Rough Numbers On The Sons of Iraq Program

Finding specific breakdowns of the Sons of Iraq (SOI) program are hard to come by. The SOI are U.S.-funded local security units that have been instrumental in turning the tide against Al Qaeda in Iraq and the insurgency. By May 2008 there were approximately 103,000 SOI fighters. 70% of them were Sunnis. They were mostly former insurgents and tribesmen. The remaining 30% were Shiite. The SOIs operate in ten of Iraq’s eighteen provinces. The following numbers come from reports by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Center for American Progress. They are still incomplete, but give a general idea of the number of SOI groups and their distribution across Iraq.

Provinces and Sons of Iraq Groups and Fighters

Anbar 7 SOI groups all Sunni 8000 fighters

Babil 23 SOI groups, 10 Sunni 12 Shiite 1 mixed Sunni-Shiite over 6000 fighters

Baghdad 43 SOI groups 20 mixed Sunni-Shiite over 43,000 fighters

Dhi Qar 2 SOI groups both Shiite over 2000 fighters

Diwaniya 6 SOI groups all Shiite over 1500 fighters

Diyala 10 SOI groups all Sunni 4000 fighters

Ninewa unknown number of groups unknown number of fighters

Salahaddin 54 SOI groups all Sunni over 4000 fighters

Tamim 11 SOI groups all Sunni over 8000 fighters

Wasit unknown number of groups 1500-3000 fighters

SOURCES

Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraqi Force Development,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2008

Katulis, Brian, Juul, Peter, and Moss, Ian, “Awakening to New Dangers in Iraq,” Center for American Progress, February 2008

Ucko, David, “Upcoming Iraqi Elections Must Consolidate Security Gains of ‘Sons of Iraq,’” World Politics Review, 5/20/08

Going After Iran’s Supply Lines In Iraq

When the insurgency and Al Qaeda in Iraq were largely tamed during 2007, the Iranian backed Special Groups became the main security concern. Many of these were part of or operated alongside members of Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army. At the end of 2006, the U.S. began going after the Special Groups, and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s 2008 crackdowns have also targeted them. With security improved, that has freed up U.S. and Iraqi forces to now disrupt the Iranian supply lines that deliver weapons to these militants by increasing security along the Iran-Iraq border.

The U.S. is working with Iraq to secure the Iranian border along four provices Basra, Maysan, Wasit and Diyala

The U.S. is working to secure the border with Iran in three southern provinces, Basra, Maysan, and Wasit, and in Diyala in the east. These governorates contain the four main routes arms smugglers use to supply Iranian weapons to the Special Groups. The U.S. is trying to create a unified border control system in the process. The American forces are setting up outposts across from Iran at major points to interdict smugglers in the south. They are also reaching out to local tribes and training the Iraqi border guards to monitor the trade and travel of Iranians going to and from. Yesterday, July 29, the government launched its latest offensive in Diyala. The U.S. and Iraqi forces are planning on operating along the Iranian border to interdict arms flows.

While the U.S. military believes that Iraqis smuggle most of the weapons, they originate from the Qods Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards led by General Qassem Suleimani. He is in charge of Iraq policy, including arming and training the Special Groups. The Qods Force has a special group for Iraq called the Ramazan Corps. In turn, the Ramazan Corps created three commands for Iraq. They operate out of the Iranian cities of Mehran, Ahaz, and Marivan. From these bases, Iranian supplies flow into major cities such as Amara in Maysan, Basra, and Diyala province, and then into the interior. One such route goes from Basra up Highway 8 through the provinces of Dhi Qar, Diwaniyah, Babil, and then the southern districts of Amil, Bayaa and Abu Disheer in the capitol where Special Group units are based.

