Iraqi Parties Try To Delay 2021 Vote Again

(CNN)
Many of Iraq’s political parties have been opposed to early elections in 2021. They have put up various roadblocks to try to delay them as a result. The latest is taking the election law to court.

A Look At Iraq’s 2014 Election, Interview With Reidar Visser

In April 2014 Iraq held its latest parliamentary elections. The vote was all about Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. His State of Law walked away with by far the most seats, 95 in total, while his rivals only got around 20-30 seats each. In the months that follow Maliki and his supporters and detractors will hold a series of protracted negotiations to form a new Iraqi government. To help explain the results and the possible outcomes of the balloting is Reidar Visser, a noted Iraq historian. He runs two blogs Iraq and Gulf Analysis and historiae.org, and has written and co-authored three books, Basra, the Failed Gulf State: Separatism and Nationalism in Southern Iraq, An Iraq of Its Regions: Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy?, and A Responsible End?: The United States and the Iraqi Transition, 2005-2010. He can be followed on Twitter @reidarvisser.

Maliki's State of Law came away as the big winner in the 2014 elections (BBC)

1. Maliki’s State of Law walked away with 95 seats in this year’s election. Approximately how many other parties are aligned with him right now and around how many seats will that give him?

Maliki’s potential support base outside State of Law can be conceptualized as a set of concentric circles with increasingly weaker loyalty to him. Immediately outside State of Law with 95 seats, and with good chances of future loyalty, is a stratum of a couple of deputies with a history of close ties to the State of Law, who have continued to maintain friendly relations with Maliki despite running separately. They include Haytham al-Jibburi of the Kafaat & Jamahir movement and Ali Taleb Abd al-Hasan of the Solidarity in Iraq movement, a party affiliated with the Dhi Qar cleric Muhammad Mahdi al-Nasiri who is considered pro-Maliki, and Ali Subhi al-Maliki of the Just State movement (who had Maliki’s picture on his own election poster). Subsequent to the publication of the results, politicians from the two first of these movements went on to claim they had formally enrolled in the State of Law alliance, as did two deputies from a local list in Najaf with a somewhat more secular profile. This segment also includes one seat for the Sadiqun party considered close to the Asaib Ahl al-Haq militia, although it is noteworthy that this movement, despite much hype about it in Western media, failed to make much of an impression on the Iraqi electorate. Nothing is set in stone, though. Another deputy from Kafaat & Jamahir, former interior minister Jawad al-Bolani, first reportedly joined the pro-[Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq] ISCI Muwatin bloc before subsequently joining Maliki, bringing the total of his State of Law bloc to around 101 seats plus the 1 Asaib Ahl al-Haq seat (which probably no one else will have anything to do with anyway).

Beyond these 102 deputies, I think the loyalties of the parties considered close or potentially close to Maliki is far more open to negotiation. Despite some points of contact in the past, there has also been periods of friction with Maliki. This includes the 6 seats of the Shia Islamist Fadhila, the one seat of the Tanzim al-Dakhil branch of the Daawa (they broke acrimoniously with Maliki in August 2009 when they joined [Iraqi National Alliance] INA ahead of the 2010 general election), and the 6 seats of Ibrahim al-Jaafari (whose role as unofficial PM candidate of INA and thus a challenger to Maliki in 2010 is often forgotten). That’s 15 extra seats, but their alliance with Maliki is no more of a foregone conclusion than the case is with respect to some of the smaller secular and religious minority parties such as the Iraq Coalition (5 seats) or the two Anbar lists (3 plus 2 seats) often cited as potential Maliki allies.

2. There was some talk before the vote about how many seats the prime minister would need to win to give him the upper hand in the government formation talks. Do you believe there was such a tipping point and if so did he achieve that amount?

Maliki would have needed closer to 120 seats in order to truly achieve the upper hand. With the results that materialized, Maliki will need to compromise with at least one (and probably two) of his main opponents – the Kurds, Sadr, Hakim, Nujafi or Allawi.

3. For the last several years Prime Minister Maliki has talked about forming a majority government. Do you think that’s possible after the 2014 elections, and would it make a more effective administration?

I think the concept of a political majority would be good for Iraq if it was attainable. In 2010, Allawi and Maliki could have achieved it if they hadn’t been strong personal enemies. This year, I don’t think the numbers will add up but they are tantalizingly close to the required majority and I fear Maliki’s hubris will make him expend a lot of energy trying to reach such a majority anyway. It should be remembered that even in the previous Iraqi parliament, State of Law deputies would frequently talk about a “political majority” in contexts when they were very far from achieving this. One potential variation of the theme would be Maliki joining with the Kurds, which could be sufficient basis for a majority. The only thing that would keep them united, though, would be agreement on a third Maliki term. Indeed, most of Maliki’s rhetoric in favor of a political majority has focused on criticism of Kurdish independent oil policy. Still, the possibility of Maliki turning around and offering some concessions for a guarantee of a third term should not be ruled out.

4. Maliki’s stated opponents, Moqtada al-Sadr’s Ahrar/Liberals, Ammar Hakim’s Mowatin/Citizen’s Alliance, Speaker Osama Nujafi’s Mutahidun/Uniters, Kurdish President Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and Iyad Allawi’s Wataniya/Nationalist Coalition won 138 seats between them. That would seem to give them the advantage over the prime minister, but as ever their main problem is keeping a unified stance. Do you think they have any better chance to achieve that than in 2012 when some of these same parties attempted a no confidence vote against Maliki?

The relative numerical strength of these parties vis a vis Maliki is less now than in 2012, where it may have been close to 160 out of 325 at its height – before Iran ordered the Sadrists to back down. When it comes to manipulating the segment of parties in the range from 1 to 3 deputies, Maliki probably has an advantage of incumbency compared to his enemies.

Allawi (left), Speaker Nujafi (center), Dep PM Mutlaq (right) are trying to create a Sunni Alliance (Shafaq News)

5. As a follow up to that Speaker Nujafi is talking about creating a grand Sunni alliance consisting of him, Allawi and Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq. What chance does that have of working out?

I think the chances of it working out are limited, not least because they have spent a good deal energy splitting up from the 2010 alliance. Additionally, it is unlikely to become politically relevant since Maliki’s interest in these groups mainly relates to the prospect of one of them breaking ranks with the others and then joining Maliki.

6. In a similar vein, Sadr and Hakim seem to be focusing upon reforming the National Alliance that they were part of in 2010. What do you think they hope to achieve with that?

Sadr and Hakim may have been hoping to reconstitute the Shiite alliance and then have Maliki replaced with someone they like better personally. That plan lost some of its momentum because of Maliki’s relative success in term of a good personal vote and an increase of his share of the parliament seats despite the Najaf clergy clearly sending signals about the desirability of replacing him with someone else. At the time of the election there was much talk of Tareq Najm [parliamentarian from State of Law] as a possible substitute for Maliki. Already that kind of talk has faded somewhat.

7. With every vote in Iraq there come complaints about the winners cheating. Maliki’s opponents are all claiming that he fixed the balloting one way or another, while most of the Kurdish parties are accusing the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan of fraud as well. Do you think there is any merit to these charges, and more importantly could they change the results if the Iraqi Election Commission takes any of them up?

