U.S. reconstruction in Iraq is coming to an end. The effort to rebuild the country following the 2003 invasion was the largest in American history, with the U.S. budgeting $51 billion for the project. That amount has almost all been spent, and no new large outlays are expected in the future, especially with the U.S. planning on withdrawing. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) believes that most of this money failed to achieve its goals. While the Iraqi security forces were successfully reconstituted, the larger goal of boosting services and the economy of Iraq failed.
Since March 2003 the U.S. has promised $51.0 billion for reconstruction in Iraq. $24.43 billion was for security, and $26.57 for the economy, government, and services. $42.16 billion of the total amount has been obligated for projects, while $37.89 billion was actually spent. Of the remaining $3.01 billion in unspent funds, $2.82 billion is for the Iraqi armed forces and police. The new Obama administration has asked for an additional $700 million, $449 million of which is supposed to go to reconstruction. The White House did not ask for any new money for the Iraqi security forces. Instead, the President wants to extend $1 billion in bridge funds left over from 2008 for that purpose.
The American program was originally aimed at rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure and building a democracy, but as violence rose in the country, more and more money was appropriated for security. By April 2009 the Iraqi security forces took almost half of the funding at $24.43 billion compared to $11.82 billion for infrastructure like electricity, oil, gas, water, sanitation, transportation, and communications. The SIGIR reported that the rise in attacks in Iraq derailed much of the reconstruction program, delaying projects and adding additional costs.
The U.S. program has not been without success. The one area that the SIGIR believes has seen the best effort is the rebuilding of the Iraqi security forces. They now stand at over 700,000 strong. The Americans have also added 1.2 million cubic meters of sewage treatment capacity, brought up water production to 2.4 million cubic meters of potable water per day, and for three straight quarters electricity production has gone up. Power output is now higher than pre-invasion levels. The problem is since the overthrow of Saddam, demand for services has skyrocketed amongst Iraqis, and the U.S.-funded increases have not kept up. Only around 25% of Iraqis polled say they were satisfied with the sewage system for example.
Today, U.S.-reconstruction is coming to an end, leaving Iraq increasingly in charge. There are no current oil projects on-line for example. There is still $224.39 million going to be spent on electricity however. Now the Iraqi government is the largest source of funding for rebuilding. Its capital budget used for investment has recently gone down from $13.1 billion in 2008 to $12.7 billion this year. Iraq has also never been able to spend all of its money, like the Electricity Ministry that only spent 12% of its budget last year.
Now that Iraqis are taking control, transferring projects is becoming an issue. An April 26, 2009 SIGIR audit found that the U.S. had been turning over projects to Iraqis with no unified plan or process. Many are given to the Iraqi government whether they can handle them or not. Most transfers are also done at the local level, and the information is not passed up to Baghdad or Washington. Of $13.5 billion in projects studied by SIGIR, 72% were handed over to local authorities, and only 13% to the central government. That means neither government has a real idea on what has been done so far. Some of these projects were not even wanted by the Iraqis, and were left unused or were not maintained. The Iraqis in general also don’t have the experience or training in much of the equipment installed by the Americans. For instance, examinations of Iraqi health care facilities found that gear wasn’t always installed and Iraqis didn’t always know how to operate them. The SIGIR is worried that this will mean much of the U.S. investment will be wasted. The U.S. is trying to address this by spending $313.7 million on training and spare parts. That still doesn’t address the larger issue of how the Iraqis will take control of the thousands of projects built by the Americans.
In its review of the U.S. reconstruction effort, the SIGIR believes that much of the U.S. reconstruction project has failed. Iraqis are largely unhappy with the state of the economy, services, and government. Production of many services such as electricity is higher than under Saddam, but it’s only meeting a fraction of demand. The main problem was the lack of security, which was not planned for. That derailed and delayed much of the work. Violence also shifted the focus of the Americans to the point that the security forces received just as much money as building up the economy and government combined. The U.S. also tended to impose their views of what Iraq should have, rather than asking Iraqis what they wanted. Many of the large infrastructure projects therefore were not used properly, left to break down, or were never wanted. Some of the $51 billion budgeted for Iraq has gone to good work, especially the money appropriated by U.S. commanders to local Iraqis. The larger projects however are more of a mixed bag.
Total Outlays By U.S.
Security - $24.43 billion
$21.18 billion obligated
$18.58 billion expended
$3.24 billion unspent
$6.84 billion for equipment and transportation
$5.79 billion for infrastructure
$5.67 billion for training and operations
$2.42 billion for sustainment
$1.72 billion for rule of law
$1.0 billion for other
Infrastructure - $11.82 billion
$11.41 billion obligated
$10.86 billion expended
$553 million unspent
Infrastructure – Electricity - $5.09 billion
$4.98 billion obligated
$4.75 billion spent
Infrastructure – Water and Sanitation - $2.25 billion
$2.17 billion obligated
$2.01 billion spent
Infrastructure – Oil and Gas - $2.05 billion
$1.93 billion obligated
$1.88 billion spent
Infrastructure – Other - $1.31 billion
Infrastructure – Transportation and Communication - $1.12 billion
$1.09 billion obligated
$965 million spent
Governance - $7.02 billion
$5.64 billion spent
$2.38 billion obligated for capacity development
$1.92 billion obligated for democracy and civil society
$1.88 billion obligated for public services
$0.81 billion obligated for humanitarian relief
Economy - $1.47 billion
$1.25 billion spent
SOURCES
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Asset-Transfer Process for Iraq Reconstruction Projects Lacks Unity and Accountability,” 4/26/09
- “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09
Tuesday, June 2, 2009
Monday, June 1, 2009
Iraqi Casualties Down For May 2009
April 2009 was marked by a series of mass casualty bombings that took the lives of some 290 Iraqis. The jump in deaths that month had many inside and out of Iraq worried that large-scale violence might be returning. The latest numbers however, show a drop in deaths for May.
The Iraqi Interior Ministry released its latest figures for casualties in Iraq. They reported 165 killed in May, 134 of which were civilians, and the remaining 31 from the Iraqi security forces. In April they recorded 355 deaths, preceded by 252 in March, 258 in February, and 191 in January. January had the lowest toll since the U.S. invasion in 2003, but May’s numbers have now surpassed that according to the Iraqi government.
Other organizations also noted the drop. Iraq Body Count found 483 killed in April, compared to a preliminary number of 344 in May, while icasualties reported 188 dead in May and 347 in April. The Associated Press keeps its own count as well and said that 225 died in May, while 371 were killed in April.
The U.S. command in Iraq noted that attacks were down 50% in mid-May compared to all of April 2009. A U.S. military spokesman said that there had only been 13 major attacks in Iraq from the beginning of May to the 23rd of that month compared to 28 for all of April. General Odierno, the U.S. commander in Iraq believed that attacks were related to two important anniversaries. April 6-7 marked the formation of the Baath Party, while April 9 was the fall of Saddam from power.
Iraq Deaths
Iraqi Ministries
November 08 340
December 08 316
January 09 191
February 09 258
March 09 252
April 09 355
May 09 165
Iraq Body Count
November 08 472
December 08 521
January 09 275
February 09 343
March 09 415
April 09 483
May 09 344
Icasualties.org
November 08 317
December 08 320
January 09 187
February 09 202
March 09 278
April 09 347
May 09 182
Associated Press
January 09 242
February 09 288
March 09 335
April 09 371
May 09 225
As reported before, overall attacks and deaths in Iraq are down compared to 2008, but have begun to creep back up in recent months. From April 1 to September 30, 2008 there were an average of just over 1,700 attacks per month. That went down to 1,169 from October 1 to December 31, 2008, and then to an average of 323 for January 1 to March 20, 2009. Casualties also dropped from July to December 2008, before hitting a low point in January 2009. That corresponded with campaigning for the 2009 provincial elections when Sunnis came out in large numbers compared to 2005 when they boycotted the ballot box. It appears that insurgents backed off for a period of time to allow people to vote. A similar series of events happened in the December 2005 elections when many insurgent groups backed the vote, held off on operations, and even provided security at polling centers. The trend since January 2009 has been for the number of Iraqis killed to go back up until May. Whether that month will turn out to be a temporary dip like January or the beginning of a new trend is yet to be seen.
For more on violence in Iraq see:
New Attack And Death Statistics For Iraq
How Many Have Died In Iraq And By What Means
Is Violence Increasing In Iraq?
Review of 2008 Attack Statistics In Iraq
2008 Iraq Death Totals
Iraqi Death Counts
SOURCES
Chon, Gina, “U.S. Says Attacks in Iraq Are Down 50% So Far in May,” Wall Street Journal, 5/25/09
Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq: USCENTCOM and Iraqi Government Estimates of the Trends in the Patterns in Violence and Casualties,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 5/1/09
Haynes, Deborah, “Transcript of The Times interview with General Ray Odierno,” Times of London, 4/9/09
Reid, Robert, “Iraq civilian deaths fall after April spike,” Associated Press, 6/1/09
Sly, Liz, “Iraqi casualties fall to record low in May,” Los Angeles Times, 6/1/09
Steinberg, Guido, “The Iraqi Insurgency,” German Institute for International and Security Affairs, December 2006
The Iraqi Interior Ministry released its latest figures for casualties in Iraq. They reported 165 killed in May, 134 of which were civilians, and the remaining 31 from the Iraqi security forces. In April they recorded 355 deaths, preceded by 252 in March, 258 in February, and 191 in January. January had the lowest toll since the U.S. invasion in 2003, but May’s numbers have now surpassed that according to the Iraqi government.
