Qods Force operatives, it was another sign of their misinterpretation of Iran’s true motives and goals in Iraq.

SOURCES

Allam, Hannah, Landay, Jonathan, and Strobel, Warren, “Is an Iranian general the most powerful man in Iraq?” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/28/08

Beehner, Lionel, Bruno, Greg, “Iran’s Involvement in Iraq,” Council on Foreign Relations, 3/3/08

CNN, “U.S. raid on Iranian consulate angers Kurds,” 1/11/07

Cockburn, Patrick, “The botched US raid that led to the hostage crisis,” Independent, 4/3/07

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

Kagan, Kimberly, “Iran’s Proxy War against the United States and the Iraqi Government,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/20/07

Kaplow, Larry, “Iraq Steps Out of Iran’s Shadow,” Newsweek, 6/6/09

Lake, Eli, “GIs Raid Iranian Building in Irbil,” New York Sun, 1/12/07

Linzer, Dafna, “Troops Authorized to Kill Iranian Operatives in Iraq,” Washington Post, 1/26/07

Myers, Steven Lee, “Americans Release Iranian Detainees to Iraq,” New York Times, 7/10/09

Parker, Ned, “Iraqi militia leader’s death shatters truce,” Los Angeles Times, 9/23/07

Phillips, James, “Iran’s Hostile Policies in Iraq,” Heritage Foundation, 4/30/07

Price, Jay and Taha, Yaseen, “Kurds denounce U.S. detention of Iranian,” McClatchy Newspapers, 9/20/07

Roggio, Bill, “Captured Iranian agent identified, 15 Special Groups operatives captured in Iraq,” Long War Journal.org, 9/30/07
- “Iran’s Ramazan Corps and the ratlines into Iraq,” Long War Journal.org, 12/5/07
- “Iranian involvement in Iraq: an old or a new case?” Long War Journal.org, 10/15/07
- “US releases Iranian Qods Force agents,” Long War Journal, 7/9/09

Roug, Louise and Daragahi, Borzou, “Iraq Edges Closer to Iran, With or Without the US,” Los Angeles Times, 1/16/07

Sanger, David, “Opening a New Front in the War, Against Iranians in Iraq,” New York Times, 1/15/07

Tehran Times, “Barzani vows to seek release of Iranian diplomats,” 10/23/08

Wright, Robin and Trejos, Nancy, “U.S. Troops Raid 2 Iranian Targets in Iraq, Detain 5 People,” Washington Post, 1/12/07

Kurds Agree To Suspend Vote On Controversial Constitution

On July 10, 2009 the Kurdistan Regional parliament agreed to postpone a referendum on a new controversial constitution. The vote was to coincide with elections for the Kurdish parliament and president on July 25. The proposed constitution has been criticized from both within and without Kurdistan.

The Kurdish parliament passed the constitution at the very last minute. The legislature was supposed to end its term on June 4, 2009, but extended their session to pass the constitution on June 24. The document has two controversial parts to it. First it lays claim to the city of Kirkuk, and other areas in Diyala and Ninewa provinces. In June 2009 talks began behind the scenes between the United Nations, Baghdad, and Kurdistan over these disputed areas. The constitution was a signal that the Kurds were not going to give up on their territorial claims to a greater Kurdistan, which they say consists of areas that are historically theirs. One member of the Kurdish parliament said that they no longer had confidence in the national constitution because there had been no movement on the disputed areas. The Iraqi constitution includes Article 140, which called for normalization, a census, and then referendum on Kirkuk and the other disputed territories. The vote was supposed to happen by December 31, 2007, but that was extended to June 2008 and then abandoned. All sides have now agreed to let the United Nations mediate this issue, yet the Kurds still talk about implementing 140.

The move caused consternation in Baghdad and Washington. 50 members of Iraq’s parliament immediately signed a statement rejecting the Kurdish constitution. They claim that it is unconstitutional. Some claimed that it was the first move towards secession by the Kurds. On July 2 Vice President Joe Biden traveled to Iraq where he said that the new constitution was not helping the increasing divide between Baghdad and Kurdistan. The new U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Christopher Hill went to talk with the Kurds shortly afterwards, followed by a visit by Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Join Chiefs of Staff, to Kirkuk. All three U.S. officials said that Iraqis needed to negotiate and resolve these disputes themselves, and that the Americans would help if needed. The problem is that the U.S. has stood on the sidelines waiting for the U.N. to make progress on the issue, when the international body cannot really do anything without a strong U.S. role. At the same time the differences between Baghdad and Kurdistan have increased. The proposed Kurdish constitution then just added fuel to the fire.