A couple of points on this. I think if IHEC was as corrupt as some claim, Maliki would have got a bigger win and he would not have lost so many key allies and friends (who lost out in the personal vote). It is still unclear which way IHEC’s decision will go with respect to the complaints. They have released data from the special vote for the security forces as well as the “Baghdad belt” (where accusations of ballot-stuffing to Maliki’s advantage materialized). Questions still remain after these attempts at creating enhanced transparency. For example, in the security force vote, the Maliki vote in Diyala and the PUK vote in Sulaymaniya seem artificially high. Similarly, with respect to the “Baghdad belt” vote, IHEC has released data that show suspiciously high participation at some stations, but it has released results only at the aggregate level of the counting centers. To allay fears about ballot stuffing, it should release results for individual stations in the “Baghdad belt”, and in particular those with participation rates in the 80-95% range.

8. Quite a few prominent Iraqi parliamentarians were defeated in this year’s balloting. Can you name some of them, and do you think this points to some accountability being established in the country?

Deputies who lost their seats include Hassan al-Sunayd, Ali Shalah, Khalid al-Attiya, Yasin Majid, Walid al-Hilli, Ihsan al-Awwadi, Sami al-Askari and Izzat al-Shabandar from the Maliki camp. Similarly Nassar al-Rubayyie and Maha al-Duri, from the Sadrist list, lost their seats.

This is the beauty of the personal vote in Iraq, and, incidentally, I think, an indication of the integrity of what IHEC is doing. Using the personal vote has become the norm with 80-90% of all voters expressing a candidate preference in the materials that I have been working with. In the big cities, in particular, personal votes radically affect the ranking of the candidates, with people far down on the lists promoted to top positions through the actions of the electorates in places like Basra, Baghdad and Mosul.

9. Internal issues are only part of the picture when it comes to Iraqi politics. The United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran all have tried to play a role in the country. How might each attempt to influence the government formation process?

I think there is a real difference between these regional powers as regards their ability to micro-manage the government formation process. Iran may want to see the next Iraqi PM emerge as the result of a decision by a united Shiite alliance. It can exercise leverage to have that alliance reconstituted and in turn influence the process of PM candidate selection within the alliance. Turkey may influence the preferences of the Iraqi Kurdish parties, though it is noteworthy that in theory the Shiites can form a government without Kurdish support this time. This fact somewhat reduces Turkish leverage. Finally, the influence of Saudi Arabia is much less than the two others, and primarily relates to the precise level, intensity and sourness of discontent expressed by its friends among Iraqi Sunnis and seculars.

Iraq’s Shiite Militias Trying To Impose Religious Beliefs On Baghdad Again

Besides the daily regimen of bombings and shootings Iraq has also witnessed a number of attacks upon clubs, bars, cafes, liquor stores, and women since 2003. This year is no different with reports emerging of a number of closures, beatings, and drive by shootings of various businesses in Baghdad. While no one has been named, it is widely believed that Shiite militias are responsible. Several politicians have come out in support of these operations, claiming that they are enforcing the public’s morals and restrictions during Ramadan. The government on the other hand has issued a number of conflicting justifications for these incidents, while no one has ever been prosecuted for them. A rather ironic set of events given that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s list is called State of Law. That has led some to accuse the premier of either being behind some of these assaults or standing by and doing nothing about them since they likely involve some of his erstwhile allies. These acts represent how Islamists have attempted to impose their will upon Iraqi society using force.

Stores that sell alcohol have been a target of militias and the security forces since 2003 (Niqash)

The latest incidents occurred in Baghdad’s Karrada district at the beginning of July 2013. On July 5, it was reported that gunmen in SUV’s stormed several clubs, bars, and cafes telling everyone to leave or they would be beaten. The government reacted by issuing a number of contradictory justifications. Baghdad authorities claimed that certain cafes had been banned. The police elaborated that they were using underage females as waitresses. A spokesman for the Baghdad Operations Command followed up by saying that it had received orders to close certain cafes, and the Interior Ministry said that the establishments could re-open as soon as they stopped using young help. On the other hand, the new Sadrist governor set up a special committee to prosecute the owners. Several Shiite politicians came out in support of the attacks. One told the press that the businesses were a disgrace and an insult to the Iraqi people and Islam, and that the government needed to regulate them more. A member of the Baghdad provincial council said that the closures were necessary to protect the families of Karrada. A Fadhila lawmaker called for an investigation, not into the attackers, but rather one owner that killed and wounded two of his assailants. He held a press conference to call for all businesses that served alcohol in the country to be closed, especially since it was Ramadan. A State of Law legislator seconded his opinion, while another claimed the bars and clubs were angering the public, and were unIslamic. A member of the Sadr bloc in parliament believed that closing the establishments was allowed under the constitution, and that it was the duty of the government to enforce these limitations. Another follower of Moqtada stated that the new Sadrist government of Baghdad was behind the closures, but that was quickly denied by another Sadrist who said that the movement was not trying to create a religious government in the capital. Other parties were not so happy with the turn of events. An Iraqi National Dialogue Front member blamed militias for the attacks, and implied they had the support of the government. A Kurdish Coalition legislator said that the attacks were a failure of the state to preserve law and order. A tribal group in Baghdad also condemned the attacks saying that the security forces should deal with any violations, and the Human Rights Ministry said that these assaults were a violation of the rule of law, and was the work of political parties. Three weeks later Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was forced to respond stating that the authorities were responsible for enforcing the law, and that militias and gangs were not accepted. He went on to claim that people had been arrested for the assaults, and the incidents were being investigated. Vigilante justice like these assaults is nothing new to Iraq. Since 2003, various groups have taken the law into their own hands over a number of issues. Businesses that are considered sinful and breaking religious law have been targeted for years. The fact that so many Shiite politicians came out in support of the actions showed that they have widespread support amongst the elite, and will continue with impunity despite Maliki’s comments about the rule of law.

A Baghdad club destroyed by security forces in Sep. 2012 (Al Arabiya)

This year has been no different from previous ones where militants have attacked shops. Earlier in the year in May, gunmen went after a brothel, killing 12 with silenced pistols and knives, and a liquor store suffered a drive by shooting. The week before several alcohol shops run by Yazidis were attacked leaving 8 to 11 people dead, and several wounded. All three incidents occurred in Baghdad’s Zayuna neighborhood. Back on September 4, 2012 security forces raided and destroyed several clubs in Karrada and Arasat for selling alcohol.  All had licenses however to sell liquor, despite statements to the contrary by the authorities. One patron claimed that the National Police conducted the closures, while Agence Presse France reported that it was the work of the Baghdad Brigade under the orders of General Farouk Araji, the director of the Office of Commander in Chief. Echoing the comments in 2013, the head of the Baghdad provincial council told the media that the actions were taken after public complaints about the clubs. The Office of Commander in Chief issued a statement saying that the raids were under court order, but a judiciary spokesman denied that. A security source told Al-Mada that Maliki had ordered the shut down of the clubs. Again like in this year, these actions were supported by other Shiite religious parties such as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. At the same time there were stories that security forces were stopping women in Kadhimiya who were without headscarves, claiming that it was in respect for the religious shrines in the area. Earlier in April 2012, police attacked a series of nightclubs and alcohol shops in Baghdad, and shut them down. Previously in June and July liquor stores in New Baghdad and Karrada were bombed. (1) This was part of a spate of bombings that started in March and struck 25 businesses selling alcohol in the capital. In 2010, Sadrists attacked alcohol sellers as well. The Trend had been carrying out similar acts since April 2003. These previous events show a mix of militias and security forces illegally shutting down and assaulting enterprises that they felt were unIslamic. All received official or unofficial support from the authorities and political parties for what they saw as legitimate acts to maintain a religious society. It is also the reason why no one has ever been punished for this lawlessness, and why it continues to this day.