Other organizations also noted the drop. Iraq Body Count found 483 killed in April, compared to a preliminary number of 344 in May, while icasualties reported 188 dead in May and 347 in April. The Associated Press keeps its own count as well and said that 225 died in May, while 371 were killed in April.
The U.S. command in Iraq noted that attacks were down 50% in mid-May compared to all of April 2009. A U.S. military spokesman said that there had only been 13 major attacks in Iraq from the beginning of May to the 23rd of that month compared to 28 for all of April. General Odierno, the U.S. commander in Iraq believed that attacks were related to two important anniversaries. April 6-7 marked the formation of the Baath Party, while April 9 was the fall of Saddam from power.
Iraq Deaths
Iraqi Ministries
November 08 340
December 08 316
January 09 191
February 09 258
March 09 252
April 09 355
May 09 165
Iraq Body Count
November 08 472
December 08 521
January 09 275
February 09 343
March 09 415
April 09 483
May 09 344
Icasualties.org
November 08 317
December 08 320
January 09 187
February 09 202
March 09 278
April 09 347
May 09 182
Associated Press
January 09 242
February 09 288
March 09 335
April 09 371
May 09 225
As reported before, overall attacks and deaths in Iraq are down compared to 2008, but have begun to creep back up in recent months. From April 1 to September 30, 2008 there were an average of just over 1,700 attacks per month. That went down to 1,169 from October 1 to December 31, 2008, and then to an average of 323 for January 1 to March 20, 2009. Casualties also dropped from July to December 2008, before hitting a low point in January 2009. That corresponded with campaigning for the 2009 provincial elections when Sunnis came out in large numbers compared to 2005 when they boycotted the ballot box. It appears that insurgents backed off for a period of time to allow people to vote. A similar series of events happened in the December 2005 elections when many insurgent groups backed the vote, held off on operations, and even provided security at polling centers. The trend since January 2009 has been for the number of Iraqis killed to go back up until May. Whether that month will turn out to be a temporary dip like January or the beginning of a new trend is yet to be seen.
For more on violence in Iraq see:
New Attack And Death Statistics For Iraq
How Many Have Died In Iraq And By What Means
Is Violence Increasing In Iraq?
Review of 2008 Attack Statistics In Iraq
2008 Iraq Death Totals
Iraqi Death Counts
SOURCES
Chon, Gina, “U.S. Says Attacks in Iraq Are Down 50% So Far in May,” Wall Street Journal, 5/25/09
Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq: USCENTCOM and Iraqi Government Estimates of the Trends in the Patterns in Violence and Casualties,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 5/1/09
Haynes, Deborah, “Transcript of The Times interview with General Ray Odierno,” Times of London, 4/9/09
Reid, Robert, “Iraq civilian deaths fall after April spike,” Associated Press, 6/1/09
Sly, Liz, “Iraqi casualties fall to record low in May,” Los Angeles Times, 6/1/09
Steinberg, Guido, “The Iraqi Insurgency,” German Institute for International and Security Affairs, December 2006
Sunday, May 31, 2009
How Did The Outgoing Provincial Councils Do?
All of Iraq’s new provincial councils have now been seated. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) released its quarterly report to Congress on April 30, which contains the latest data on how those outgoing politicians did. The previous councils were in office from 2005 to 2009. Most came to power with little to no experience in government. Their last two years should be their best performance because they were able to learn on the job, had the benefit of U.S. and international training, and saw a dramatic drop in violence.
In 2008 the provinces were budgeted $9,830.69 million. They spent 67% of it, or $6,596.8 million. The three Kurdish provinces of Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniya received almost a third of the overall amount, $3,701.49 million. The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) does not provide information about its spending however, so both Baghdad and the U.S. tend to count all of the money sent north as spent. In 2008 the SIGIR said Kurdistan spent 100% of their budget, which skews the overall number for Iraq’s provinces upwards. Without the KRG, the remaining fifteen governorates were budgeted $6,129.2 million, and only spent 47% of it, $2,894.7 million. This was an improvement over 2007 when the provinces were budgeted $3,631 million and spent over $2,137 million, 58%+. Minus Kurdistan the provinces spent $650 mil of their $2,071 budget, 31.3% however. While getting better, these numbers show that Iraq’s local governments still have a ways to go in appropriating and investing their money. The public sector is the largest part of the economy, so it’s important that the provinces expend as much as possible. 47% in 2008, especially with the dramatic drop in violence, is still an inadequate amount given the demands of average Iraqis.
In terms of individual provinces, outside of Kurdistan, Maysan, Karbala, Najaf, Babil, and Anbar did the best in executing their budget in that order in 2008. Maysan, which was controlled by the Sadrists, spent 86.4% of their 2008 budget. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) controlled Karbala, 85.3%, Najaf, 75.7%, and Babil 63.5%. The Iraqi Islamic Party ran Anbar, which rounded out the top five, spending 54.4% of its budget. In 2007 many of the same provinces and parties were at the top, starting with Najaf, 64%, Maysan, 51%, Babil, 49%, Karbala, 41%, and Wasit, 41%, the last of which had a Sadrist governor and a provincial council run by the Iraq Elites Gathering.
Ninewa, 36.6%, Dhi Qar, 33.1%, Qadisiyah, 31.5%, Diyala, 28.2%, and Muthanna, 26.8%, were at the bottom last year. The Supreme Council ran Qadisiyah alone. In Dhi Qar, the council was split between the Fadhila Party and the SIIC, and Diyala and Muthanna had a SIIC-Dawa coalition. Ninewa was controlled by the Kurdish Alliance of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), with an independent Arab governor. In 2007 Baghdad, 31%, Ninewa, 26%, Basra, 21%, Muthanna, 19%, and Anbar, 3.7%, did the worst. The Supreme Council controlled Baghdad, and all of them except for Muthanna were some of the most violent in the country that year, which greatly complicated governing them. The provinces that did the best and worst in this category show that the ruling party had little to do with performance. The Supreme Council for example controlled three of the top five governorates that spent the most money, but also had a hand in ruling four of the bottom five. It seems that local officials, and their training and expertise would be much more important factors than what national parties they belonged to when it came to executing their budgets.
2008 Provincial Budget Execution – Ruling Parties
Total: Budgeted $9,830.69 mil, Spent $6,596.8 mil, 67%
Not Including Kurdistan: Budgeted $6,129.2 mil, Spent $2,894.7 mil, 47%
Kurdistan - Budgeted: $3,701.49 mil, Spent $3,702.1 mil, 100% - KDP-PUK
Maysan - Budgeted $194.59 mil, Spent $168.09 mil, 86.4% - Sadrists
Karbala - Budgeted $164.03 mil, Spent $139.86 mil, 85.3% - SIIC
Najaf - Budgeted $328.18 mil, Spent $248.41 mil, 75.7% - SIIC
Babil - Budgeted $409.09 mil, Spent $259.83 mil, 63.5% - SIIC
Anbar - Budgeted $367.15 mil, Spent $199.68 mil, 54.4% - Iraqi Islamic Party
Wasit - Budgeted $217.59 mil, Spent $117.16 mil, 53.8% - Iraq Elites Gathering-Sadrists
Baghdad - Budgeted $1,433.52 mil, Spent $670.66 mil, 46.8% - SIIC
Salahaddin - Budgeted $243.47 mil, Spent $112.25 mil, 46.1% - KDP-PUK
Basra - Budgeted $660.04 mil, Spent $287.37 mil, 43.5% - SIIC-Fadhila
Tamim - Budgeted $285.52 mil, Spent $108.19 mil, 37.9% - KDP-PUK
Ninewa - Budgeted $538.43 mil, Spent $197.11 mil, 36.6% - KDP-PUK
Dhi Qar - Budgeted $377.09 mil, Spent $124.84 mil, 33.1% - Fadhila-SIIC
Qadisiyah - Budgeted $240.45 mil, Spent $75.67 mil, 31.5% - SIIC
Diyala - Budgeted $443.11 mil, Spent $124.81 mil, 28.2% - Dawa-SIIC
Muthanna - Budgeted $226.94 mil, Spent $60.77 mil, 26.8% - Dawa-SIIC
2007 Provincial Budget Execution – Ruling Parties
Total: Budgeted $3,631 mil, Spent $2,137+ mil, 58%+
Not Including Kurdistan: Budgeted $2,071 mil, Spent $650 mil, 31.3%+
Kurdistan - Budgeted $1,560 mil, Spent $1,487, 95% - KDP-PUK
Najaf – Budgeted $88 mil, Spent $54.6 mil, 64% - SIIC
Maysan – Budgeted $76 mil, Spent $39 mil, 51% - Sadrists
Babil – Budgeted $127 mil, Spent $61.9 mil, 49% - SIIC
Karbala – Budgeted $71 mil, Spent $29.4 mil, 41% - SIIC
Wasit – Budgeted $83 mil, Spent $33.7 mil, 41% - Iraq Elites Gathering-Sadrists
Dhi Qar – Budgeted $138 mil, Spent $54.8 mil, 40% - Fadhila-SIIC
Qadisiyah – Budgeted $64 mil, Spent $24.7 mil, 39% - SIIC
Salahaddin – Budgeted $93 mil, Spent $31.5 mil, 34% - KDP-PUK
Tamim – Budgeted $91 mil, Spent $31 mil, 34% - KDP-PUK
Baghdad – Budgeted $560 mil, Spent $174.4 mil, 31% - SIIC
Ninewa – Budgeted $226 mil, Spent $58.5 mil, 26% - KDP-PUK
Basra – Budgeted $195 mil, Spent $40.8 mil, 26% - SIIC-Fadhila
Muthanna – Budgeted $52 mil, Spent $9.9 mil, 19% - Dawa-SIIC
Anbar – Budgeted $107 mil, Spent $4 mil, 3.7% - Iraqi Islamic Party
Diyala – Budgeted $100 mil, Spent N/A – Dawa-SIIC
The aggregate numbers on the amount budgeted and spent in each province only tells half of the story. In 2008, Maysan was ranked the top province in spending its budget outside of Kurdistan at 86.4%. However that money only led to 41 of 241 projects being completed there. For another view, the SIGIR report also included assessments of the U.S.-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which operate in each of Iraq’s governorates. They rated Maysan as the least developed of all of Iraq’s provincial economies.