The hope is with the changed security environment, both the U.S. and Iraqis can have the forces to concentrate not only on breaking up the Special Groups, but also their lines of supply that lead back to Iran. Military operations are on going throughout central and southern Iraq to do that first job. The new border policy is a move towards accomplishing the second. Iran has already lost many assets in Iraq in the recent fighting. This new policy could be aimed at limiting their influence within Iraq even more without attacking Iran itself, something the U.S. military is not hot on since it has its hands full with Iraq and Afghanistan. Ultimately, the goal should be to convince Iran that it can’t support the Iraqi government, while also sowing chaos behind the scenes with the Special Groups. Iran needs to be more constructive in Iraq rather than trying to have it both ways.

SOURCES

Ahmed, Farook and Cochrane, Marisa, “Recent Operations against Special Groups and JAM in Central and Southern Iraq,” Institute for the Study of War, 4/7/08

Burns, Robert, “Crackdown focuses on arms smuggling from Iran,” Associated Press, 7/18/08

Paley, Amit, “U.S. Deploys a Purpose-Driven Distinction,” Washington Post, 5/21/08

Roggio, Bill, “Iran’s Ramazan Corps and the ratlines into Iraq,” Long War Journal.org, 12/5/07

Strobel, Warren and Fadel, Leila, “Iranian who brokered Iraqi peace is on U.S. terrorist watch list,” McClatchy Newspaper, 3/31/08

The Conservative Ideology Behind The Iraq Invasion

Today, July 29 National Public Radio’s Fresh Air interviewed J. Peter Scoblib about his new book, U.S. Versus Them. Scoblib is the executive editor of the New Republic, and former editor of Arms Control Today. He wrote the book while he was a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a visiting researcher at Georgetown University’s Center for Peace and Security Studies. The goal of his book was to look at his area of expertise, arms control, to ascertain the main strands of thought that led to President Bush’s invasion of Iraq. He came away with the thesis that the Bush administration’s foreign policy was largely shaped by the new conservatism of William Buckley’s National Review and Barry Goldwater.

The first term of George W. Bush had a moralist foreign policy that according to Scoblib came from the new conservatism that emerged during the Cold War. Before World War II, conservatives were mostly isolationist and divided. They did not want America to be involved in Europe’s problems, and were divided between social conservatives that were upset with the direction of the country’s culture that they believed was abandoning Christianity, and anti-government economic conservatives. William Buckley and his National Review magazine were largely credited with uniting these two factions in their opposition to communism to form the new conservatism. Russia threatened to spread godless communism where the government would control all aspects of the economy, which brought together the two strains of conservative thought. This new ideology believed that the Cold War was a moral battle between good and evil. They did not believe that Russia could be negotiated with, and that only a massive American military and a large nuclear stockpile could stop them from taking over. Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona became the public symbol for this new breed of thought.

Ronald Reagan was the first to bring these new ideas about conservatism to the White House, but his presidency turned out to be a paradox. Members of his administration believed that the U.S. needed to confront Russia and thought it could win the Cold War, even win a nuclear confrontation. Following these beliefs Reagan rejected arms control negotiations, wanted to deploy Pershing nuclear missiles to Europe, announced the Star Wars missile defense system, and civil defense plans to be carried out in case of a nuclear attack. A funny thing happened though in his second term. In the last four years of Reagan’s presidency he turned 180 degrees and began doing all the things that he opposed. He opened negotiations with Russia, cut mid-range missiles, and had a friendly relationship with Russian premier Mikhail Gorbachev. The conservatives were beside themselves, attacking Reagan for selling out America’s ideals and even claiming that the communists had duped him. When the Soviet Union fell apart the new conservatives rationalized it by saying that it was Reagan’s strong opposition to communism that made it collapse. They said it was an example of the triumph of peace through strength, forgetting that the president had abandoned most of those policies in the last half of his term in office.