A bombed liquor store in Baghdad (CNN)

All of the major Shiite parties that rule Iraq are religious ones. Whether it is Maliki’s State of Law, which is led by the Dawa, the Supreme Council, the Sadrists, Fadhila or others, all have an Islamist ideology. Following these beliefs they have carried out attacks again and again upon businesses they feel are breaking their moral codes. Many times they have publicly come out saying that this is legal and constitutional, and done at the behest of the public. In reality, it shows that they are vigilantes who flaunt the law to impose their own religious views upon society. It is highly ironic as well since they condemn the terrorist acts of the Sunni insurgency, but are completely willing to carrying out their own bombings and killings when it suits them. This is the sorry state of Iraqi politics where every party has a militia, and some have sway over the security forces, and are more than willing to use them for their own gain rather than trying to create a country based upon rule of law where no party is above it.

FOOTNOTE

1. Brosk, Raman, “Baghdad liquor stores targeted in bombings,” AK News, 6/21/11

SOURCES

Abbas, Mushreq, “New Religious Campaign Targets Baghdad’s Cafes,” Al-Monitor, 7/19/13

Agence France Presse, “Dozen shot dead at Baghdad brothel,” 5/22/13

AIN, “Baldawi calls to close impudent coffee shops,” 7/20/13

- “Nightclubs arouse rage among people, politicians,” 7/21/13

- “Sadrist MP: Constitution assures calling to close impudent coffee shops,” 7/20/13

Alsumaria, “Human rights: political parties behind closed cafes and civil peace at risk,” 7/21/13

Aswat al-Iraq, “Alcohol shop blown up, 2 persons injured, in Baghdad,” 7/5/11

Brosk, Raman, “Baghdad liquor stores targeted in bombings,” AK News, 6/21/11

Buratha News, “Deputy: House of Representatives cafes defenders dissolute return to the countries in which they reside,” 7/20/13

Cole, Juan, “The United States and Shi’ite Religious Factions in Post-Ba’thist Iraq,” Middle East Journal, Autumn 2003

Decamme, Guillaume, “Iraq forces raid Baghdad nightclubs: officials,” Agence France Presse, 9/5/12

Habib, Musafa, “baghdad bans beer: why new Iraqi prohibition is an ominous sign,” Niqash, 9/13/12

Al-Haidari, Moyad, Rechnagel, Charles, “Raid On Nightclubs Raises Fears Of Islamic State,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 9/11/12

Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Shiite militia reviving in post-election Iraq,” Associated Press, 5/4/10

Lewis, Jessica, Ali, Ahmed, and Kagan, Kimberly, “Iraq’s sectarian crisis reignites as Shi’a militias execute civilians and remobilize,” Institute for the Study of War, 5/31/13

Al-Mada, “Clans gathered south of Baghdad: Assault on cafes unacceptable and strange to talk about converting to other Najaf Karrada,” 7/21/13

- “Deputies: “assault” on the social clubs attempt to clone “Iranian experience” and was a “failure” of the state,” 7/7/13

National Iraqi News Agency, “Maliki: The State in responsible of enforcing the Law, no trespassing leniency with the militias, gangs,” 7/20/13

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Several Killed As Iraqi Gunmen Open Fire On Liquor Stores,” 5/14/13

Al-Rasheed, Muntathar and al-Shibeeb, Dina, “Crackdown on Iraq nightclubs upsets rights activists, sparks mystery,” Al Arabiya, 9/22/12

Al Rayy, “Fadhila calls for an investigative committee on the killing and wounding citizens demanded the closure of liquor shops,” 7/18/13

Sadah, Ali Abel, “Iraq’s Yazidis in Crossfire In Baghdad,” Al-Monitor, 5/19/13

Al-Saray, Ali, “Iraqi Nightclub Crackdown Fuels ‘Islamization’ Fears,” Al-Hayat, 9/11/12

Shafaq News, “Source: new measures promote the government to be Islamic state,” 9/8/12

Tawfeeq, Mohammed and Carter, Chelsea, “Iraq liquor store owners fear for their lives amid attacks,” CNN, 6/7/11

Is Iraq’s Prime Minister Becoming A Dictator? An Interview With Kirk Sowell Of Inside Iraqi Politics

Kirk Sowell runs Uticensis Risk Services. He combs through Arabic sources for news on Iraq, and compiles the information in his twice-monthly Inside Iraqi Politics newsletter, one of the most informative sources available. Below is an interview with Sowell on the hot topic within Iraq today, whether Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is becoming an autocrat. One of the main concerns of analysts and Iraqi politicians has been the premier’s attempts to politicize the security forces. That is the main point of the conversation with Sowell, but it also covers the political and judicial situation, and what are Maliki’s main motivations. This is one part of a series of interviews with leading Iraq analysts on the topic of the prime minister.

PM Maliki at the opening ceremony of the Defense University for Military Studies in Baghdad June 17, 2012. There have been many reports that the premier has tried to politicize the security forces (Reuters)

1.  One of the main arguments made by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s critics is that he has politicized the Iraqi security forces. Is there any validity behind this claim?

There are numerous examples, which confirm this. Three examples: one, use of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, Maliki’s military staff, to sideline the Army senior staff; two, the operations commands, which report to Maliki, have no legal basis and often make warrantless arrests; and three, the massively-staffed Interior Ministry, which is run by a close Dawa Party ally, and also makes warrantless arrests.

Furthermore, he has done it in a way that has helped seal their loyalty to him. A lot of Maliki’s senior officers are former Baathists he has protected from deBaathification. He doesn’t have the legal authority to do that, but he’s done it anyway, and it means many would fear for their lives and careers if a Shiite Islamist with a more hardline stance on deBaathification were to take office.

2. Since the 2010 parliamentary elections, Maliki has gained greater control over the security apparatus, because he was made acting head of the Interior, Defense, and National Security Ministries. If people were concerned about his use of the security forces, why did they agree to give him so much control over them?

To be candid, I don’t know what they were thinking. It is truly stunning in fact, given the long struggle to prevent his reelection and all the talk from the Sadrists and Kurds about limiting the prime minister’s power, that they did this. It was a colossal and really inexplicable misjudgment.

3.  Who was supposed to get each one of those ministries, and why haven’t they ever been appointed?

Iyad Allawi was supposed to nominate the Defense Minister, and the Shiite Islamist bloc would nominate the Interior Minister. That was the agreement as both sides described it in December 2010 when the government was formed. Maliki has engaged in revisionism, saying later that the agreement was to have the defense nominee be a Sunni Arab, allowing him to just appoint one close to himself. As for why, it is kind of a game that Maliki played last year. Maliki rejected all of Allawi’s nominees except one, and that one he submitted to parliament was after he publicly broke with Allawi and Allawi disowned him. The Sadrists have worked with Allawi to veto Maliki’s choice at interior.

