Reports said that Sadr had gone to Iran in 2007 to study in Qom, one of the centers of Shiite religious studies. Sadr supposedly was going for weekly classes there to become a mujtahid, a learned scholar. If he attained that rank he would have the power to issue religious decrees. Many believed that Sadr was striving to become an ayatollah, which would give him greater religious and political standing when he returned to Iraq.
Ayatollah Haeri (Al-Shahed) |
Ayatollah Shahroudi (Reuters) |
All of the mentors mentioned for Sadr are followers of Ayatollah Khomeini’s version of clerical rule, many of them are close to the hardliners in Iran, and have followed Iran’s foreign policy towards Iraq. Ayatollah Haeri for example, came out against Sadr’s April 2004 uprising, opposed Iraq signing the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the U.S., and came out for Maliki’s second term in office after the March 2010 elections, all of which mirrored Iran’s stance. Yazidi on the other hand is an adviser to President Ahmadenijad. Shahroudi has been called a moderate conservative in Iran, and seemed to be dissatisfied with the 2009 elections there, but he was a student of Ayatollah Khomeini, and took part in the Iranian Revolution.
While in Qom, Sadr was inculcated in Khomeini’s theology, which is different than the Shiism prevalent in Najaf. Both schools believe that ayatollahs should play a leading role in society and politics. Khomeini however advocated the direct supervision of the government by clerics. Sadr has now transferred his studies to Najaf. If he hopes to become an ayatollah and join the religious hierarchy there, the marjaiya, he would traditionally have to gain the support of powerful clerics. On the other hand, he could try to force his way in rather than integrate into the establishment. With a militia and his movement’s new political standing after the March 2010 elections Sadr could be a serious threat to the marjaiya in the coming years. If he were successful that would also be a coup for Tehran because Sadr has grown closer to its leadership, and it sees Najaf, as a rival. Sadr has to make the right decisions for this to happen however, and that has always been a problem for him.
SOURCES
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6 comments:
I am extremely curious which ministry Sadr's block will end up with. I have heard it described as Defense, Interior or Energy. Any of those will give him extreme leverage in policy (even though it won't be him but one of his followers in the position). In my opinion, Interior is the worst outcome because then he controls the police, and can sanction/coordinate crackdowns on Sunnis while shielding his followers.
Currently the Sadrists hold the following offices:
Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Ministries of Housing, Labor, Planning (temp), Public Works (temp), State, Tourism - 6 ministries total, 2 temporary
They have been pushing for one of the security ministries but I'm not sure Maliki will give it to them. The National Coalition is supposed to get Interior and National Security. One will probably go to the State of Law. It's definitely something to look out for.
Michael,
Just read that Maliki is going to propose that the National Security Ministry go to Jaafari's Reform party. They didn't get any ministries so far. I would assume Maliki would want a State of Law member or independent close to him to get Interior. That could shut the Sadrists out of at least the top security positions. Jaafari's party is close to them though so deputies and others may still go to Sadrists.
Hi Joel,
Just a quite clarification. Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi was not taught by the late Abdul Majid al-Khoei, but may have been taught by his father, Ayatollah Abul Qassim al-Khoei. The former was murdered by Sadr, the latter was the grand ayatollah who most others studied under.
Safari
Thanks for the information. I read Khoei and assumed it must have been the younger one. Will fix the article accordingly.
That should say "Saffar." Sorry that's the automatic spell check on my phone doing that.
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