The new conservatives and another group calling themselves neoconservatives took up the Buckley-Goldwater-Reagan mantle in the Bush administration. In the White House’s stance towards Iraq you saw the vision of a moral battle between good and evil, and the belief that only force should be used to protect America not negotiations. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and John Bolton, who is often labeled a neoconservatives but isn’t, represented the new conservative stance that military power is what should be used to protect America. They saw Saddam Hussein as a threat to the U.S’s interests in the Middle East who couldn’t be left in power after 9/11. They wanted to go in fast, overthrow the government, and get out just as quickly. The neoconservatives were mostly former liberals who abandoned the Democratic Party because it opposed the Vietnam War, which was seen as a cop out to communism. They brought to the Republicans the belief in a moral foreign policy based upon confronting evil regimes such as Iraq. They wanted to spread good by bringing democracy to the Middle East by overthrowing Saddam. Neither faction believed that talking with Iraq would do anything but maintain the regime. Like the Cold War united the social and economic conservatives, Iraq proved to be the bridge that connected the new conservatives and neoconservatives in the Bush White House. The result was the invasion of Iraq.

In the end, Scoblib believes that a moral foreign policy is dangerous. He said that the new conservative stance during the Cold War escalated tensions with the Soviet Union more than they had to be, and blocked constructive engagement over issues such as nuclear weapons that could have stabilized things more. Taking a moral view of the world leads to absolutes where there is nothing acceptable but a victory over evil. It also leads to a reliance upon force to protect the nation. The conservatives and neoconservatives thought they had proof of their beliefs when Reagan was elected to office and the Soviet Union collapsed. Scoblib believes that Russia was going to fall apart whether Reagan was president or not because communism was not a sustainable system. Reagan ended up abandoning most of his confrontational policies anyways and began talking with Russia, something that both conservative groups expunged from their histories to justify their own worldview. All of these ideas played out in Iraq where you had two conservative groups in the White House that had different ideas about the world, but united in their opposition to Saddam. They decided on war, and sidelined countries like France and Germany that wanted to negotiate, and used the United Nations only to provide an excuse for an invasion. The fact that the new conservatives and neoconservatives had different visions of what to do after the war was never really discussed. Although Scoblib didn’t mention it in his interview, this division is what led to the predicament the U.S. now finds itself in Iraq. The conservative ideologies led to a war that had no united post-invasion vision. Scoblib does bring up the example of Libya where forces within the administration were able to oppose the conservatives and negotiate Muammar Qaddafi’s unilateral destruction of his weapons of mass destruction and nuclear programs. Qaddafi was just as much of a rogue leader and terrorist supporter as Saddam Hussein in the Middle East. In fact, it turned out that Libya had a much more advanced weapons program. This could have been an alternative outcome to the invasion of Iraq.

SOURCES

Fresh Air, “’U.S. Versus Them’: The Cost Of Hawkishness,” National Public Radio, 7/29/08

Diyala Offensive Begins

Today, July 29, U.S. and Iraqi forces began a new major offensive in Diyala province east of Baghdad. Up to 30,000 soldiers and police are participating, a number similar to other recent operations in Basra and Mosul. Diyala is one of the few remaining areas that still has widespread instability. Operations began in the provincial capitol of Baquba where vehicles were banned. In Mid-June, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki announced that the crackdown was being planned. Originally, Iraqi forces said they would begin on August 1.

The head of Iraqi forces in the province said their main target will be Al Qaeda in Iraq. Many of their fighters have fled to Diyala in 2008, looking to re-establish bases to carry out operations after crackdowns in areas such as Mosul. In May for example, 300 Al Qaeda fighters held a parade in the village of al-Asiwa. The province has also seen the largest number of female suicide bombers in 2008, a new tactic being used by the Islamist organization.

Diyala has also been used as a supply route for Iranian weapons to Baghdad. Arms smugglers and Shiite Special Groups would ferry weapons from Iran through Diyala to the eastern Baghdad neighborhoods of Sadr City, Shaab, and Urb. This will also be a target of the offensive.