4.  Maliki actually got rid of the National Security Ministry rather quietly. Could you explain how he did that?

He did it by fiat. No written order has ever surfaced, nor even a press release announcing it. It was created when Iyad Allawi was prime minister and never established by statute, so there is no reason why legally he couldn’t abolish it. What is odd is that he tried to get parliament to do so in July 2011, and it refused, and so he just did it anyway, but quietly, and then it was acknowledged only later. According to parliamentary minutes, the ministry’s abolition was first mentioned there on November 26, 2011, and in passing, by a Maliki parliamentarian, as if it were no big deal. This means there is no parliamentary confirmation process for overseeing the intelligence services. It is now called the National Security Advisory.

5.  Who are the acting Defense and Interior Ministers and how are they connected to Maliki?

Acting Defense Minister Sadoun al-Dulaimi belongs to the Sunni Arab Accordance Front, which has long been a relatively Maliki-friendly Sunni party. He served as Defense Minister under Ibrahim al-Jaafari and has no political base. The de facto Interior Minister is Deputy Interior Minister Adnan al-Asadi, who is a card-carrying member of the Dawa Party. He held the same position in Maliki’s first government, and then was elected to parliament in 2010. He resigned on Maliki’s instructions in June 2011, and began running Interior informally for Maliki shortly thereafter.

6. One way the premier has been able to assert himself within the security forces is to appoint commanders. In a recent issue of your Inside Iraqi Politics, you said that he was actually doing that for three separate reasons, could you explain those?

Well, there are three reasons given by different parties. One, by Asadi, is just protocol – it is standard procedure to rotate commanders. Two, others close to Maliki say the changes are related to issues of competency, given continued security failures. Three, Maliki’s rivals say it is to implant his personal control.

7. Could another reason why the prime minister is changing commanders within the security forces be the fact that he is trying to "coup proof" the government?  In most of the Middle East, the primary concern of the security forces is to repress internal opponents, and ensure the regime's survival. Is Iraq falling back into that pattern?

I believe that is a reason, and indeed if you look at the relatively small size of the army compared to the Interior Ministry, the latter is three times larger, this is exactly how other Arab countries have their security forces structured. More than one in every fifty Iraqis works for the Interior Ministry. It would be as if, adjusting for population, in the U.S. the FBI and the marshal service had over six million armed personnel.

8. One way Maliki has been able to do all this is because parliament has never passed any laws to regulate the security forces. What happened to that legislation?

The legislation is still there, in fact the Defense and Interior Ministry bills have passed an initial reading. The fault here is parliament’s, or more specifically, the parties, their leaders and MPs. Maliki only controls 87 of 325 MPs; the other parties could override him if they’d just show up, but lots of them, especially from Allawi’s side, just don’t attend. Allawi himself is a member of parliament, but lives in Jordan and almost never attends.

9. There is a law for the provincial police forces under the 2008 Provincial Powers Law that gives the governors control over things like police chiefs. How has Maliki been able to get around that legislation?

Article 31 of that law gives governors “direct authority over local security… with the exception of army units.” A couple of other provisions provide more qualified authority to the provincial government, one says that the local security plan must be formulated “in coordination with” the federal government, and another says that when the governor appoints a new chief of police this appointment must be in accordance with Interior Ministry standards. What Maliki has done in practice is turn this inside out. He sometimes consults with local authorities, but often just imposes a police chief when consultation breaks down.

How Maliki gets away with this is a bit more complicated, but it essentially comes down to using all the levers of pressure he has and not taking “no” for an answer. In the Shiite provinces, only two of the ten governors are from his rivals, and all across the country they are almost entirely dependent on Baghdad for money. In addition to political and financial levers, one must bear in mind that councilmembers have been arrested before simply for criticizing federal policy, and that makes it easier to understand how he seems to always get his way. In some cases, Maliki will appoint his preferred candidate as “acting chief,” despite having no authority to do so, and then just keep applying pressure until the council gives in.

10. As early as 2009 there have been reports that Maliki has used the security forces against his opponents. Do you have any examples of that?

I’d go back to 2006, when he federalized the police in Basra to take on the base of the Fadhila Party, a rival Shiite party. Then in 2007 he started taking over the police in provinces controlled by the Iran-backed Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), and then in 2008 he went after Sadr with the army. The difference then was that under Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order 71 he had the authority to take over the police, and frankly, Fadhila, ISCI and Sadr all were running militias, so they deserved it. The security forces have been deeply politicized since 2005 under Jaafari; it’s not like they were ever not politicized.

There have also been many claims from Allawi and his Sunni allies of illegal arrests; you may be thinking of a couple of prominent cases in Diyala prior to the 2010 elections. The problem in all those cases is the lack of transparency; there is no publicly available information related to arrest warrants, no public trials. In fact few get trials, most I’ve seen reports on are arrested, and then later released. The point appears to just be intimidation.

11. Could you speak on Maliki’s influence over the judiciary?

The jurisprudence of this Supreme Court, which was founded in 2005, can be divided into two periods. One is from 2005-2009, during which time the Court made some principled decisions, which were controversial, but which did not threaten the executive, such as by affirming the right of parliamentarians to travel to Israel, and invalidating electoral rules passed by parliament. When it came to anything really high stakes, they simply refused to take the case. The second period runs from early 2010 to the present, in which the Court has had a perfect pro-Maliki record. Some of these decisions have been defensible on their face, and some have been absurd. The main two areas of impact have been the Court's role in letting the Shiite bloc and the Kurds violate the constitution in 2010 and take as long as they needed to make their deal [over a new ruling coalition], and also two decisions have which weakened parliament and the independent commissions vis-a-vis the executive.

How exactly Maliki managed this is not clear, but the common denominator is Chief Justice Medhat al-Mahmoud, who heads both the Supreme Court and the Judicial High Council, which appoints the judges for all lower courts. Mahmoud had a long career in the Saddam-era justice ministry, and appears to have accommodated himself to the new system.

12. Can parliament limit Maliki's power in any way, and if so, why hasn't it?

Yes it could, or at least it could put Maliki on the spot by passing legislation and forcing Maliki to either accept or defy it. It hasn't been able to do so, because of divisions between the other parties, and because so many just don't show up in parliament. Attendance averages 60-65 percent and is rarely above 75 percent.

13. Iraq’s political parties have been pretty ineffective in limiting Maliki’s expansion of power. Have any rivals emerged within Maliki’s own State of Law or Dawa Party that might challenge him in the future?

I would say none that don't have so much baggage as to be seriously handicapped. Within Dawa, Ali al-Adeeb, the Minister of Higher Education, is known as the head of the "Iranian wing" of the party, and there have been numerous reports over the years of barely concealed competition with Maliki. His following outside of Dawa is very limited, and indeed negative, precisely because he is viewed as close to Iran.

In State of Law more broadly, Deputy Prime Minister for Energy Affairs Hussein al-Shahristani appeared for some time to perhaps be able to do so. The Electricity and Oil Ministries' problems, combined with Shahristani's incessant conflicts with provincial officials over centralization, have taken the shine off. Even more there is a report by parliament's energy committee on the electricity contracts scandal, which members indicate is going to implicate Shahristani, and State of Law appears to be preventing it from coming to the floor. There was a session of parliament on April 23, which failed quorum, and I believe it was for this reason.

