Chapter 8 of the second volume of the U.S. Army’s history of the Iraq War focuses upon the 2008 Charge of Knights campaign launched by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki against his political rival Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army militia. Maliki ordered the offensive impulsively without providing the support necessary for it to be successful. The Iraqi Forces almost collapsed as a result until the Coalition stepped in with aid.
For Iraq’s political class Basra is the second most important province after Baghdad because of its oil wealth. The governorate was controlled by the Fadhila Party a breakaway from the Sadrists and its Governor Waeli had a running dispute with PM Maliki for power. One dispute was over security. After Waeli refused to give into Maliki’s demands over the issue the premier put Basra Operations Command head General Mohammed al-Freiji, a Maliki loyalist, in charge of security. At the same time the Iraqi army’s 10th Division was moved out of Basra for being corrupt and full of militia and replaced with the 14th Division which was still being formed at the time. This was important background because it showed that the prime minister was interested in extending his influence into Basra using the security forces.
The British were originally responsible for Basra but by 2007 they were focusing upon withdrawal leading to chaos especially in Basra City. When the UK pulled out of the city it led to a wave of crime and violence by gangs and militias. The British military made a truce with the Mahdi Army to try to allow it a peaceful pull out and it seemed to work initially as attacks dropped at the end of 2007. As part of that deal a Mahdi Army commander was released in December but that actually led to a new round of rocket and mortar attacks upon the Brits. Maliki would blame the UK for the security problems in Basra and use that as a reason to move into the province.
At the start of 2008 the Iraqi government was drawing up plans to gain control of Basra City. In March Basra commander General Freiji presented his ideas to Maliki and U.S. commander General David Petraeus The Americans were not impressed because it lacked resources to carry it out, included shelling residential areas, and was based upon the idea that it would be quick and easy. Maliki had his own ideas and ordered more Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to the city. National Security Advisor Mowafaq al-Rubaie claimed that General Freiji was exaggerating the situation and that the real issue was mostly criminal and gang related. This only added to the U.S. impression that the Iraqis did not understand what was really going on in the governorate nor what it would take to solve the problems there. The result as a disastrous start to what would become Charge of Knights.
On March 24, 2008 PM Maliki, Defense Minister Abdul Qadir al-Obeidi, National Security Affairs Minister Shirwan al-Waeli and military advisors arrived in Basra City. Maliki ordered Operation Charge of Knights to start the next day despite reinforcements not having arrived. Maliki believed this would not only be a victory for his government but also deal a blow to his political rival Moqtada al-Sadr. Sadr helped put Maliki in office in 2006 but as Maliki expanded his power he felt like he no longer needed his ally.
On March 25 Charge of Knights got off to a horrible start. First off the Mahdi Army found out about the offensive from its members within the security forces. They were able to ambush the ISF who fell into disarray and even shelled the Basra palace killing the head of Maliki’s security team. Things quickly spiraled out of control. By the end of the day a brigade from the Iraqi 14th Division had broken and two-thirds of the local police deserted with some joining the Mahdi Army.
Because the Iraqi forces lacked communications General Freiji had to use cell phones to contact his units. Not only that but the chain of command was split between Freiji and Maliki complicating things. The Iraqi general asked for British support but could give no coordinates for air or artillery strikes because the situation was so chaotic. Maliki ended up relieving Freiji of command but he stayed in his office and continued giving orders meaning that the ISF now had three different people in control, Maliki, General Freiji and his replacement General Abdul Aziz al-Obeidi.
In the next few days things escalated with fighting spreading across Iraq. From March 26-28 the Mahdi Army rose up in Wasit, Diwaniya, Babil, Dhi Qar and Baghdad. The Sadrists with the help of former PM Ibrahim Jaafari and Ahmed Chalabi called for a no confidence vote against Maliki in parliament. It seemed like Sadr had the upper hand.
On March 27 U.S. General Lloyd Austin went to Basra and met with Maliki to assess the situation. The premier blamed everything on the British for letting militias take over. He demanded Coalition support when he initially did not include them in his plans. Austin was able to convince Maliki to allow U.S. advisors to work with Iraqi units who would be able to call in air strikes. The Iraqis had completely mishandled the situation and were finally asking for help. The fact that Maliki was not taking any responsibility for anything and blaming others was telling.
In April the Iraqis re-assessed their plans. First, Maliki announced a 7 day ceasefire on April 2. That allowed the ISF to resupply and get more reinforcements into Basra. On April 5 the PM got the backing of the major parties and ended the no confidence move against him. On April 12 the ceasefire ended and the ISF moved against the Mahdi Army once again this time with the full backing of the Coalition with both American and British advisors embedded with Iraqi units and artillery and air support. The Mahdi Army began fleeing with many going to Iran.
The fighting in Baghdad turned into a completely separate operation. The Mahdi Army attacks there appeared to be a pre-planned offensive by the militia before the Charge of Knights. On March 23 the Sadrists began firing rockets at the Green Zone after a 6 month break. At the same time the Mahdi Army assaulted 11 checkpoints around Sadr City as well as kidnapping 14 soldiers in Khadimiya and the general secretary of parliament. 700 soldiers deserted in the first two days of fighting. In the capitol the U.S. was in control of operations and decided to push the militia back from southern Sadr City so that it rockets could not reach the Green Zone. On April 15 the Americans began building a wall in Sadr City to deny areas to Sadr’s followers. Like in Basra the militia eventually broke and most of its leadership fled Baghdad for Iran.
On May 10 Sadr agreed to a ceasefire with PM Maliki. The Mahdi Army was defeated in two of its strongholds in Basra City and eastern Baghdad. The militia was already fracturing in 2007 as Sadr fled Iraq for Iran fearing that the U.S. would arrest him during the Surge. Tehran was also peeling off followers hoping to gain direct control of his fighters and weaken him since Sadr was considered too much of a loose cannon to be a reliable ally. Sadr would eventually claim to disband his militia only to reform it under another name.
Maliki on the other hand was emboldened by his victory. He gained new followers after taking on a Shiite rival and had the backing of the other ruling parties. Rather than taking the opportunity to try to govern better and bring Iraq together he would use the military against the Sahwa, the Iraqi Accordance Front, the Islamic Party, the Kurds and work to undermine the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq.
SOURCES
Rayburn, Colonel Joel, Sobchak, Colonel Frank, Editors, The U.S. Army In The Iraq War Volume 2, Surge And Withdrawal 2007-2011, Strategic Studies institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2019
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