The PRTs assess governance, political development, reconciliation, economic development, and rule of law. These topics are ranked beginning, developing, sustaining, performing, or self-reliant. From February 2008 to February 2009 Kurdistan was given the highest rating, Wasit, Babil, and Karbala had the most improvement, while Ninewa, Anbar, Diyala, Baghdad, Muthanna, and Basra all saw reversals. Karbala, run by the SIIC, was rated the most successful province outside of Kurdistan, progressing from developing to performing in political development, reconciliation, and rule of Law, and from developing to sustaining in governance and economic development. Wasit was the only province that was given a self-reliant mark, and that was in reconciliation. Muthanna had a similar rating in February 2008, but fell back to sustaining a year later.
PRT Rankings:
Beginning: Little progress on decision-making, provision of services, political participation, fighting corruption, basic freedoms, infrastructure, and unemployment.
Developing: Small improvements in economic development, government, and security. Still lack budget spending, basic freedoms, political participation, jobs, banks, and effort against corruption.
Sustaining: Getting better at working with national government, building political parties, political participation, and police. Still lacks coordination, appropriations, banks, and still has tribal influences.
Performing: Social and financial institutions and infrastructure working, coordination, political participation, and transparency exists. Banks opening, appropriations improving, transportation available, police and legal system building, security forces in the lead, and tribes deferring to government.
Self-Reliant: Independent government with basic freedoms, security, political and economic institutions working, religious tolerance, working legal system, and self-sufficient security forces.
Anbar
Governance – Sustaining
Political Development – Sustaining
Reconciliation – Sustaining
Economic Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Rule of Law – Moved down from Sustaining to Developing
Babil
Governance – Developing
Political Development – Advanced from Beginning to Performing
Reconciliation – Advanced from Beginning to Sustaining
Economic Development – Sustaining
Rule of Law – Advanced from Sustaining to Performing
Baghdad
Governance – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Political Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Reconciliation – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Economic Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Rule of Law – Moved down from Sustaining to Developing
Basra
Governance – Moved down from Sustaining to Developing
Political Development – Advanced from Sustaining to Performing
Reconciliation – Sustaining
Economic Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Rule of Law – Developing
Dhi Qar
Governance – Sustaining
Political Development – Sustaining
Reconciliation – Sustaining
Economic Development – Sustaining
Rule of Law - Sustaining
Diyala
Governance – Moved down from Sustaining to Developing
Political Development – Developing
Reconciliation – Developing
Economic Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Rule of Law – Beginning to Developing
Karbala
Governance – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Political Development – Advanced from Developing to Performing
Reconciliation – Advanced from Developing to Performing
Economic Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Rule of Law – Advanced from Developing to Performing
Kurdistan
Governance – Sustaining
Political Development – Performing
Reconciliation – Performing
Economic Development – Advanced from Sustaining to Performing
Rule of Law – Advanced from Sustaining to Performing
Maysan
Governance – Advanced from Beginning to Developing
Political Development – Developing
Reconciliation – Sustaining
Economic Development – Beginning
Rule of Law – Developing
Muthanna
Governance – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Political Development – Advanced from Beginning to Performing
Reconciliation- Moved down from Self-Reliant to Sustaining
Economic Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Rule of Law – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Najaf
Governance – Sustaining
Political Development – Advanced from Developing to Performing
Reconciliation – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Economic Development – Sustaining
Rule of Law – Sustaining
Ninewa
Governance – Developing
Political Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Reconciliation – Advanced from Beginning to Developing
Economic Development – Developing
Rule of Law – Moved down from Sustaining to Developing
Qadisiyah
Governance – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Political Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Reconciliation – Beginning
Economic Development – Advanced from Beginning to Sustaining
Rule of Law – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Salahaddin
Governance – Sustaining
Political Development – Advanced from Sustaining to Performing
Reconciliation – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Economic Development – Developing
Rule of Law – Developing
Tamim
Governance – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Political Development – Sustaining
Reconciliation – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Economic Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Rule of Law – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Wasit
Governance – Developing
Political Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Reconciliation – Advanced from Beginning to Self-Reliant
Economic Development – Advanced from Beginning to Sustaining
Rule of Law – Advanced from Developing to Performing
The SIGIR also provided the unemployment figures for each province. A recent January 2009 United Nations survey of Iraqis found the jobless rate at 18%. The SIGIR’s numbers were close at 19.5%. Wasit had the lowest unemployment rate at 13.6%. It also spent more than half of its budget at 53.8%, and had one of the largest jumps in economic development from beginning to sustaining according to the PRTs. Wasit was followed by Baghdad, 14.5%, Tamim, 15.7%, Babil, 15.9%, and Qadisiyah, 15.9%. Those four provinces were all over the place in spending their budgets from Qadisiyah that was third from last, only executing 31.5% of its money, to Babil, which spent 63.5% of its budget. The PRTs also ranked all of them at the sustaining level as well. At the opposite end of the spectrum were Karbala, 19.1%, Ninewa 20.9%, Salahaddin, 21.9%, Muthanna, 30.5%, and Dhi Qar, 36.5%, that had the highest unemployment. Ninewa and Salahaddin were both given developing marks in economics by the PRTs, the second to last rating, and were in the middle to bottom in spending their money. Muthanna and Dhi Qar were given sustaining ranks by the PRTs, but barely executed their budgets, with Muthanna in last place.
Unemployment By Province
Wasit 13.6%
Baghdad 14.5%
Tamim 15.7%
Babil 15.9%
Qadisiyah 15.9%
Kurdistan 16.7%
Maysan 17.3%
Anbar 17.4%
Najaf 18.6%
Basra 18.8%
Diyala 19.0%
Karbala 19.1%
Ninewa 20.9%
Salahaddin 21.9%
Muthanna 30.5%
Dhi Qar 36.5%
Avg. 19.5%
The budget execution and unemployment numbers provided by the SIGIR and the PRT assessments are some of the best available information on Iraq’s provinces. They can point out the overall economic situation of each area, and give hints at how they were governed. Overall, the statistics show that party affiliation does not translate into either good or bad policies. The Supreme Council for example ran half of Iraq’s provinces, but that only meant they were both at the top and bottom in terms of developing their areas. The real difference was the growth and performance of local officials, many of which were amateurs when they were elected in 2005. Some provinces showed great improvement according to the PRTs, and that was reflected in their spending and unemployment situation. All eighteen governorates however still needed to get much better at appropriating their money and providing jobs. The problem is that many of the new incoming councils are novices as well, which could mean another long process of learning the nuts and bolts of governing and budgeting with the provinces suffering in the meantime.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “41 out of 241 projects implemented in Missan,” 12/30/08
Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Iraq Labour Force Analysis 2003-2008,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, January 2009
Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008
Robertson, Campbell and Glanz, James, “Iraqi Figures Back U.S. View on Low Spending for Reconstruction,” New York Times, 8/21/08
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/08
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09
In 2008 the provinces were budgeted $9,830.69 million. They spent 67% of it, or $6,596.8 million. The three Kurdish provinces of Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniya received almost a third of the overall amount, $3,701.49 million. The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) does not provide information about its spending however, so both Baghdad and the U.S. tend to count all of the money sent north as spent. In 2008 the SIGIR said Kurdistan spent 100% of their budget, which skews the overall number for Iraq’s provinces upwards. Without the KRG, the remaining fifteen governorates were budgeted $6,129.2 million, and only spent 47% of it, $2,894.7 million. This was an improvement over 2007 when the provinces were budgeted $3,631 million and spent over $2,137 million, 58%+. Minus Kurdistan the provinces spent $650 mil of their $2,071 budget, 31.3% however. While getting better, these numbers show that Iraq’s local governments still have a ways to go in appropriating and investing their money. The public sector is the largest part of the economy, so it’s important that the provinces expend as much as possible. 47% in 2008, especially with the dramatic drop in violence, is still an inadequate amount given the demands of average Iraqis.