14. Iraq is set for two more elections in the next few years, one is for the provincial councils, and another is for parliament. What do you think they will look like, and do you believe they offer a chance to weaken or replace Maliki?

I'll answer the second part of the question first. The answer is yes, I think they'll be open enough to offer voters a chance to at least weaken if not replace Maliki, because the other Shiite parties are strong and organized enough to prevent widespread fraud. Unfortunately, the most likely alternative to a strong Maliki is likely going to be a weak Maliki even more dependent on the Sadrists. Maliki and Sadr are the only two Shiite leaders who really appear to have organized political machines throughout the Shiite provinces. Iyad Allawi's secular Shiite Wifaq party hasn't been able to maintain what organization it had, and Allawi himself seems to spend more time talking to Sunni monarchs than Shiite voters.

In the Sunni provinces it is much less clear cut. The Sunni Arab and secular Shiite parties alike suffer one splinter after another, hardly a month goes by without a new party announcement, which splits that population into another faction. I don't feel I have enough data to make any kind of forecast, other than to say I expect the Sunnis to collectively be quite weak.

15. Some U.S. commentators have said that if the U.S. kept troops in Iraq they would be able to limit Maliki’s use of the security forces. What do you think of that?

There was surely some inhibition, and the timing of the warrant for Vice-President Tariq al-Hashemi, right after U.S. troops withdrew, supports that. Two points argue against overemphasizing that factor. One, as noted above, there are many previous examples of security actions, which appear political. Two, Maliki himself tried to have the U.S. presence renewed, it was the Sadrists and Sunni Arabs who blocked it.

16. In your opinion is Maliki becoming an autocrat?

Yes, but don’t think Saddam Hussein, think Vladimir Putin. I’d say Maliki is presently about 80 percent through with the construction of his own “power vertical.” If he completes it, Iraq will still be a mostly free society in the sense that people can travel freely, get access to information if they make the effort to do so, and compete for spoils and a portion of power within the Maliki system. Maliki’s dominance of the security services, state media, the judiciary, the anti-corruption watchdog and the pillars of the financial system will give it a very “managed democracy” kind of feel. Parliament, the electoral commission and the Central Bank are the three institutions, which remain independent. Maliki has used the Supreme Court to weaken the first, and is currently pressuring the second and third.

17. What do you think is his main motivation for trying to control the security forces?

Maliki spent over two decades before 2003 working his way up the ladder in a clandestine organization with a death warrant on his head, living first in Iran and then in Syria. This left him trusting no one who was not a close ally. As with energy policy, where he has resisted forming a national oil and gas commission, which would weaken control by close allies, Maliki has resisted the formation of an institutionalized security structure. Leaders who expect to be leaving power soon know they have an interest in building institutions so they will be protected when they leave. That Maliki has staunchly resisted such institutionalization should tell us something.

SOURCES

International Crisis Group, “Loose Ends: Iraq’s Security Forces Between U.S. Drawdown And Withdrawal,” 10/26/10

Salmoni, Barak, “Responsible Partnership; The Iraqi National Security Sector after 2011,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 2011

Sowell, Kirk, “Inside Iraqi Politics No. 37,” 5/1/12

Evolution Of Iraq’s Government From 2010-2011

Iraq's first cabinet being announced in December 2010 (Agence France Presse)

Each of Iraq’s post-2003 governments has been a national unity one. That means every party that won seats in parliament, received one or more ministries. Government offices therefore, were more a reflection of co-opting the winning lists by giving each one of them their own personal fiefs, rather than public need. After the 2010 election that led to 40 ministries. That was then expanded to 43 by early 2011. When protests broke out in early 2011, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki tried to appease them by reducing the number of cabinet positions to 30. Despite this cut the parties continue to work in the same manner. Every list, big and small that is represented in parliament, has at least one seat at the table creating a bloated government. 

In December 2010, Iraq’s parties came to a tentative power sharing agreement that finally enabled them to name a government, nine months after elections. Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barzani brokered the deal, which became known as the Irbil Agreement. It included Maliki remaining as premier for a second term, ethnosectarian quotas for the major positions, and the creation of a new National Council for Strategic Policies, which Iyad Allawi of the Iraqi National Movement would head as a consolation for not beating Maliki. As part of the quota system, a Shiite remained premier, a Kurd, Jalal Talabani, stayed in office as Iraq’s President, and a Sunni, Osama Nujafi, became Speaker of parliament. Also, Maliki’s and the Speaker's three deputies were all split up amongst the country’s three largest groups, Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. The forty ministries were then divided amongst the winning lists. Within the Shiite led National Coalition, which Maliki was able to put together to hold onto power, his State of Law received eleven ministries, the Sadrists six, the Fadhila Party two, and one each for the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and Hezbollah Iraq. Allawi’s National Movement got ten, the Kurdish Coalition six, the Centrist Alliance two, and the Assyrian Democratic Movement one. Maliki’s Dawa and the Muqtada al-Sadr ended up with the most ministries of any parties with six each. That was a result of Sadr being the kingmaker in the government formation process. The political nature of the process was shown by the creation of ten Ministers of State, which were added simply to dole out to parties to get them to agree to the new government. Iraq’s leaders were also under such pressure to put together a ruling coalition, since it had been months since elections that they left several ministries such as Defense, Interior, National Security, Trade, and Electricity with no leadership. Maliki for instance, was named acting minister for Defense, Interior and National Security. All of those offices were eventually given ministers, except for the security ones, which Maliki remains in charge of. That has been a boiling issue between the other lists and the prime minister ever since then because it gives him control of all the intelligence and security forces.

By early 2011, the cabinet had been expanded to forty-three, and all of them had ministers except for the three security ones. Some of the original ministries were re-shuffled, and three new Ministers of State were added. In the end, the Sadrists added two new ministries, the Supreme Council one, and eight parliamentarians broke away from the National Movement to form the White Iraqiya, and took a ministry with them. This just added to the already bloated government with three more useless ministries to appease all of the parties.

At the same time, protests were breaking out across Iraq. One of their main complaints was about government waste. In response, Maliki announced that he would reduce the size of the cabinet by getting rid of unnecessary offices. That led to the number of ministers being cut from forty-three to thirty. By this time, President Talabani also had two vice presidents named, with Tariq al-Hashemi of the National Movement retaining his job, and Khudayr al-Khuzai of Maliki’s State of Law being named the second deputy. In the latest, re-organization, State of Law went from eleven to seven ministries, the Sadrists from eight to six, the Kurdish Coalition from six to four, Fadhila, the Supreme Council, the National Movement, and the Centrist Alliance lost one each, and Hezbollah Iraq and White Iraqiya lost their sole ministries. This was a needed downsizing of the cabinet, which was already overblown. There are still probably too many ministries that are run for the benefit of the parties rather than the people they are supposed to serve.