The constitution has also caused protests within Kurdistan. The biggest problem is that it gives new powers to the regional president. The president would be allowed to dissolve the Kurdish parliament, gives the office executive power, command over the peshmerga, the ability to pass and veto laws, and remove any ministers. Opposition parties claim that the document is an attempt to preserve the power of the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) that have ruled the autonomous region since 1991. In this year’s vote they are facing serious challengers for the first time. Incumbent Kurdish President Massoud Barzani of the KDP however, is expected to be re-elected. The belief is that if the KDP and PUK loose power to these new parties in parliament they will have a new trump card in the expanded powers of the president. In response, several social organizations in Sulaymaniya began a campaign against the new constitution in June 2009, and some of the opposition parties are talking about joining behind one candidate to oppose Barzani in the election.

The whole issue is now going to be postponed. Iraq’s Election Commission said that it couldn’t have an election for the Kurdish parliament and president at the same time as a referendum on the new constitution. The Commission said the soonest it could hold a vote for the constitution would be August 11, and the Kurdish parliament said they would have it no later than September 2009.

This delay is only holding off the inevitable. Annexing Kirkuk and other disputed areas is widely popular in Kurdistan. Many Kurds have not even heard or read the constitution either, and will probably be unaware of the changes that it will make in the power of the president before the vote. That means the constitution will likely be passed. If it does it will ensure the continued rule of the PUK-KDP alliance no matter what the outcome of the Kurdistan parliamentary vote is, and add to the growing Arab-Kurdish divide within the country. It also shows the obstinacy of the Kurdish ruling parties to not budge on either domestic Kurdish issues, or national ones.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraq panel rejects Kirkuk vote on same day as Kurd polls,” 7/6/09

Alsumaria, “Kurdistan keeps on elections, delays referendum,” 7/10/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Kurdistan presidential hopeful slams Talabani’s promotion of Barzani,” 7/13/09

Dagher, Sam, “Kurds Defy Baghdad, Laying Claim to Land and Oil,” New York Times, 7/10/09

Khalil, Lydia, “Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Mirage?” Brookings Institution, June 2009

Mahmoud, Amer, “controversy over Kurdish constitution,” Niqash, 7/6/09

Muhammad, Sardar, “KRG presidential candidates,” Niqash, 7/9/09

Stansfield, Gareth Anderson, Liam, “Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” Middle East Policy, Spring 2009

UPI, “’Figure it out,’ Mullen tells Kirkuk,” 7/14/09

How Many Iraqi Refugees Have Returned?

In June 2009 the United Nations' High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) released its latest report on the return of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced. The numbers show that the rate of return has gone up and down since the 2003 invasion, largely connected to the security situation within Iraq. Of Iraq's estimated 4.6 million refugees, roughly a third have returned so far. Many are going back to areas where their group is predominate, changing the demographics of the country. If current trends continue, fewer Iraqis will come back in 2009 compared to 2008, which poses the questions of what will be the plight of those that don't go back.

Iraq has faced three waves of displacement in recent history. First Saddam used the removal of populations against his domestic Shiite and Kurdish opponents. Over 1 million Iraqis lost their homes before 2003 as a result. The U.S. invasion and the subsequent fighting led to another 200,000 displaced from 2003-2005. The bombing of the Shiite shrine in Samarra in 2006 led to over 1.6 million more. Another two million Iraqis have also become refugees during this time.

The UNHCR numbers show that immediately after the U.S. invasion in 2003 Iraqis began coming home. In 2003 55,249 refugees came back, but no displaced did. 2004 saw the largest total returns to date with 291,997 displaced and refugees making the trip. With the insurgency and the sectarian war taking off the number of returns slowed down by 2007. In 2005 154,155 came back, followed by 170,235 in 2006, but then only 81,420 in 2007. With the improved security, returns jumped back up in 2008. Most of those, 195,890, have been internally displaced compared to only 25,370 refugees. In the first five months of 2009 this trend has continued, 64,450 displaced and 18,630 refugees, but with fewer people overall, 83,080 up to May 2009 compared to 221,260 total in 2008. Overall, 61% of those coming back since the invasion have been displaced Iraqis.

The UNHCR counts 1,057,576 as a rough estimate of the total number of returns since 2003. That would mean about 37% of Iraq's displaced and refugees have gone back. 501,581 came back before the Samarra bombing in 2006, 47.4% of the total, while 555,995, 52.6%, have returned afterwards.