In terms of individual provinces, outside of Kurdistan, Maysan, Karbala, Najaf, Babil, and Anbar did the best in executing their budget in that order in 2008. Maysan, which was controlled by the Sadrists, spent 86.4% of their 2008 budget. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) controlled Karbala, 85.3%, Najaf, 75.7%, and Babil 63.5%. The Iraqi Islamic Party ran Anbar, which rounded out the top five, spending 54.4% of its budget. In 2007 many of the same provinces and parties were at the top, starting with Najaf, 64%, Maysan, 51%, Babil, 49%, Karbala, 41%, and Wasit, 41%, the last of which had a Sadrist governor and a provincial council run by the Iraq Elites Gathering.
Ninewa, 36.6%, Dhi Qar, 33.1%, Qadisiyah, 31.5%, Diyala, 28.2%, and Muthanna, 26.8%, were at the bottom last year. The Supreme Council ran Qadisiyah alone. In Dhi Qar, the council was split between the Fadhila Party and the SIIC, and Diyala and Muthanna had a SIIC-Dawa coalition. Ninewa was controlled by the Kurdish Alliance of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), with an independent Arab governor. In 2007 Baghdad, 31%, Ninewa, 26%, Basra, 21%, Muthanna, 19%, and Anbar, 3.7%, did the worst. The Supreme Council controlled Baghdad, and all of them except for Muthanna were some of the most violent in the country that year, which greatly complicated governing them. The provinces that did the best and worst in this category show that the ruling party had little to do with performance. The Supreme Council for example controlled three of the top five governorates that spent the most money, but also had a hand in ruling four of the bottom five. It seems that local officials, and their training and expertise would be much more important factors than what national parties they belonged to when it came to executing their budgets.
2008 Provincial Budget Execution – Ruling Parties
Total: Budgeted $9,830.69 mil, Spent $6,596.8 mil, 67%
Not Including Kurdistan: Budgeted $6,129.2 mil, Spent $2,894.7 mil, 47%
Kurdistan - Budgeted: $3,701.49 mil, Spent $3,702.1 mil, 100% - KDP-PUK
Maysan - Budgeted $194.59 mil, Spent $168.09 mil, 86.4% - Sadrists
Karbala - Budgeted $164.03 mil, Spent $139.86 mil, 85.3% - SIIC
Najaf - Budgeted $328.18 mil, Spent $248.41 mil, 75.7% - SIIC
Babil - Budgeted $409.09 mil, Spent $259.83 mil, 63.5% - SIIC
Anbar - Budgeted $367.15 mil, Spent $199.68 mil, 54.4% - Iraqi Islamic Party
Wasit - Budgeted $217.59 mil, Spent $117.16 mil, 53.8% - Iraq Elites Gathering-Sadrists
Baghdad - Budgeted $1,433.52 mil, Spent $670.66 mil, 46.8% - SIIC
Salahaddin - Budgeted $243.47 mil, Spent $112.25 mil, 46.1% - KDP-PUK
Basra - Budgeted $660.04 mil, Spent $287.37 mil, 43.5% - SIIC-Fadhila
Tamim - Budgeted $285.52 mil, Spent $108.19 mil, 37.9% - KDP-PUK
Ninewa - Budgeted $538.43 mil, Spent $197.11 mil, 36.6% - KDP-PUK
Dhi Qar - Budgeted $377.09 mil, Spent $124.84 mil, 33.1% - Fadhila-SIIC
Qadisiyah - Budgeted $240.45 mil, Spent $75.67 mil, 31.5% - SIIC
Diyala - Budgeted $443.11 mil, Spent $124.81 mil, 28.2% - Dawa-SIIC
Muthanna - Budgeted $226.94 mil, Spent $60.77 mil, 26.8% - Dawa-SIIC
2007 Provincial Budget Execution – Ruling Parties
Total: Budgeted $3,631 mil, Spent $2,137+ mil, 58%+
Not Including Kurdistan: Budgeted $2,071 mil, Spent $650 mil, 31.3%+
Kurdistan - Budgeted $1,560 mil, Spent $1,487, 95% - KDP-PUK
Najaf – Budgeted $88 mil, Spent $54.6 mil, 64% - SIIC
Maysan – Budgeted $76 mil, Spent $39 mil, 51% - Sadrists
Babil – Budgeted $127 mil, Spent $61.9 mil, 49% - SIIC
Karbala – Budgeted $71 mil, Spent $29.4 mil, 41% - SIIC
Wasit – Budgeted $83 mil, Spent $33.7 mil, 41% - Iraq Elites Gathering-Sadrists
Dhi Qar – Budgeted $138 mil, Spent $54.8 mil, 40% - Fadhila-SIIC
Qadisiyah – Budgeted $64 mil, Spent $24.7 mil, 39% - SIIC
Salahaddin – Budgeted $93 mil, Spent $31.5 mil, 34% - KDP-PUK
Tamim – Budgeted $91 mil, Spent $31 mil, 34% - KDP-PUK
Baghdad – Budgeted $560 mil, Spent $174.4 mil, 31% - SIIC
Ninewa – Budgeted $226 mil, Spent $58.5 mil, 26% - KDP-PUK
Basra – Budgeted $195 mil, Spent $40.8 mil, 26% - SIIC-Fadhila
Muthanna – Budgeted $52 mil, Spent $9.9 mil, 19% - Dawa-SIIC
Anbar – Budgeted $107 mil, Spent $4 mil, 3.7% - Iraqi Islamic Party
Diyala – Budgeted $100 mil, Spent N/A – Dawa-SIIC
The aggregate numbers on the amount budgeted and spent in each province only tells half of the story. In 2008, Maysan was ranked the top province in spending its budget outside of Kurdistan at 86.4%. However that money only led to 41 of 241 projects being completed there. For another view, the SIGIR report also included assessments of the U.S.-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which operate in each of Iraq’s governorates. They rated Maysan as the least developed of all of Iraq’s provincial economies.
The PRTs assess governance, political development, reconciliation, economic development, and rule of law. These topics are ranked beginning, developing, sustaining, performing, or self-reliant. From February 2008 to February 2009 Kurdistan was given the highest rating, Wasit, Babil, and Karbala had the most improvement, while Ninewa, Anbar, Diyala, Baghdad, Muthanna, and Basra all saw reversals. Karbala, run by the SIIC, was rated the most successful province outside of Kurdistan, progressing from developing to performing in political development, reconciliation, and rule of Law, and from developing to sustaining in governance and economic development. Wasit was the only province that was given a self-reliant mark, and that was in reconciliation. Muthanna had a similar rating in February 2008, but fell back to sustaining a year later.
PRT Rankings:
Beginning: Little progress on decision-making, provision of services, political participation, fighting corruption, basic freedoms, infrastructure, and unemployment.
Developing: Small improvements in economic development, government, and security. Still lack budget spending, basic freedoms, political participation, jobs, banks, and effort against corruption.
Sustaining: Getting better at working with national government, building political parties, political participation, and police. Still lacks coordination, appropriations, banks, and still has tribal influences.
Performing: Social and financial institutions and infrastructure working, coordination, political participation, and transparency exists. Banks opening, appropriations improving, transportation available, police and legal system building, security forces in the lead, and tribes deferring to government.
Self-Reliant: Independent government with basic freedoms, security, political and economic institutions working, religious tolerance, working legal system, and self-sufficient security forces.