Despite Iraq having a parliamentarian form of government it has no opposition. Rather every party that wins a seat gets a place in the ruling coalition. This has been true of every one put together since Iraq got its sovereignty back from the United States in 2005. The latest government was the largest one yet with initially forty ministries, which would eventually increase to forty-three. Public pressure led that to being cut to thirty. Still ethnosectarian and party quotas rule the government. Each list and group fills its offices with followers, whether they are qualified or not. Other jobs are sold off, and there is widespread fraud in degrees, which are necessary to receive a civil service position. Party loyalty is the main priority then, rather than serving the public. These are all problems that Iraq will be dealing with far into the future as its political leaders have no reason to change the system since they all benefit from it.

December 2010 Iraqi Government

• Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, State of Law – Dawa, National Coalition, acting Interior, Defense, and National Security Ministers
• Deputy Premier Rowsch Nouri Shaways, Kurdish Coalition – Kurdistan Democratic Party, acting Trade Minister
• Deputy Premier Hussein Shahristani, State of Law – Independents, National Coalition, acting Electricity Minister
• Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq, Iraqi National Movement – Iraqi National Dialogue Front

• President Jalal Talabani, Kurdish Coalition – Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

• Speaker of Parliament Osama Nujafi, Iraqi National Movement – Iraqiyoon Party
• Deputy Speaker of Parliament Qusay Abdul Wahab Suhail, Iraqi National Alliance – Sadrists, National Coalition 
• Deputy Speaker of Parliament Aref Tayfour, Kurdistan Coalition – Kurdistan Democratic Party

Cabinet

• Agriculture Minister Izz al-Din al-Dawla, Iraqi National Movement - Iraqiyoon
• Communication Minister Mohammed Tawafak Allawi, Iraqi National Movement - Iraqi National List
• Culture Minister Sadoun Dulaimi, Centrist Alliance – Iraqi Accordance Front
• Education Minister Mohammed Tamim, Iraqi National Movement - Iraqi National Dialogue Front
• Environment Minister Sargon Sliwa Lazar, Assyrian Democratic Movement 
• Finance Minister Rafi Issawi, Iraqi National Movement – National Future Gathering 
• Foreign Affairs Minister Hoshyar Zebari, Kurdish Coalition – Kurdistan Democratic Party, acting Women Affairs Minister
• Health Minister Mohammed Amin, Kurdish Coalition – Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
• Higher Education Minister Ali al-Adeeb, State of Law – Dawa, National Coalition, acting National Reconciliation Minister 
• Housing Minister Mohammed Sahib Darraji, Iraqi National Alliance – Sadrists, National Coalition, acting Public Works Minister
• Human Rights Minister Mohammed Shaia’a Sudani, State of Law – Dawa, National Coalition
• Immigration and Displacement Minister Dindar Najman al-Doski Shaffiqq, Kurdish Coalition – Islamic Movement, acting Civil Society Minister
• Industry Minister Ahmad Nasser al-Dalli Karbuli, Iraqi National Movement - Solution Party
• Justice Minister Hassan Shammari, Iraqi National Alliance – Fadhila, National Coalition
• Labor Minister Nassar Rubaie, Iraqi National Alliance – Sadrists, National Coalition, acting Planning Minister
• Oil Minister Abdul Karim Luaibi, State of Law – Independent, National Coalition
• Science and Technology Minister Abdul al-Karim al-Samarraie, Iraqi National Movement – Renewal Party
• State Minister Salah Muzahim Darwish, Iraqi National Movement – Iraqi National Dialogue Front
• State Minister Salah Jabouri, Iraqi National Movement – Iraqi National Dialogue Front
• State Minister Abdul al-Mahdi al-Mutayri, Iraqi National Alliance – Sadrists, National Coalition
• State Minister Bushra Hussain Saleh, Iraqi National Alliance – Fadhila, National Coalition 
• State Minister Hassan al-Sari, Iraqi National Alliance – Hezbollah Iraq, National Coalition 
• State Minister for Foreign Affairs Ali al-Sajri, Centrist Alliance – Constitution Party
• State Minister for Government Spokesmanship Ali al-Dabbagh, State of Law – Independents, National Coalition 
• State Minister for Parliamentary Affairs Safi al-Din al-Safi, State of Law – Independents, National Coalition 
• State Minister for Provincial Affairs Turan Matthaw Hassan, Iraqi National Movement – Iraqi Turkmen Front
• State Minister for Tribal Affairs Jamal Batikh, Iraqi National Movement
• Tourism Minister Lewaa Smisam, Iraqi National Alliance – Sadrists, National Coalition
• Transportation Minister Hadi al-Ameri, Iraqi National Alliance – SIIC, National Coalition
• Youth and Sports Minister Jasim Mohammed Jaffar, State of Law – Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkmen, National Coalition

Government Positions By List:

National Coalition 24
State of Law 13
• Dawa 7
• Independents 5
• Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkmen 1
Iraqi National Alliance 11
• Sadrists 7
• Fadhila 2
• Hezbollah Iraq 1
• Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council 1

Iraqi National Movement 12
• Iraqi National Dialogue Front 4
• Iraqiyoon 2
• Renewal Party 1
• Solution Party 1
• Iraqi National List 1
• National Future Gathering 1
• Iraqi Turkmen Front 1

Kurdish Coalition 9
• Kurdistan Democratic Party 5
• Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 2
• Islamic Movement  2

Centrist Alliance 2
• Constitution Party 1
• Iraqi Accordance Front 1

Assyrian Democratic Movement 1

April 2011 Iraqi Government

• Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, State of Law – Dawa, National Coalition, acting Interior, Defense, and National Security Ministers
• Deputy Premier Rowsch Nouri Shaways, Kurdish Coalition – Kurdistan Democratic Party 
• Deputy Premier Hussein Shahristani, State of Law – Independents, National Coalition
• Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq, Iraqi National Movement – Iraqi National Dialogue Front

• President Jalal Talabani, Kurdish Coalition – Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

• Speaker of Parliament Osama Nujafi, Iraqi National Movement – Iraqiyoon Party
• Deputy Speaker of Parliament Qusay Abdul Wahab Suhail, Iraqi National Alliance – Sadrists, National Coalition 
• Deputy Speaker of Parliament Aref Tayfour, Kurdistan Coalition – Kurdistan Democratic Party