As reported earlier, Diyala has been the site of Arab-Kurdish tensions, inter-Shiite battles, and contentious Sons of Iraq units. The Kurds have designs on annexing northern sections of the province, the Mahdi Army and Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council have battled over control of the local security forces, and Sons of Iraq (SOI) units have been formed that have also clashed with Iraqi forces. SOIs have actually asked to participate in the government’s crackdown, but the security forces have said that only they will be able to operate during the offensive.

If previous crackdowns are any indication, Iraqi forces will be able to provide a modicum of security in the province. Since the operation was announced so far in advance, many militants will probably have fled beforehand, leaving lower level fighters to be swept up in round-ups or lie low. The next stage will be searches for weapons stashes. These will probably go smoothly. The real issue will be whether the government will be able to mediate between the Arabs and Kurds, and Sunnis and Shiites in the province. That is a much bigger challenge for not only Diyala, but the rest of Iraq as security continues to improve.

SOURCES

Ahmed, Farook and Cochrane, Marisa, “Recent Operations against Special Groups and JAM in Central and Southern Iraq,” Institute for the Study of War, 4/7/08

Adas, Basil, “Al Qaida ‘will put up fierce fight to keep last Iraqi stronghold,’” Gulf News, 5/16/08

Associated Press, “U.S.-backed operation begins in Diyala province of Iraq,” USA Today, 7/29/08

Dagher, Sam, “In Iraq, Sunni insurgents still aim to oust U.S., Shiites,” Christian Science Monitor, 4/10/08

IraqSlogger.com, “A Role for Tribal Forces in Diyala Crackdown?” 7/29/08

Multi-National Force-Iraq, “Operational Update: Rear Adm. Driscoll, Maj. Gen. Atta,” 6/22/08

Spangler, Nicholas, “Iraq, U.S. forces start operation in restive Diyala province,” McClatchy Newspapers, 7/29/08

Voices of Iraq, “300 al-Qaeda fighters hold military parade in Diala,” 5/3/08

Kurdish Frustrations Over Provincial Elections Boil Over After Suicide Bombing

Today, July 28 a suicide bomber attacked a crowd of thousands of Kurds who were protesting the provincial election law in the northern city of Kirkuk. The bombing killed 24 people. The protestors turned angry afterwards and charged the headquarters of the Iraqi Turkoman Front, burning it to the ground. A Kurdish politician claimed that shots were fired from the offices into the crowd. An Arab member of the Tamim provincial council said that his house was destroyed as well by the mob. He threatened to call in Sunni Sons of Iraq units to protect the Arab population of Kirkuk, while the Turkoman Front said that Baghdad needed to send in troops to secure the city’s Arab and Turkoman population from the Kurdish Pershmerga security forces. A Kurdish member of parliament said that the political blocs that passed the election law bore responsibility for the bombing and casualties.

It was unclear whether the bomber was a woman or not. An Iraqi police general said that he had found a woman’s remains, while the U.S. said they had no evidence to support that. A car bomb was also found nearby and it was destroyed. In total 170 people were injured. The police imposed a curfew on Kirkuk to restore order after the disturbances. No group has claimed responsibility for the act, but the U.S. believes that it is Al Qaeda in Iraq that has been using woman bombers more and more this year. If it was a woman, this would be the 27th such attack this year.

The ethnic tensions that exploded afterwards were probably just the response the masterminds behind the bombing wanted. The disputed city of Kirkuk is the major reason why the Presidential Council vetoed the election law that was passed by parliament just a few days ago. The law called for a six-month delay in voting in Kirkuk’s Tamim province, and in the meantime seats on the provincial council were to be divided evenly between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkoman, with one seat going to Christians. The Kurds opposed this clause because they currently control the governorship, head of the council, and a majority of its seats, plus they are most likely a majority in the province. The Kurdish bloc in parliament stormed out during the vote, and the Kurdish President Jalal Talabni along with the Shiite Vice President Adel Abdel-Mahdi of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council ended up vetoing it.