Anbar
Governance – Sustaining
Political Development – Sustaining
Reconciliation – Sustaining
Economic Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Rule of Law – Moved down from Sustaining to Developing
Babil
Governance – Developing
Political Development – Advanced from Beginning to Performing
Reconciliation – Advanced from Beginning to Sustaining
Economic Development – Sustaining
Rule of Law – Advanced from Sustaining to Performing
Baghdad
Governance – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Political Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Reconciliation – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Economic Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Rule of Law – Moved down from Sustaining to Developing
Basra
Governance – Moved down from Sustaining to Developing
Political Development – Advanced from Sustaining to Performing
Reconciliation – Sustaining
Economic Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Rule of Law – Developing
Dhi Qar
Governance – Sustaining
Political Development – Sustaining
Reconciliation – Sustaining
Economic Development – Sustaining
Rule of Law - Sustaining
Diyala
Governance – Moved down from Sustaining to Developing
Political Development – Developing
Reconciliation – Developing
Economic Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Rule of Law – Beginning to Developing
Karbala
Governance – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Political Development – Advanced from Developing to Performing
Reconciliation – Advanced from Developing to Performing
Economic Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Rule of Law – Advanced from Developing to Performing
Kurdistan
Governance – Sustaining
Political Development – Performing
Reconciliation – Performing
Economic Development – Advanced from Sustaining to Performing
Rule of Law – Advanced from Sustaining to Performing
Maysan
Governance – Advanced from Beginning to Developing
Political Development – Developing
Reconciliation – Sustaining
Economic Development – Beginning
Rule of Law – Developing
Muthanna
Governance – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Political Development – Advanced from Beginning to Performing
Reconciliation- Moved down from Self-Reliant to Sustaining
Economic Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Rule of Law – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Najaf
Governance – Sustaining
Political Development – Advanced from Developing to Performing
Reconciliation – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Economic Development – Sustaining
Rule of Law – Sustaining
Ninewa
Governance – Developing
Political Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Reconciliation – Advanced from Beginning to Developing
Economic Development – Developing
Rule of Law – Moved down from Sustaining to Developing
Qadisiyah
Governance – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Political Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Reconciliation – Beginning
Economic Development – Advanced from Beginning to Sustaining
Rule of Law – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Salahaddin
Governance – Sustaining
Political Development – Advanced from Sustaining to Performing
Reconciliation – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Economic Development – Developing
Rule of Law – Developing
Tamim
Governance – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Political Development – Sustaining
Reconciliation – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Economic Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Rule of Law – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Wasit
Governance – Developing
Political Development – Advanced from Developing to Sustaining
Reconciliation – Advanced from Beginning to Self-Reliant
Economic Development – Advanced from Beginning to Sustaining
Rule of Law – Advanced from Developing to Performing
The SIGIR also provided the unemployment figures for each province. A recent January 2009 United Nations survey of Iraqis found the jobless rate at 18%. The SIGIR’s numbers were close at 19.5%. Wasit had the lowest unemployment rate at 13.6%. It also spent more than half of its budget at 53.8%, and had one of the largest jumps in economic development from beginning to sustaining according to the PRTs. Wasit was followed by Baghdad, 14.5%, Tamim, 15.7%, Babil, 15.9%, and Qadisiyah, 15.9%. Those four provinces were all over the place in spending their budgets from Qadisiyah that was third from last, only executing 31.5% of its money, to Babil, which spent 63.5% of its budget. The PRTs also ranked all of them at the sustaining level as well. At the opposite end of the spectrum were Karbala, 19.1%, Ninewa 20.9%, Salahaddin, 21.9%, Muthanna, 30.5%, and Dhi Qar, 36.5%, that had the highest unemployment. Ninewa and Salahaddin were both given developing marks in economics by the PRTs, the second to last rating, and were in the middle to bottom in spending their money. Muthanna and Dhi Qar were given sustaining ranks by the PRTs, but barely executed their budgets, with Muthanna in last place.
Unemployment By Province
Wasit 13.6%
Baghdad 14.5%
Tamim 15.7%
Babil 15.9%
Qadisiyah 15.9%
Kurdistan 16.7%
Maysan 17.3%
Anbar 17.4%
Najaf 18.6%
Basra 18.8%
Diyala 19.0%
Karbala 19.1%
Ninewa 20.9%
Salahaddin 21.9%
Muthanna 30.5%
Dhi Qar 36.5%
Avg. 19.5%
The budget execution and unemployment numbers provided by the SIGIR and the PRT assessments are some of the best available information on Iraq’s provinces. They can point out the overall economic situation of each area, and give hints at how they were governed. Overall, the statistics show that party affiliation does not translate into either good or bad policies. The Supreme Council for example ran half of Iraq’s provinces, but that only meant they were both at the top and bottom in terms of developing their areas. The real difference was the growth and performance of local officials, many of which were amateurs when they were elected in 2005. Some provinces showed great improvement according to the PRTs, and that was reflected in their spending and unemployment situation. All eighteen governorates however still needed to get much better at appropriating their money and providing jobs. The problem is that many of the new incoming councils are novices as well, which could mean another long process of learning the nuts and bolts of governing and budgeting with the provinces suffering in the meantime.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “41 out of 241 projects implemented in Missan,” 12/30/08
Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Iraq Labour Force Analysis 2003-2008,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, January 2009
Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008
Robertson, Campbell and Glanz, James, “Iraqi Figures Back U.S. View on Low Spending for Reconstruction,” New York Times, 8/21/08
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/08
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09
Friday, May 29, 2009
Iraq Oil Prices Up, But Still Facing A Deficit
Iraq’s Oil Ministry recently announced that both its oil exports and revenues were up for April 2009, but it is not enough to meet the demands of the country’s budget. In April Iraq earned $2.69 billion, the largest amount this year, compared to $2.49 billion in March. 54.7 million barrels were exported last month for an average of 1.832 million barrels a day. In March 1.816 million barrels were exported a day. Each barrel went for $49.21 in April compared to $44.20 in March. An Oil Ministry official said that Iraqi oil had reached $50 a barrel on May 23. Another Ministry employee told the press that exports would rise to an average of 1.9 million barrels a day this month.
Oil Ministry’s Numbers On Iraq’s Oil Exports (Avg. Mil. Barrels Per Day)
April 09 1.83
March 09 1.81
Feb. 09 1.80
Jan. 09 1.89
Dec. 08 1.81
Nov. 08 1.76
The Oil Ministry is desperately trying to boost production since oil is estimated to account for 85% of the country’s revenue this year. The Ministry wants to increase overall output by 300,000-500,000 barrels a day by the end of the year. To accomplish this they have signed several deals recently, including one with China National Petroleum, the first major oil contract since the invasion, tenders to drill 100 new wells, and is offering up 19 major oil and gas fields to major international energy companies. The Oil Ministry is even apparently going to allow the Kurds to begin exports even though it considers the deals illegal.
Despite the modest increase in exports in April, and the expected growth in May, Iraq will not be generating enough money this year to cover its needs. The country’s 2009 budget is based upon an average of 2 million barrels a day in exports and a $50 a barrel price. It took the country five months to reach $50 a barrel, and it still has not made its export mark this year. To make up the difference the Finance Ministry will borrow $7 billion for two years from the International Monetary Fund to cover the budget deficit. The government also claims that cell phone companies owe them $1.875 billion, and want payments to begin now to add extra revenue. As reported before, the government is making massive cuts in spending across all of its ministries as a result of the deficit. Everything from services to security is going to be affected.
Iraq is still trying to pull itself out of years of wars and international sanctions. The U.S. reconstruction effort is coming to an end, and no major aid packages from either America or the international community is expected in the future. There is very little foreign investment either. That leaves Iraq increasingly on its own. Iraq’s economy is still driven by the state as well with the government being the largest employer in the country. The budget deficit will mean less opportunity for growth and jobs in Iraq as a result.
SOURCE
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq passes sharply reduced budget for 2009,” Associated Press, 3/5/09
Ali, Mohannad, “Iraq allocates $224 million to drill new wells in oil field in south,” Azzaman, 5/15/09
Associated Press, “Iraq’s oil exports inch up in January,” 2/1/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Finance ministry to sign new agreements with IMF,” 5/27/09
- “Iraq’s oil exports exceeded 54 million barrels in December – Oil Ministry,” 1/6/09
- “Iraq’s oil prices lower than the international average,” 5/23/09
- “Iraq’s oil revenues increase in April 2009,” 5/23/09
- “Kurdistan oil exports to help reduce budget deficit-lawmakers,” 5/23/09
Business Intelligence Middle East, “China faces unexpected problem drilling for oil in Iraq,” 5/22/09
Chon, Gina, “China Faces Unexpected Problem Drilling for Oil in Iraq – Farmers,” Wall Street Journal, 5/22/09
DiPala, Anthony, “Iraq Oil Export Income Rose 8.2% to $2.69 Billion in April,” Bloomberg, 5/25/09
Hafidh, Hassan, “UPDATE: Iraq April Oil Exports 1.82M B/d, Up 0.33% On Month,” Dow Jones, 5/3/09
Hoyos, Carola and Khalaf, Roula, “Kurdish exports resume despite Iraq impasse,” Financial Times, 5/27/09
Iraq Directory, “The Iraqi oil production is back to 2.4 million barrels per day,” 3/9/09
Lando, Ben, “Iraqi oil exports up but earning less,” UPI, 12/22/08
Reuters, “UPDATE 1-Iraq says to start Kurdistan oil exports on Sunday,” 5/27/09
Salaheddin, Sinan, “Oil Ministry: Iraq’s oil revenues drop,” Associated Press, 4/5/09
Sly, Liz, “Economic downturn finally hits Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, 5/11/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09
Oil Ministry’s Numbers On Iraq’s Oil Exports (Avg. Mil. Barrels Per Day)
April 09 1.83
March 09 1.81
Feb. 09 1.80
Jan. 09 1.89
Dec. 08 1.81
Nov. 08 1.76
The Oil Ministry is desperately trying to boost production since oil is estimated to account for 85% of the country’s revenue this year. The Ministry wants to increase overall output by 300,000-500,000 barrels a day by the end of the year. To accomplish this they have signed several deals recently, including one with China National Petroleum, the first major oil contract since the invasion, tenders to drill 100 new wells, and is offering up 19 major oil and gas fields to major international energy companies. The Oil Ministry is even apparently going to allow the Kurds to begin exports even though it considers the deals illegal.