Iraqi Returns

Time	Displaced – Individuals	Refugees – Individuals	Total	%
2003	0	55,249	55,429	5%
2004	98,000	193,997	291,997	28%
2005	98,000	56,155	154,155	15%
2006	150,000	20,235	170,235	16%
2007	36,000	45,420	81,420	8%
2008	195,890	25,370	221,260	21%
Jan. 09	6,390	1,130	7,520
Feb. 09	15,810	2,970	18,780
March 09	20,690	5,850	26,540
April 09	11,020	3,890	14,910
May 09	10,540	4,790	15,330
Total 09	64,450	18,630	83,080	8%
Total	642,340 61%	415,236 39%	1,057,576	100%

Most of the fighting and ethnic cleansing during the sectarian war occurred in Baghdad and Diyala with its mixed Sunni-Shiite populations. Those two provinces have seen the largest number of people coming back in 2009. Baghdad saw 51% of returns and Diyala 34%. The next province was Ninewa with only 3%. When broken down between refugees and displaced, however, a new pattern emerges. Baghdad still received the most refugees coming back with 55%, but Najaf was second with 11%, followed by Diyala with 7% and Karbala with 6%. The displaced have mostly gone back to Baghdad, 51% and Diyala 42%.

Refugees and Displaced Returns By Province – Individuals 2009

Province	Jan. 09	Feb. 09	March 09	April 09	May 09	Total 09	%
Anbar	0	0	40	20	340	400	0%
Babil	210	190	460	400	290	1,550	2%
Baghdad	2,000	7,550	12,670	10,230	10,330	42,780	51%
Basra	340	130	450	120	80	1,120	1%
Dohuk	0	0	40	10	10	60	0%
Dhi Qar	20	30	180	100	20	350	0%
Diyala	3,420	9,040	10,120	2,650	2,980	28,210	34%
Irbil	20	20	50	0	60	150	0%
Karbala	90	80	240	280	380	1,070	1%
Maysan	70	40	70	100	80	360	0%
Muthanna	20	0	110	30	10	170	0%
Najaf	370	510	120	580	380	1,960	2%
Ninewa	590	680	1,150	30	30	2,480	3%
Qadisiyah	20	40	280	90	10	440	1%
Salahaddin	10	40	40	80	90	260	0%
Sulaymaniya	0	0	0	0	030	30	0%
Tamim	0	180	230	160	100	670	1%
Wasit	340	250	290	30	110	1,020	1%
TOTAL	7,520	18,780	26,540	14,910	15,330	83,080	100%
	9%	23%	32%	18%	18%	100%

Refugee Returns By Province – Individuals 2009

Province	Jan. 09	Feb. 09	March 09	April 09	May 09	Total 09	%
Anbar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Babil	110	160	250	290	120	930	5%
Baghdad	0	1,340	3,330	2,140	3,420	10,230	55%
Basra	220	90	140	90	50	590	3%
Dohuk	0	0	40	10	10	60	0%
Dhi Qar	10	30	180	100	20	340	2%
Diyala	120	400	760	70	0	1,350	7%
Irbil	20	20	30	0	50	120	1%
Karbala	90	80	240	270	360	1,040	6%
Maysan	60	30	60	90	60	300	2%
Muthanna	20	0	110	30	10	170	1%
Najaf	370	510	120	580	380	1,960	11%
Ninewa	0	0	0	0	20	20	0%
Qadisiyah	20	40	280	90	10	440	2%
Salahaddin	0	20	20	0	40	80	0%
Sulaymaniya	0	0	0	0	30	30	0%
Tamim	0	180	220	130	100	630	3%
Wasit	90	70	70	0	110	340	2%
TOTAL	1,130	2,970	5,850	3,890	4,790	18,630	100%
	6%	16%	31%	21%	26%	100%

Displaced Returns By Province – Individuals 2009

Province	Jan. 09	Feb. 09	March 09	April 09	May 09	Total 09	%
Anbar	0	0	40	20	340	400	1%
Babil	100	30	210	110	170	620	1%
Baghdad	2,000	6,210	9,340	8,090	6,910	32,550	51%
Basra	120	40	310	30	30	530	1%
Dohuk	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Dhi Qar	10	0	0	0	0	10	0%
Diyala	3,300	8,640	9,360	2,580	2,980	26,860	42%
Irbil	0	0	020	0	10	30	0%
Karbala	0	0	0	10	20	30	0%
Maysan	10	10	10	10	20	60	0%
Muthanna	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Najaf	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Ninewa	590	680	1,150	30	10	2,460	4%
Qadisiyah	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Salahaddin	10	20	20	80	50	180	0%
Sulaymaniya	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Tamim	0	0	10	30	0	40	0%
Wasit	250	180	220	30	0	680	1%
TOTAL	6,390	15,810	20,690	11,020	10,540	64,450	100%
	10%	24%	32%	17%	16%	100%