SOURCES

BBC News, “Iraq suicide blasts cause carnage,” 7/28/08

Gamel, Kim, “Female suicide attackers kill 57 in Iraq,” Associated Press, 7/28/08

Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Dozens Kill in Iraq Suicide Bombings,” Washington Post, 7/28/08

Spangler, Nicholas and Kadhim, Hussein, “Iraqi bombings kill dozens, wound more than 200,” McClatchy Newspapers, 7/28/08

Voices of Iraq, “Blocs that drafted provincial election bill responsible for Kirkuk incidents – Kurdish lawmaker,” 7/28/08

26th Female Suicide Attack In Iraq Takes Dozens Of Lives In Baghdad

Today, July 28 three female suicide bombers attacked a crowd of Shiite pilgrims in Baghdad’s Karrada district on their way to the Kadhimiya shrine of the 8th Century Imam Musa al-Kadhim. The latest report had the death toll at 32 with 100 wounded. It was the deadliest attack in the capitol since the June 13 attack in Hurriya by a Shiite Special Groups unit that killed 63. It was also the third deadliest female bombing this year. On March 17 a women attacked a crowd of Shiites in Karbala killing 40 and wounding 65. The most lethal was on February 1 when a women killed 45 and wounded 82 in a pet market in Baghdad, followed by a second female bomber who killed 27 and wounded 67 in another market. The last female suicide attack only a few days ago in Diyala province’s capitol Baquba on July 24.

The bombing was a coordinated one with the first blast occurring at around 7:45 am as pilgrims were taking a rest at Fardos Square where the famous footage of Saddam’s statue being taken down was filmed. As people fled the scene another woman detonated her bomb on a side street around five minutes later. The third woman set off her explosives 15 minutes later, perhaps aimed at rescue workers and concerned citizens looking to help the survivors. Each year, Shiite pilgrimages such as this one have been targeted by militants. More than one million people are expected to attend this year’s Kadhimiya ceremony, providing a tempting target for Sunni insurgents. The Iraqi government has deployed 100,000 security personnel to protect the event, including 200 women volunteers to search women visitors.

No group has claimed responsibility for the act, but female suicide bombers are becoming an increasing tactic used by Al Qaeda in Iraq. As documented earlier, the Islamist group has been running out of fighters and foreigners to carry out such attacks, and their overall ability to carry organized campaigns as they did in the past has been greatly degraded. The use of women bombers, while effective and headline grabbing, is actually a sign of the desperation of the organization.

SOURCES

Ahmed, Caesar and Parker, Ned, “Female suicide bombers in Baghdad and Kirkuk kill 57, injure 280,” Los Angeles times, 7/28/08

BBC News, “Iraq suicide blasts cause carnage,” 7/28/08
- “Two bombs kill scores in Baghdad,” 2/1/08

CNN, “Female suicide bomber kills 40 in Iraq, official says,” 3/17/08

Gamel, Kim, “Female suicde attackers kill 57 in Iraq,” Associated Press, 7/28/08

Hacaoglu, Selcan, “Female suicide bombers kill at least 57 in Iraq,” Associated Press, 7/28/08

Spanger, Nicholas and Kadhim, Hussein, “Iraqi bombings kill dozens, wound more than 200,” McClatchy Newspapers, 7/28/08

The Sunni Accordance Front Returns To Maliki’s Government Amidst Recriminations and Challenges

On July 20 the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front (IAF) officially returned to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s cabinet. The Accordance Front is a coalition of three Sunni parties, the Iraqi Islamic Party led by Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, the Iraq People’s Congress headed by Adnan al-Dulaimi, and the National Dialogue Council of Khalaf al-Ilyan, that holds 44 seats in Iraq’s 275 member parliament. The IAF withdrew their six ministers almost a year ago on August 1, 2007, claiming that they were not included in Maliki’s decision making process, that the government was sectarian, and not moving towards reconciliation. By boycotting the cabinet, the IAF hoped to undermine the “national unity” image of the government, and gain greater concessions. Their return took months of internal disputes and bickering with Maliki, and they came back not from a position of strength, but from one of weakness.

