Review James Baker III and Hamilton, Lee, The Iraq Study Group Report, The Way Forward – A New Approach, Vintage Books, 2006

Baker, James, III and Hamilton, Lee, The Iraq Study Group Report, The Way Forward – A New Approach, Vintage Books, 2006

 

By 2006 the American political establishment finally realized that things were not going right in Iraq. Violence was going up and neither the Iraqis nor the U.S. seemed like they had any answers. That led to several strategy reviews including the independent Iraq Study Group whose main findings are contained within this book. Ironically rather than coming up with a course adjustment the group actually advocated for maintaining the status quo showing that many of the elites didn’t know what the actual policy was in Iraq.

 

The book is split into two parts with the first describing the situation in Iraq in 2006. The government and economy were dysfunctional. Services for instance were inadequate and dealt out based upon sectarianism. There was no rule of law as the courts were under constant threats. It does a good job explaining how violence had splintered into various groups all with different agendas from the insurgency to Al Qaeda in Iraq to militias to common criminals.

 

To deal with this U.S. forces said they were focused upon clearing areas of armed groups, holding them so they didn’t return and then building up services. The problem was attacks and deaths kept on spiraling upwards.

 

In August 2006 for instance the Iraqi forces and Americans launched Operation Together Forward II in Baghdad. Insurgents left areas during sweeps and returned afterwards. The police were powerless to stop these infiltrations. The Iraqi army only sent 2 of 6 battalions it promised and the Maliki government refused to allow Sadr City the stronghold of Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army militia to be included. The report didn’t mention that the Iraqi forces helped militias cleanse neighborhoods of Sunnis. The operation quickly failed as a result just as the first one had a few weeks before.

 

The Study Group advocated for diplomacy to get Iraq’s neighbors to become positively involved in Iraq to help stabilize the country. At the time Iran was supporting militias, Syria was allowing insurgents to flow across its borders, Saudi Arabia was allowing fund raising for those militants while Turkey was fighting the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) within Iraq and trying to block Iraq’s Kurds from gaining more power. The group believed that a stronger effort from Washington could get these countries to help the U.S. The Bush administration could push for an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal as a carrot to get the region behind its effort in Iraq.

 

This is the weakest part of the report. Syria and Iran did not want the United States in Iraq seeing its presence as a threat. There was little to negotiate as they both wanted the Americans out not to help them stay. Turkey was just as difficult. It refused to allow the U.S. to use its territory during the 2003 invasion because of its concerns about Iraq’s Kurds. The idea that Washington could make meaningful progress with these nations seemed like a pipe dream.

 

The second part of the Group’s recommendations emphasized building up the Iraqi Security Forces so that the U.S. could withdraw. At the same time the Americans should set out a series of benchmarks such as local elections, a law to deal with militias, amending the constitution and others to achieve national reconciliation. This was not a new proposal however but rather the current battle plan.

 

The problem was the U.S. military in Iraq had been wanting to withdraw from the day the invasion ended in 2003 but the political leadership back in Washington didn’t understand that. President Bush for instance constantly talked about wanting victory while announcing policies such as the U.S. would stand down when the Iraqis stood up which was a withdrawal plan not one to win the war.

 

This part of the book highlights how dysfunctional Washington was at the time with the right hand not knowing what the left hand was doing. This was especially glaring for the Study Group because they talked with the Iraq and American leadership and the military forces on the ground and still didn’t seem to understand what was going on.

 

In the end the Iraq Study Group came to naught. President Bush went for a troop surge instead because it was his war and he wanted his administration not outsiders to come up with a new policy. The group’s report then is just a snapshot of how U.S. policy was in disarray in 2006. Iraq was spiraling out of control and policy makers back in Washington didn’t even know what the strategy was.

 

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