Within Baghdad, returning Iraqis have been unevenly distributed. The central district of Karkh has seen the most returns with 23,630. After that the western district of Kadamiya 5,450, and the northern district of Adhamiya, 5,320, were next. All three were battlefields in the sectarian war. Adhamiya was a mixed Sunni-Shiite area with a Sunni majority in northwestern Baghdad next to Sadr City. Karkh was in the middle with a largely mixed Sunni-Shiite population, and Kadamiya was a Shiite area in mostly Sunni western Baghdad. The Mahdi Army for example, tried to expand into all three areas. Abu Ghraib in contrast, which is located in the west by the Baghdad International Airport, just outside of the capital, was mostly known for insurgent activity, and has only had 330 returns this year as a result. On the one hand it's good to see that the areas in Baghdad province that had the most intense fighting are seeing the largest returns, at the same time most reports say that families are largely returning to areas where their sect is predominate adding to the segregation of the area.

Iraqis have been returning to the country since 2003. The numbers coming back have gone up and down depending upon the security situation. 2004 saw the largest amount of people coming back, but most of the conversation today is about those that lost their homes during the sectarian fighting after the 2006 Samarra bombing. 2008 saw a huge increase in returns, but if this year's trend continues, fewer will come back in 2009. There are two major concerns about this process. First, over three and a half million Iraqis are still displaced even with violence dramatically down. Some are worried that these Iraqis will become permanent refugees similar to the Palestinians. Second, many of central and northern Iraq's cities use to be made up of mixed neighborhoods. The sectarian war created segregated areas, which are now being solidified by the pattern of returns. Both of these will have dramatic effects upon Iraq's society if they are continued.

SOURCES

Bigio, Jamille and Scott, Jen, "Internal Displacement in Iraq: The Process of Working Toward Durable Solutions," Brookings Institution and University of Bern, June 2009

International Crisis Group, "Iraq's Civil War, The Sadrists And The Surge," 2/7/08

UNHCR, "UNHCR Iraq Operation, Monthly Statistical Update on Return – May 2009," June 2009

Overview of Iraq’s Tribes

Much of the commentary about Iraq is driven by U.S. experiences, which are not always the reality in Iraq. When the sectarian war took off in 2006 for example, much of the writing about the country was focused upon the Sunni-Shiite divide. A common argument was that these two interpretations of Islam had always been in conflict, and could not coexist in Iraq. Later, when the U.S. began working with the tribes in Anbar, which became known as the Awakening, a new line of thinking opened up claiming that Iraq was at heart a tribal society. This ignored the fact that many of the country’s largest tribes were a mix of Sunnis and Shiites. If the first argument held true, than the sectarian fighting should’ve destroyed many of Iraq’s tribes. Neither was completely true nor false. A quick review of Iraq’s tribal history shows that they are but one form of social organization and identity within the country amongst others. Their influence is usually directly related to the power of the state.

Many of Iraq’s tribes migrated there from the Arabian peninsula. Iraq’s tribes are divided into sub-tribes, clans, and their most basic unit, the extended family. Sheikhs are leaders within these communities. They control local economies, settle disputes, etc. The problem is there are so many it’s hard to determine which ones have real standing. About 75% of Iraq’s 26 million people belong to a tribe. There were originally nine tribes in Iraq, the Mutafiz, Zubayd, Dulaym, Ubayd, Khazal, Bani Lam, Al Bu Muhammad, Rabia, and Kab. By the 1800s there were several new groups included the Shammar, Anaza, Bani Tamim, and Zafire. Many of these groups have divided over the years leading to about 150 different tribes in the country, and around 2,000 clans today. The larger tribes are usually a mix of Sunnis and Shiites.