Cabinet

• Agriculture Minister Izz al-Din al-Dawla, Iraqi National Movement - Iraqiyoon
• Communication Minister Mohammed Tawafak Allawi, Iraqi National Movement - Iraqi National List
• Culture Minister Sadoun Dulaimi, Centrist Alliance – Iraqi Accordance Front
• Education Minister Mohammed Tamim, Iraqi National Movement - Iraqi National Dialogue Front
• Electricity Minister Raad Shallal al-Ani, Iraqi National Movement – Solution Party
• Environment Minister Sargon Sliwa Lazar, Assyrian Democratic Movement 
• Finance Minister Rafi Issawi, Iraqi National Movement – National Future Gathering 
• Foreign Affairs Minister Hoshyar Zebari, Kurdish Coalition – Kurdistan Democratic Party
• Health Minister Mohammed Amin, Kurdish Coalition – Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
• Higher Education Minister Ali al-Adeeb, State of Law – Dawa, National Coalition 
• Housing Minister Mohammed Sahib Darraji, Iraqi National Alliance – Sadrists, National Coalition
• Human Rights Minister Mohammed Shaia’a Sudani, State of Law – Dawa, National Coalition
• Immigration and Displacement Minister Dindar Najman al-Doski Shaffiqq, Kurdish Coalition – Islamic Movement
• Industry Minister Ahmad Nasser al-Dalli Karbuli, Iraqi National Movement - Solution Movement
• Justice Minister Hassan Shammari, Iraqi National Alliance – Fadhila, National Coalition
• Labor Minister Nassar Rubaie, Iraqi National Alliance – Sadrists, National Coalition 
• Oil Minister Abdul Karim Luaibi, State of Law – Independent, National Coalition
• Planning Minister Ali Yousef Abdul-Nabi, Iraqi National Alliance – Sadrists, National Coalition
• Public Works Minister Adel Muhoder Radi al-Maliki, Iraqi National Alliance – Sadrists, National Coalition
• Science and Technology Minister Abdul al-Karim al-Samarraie, Iraqi National Movement – Renewal Party
• State Minister Yassin Mohammed Ahmed, Iraqi National Alliance – Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, National Coalition
• State Minister Diyah al-Asadi, Iraqi National Alliance – Sadrists, National Coalition
• State Minister Abdul Saheb Qahraman Issa, Kurdish Coalition – Kurdistan Democratic Party
• State Minister Salah Jabouri, Iraqi National Movement – Iraqi National Dialogue Front
• State Minister Abdul al-Mahdi al-Mutayri, Iraqi National Alliance – Sadrists, National Coalition
• State Minister Bushra Hussain Saleh, Iraqi National Alliance – Fadhila, National Coalition 
• State Minister Hassan al-Sari, Iraqi National Alliance – Hezbollah Iraq, National Coalition 
• State Minister for Civil Society Bashir Dakhil Qassim Hassoun, Kurdish Coalition – Kurdistan Democratic Party
• State Minister for Foreign Affairs Ali al-Sajri, Centrist Alliance – Constitution Party
• State Minister for Government Spokesmanship Ali al-Dabbagh, State of Law – Independents, National Coalition 
• State Minister for National Reconciliation Amir Hassan al-Khuzai, State of Law – Dawa, National Coalition
• State Minister for Parliamentary Affairs Safi al-Din al-Safi, State of Law – Independents, National Coalition 
• State Minister for Provincial Affairs Turan Matthaw Hassan, Iraqi National Movement – Iraqi Turkmen Front
• State Minister for Tribal Affairs Jamal Batikh, White Iraqiya 
• State Minister for Women’s Affairs Ibtihal al-Zaidi, State of Law – Dawa, National Coalition
• Tourism Minister Lewaa Smisam, Iraqi National Alliance – Sadrists, National Coalition 
• Trade Minister Khayrulla Hassan Babakir, Kurdish Coalition – Kurdistan Democratic Party
• Transportation Minister Hadi al-Ameri, Iraqi National Alliance – SIIC, National Coalition
• Water Minister Muhanad Salman al-Saadi, Iraqi National Alliance – Sadrists, National Coalition
• Youth and Sports Minister Jasim Mohammed Jaffar, State of Law – Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkmen, National Coalition

Government Positions By List:

National Coalition 28
State of Law 13
• Dawa 8
• Independents 4
• Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkmen 1
Iraqi National Alliance 14
• Sadrists 9
• Fadhila 2
• Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council 2
• Hezbollah Iraq 1

Iraqi National Movement 11
• Iraqi National Dialogue Front 3
• Iraqiyoon 2
• Solution Party 2
• Renewal Pary 1
• Iraqi National List 1
• National Future Gathering 1
• Iraqi Turkmen Front 1

Kurdish Coalition 9
• Kurdistan Democratic Party 6
• Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 2
• Islamic Movement 1

Centrist Alliance 2
• Constitution Party 1
• Iraqi Accordance Front 1

White Iraqiya 1

Assyrian Democratic Movement 1

November 2011 Iraqi Government

• Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, State of Law – Dawa, National Coalition, acting Interior Minister
• Deputy Premier Rowsch Nouri Shaways, Kurdish Coalition – Kurdistan Democratic Party
• Deputy Premier Hussein Shahristani, State of Law – Independents, National Coalition
• Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq, Iraqi National Movement – Iraqi National Dialogue Front

• President Jalal Talabani, Kurdish Coalition – Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
• Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, Iraqi National Movement – Renewal Party
• Vice President Khudayr al-Khuzai, State of Law – Dawa – Iraq, National Coalition

• Speaker of Parliament Osama Nujafi, Iraqi National Movement – Iraqiyoon Party
• Deputy Speaker of Parliament Qusay Abdul Wahab Suhail, Iraqi National Alliance – Sadrists, National Coalition 
• Deputy Speaker of Parliament Aref Tayfour, Kurdistan Coalition – Kurdistan Democratic Party

Cabinet

• Acting Defense Minister Sadoun Dulaimi, Iraqi National Movement - Iraqi Accordance Front
• Agriculture Minister Izz al-Din al-Dawla, Iraqi National Movement - Iraqiyoon
• Communication Minister Mohammed Tawafak Allawi, Iraqi National Movement - Iraqi National List
• Education Minister Mohammed Tamim, Iraqi National Movement - Iraqi National Dialogue Front
• Electricity Minister Abdul Karim Aftan, Iraqi National Movement – Solution Movement
• Environment Minister Sargon Sliwa Lazar, Assyrian Democratic Movement 
• Finance Minister Rafi Issawi, Iraqi National Movement – National Future Gathering 
• Foreign Affairs Minister Hoshyar Zebari, Kurdish Coalition – Kurdistan Democratic Party
• Health Minister Mohammed Amin, Kurdish Coalition – Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
• Higher Education Minister Ali al-Adeeb, State of Law – Dawa, National Coalition 
• Housing Minister Mohammed Sahib Darraji, Iraqi National Alliance – Sadrists, National Coalition
• Human Rights Minister Mohammed Shaia’a Sudani, State of Law – Dawa, National Coalition
• Immigration and Displacement Minister Dindar Najman al-Doski Shaffiqq, Kurdish Coalition – Islamic Movement
• Industry Minister Ahmad Nasser al-Dalli Karbuli, Iraqi National Movement - Solution Party
• Deputy Interior Minister Adnan Asadi, State of Law – Dawa, National Coalition
• Justice Minister Hassan Shammari, Iraqi National Alliance – Fadhila, National Coalition
• Labor Minister Nassar Rubaie, Iraqi National Alliance – Sadrists, National Coalition 
• Acting National Security Minister Faleh al-Fayadh, National Alliance - National Reform Party, National Coalition
• Oil Minister Abdul Karim Luaibi, State of Law – Independent, National Coalition
• Parliamentary Affairs Minister Safi al-Din al-Safi, State of Law – Independent, National Coalition
• Planning Minister Ali Yousef Abdul-Nabi, Iraqi National Alliance – Sadrists, National Coalition
• Provincial Affairs Minister Tuhan Mathhar Abdullah Hassan, Iraqi National Movement – Iraqi Turkmen Front
• Public Works Minister Adel Muhoder Radi al-Maliki, Iraqi National Alliance – Sadrists, National Coalition
• Science and Technology Minister Abdul al-Karim al-Samarraie, Iraqi National Movement – Renewal Party
• Tourism Minister Lewaa Smisam, Iraqi National Alliance – Sadrists, National Coalition 
• Trade Minister Khayrulla Hassan Babakir, Kurdish Coalition – Kurdistan Democratic Party
• Transportation Minister Hadi al-Ameri, Iraqi National Alliance – SIIC, National Coalition
• Water Minister Muhanad Salman al-Saadi, Iraqi National Alliance – Sadrists, National Coalition
• Women’s Affairs Minister Ibtihal al-Zaidi, State of Law – Dawa, National Coalition 
• Youth and Sports Minister Jasim Mohammed Jaffar, State of Law – Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkmen, National Coalition