The eleven-month boycott of the cabinet gained the Accordance Front little, and increased the divisions within the bloc. The IAF was given its six original ministries (planning, higher education, culture, communication, women’s affairs, and foreign affairs) plus one deputy premier, giving them no more say in the government than they had before. Four of the ministers and the deputy premier came from Vice President Hashemi’s Islamic Party, which led to recriminations within the bloc. The National Dialogue Council, that received two ministries, claimed that they were never consulted about the nominees, and even threatened to withdraw from the IAF back in April. The IAF’s boycott did undermine Prime Minister Maliki’s standing not only with the Iraqi public, but neighboring Arab countries as well that are all ruled by Sunnis. In the end, the Front had little to show for it however, and the Islamic Party’s dominance of the ministries threatened to break the coalition apart.

The reason why the IAF was so anxious to return to the cabinet is the impending provincial elections. During the first such polling in January 2005, the Islamic Party was the only Sunni group to participate, and gained control of Anbar province. Since then, local tribes formed the Awakening movement, which was instrumental in forcing out Al Qaeda in Iraq from most of Western Iraq. The tribes are now forming political parties that are expected to sweep the Islamic Party out of power in Anbar, and probably gain seats in central Iraq as well. Feeling threatened, the Accordance Front wanted to return to the cabinet as swiftly as possible so that they could shore up their positions, gain back their ministries, which they can use to dole out patronage in return for votes, and try to shape conditions on the ground so that they can beat back the challenge of the Awakening movement.

Conclusion

After almost a year, the Sunni Accordance Front finally returned to Prime Minister Maliki’s cabinet. Rather than being a sign of reconciliation, it was actually out of desperation by the Sunni bloc. They wanted their ministries back so that they could fend off the challenge of the Anbar Awakening and other tribal groups that are going to run in the upcoming provincial elections. The move also threatened to break up the coalition as the majority of the ministers came from the Islamic Party, which caused dissension and jealousy amongst others. All of these are bad signs for the Front. They are losing legitimacy amongst Sunnis and within their own bloc, which is not a good way to be heading into elections.


SOURCES

Ahmed, Farook, “The Iraqi Accord Front’s Return to Government,” Institute for the Study of War, 5/16/08

Alsumaria, “Iraqi governmental crisis to further snag,” 5/5/08

BBC News, “Iraqi Kurdish Alliance says most blocs agree to Kirkuk poll delay,” 7/22/08

CNN, “Iraqi Sunni bloc’s ministers withdrawing from coalition Cabinet,” 8/2/07

Gamel, Kim, “US Commanders Welcome Fallujah Revival,” Associated Press, 2/9/08

Katzman, Kenneth, “Iraq: Government Formation and Benchmarks,” Congressional Research Service, 8/10/07

Katulis, Brian, Juul, Peter, and Moss, Ian, “Awakening to New Dangers in Iraq,” Center for American Progress, February 2008

Mohammed, Wisam, “Iraq’s main Sunni bloc suspends government talks,” Reuters, 5/27/08

Partlow, Joshua, “Top Iraqis Pull Back From Key U.S. Goal,” Washington Post, 10/8/07

Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Sunni Bloc Rejoins Iraqi Government, Amid Reconciliation Hopes,” Washington Post, 7/20/08

Tarabay, Jamie, “Sunni Tribal Leaders Demand Government Support,” All Things Considered NPR, 11/13/07

Voices of Iraq, “Govt. spokesman says deal reached to name IAF ministers,” 6/30/08
- “Head of NDC will not withdraw from IAF, says al-Dulaimi,” 5/10/08
- “IAF accuses government of hindering its return,” 5/29/08
- “IAF: Leniency on Mosul operation would strengthen gunmen cells,” 5/13/08
- “IAF member foresees ‘collapse’ in negotiations with govt.,” 5/26/08
- “NDC objects IAF deputy PM candidate – MP,” 7/17/08