The power and role of Iraq’s tribes have gone up and down depending upon the rulers of the country. When the Ottomans originally ruled Iraq they had very loose control over the area, so the tribes held the real authority. By the mid-19th Century however, the Ottomans began encouraging people to give up their semi-nomadic lifestyle by settling in towns and cities, and instituted land reform, both of which diluted the standing of the tribes. That changed when the British took over and created Iraq in the wake of World War I. They turned to sheikhs as local partners to institute a form of indirect rule in the country. Many tribes became connected to specific villages at this time based upon extended families. Beginning in the 1920s when the monarchy tried to establish itself that again withered the power of the tribes. In 1968 when the Baathists took power they had a mixed policy towards the tribes. On the one hand the party wanted to modernize the state, and banned tribal names, encouraged migration from rural areas to the cities, again instituted land reform, which broke up the traditional structures many tribes relied upon, and emphasized Iraqi nationalism over other identities. At the same time, top Baathist leaders privileged their own personal kinsmen and gave them top positions in the new government.

Saddam ended up turning to the country’s tribes in the 1980s because of the wars and uprisings he faced, which eventually came back on him. First he looked to the tribes to organize soldiers to fight in the Iran-Iraq war. It was during this time that the Dulaym tribe in Anbar for example, gained privileged status from the government. After the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam relied even more upon the tribes to control the country after the Kurdish and Shiite uprisings. He gave tribes more autonomy and services, and in return, they agreed to provide security in their areas. He also played the tribal leaders off against each other, and created new tribes in a divide and rule policy. The sheikhs’ authority then was dependent upon the amount of support they received from the state. At the same time, their growing power was a sign that the Iraqi state was crumbling from the wars and sanctions. By the 1990s in fact, there were at least two tribal coup attempts against Saddam.

Immediately after the invasion in 2003, the U.S. had a contradictory attitude towards Iraq’s tribes. On the one hand, Paul Bremer wanted to get rid of the old order, which included the tribes. At the same time, in an attempt to create a sectarian and ethnically balanced Iraqi Governing Council and interim Iraqi government the Coalition Provisional Authority selected a few sheikhs to represent the Sunnis. Ghazi Ajil al-Taware of the Shammar tribe for example, was appointed Iraq’s interim president in 2004. The U.S. military also reached out to selected tribes to provide security, but many of those efforts proved futile. Many of the leaders the U.S. worked with proved largely powerless, unpopular, or were playing both sides in the conflict.

In the provinces, the overthrow of Saddam not only led to resistance, but the collapse of the Iraqi state. The situation was made worse when the Sunnis decided to boycott the January 2005 elections. Only 2% of Anbar for example, participated. The Iraqi Islamic Party came to power despite lacking any mandate or legitimacy. The provincial government only operated where U.S. forces could protect them, which was few and far between. Into this vacuum stepped in the insurgency and Al Qaeda in Iraq. Playing upon a sense of loss by the Sunni community, Iraqi nationalism, anti-Americanism, and cash, the militants recruited many young men to fight.

At first the tribes of Anbar aligned themselves with the insurgents, but then came to see Al Qaeda in Iraq as a threat. At first both had a common enemy in the Americans, but then a few tribes felt that the Islamists were attempting to take control of Anbar for themselves. This eventually led to the Anbar Awakening, which aligned itself with the United States. The Americans in turn gave them jobs in the local security forces, and directed reconstruction money to them. This gave rise to a new generation of sheikhs who replaced the old ones. The U.S. in fact, became the new patrons of the tribal leaders, playing a similar role to what Saddam did.

In the south, many tribes were co-opted by the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and of Shiite parties. When the U.S. tried to replicate the Awakening with Shiite tribes during the Surge they met stiff resistance by the Supreme Council who controlled many of the provincial governments in the region, and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Both considered the tribes their constituents. Maliki began winning over many from the Supreme Council in 2008 with his Tribal Support Councils. Like Saddam and the Americans, the Prime Minister created a patronage system to keep these tribes under his control.

The majority of Iraqis claim membership in tribes, but that is not their only identity. Urbanism, Islam, and Iraqi nationalism are other factors that shape Iraqis. Throughout the country’s history the tribes have risen and fallen in relation to the power of the central authorities. During the early Ottoman period, British rule, and after the U.S. invasion, the government was weak and the tribes were strong, while in the other periods their power was diluted. Today, the tribes have found a new space in Iraq, but it appears still conditional. In Anbar the Awakening tribes are trying to form themselves into a new political force, but in southern Iraq many have been co-opted by Prime Minister Maliki. Again, it is the strength of the government that seems to determine the influence of the tribes.