Despite the modest increase in exports in April, and the expected growth in May, Iraq will not be generating enough money this year to cover its needs. The country’s 2009 budget is based upon an average of 2 million barrels a day in exports and a $50 a barrel price. It took the country five months to reach $50 a barrel, and it still has not made its export mark this year. To make up the difference the Finance Ministry will borrow $7 billion for two years from the International Monetary Fund to cover the budget deficit. The government also claims that cell phone companies owe them $1.875 billion, and want payments to begin now to add extra revenue. As reported before, the government is making massive cuts in spending across all of its ministries as a result of the deficit. Everything from services to security is going to be affected.
Iraq is still trying to pull itself out of years of wars and international sanctions. The U.S. reconstruction effort is coming to an end, and no major aid packages from either America or the international community is expected in the future. There is very little foreign investment either. That leaves Iraq increasingly on its own. Iraq’s economy is still driven by the state as well with the government being the largest employer in the country. The budget deficit will mean less opportunity for growth and jobs in Iraq as a result.
SOURCE
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq passes sharply reduced budget for 2009,” Associated Press, 3/5/09
Ali, Mohannad, “Iraq allocates $224 million to drill new wells in oil field in south,” Azzaman, 5/15/09
Associated Press, “Iraq’s oil exports inch up in January,” 2/1/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Finance ministry to sign new agreements with IMF,” 5/27/09
- “Iraq’s oil exports exceeded 54 million barrels in December – Oil Ministry,” 1/6/09
- “Iraq’s oil prices lower than the international average,” 5/23/09
- “Iraq’s oil revenues increase in April 2009,” 5/23/09
- “Kurdistan oil exports to help reduce budget deficit-lawmakers,” 5/23/09
Business Intelligence Middle East, “China faces unexpected problem drilling for oil in Iraq,” 5/22/09
Chon, Gina, “China Faces Unexpected Problem Drilling for Oil in Iraq – Farmers,” Wall Street Journal, 5/22/09
DiPala, Anthony, “Iraq Oil Export Income Rose 8.2% to $2.69 Billion in April,” Bloomberg, 5/25/09
Hafidh, Hassan, “UPDATE: Iraq April Oil Exports 1.82M B/d, Up 0.33% On Month,” Dow Jones, 5/3/09
Hoyos, Carola and Khalaf, Roula, “Kurdish exports resume despite Iraq impasse,” Financial Times, 5/27/09
Iraq Directory, “The Iraqi oil production is back to 2.4 million barrels per day,” 3/9/09
Lando, Ben, “Iraqi oil exports up but earning less,” UPI, 12/22/08
Reuters, “UPDATE 1-Iraq says to start Kurdistan oil exports on Sunday,” 5/27/09
Salaheddin, Sinan, “Oil Ministry: Iraq’s oil revenues drop,” Associated Press, 4/5/09
Sly, Liz, “Economic downturn finally hits Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, 5/11/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09
Thursday, May 28, 2009
Survey Finds 23% of Iraqis Live In Poverty
The Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology (COSIT), a branch of the Iraqi Planning and Development Ministry, conducted a countrywide survey that was released on May 19, 2009 that found 23% of the nation was living in poverty. The poverty line was set at earning $66 per month, or $2.20 a day. The COSIT was expecting a higher rate, but discovered that the government’s food ration system provided a huge relief to many families, which kept them out of the bottom rung of society. Muthanna at 49%, Babil at 41% and Salahaddin at 40% had the highest rates of poverty. The three Kurdish provinces of Dohuk, 10%, Irbil, 3%, and Sulaymaniya, 3%, had the least.
The COSIT findings are similar to other recent reports on impoverishment in Iraq, and lower than previous accounts. The United Nations for example, puts the poverty rate at 22%. In November 2008 the World Food Programme released an analysis of Iraq’s food situation that included a breakdown of wealth across every district in Iraq that also said poverty hit 22% of the Iraqi population. Their report was more detailed and found that 40% of Iraq’s population lived in the two lowest quintiles of wealth in the country. It also showed that within provinces there were deep pockets of poverty that would be overlooked by the aggregate numbers found by the COSIT and U.N. Ibril for example was tied for the province with the lowest poverty rate by COSIT, yet in the Choman district 79-94% of the population lived in the poorest quintile, and in the Soran and Makhmur districts 50-75% of the population were in that lowest group. At the same time, the 2009 estimate is lower than 2007 when Oxfam estimated that 43% of the country was poor.
A Planning Ministry official said that the major causes of poverty in Iraq were unemployment, run down infrastructure, and corruption. A U.N. survey released in February 2009 found that the jobless rate in Iraq was 18% and underemployment 10%, but that among young people 15-29 years of age, it was 28%. When broken down by gender, young men 15-29 years old have a 57% unemployment rate, which was even higher for women. Iraq has also been consistently rated one of the most corrupt countries in the world. The German group Transparency International releases annual reports ranking countries by corruption. In 2003 Iraq was tied for 113 out of 133 with 1 being the least corrupt country in the world and 133 the worst. In 2004 Iraq went down to being tied for 129 out of 146. In 2005 It was tied for 137 out of 159, 2006 tied for 160 out of 163, 2007 178 out of 180. By 2008 Iraq was tied with Myanmar as the second most corrupt country in the world. Iraq’s infrastructure has also suffered through the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, and the U.S. invasion, along with a decade of international sanctions. It was during the U.N. sanctions in 1995 that the country’s food ration system was created under the Oil-For-Food program. While the system is far from perfect, with the Trade Minister recently having to resign for abusing the program, it is one of the major safety nets in the country.
The COSIT survey is just the most recent report to come out of Iraq that gives a clearer picture of the humanitarian situation within the country. During the height of the fighting large parts of Iraq were off limits, even to the government. Now that violence is down, ministry officials, the United Nations, and non-government organizations are able to enter into most parts of the nation to study the plight of the people. What they are finding is that Iraq is still suffering from many economic hardships, but the numbers are not as high as people expected, and there is hope for improvement with greater access to the population.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq among countries with highest levels of corruption – report,” 9/23/08
- “Poverty in Iraq in 2007 at 23% - COSIT,” 5/19/09
Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq’s Insurgency and Civil Violence,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/22/07
Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Iraq Labour Force Analysis 2003-2008,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, January 2009
- “Karbala Governorate Profile,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, April 2009
IRIN, “IRAQ: Corruption undermining state food aid programme?” 5/19/09
- “IRAQ: Over 20 percent of Iraqis live below the poverty line,” 5/24/09
Reuters, “Iraq Trade Minister Resigns Over Corruption Scandal,” 5/25/09
World Food Programme, “Comprehensive Food Security & Vulnerability Analysis: Iraq,” November 2008
The COSIT findings are similar to other recent reports on impoverishment in Iraq, and lower than previous accounts. The United Nations for example, puts the poverty rate at 22%. In November 2008 the World Food Programme released an analysis of Iraq’s food situation that included a breakdown of wealth across every district in Iraq that also said poverty hit 22% of the Iraqi population. Their report was more detailed and found that 40% of Iraq’s population lived in the two lowest quintiles of wealth in the country. It also showed that within provinces there were deep pockets of poverty that would be overlooked by the aggregate numbers found by the COSIT and U.N. Ibril for example was tied for the province with the lowest poverty rate by COSIT, yet in the Choman district 79-94% of the population lived in the poorest quintile, and in the Soran and Makhmur districts 50-75% of the population were in that lowest group. At the same time, the 2009 estimate is lower than 2007 when Oxfam estimated that 43% of the country was poor.
A Planning Ministry official said that the major causes of poverty in Iraq were unemployment, run down infrastructure, and corruption. A U.N. survey released in February 2009 found that the jobless rate in Iraq was 18% and underemployment 10%, but that among young people 15-29 years of age, it was 28%. When broken down by gender, young men 15-29 years old have a 57% unemployment rate, which was even higher for women. Iraq has also been consistently rated one of the most corrupt countries in the world. The German group Transparency International releases annual reports ranking countries by corruption. In 2003 Iraq was tied for 113 out of 133 with 1 being the least corrupt country in the world and 133 the worst. In 2004 Iraq went down to being tied for 129 out of 146. In 2005 It was tied for 137 out of 159, 2006 tied for 160 out of 163, 2007 178 out of 180. By 2008 Iraq was tied with Myanmar as the second most corrupt country in the world. Iraq’s infrastructure has also suffered through the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, and the U.S. invasion, along with a decade of international sanctions. It was during the U.N. sanctions in 1995 that the country’s food ration system was created under the Oil-For-Food program. While the system is far from perfect, with the Trade Minister recently having to resign for abusing the program, it is one of the major safety nets in the country.
The COSIT survey is just the most recent report to come out of Iraq that gives a clearer picture of the humanitarian situation within the country. During the height of the fighting large parts of Iraq were off limits, even to the government. Now that violence is down, ministry officials, the United Nations, and non-government organizations are able to enter into most parts of the nation to study the plight of the people. What they are finding is that Iraq is still suffering from many economic hardships, but the numbers are not as high as people expected, and there is hope for improvement with greater access to the population.