SOURCES

Burns, John and Glanz, James, “Iraqi Shiites Win, but Margin Is less Than Projection,” New York Times, 2/14/05

Byman, Daniel, “An Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle: Policy Failure or Bridge Too Far?” Security Studies, October 2008

Eisenstadt, Lieutenant Colonel Michael, “Iraq Tribal engagement Lessons Learned,” Military Review, September-October 2007

Gordon, Michael, “The Last Battle,” New York Times, 8/3/08

Hassan, Hussein, “Iraq: Tribal Structure, Social, and Political Activities,” Congressional Research Service, 4/7/08

International Crisis Group, “Iraq After The Surge I: The New Sunni Landscape,” 4/30/08

Long, Austin, “The Anbar Awakening,” Survival, April 2008

McCary, John, “The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives,” Washington Quarterly, January 2009

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The Problems With Iraq’s Electricity Network

Iraq’s electricity production is far above what it was before the 2003 invasion, yet the lack of power is one of the main complaints average Iraqis have. The problem is two fold. First, after the invasion, those with money went on a buying spree purchasing air conditioners, refrigerators, etc., which greatly increased demand above what it was before when the country was under international sanctions. Second, the U.S. and Iraq have invested billions into the power system, yet much of the equipment can’t be maintained or supplied. Together this has caused continuing problems providing electricity to Iraq’s citizens.

In the first quarter of 2009 Iraq reached a new post-invasion high in electrical output. From January to March 2009 Iraq averaged 118,485 megawatts. With the importation of 13,021 megawatts from Iran and Turkey, total supply reached 131,506 megawatts. This was the third straight quarter that production was up, and was a 10% increase from the last three months of 2008. That averaged out to about 6,300 megawatts per day, which was far about the 4,075 megawatts supplied under Saddam in 2003 before the invasion, and the approximately 4,800 megawatts available in 2008.

Even with that increase the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) estimates that the government only meets about 73% of demand in 2009. An Oxfarm International survey of Iraqi women in the second half of 2008 found that they felt access to power was worse in that year compared to 2006. A January 2009 survey also reported that 43% of respondents only got electricity half of the time. That was a 12% decrease from 2007.

Because Iraqis cannot rely upon the public power network, many turn to private generators to make up the difference. It’s unknown how much is produced this way, but it’s believed to be about 2,000-3,000 megawatts per day. 75% of respondents in the Oxfam survey said they used private generators. If families don’t own their own generator there are many individuals and businesses that offer the service for a fee. SIGIR visited the Haditha Primary Healthcare Center in Anbar for example, and found that it only got 5 hours of electricity from the government, and had to rely upon its own generator for the rest.

One reason that the municipal supply is inadequate is that the country is not generating as much power as it should. Iraq’s power plants operate at less than half of their feasible capacity. This is caused by a number of factors. First, Iraqis have problems operating, maintaining, and sustaining the plants installed by the Americans. Before the U.S. invasion, Iraq relied largely upon foreigners to operate their electrical system. These technicians have mostly left, and Iraq has a shortage of trained personnel because of the war. That means plants are often broken, under repair, or under producing. Another problem is that when the U.S. began its reconstruction effort in Iraq it installed western style turbines, which rely upon natural gas. Iraq has plenty of that resource, but it has never been developed. That means many of these turbines have to run on fuel instead, which burns out the equipment, causing more technical and maintenance difficulties. Iraq has also had severe fuel shortages to run the plants. To add to these difficulties, the Electricity Ministry has not gotten the money that it has requested, and has not been able to spend most of its budget anyway. In 2008 the Ministry got $1.389 billion, $1.3 billion of which was for its capital expenditures to invest in equipment. It only spent 12% of its money however. In 2009, because of the country’s budget problems, the Ministry is getting $1.08 billion for its capital budget, when it asked for $7 billion. The Electricity Minister worries that it won’t be able to keep up with its production this year as a result. This is especially true because the Ministry has bought new turbines, but not the equipment and contracted for the work to connect them to the distribution system.

With security improving in Iraq, the delivery of basic services is becoming a larger issue, and electricity is at the top of the list. Politicians ran on it during the January 2009 provincial elections, and it could be an issue again in the January 2010 provincial balloting. Both the American and Iraqi governments have invested billions into the electricity system, and production is far above what it was in the Saddam years, yet it is still not sufficient to meet demand. Kirkuk is reportedly the only city in the country that has 24-hour power, and that was just achieved in June 2009, six years after the U.S. invasion. With budget, maintenance, fuel, and personnel issues, this could still be a problem six years from now.