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq among countries with highest levels of corruption – report,” 9/23/08
- “Poverty in Iraq in 2007 at 23% - COSIT,” 5/19/09
Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq’s Insurgency and Civil Violence,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/22/07
Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Iraq Labour Force Analysis 2003-2008,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, January 2009
- “Karbala Governorate Profile,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, April 2009
IRIN, “IRAQ: Corruption undermining state food aid programme?” 5/19/09
- “IRAQ: Over 20 percent of Iraqis live below the poverty line,” 5/24/09
Reuters, “Iraq Trade Minister Resigns Over Corruption Scandal,” 5/25/09
World Food Programme, “Comprehensive Food Security & Vulnerability Analysis: Iraq,” November 2008
Wednesday, May 27, 2009
How Long Will The U.S. Be In Iraq?
In late May 2009 General George Casey, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff said that the United States could be in Iraq for the next ten years. American forces could actually stay longer. Under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) U.S. troops are to be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. Iraq’s security forces however, will not be able to defend the country by then, most likely leading Baghdad to ask the U.S. to leave behind a residual force to protect Iraq from external threats until the government is able to fulfill its duties.
At the end of February 2009 President Barak Obama announced his withdrawal plan from Iraq. He said that the U.S. drawdown would follow the SOFA signed between the Bush White House and Baghdad. That called for U.S. combat troops to be out of Iraq’s cities and towns by June 30, 2009. They would then relocate to major bases, some of which are going to be conveniently designated outside of city borders like Camp Victory and Forward Operation Base Falcon, both within Baghdad. There are also plans for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government to ask the U.S. to stay in selected joint security stations in the capital, Mosul, and perhaps a few other cities. U.S. forces would then go down from about 140,000 to 128,000 by September 2009. They would stay at that level until Iraq’s parliamentary elections are completed. Originally those were planned for the end of this year, but have now been pushed back to January 30, 2010. Based upon conditions in Iraq, Americans troops would then go down to around 50,000 by the end of August 2010, but that now may be delayed because of the change in schedule for the balloting. The 50,000 would be tasked with advising Iraqi troops, conducting anti-terrorist operations, providing security to U.S. civilians and reconstruction teams, as well as protecting supply convoys. By December 31, 2011 those remaining troops are to be withdrawn. There is one major problem with this plan, Iraqi forces will not be able to protect the country by that date.
The Iraqi army and police have gone through a massive expansion, but still have many years to go. There are now 725,691 in the Iraqi security forces. Their development has been uneven, and there are still plenty of problems to overcome. One of the most important is the fact that the armed forces do not have the heavy weapons such as jetfighters, artillery, and boats, to defend the country from external threats. Originally, the Iraqi Defense Ministry had pegged 2020 as the date they would be capable of national defense. However, because of the country’s financial problems with the drop in oil prices these ideas have now been put on hold. There will be no expansion of the Iraqi Army or major purchases of weapons this year. The Iraqi Air Force wanted to buy 96 F-16 fighters from the United States by 2020. Baghdad doesn’t have the money for that. They don’t even have the funds to maintain what they have now. The U.S. donated 5,000 Humvees to the Iraqi forces, and are expected to turn over another 4,000 as part of the withdrawal. The Americans told the Defense Ministry that they needed $68 million for spare parts to keep up these vehicles, but only $1 million was appropriated. The Iraqis are salvaging spare parts from broken down Humvees to keep others still running as a result.
President Obama and the Iraqi government will have the ultimate decision as to whether the U.S. will stay past 2011. The President has said he doesn’t plan on asking Iraq to let the Americans stay after that deadline, but at the same time he has been very open to the advice of his military commanders. When deciding on the withdrawal timeline he picked the middle path between his promise of getting U.S. troops out in 16 months and the U.S. military command in Iraq’s wish to take 23 months. It would be hard to believe that they won’t advocate staying longer in Iraq if the government can’t protect its air, sea, and borders yet. Baghdad is said to have a similar opinion. Many things can happen between now and 2011, but the way it stands now it looks like the U.S. will be in Iraq for several more years after that date.
SOURCES
Adas, Basil, “US launches plan to boost Iraqi army’s capability,” Gulf News, 9/24/08
Agence France Presse, “Iraq sets election date,” 5/18/09
Ahmed, Hamid, “Iraqi leader calls for anti-corruption campaign,” Associated Press, 5/9/09
Alsumaria, “Iraq to purchase F-16 fighters this year,” 4/1/09
Arraf, Jane, “Can Iraq go it alone?” Christian Science Monitor, 4/21/09
- “Iraqi Army: almost one-quarter lacks minimum qualifications,” Christian Science Monitor, 5/22/09b
- “To meet June deadline, US and Iraqis redraw city borders,” Christian Science Monitor, 5/19/09
Associated Press, “Army chief: U.S. troops could be in Iraq for 10 years,” 5/27/09
Barnes, Julian, “Compromise on Iraq withdrawal timeline appears near,” Los Angeles Times, 2/25/09
- “Obama sees most troops out of Iraq by Aug. 31, 2010,” Los Angeles Times, 2/28/09
BBC, “Iraq sets election date of January 2010,” 5/18/09
Carter, Chelsea, “New threat for Iraqi military: Drop in oil prices,” Associated Press, 5/13/09
Cloud, David, “Inside Obama’s Iraq decision,” Politico, 2/27/09
Haynes, Deborah, “Kurdish Prime Minister predicts US troops will remain in Iraq until 2020,” Times of London, 10/24/08
Londono, Ernesto, “Plunging Oil Prices Force Iraq to Cut Security Jobs,” Washington Post, 5/18/09
Missing Links Blog, “Iraqi forces to be ready by the year 2020, according to plan,” 8/11/08
Nordland, Rod, “Exceptions to Iraq Deadline Are Proposed,” New York Times, 4/27/09
Shanker, Thom, “Minister Sees Need for U.S. Help in Iraq Until 2018,” New York Times, 1/15/08
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09
United States Government Accountability Office, “IRAQ Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,” March 2009
At the end of February 2009 President Barak Obama announced his withdrawal plan from Iraq. He said that the U.S. drawdown would follow the SOFA signed between the Bush White House and Baghdad. That called for U.S. combat troops to be out of Iraq’s cities and towns by June 30, 2009. They would then relocate to major bases, some of which are going to be conveniently designated outside of city borders like Camp Victory and Forward Operation Base Falcon, both within Baghdad. There are also plans for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government to ask the U.S. to stay in selected joint security stations in the capital, Mosul, and perhaps a few other cities. U.S. forces would then go down from about 140,000 to 128,000 by September 2009. They would stay at that level until Iraq’s parliamentary elections are completed. Originally those were planned for the end of this year, but have now been pushed back to January 30, 2010. Based upon conditions in Iraq, Americans troops would then go down to around 50,000 by the end of August 2010, but that now may be delayed because of the change in schedule for the balloting. The 50,000 would be tasked with advising Iraqi troops, conducting anti-terrorist operations, providing security to U.S. civilians and reconstruction teams, as well as protecting supply convoys. By December 31, 2011 those remaining troops are to be withdrawn. There is one major problem with this plan, Iraqi forces will not be able to protect the country by that date.
The Iraqi army and police have gone through a massive expansion, but still have many years to go. There are now 725,691 in the Iraqi security forces. Their development has been uneven, and there are still plenty of problems to overcome. One of the most important is the fact that the armed forces do not have the heavy weapons such as jetfighters, artillery, and boats, to defend the country from external threats. Originally, the Iraqi Defense Ministry had pegged 2020 as the date they would be capable of national defense. However, because of the country’s financial problems with the drop in oil prices these ideas have now been put on hold. There will be no expansion of the Iraqi Army or major purchases of weapons this year. The Iraqi Air Force wanted to buy 96 F-16 fighters from the United States by 2020. Baghdad doesn’t have the money for that. They don’t even have the funds to maintain what they have now. The U.S. donated 5,000 Humvees to the Iraqi forces, and are expected to turn over another 4,000 as part of the withdrawal. The Americans told the Defense Ministry that they needed $68 million for spare parts to keep up these vehicles, but only $1 million was appropriated. The Iraqis are salvaging spare parts from broken down Humvees to keep others still running as a result.
President Obama and the Iraqi government will have the ultimate decision as to whether the U.S. will stay past 2011. The President has said he doesn’t plan on asking Iraq to let the Americans stay after that deadline, but at the same time he has been very open to the advice of his military commanders. When deciding on the withdrawal timeline he picked the middle path between his promise of getting U.S. troops out in 16 months and the U.S. military command in Iraq’s wish to take 23 months. It would be hard to believe that they won’t advocate staying longer in Iraq if the government can’t protect its air, sea, and borders yet. Baghdad is said to have a similar opinion. Many things can happen between now and 2011, but the way it stands now it looks like the U.S. will be in Iraq for several more years after that date.
SOURCES
Adas, Basil, “US launches plan to boost Iraqi army’s capability,” Gulf News, 9/24/08
Agence France Presse, “Iraq sets election date,” 5/18/09
Ahmed, Hamid, “Iraqi leader calls for anti-corruption campaign,” Associated Press, 5/9/09
Alsumaria, “Iraq to purchase F-16 fighters this year,” 4/1/09
Arraf, Jane, “Can Iraq go it alone?” Christian Science Monitor, 4/21/09
- “Iraqi Army: almost one-quarter lacks minimum qualifications,” Christian Science Monitor, 5/22/09b
- “To meet June deadline, US and Iraqis redraw city borders,” Christian Science Monitor, 5/19/09
Associated Press, “Army chief: U.S. troops could be in Iraq for 10 years,” 5/27/09
Barnes, Julian, “Compromise on Iraq withdrawal timeline appears near,” Los Angeles Times, 2/25/09
- “Obama sees most troops out of Iraq by Aug. 31, 2010,” Los Angeles Times, 2/28/09
BBC, “Iraq sets election date of January 2010,” 5/18/09
Carter, Chelsea, “New threat for Iraqi military: Drop in oil prices,” Associated Press, 5/13/09
Cloud, David, “Inside Obama’s Iraq decision,” Politico, 2/27/09
Haynes, Deborah, “Kurdish Prime Minister predicts US troops will remain in Iraq until 2020,” Times of London, 10/24/08
Londono, Ernesto, “Plunging Oil Prices Force Iraq to Cut Security Jobs,” Washington Post, 5/18/09
Missing Links Blog, “Iraqi forces to be ready by the year 2020, according to plan,” 8/11/08
Nordland, Rod, “Exceptions to Iraq Deadline Are Proposed,” New York Times, 4/27/09
Shanker, Thom, “Minister Sees Need for U.S. Help in Iraq Until 2018,” New York Times, 1/15/08
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09
United States Government Accountability Office, “IRAQ Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,” March 2009
Tuesday, May 26, 2009
Kurdish Parliamentary Elections Announced For July
At the beginning of May 2009 the President of the Kurdistan Regional Government Massoud Barzani announced that Kurdish parliamentary elections will be held on July 25. Originally they were planned for May. 42 parties and alliances with a total of 509 candidates will run for 111 seats. That’s an increase from previous elections. In 1992 only seven parties ran, and in 2005 thirteen. Since the 1990s Kurdish politics have been dominated by the two major parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Barzani. They plan on running together again in the 2009 vote. This year’s balloting may be the start of a sea change in Kurdish politics however as the former co-founder of the PUK his own party, which could break the monopoly on power held by the ruling groups.
2.5 million Kurds are registered to vote. Only those that reside in the three Kurdish provinces of Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniya are eligible. Eleven of the 111 seats are reserved for minorities. Five are to go to Turkmen, five for Christians, and one for Armenians. 30% are also to go to women. Despite some earlier controversy, the Iraqi Election Commission will supervise the voting. Currently the KDP holds 40 seats, followed by the 38 of the PUK. The next two parties, the Kurdistan Islamic Union only holds nine followed by the Turkmen Party with four.
Current Seats Held In The Kurdish Parliament
Kurdistan Democratic Party: 40
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 38
Kurdistan Islamic Union: 9
Turkmen Party: 4
Kurdistan Communist Party: 3
Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party: 2
Assyrian Democratic Movement: 2
Chaldean Cultural Society: 1
Bet Nahrain Democratic Party: 1
Chaldean Democratic Union Party: 1
Farmers Movement Party: 1
Kurdistan Democratic National Union: 1
Independent Nouri Talabany: 1
Islamic Group of Kurdistan: 6
Kurdistan Toilers Party: 1
The biggest change in this year’s election is the fact that PUK co-founder Nishurwan Mustafa will run as the head of the Change List. Mustafa co-founded the PUK with Talabani, but later resigned in December 2006. Mustafa plans on running against the domination of the PUK and KDP, claiming that they are corrupt, autocratic, and have not provided services. Mustafa has a decided advantage heading into the balloting because he owns a large media company called Wisha, and is popular in Sulaymaniya. Since the KDP and PUK are roughly equal, Mustafa could play the insurgent and break that balance of power.
This comes on the heels of a number of defections and dissension within the PUK. In February 2009 a group of leading officials in the PUK politburo led by Deputy Secretary General Kosrat Rasoul Ali, who is also the Vice President of the Kurdistan Regional Government, threatened to resign unless Talabani instituted reforms in the party to make it more democratic, end corruption, and work towards greater transparency over its finances. Talabani ended up giving into their demands, and replaced the Interior Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of Kurdistan as well.
The next few months will be an interesting election cycle in Kurdistan. Mustafa will have to prove that he can use his media power and popularity to form a credible opposition party and sway voters to his cause. The PUK and KDP will also have to bring out the vote as they have come under increasing criticism from everyday Kurds along with their own party officials. This could be the beginning of a major change in the region’s politics if the hold of the PUK and KDP are really challenged.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Five Iraqi Kurdish Party Officials Resign,” 2/13/09
- “Iraqi Kurds to hold election on July 25,” 5/5/09
Alsumaria, “Talabani to share power within his party,” 2/18/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “509 candidates run for Kurdish elections – IHEC,” 5/21/09
- “Kurdish interior ministry to resign – ministry,” 3/10/09
- “Kurdistan’s deputy PM resigns after relieved of duties,” 2/24/09
- “Main Kurdish parties announce alliance in elections,” 5/7/09
Azzaman, “Talabani Tries To Prevent His Party From Splitting And Rejects The Resignation Of Rasul,” 2/17/09
Barzanji, Yahya, “New candidate emerges among Iraq’s Kurds,” Associated Press, 5/2/09
Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “kdp and puk face election challenge,” Niqash, 5/12/09
Kurdish Media.com, “Barzani rejects IHEC to supervise KRG Elections, Hawlati,” 2/26/09
Ose, Oshnag, “talabani battles new calls for reform,” Niqash, 3/4/09
Zagros, Roman and Mahmood, Azeez, “Third Force in Kurdish Politics Mooted,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 3/30/09
2.5 million Kurds are registered to vote. Only those that reside in the three Kurdish provinces of Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniya are eligible. Eleven of the 111 seats are reserved for minorities. Five are to go to Turkmen, five for Christians, and one for Armenians. 30% are also to go to women. Despite some earlier controversy, the Iraqi Election Commission will supervise the voting. Currently the KDP holds 40 seats, followed by the 38 of the PUK. The next two parties, the Kurdistan Islamic Union only holds nine followed by the Turkmen Party with four.
Current Seats Held In The Kurdish Parliament
Kurdistan Democratic Party: 40
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 38
Kurdistan Islamic Union: 9
Turkmen Party: 4
Kurdistan Communist Party: 3
Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party: 2
Assyrian Democratic Movement: 2
Chaldean Cultural Society: 1
Bet Nahrain Democratic Party: 1
Chaldean Democratic Union Party: 1
Farmers Movement Party: 1
Kurdistan Democratic National Union: 1
Independent Nouri Talabany: 1
Islamic Group of Kurdistan: 6
Kurdistan Toilers Party: 1
The biggest change in this year’s election is the fact that PUK co-founder Nishurwan Mustafa will run as the head of the Change List. Mustafa co-founded the PUK with Talabani, but later resigned in December 2006. Mustafa plans on running against the domination of the PUK and KDP, claiming that they are corrupt, autocratic, and have not provided services. Mustafa has a decided advantage heading into the balloting because he owns a large media company called Wisha, and is popular in Sulaymaniya. Since the KDP and PUK are roughly equal, Mustafa could play the insurgent and break that balance of power.
This comes on the heels of a number of defections and dissension within the PUK. In February 2009 a group of leading officials in the PUK politburo led by Deputy Secretary General Kosrat Rasoul Ali, who is also the Vice President of the Kurdistan Regional Government, threatened to resign unless Talabani instituted reforms in the party to make it more democratic, end corruption, and work towards greater transparency over its finances. Talabani ended up giving into their demands, and replaced the Interior Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of Kurdistan as well.
The next few months will be an interesting election cycle in Kurdistan. Mustafa will have to prove that he can use his media power and popularity to form a credible opposition party and sway voters to his cause. The PUK and KDP will also have to bring out the vote as they have come under increasing criticism from everyday Kurds along with their own party officials. This could be the beginning of a major change in the region’s politics if the hold of the PUK and KDP are really challenged.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Five Iraqi Kurdish Party Officials Resign,” 2/13/09
- “Iraqi Kurds to hold election on July 25,” 5/5/09
Alsumaria, “Talabani to share power within his party,” 2/18/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “509 candidates run for Kurdish elections – IHEC,” 5/21/09
- “Kurdish interior ministry to resign – ministry,” 3/10/09
- “Kurdistan’s deputy PM resigns after relieved of duties,” 2/24/09
- “Main Kurdish parties announce alliance in elections,” 5/7/09
Azzaman, “Talabani Tries To Prevent His Party From Splitting And Rejects The Resignation Of Rasul,” 2/17/09
Barzanji, Yahya, “New candidate emerges among Iraq’s Kurds,” Associated Press, 5/2/09
Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, “kdp and puk face election challenge,” Niqash, 5/12/09
Kurdish Media.com, “Barzani rejects IHEC to supervise KRG Elections, Hawlati,” 2/26/09
Ose, Oshnag, “talabani battles new calls for reform,” Niqash, 3/4/09
Zagros, Roman and Mahmood, Azeez, “Third Force in Kurdish Politics Mooted,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 3/30/09
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