Government Positions By List:

National Coalition 20
State of Law 10
• Dawa 6
• Independents 3
• Dawa – Iraq 1
• Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkmen 1
National Alliance 10
• Sadrists 7
• SIIC 1
• Fadhila 1
• National Reform Party 1

Iraqi National Movement 12
• Renewal Party 2
• Iraqi National Dialogue Front 2
• Iraqiyoon 2
• Solution Movement 2
• Iraqi National List 1
• Iraqi Accordance Front 1
• National Future Gathering 1
• Iraqi Turkmen Front 1

Kurdish Coalition 7
• Kurdistan Democratic Party 4
• Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 2
• Islamic Movement 1

Assyrian Democratic Movement + 1

SOURCES

Hanna, Michael Wahid, “Meet the new boss, same as the old boss,” Middle East Channel, Foreign Policy, 10/1/10

Al-Mawsai, Ali, “Tens of thousands of Iraqi civil servants, among them high-ranking officials, obtained jobs on forged degrees,” Azzaman, 10/8/11

Roads To Iraq, “The “Round-Table” results,” 10/28/10

Schmidt, Michael and Al-Jawoshy, Omar, “Coveted Jobs in Iraq Breed Diploma Fraud,” New York Times, 10/10/11

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/11

Visser, Reidar, “208 Days and Counting: Iraq Beats the World Record in Slow Government Formation,” Historiae, 10/1/10

Attacks On Liquor Stores Continue In Iraq

On June 21, 2011 two liquor stores in the Karrada district of central Baghdad were bombed. The Iraqi police said that the businesses were targeted. Islamist groups, both Sunni and Shiite, have attacked alcohol stores in the past. This was just the latest incident in a campaign against what some consider un-Islamic practices, which has been going on since the 2003 invasion.

Islamic law forbids the drinking of liquor. In 2003, many stores that sold alcohol were attacked in the post-war chaos that enveloped the country. Anti-drinking laws followed, and alcohol bans were imposed on religious grounds. Despite that, nightclubs and liquor businesses flourished in Baghdad. When the sectarian civil war started in 2005, stores were again attacked, but then re-opened when security improved in 2008. By 2009, there were around 350 shops, bars, and clubs that served alcohol in the capital. The fall of Saddam Hussein released competing trends within the Iraqi public. Drinking was silently allowed in Iraq before 2003, and some wanted to continue with that freedom after the dictator was gone. Others turned towards their religion, and what they considered a moral life, because it provided an identity and authority in a shattered state. The conflict between those two trends played out with the back and forth over alcohol.

Alive In Baghdad video on the return of alcohol stores after the end of the sectarian war


With the end of the sectarian war, those that wanted to drink and sell alcohol seemed to have the space to do so, but that started to change in 2010. In November, the Baghdad provincial council revived a 1994 law, which said that cafes and hotel restaurants could not sell liquor. Saddam originally passed the act during his “Faith Campaign” when he was trying to raise support for the government by turning to Islam. Back in May 2009, the Baghdad Tourism Authority used the same law to shut down more than 90 stores. In the January 2009 provincial council elections, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list, led by his Dawa party, swept into power in Baghdad, winning a majority of seats, the governorship, deputy governor, head of the provincial council, and his deputy. Maliki ran on security, nationalism, and secularism. His party members proved to be much more religious, and tried to impose their views on the capital with the alcohol ban.

CNN video on reviving the Saddam era law in November 2010


The revival of the old law led to a new wave of crackdowns and attacks upon places, which sold or used alcohol. First, the act only allowed Christians and Yazidis to sell liquor, but they had to get a license. Many did not know how to get one, and according to one media report, no office in Baghdad claimed it had the authority to issue permits. The month that the law was brought back, security forces also began raiding bars and clubs. There were also a series of vigilante attacks, some of which might have been connected to the police or the provincial council. In December, other Shiite parties came out for the ban. Moqtada al-Sadr issued a statement saying that Iraqis needed to stand up against drinking and other bad influences. Clergy connected to the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) also supported the anti-drinking drive, and Shiite imams bought up the topic at Friday prayers. It seemed like the Baghdad provincial council had the political and religious support it needed to follow through with its plans.

Pictures of a liquor store bombed in Baghdad, May 17, 2011

 (Associated Press)

Liberal groups had their own ideas. In December 2010, there was a march in Tahrir Square in central Baghdad against reviving the Saddam era law. Some carried banners saying “Baghdad is not Kandahar” in reference to the Taliban’s stronghold in Afghanistan and their attempt to impose Islamic law on that country. The demonstration was led by the Writers’ Union and several civil organizations. When the protest movement started in Iraq at the beginning of 2011, there were some people that brought up the issue as well. Under that pressure, Premier Maliki allowed some clubs to re-open in February. At the same time though, attacks began again. An Interior Ministry official told CNN that from March to May, 25 stores had been bombed in Baghdad. Most of the victims were Christians and Yazidis, and they blamed Shiite Islamists as the perpetrators. In March, the police started raids again, and shut down businesses that didn’t have licenses. It seemed like there was a battle was going on in Baghdad between religious and secular forces, with the former having the upper hand since the Shiite political parties, government, and security forces were all with them.

Today, the topic of alcohol is still up in the air in Baghdad. Bombings like those in Karrada still occur. In April, the head of the Fadhila Party in parliament introduced a bill to ban not only the sale, but also the drinking of liquor throughout the country. He claimed the law, if enacted, would be legal because the constitution states that the country is an Islamic one. The conflict represents the two sides of the new Iraq. On the one hand, the fall of Saddam Hussein opened up the country to religious parties that still hold a large amount of power. Even State of Law, which presents itself as a non-sectarian, nationalist list, still has at its core the Dawa Party that was founded as an Islamist group that followed Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, the father of Moqtada al-Sadr. The State of Law led Baghdad council was the one that brought back the 1994 law to ban alcohol in the governorate in an attempt to impose Islamic norms. On the other, you have Iraqis that want more personal freedom. Some of them are liberals, artists, intellectuals, and students that want all of the liberty that a democracy is supposed to include. They were the ones that took to the streets in December 2010 and February 2011 complaining that the Baghdad council was acting like the Taliban in Afghanistan. There are also just regular citizens who are Muslims, but don’t want a strict interpretation of their faith imposed, and would like to have a drink now and then. Since the Shiite parties hold office in the capital province, they have been able to carry out their alcohol policy, while militants have been able to do vigilante attacks with no consequences, and maybe even with official support. Which way this ultimately goes, could be a sign of which side will hold more sway over Baghdad, and perhaps the future of the country.

SOURCES

Brosk, Raman, “Baghdad liquor stores targeted in bombings,” AK News, 6/21/11

Al Ghazi, Mohammed, “egypt’s landmark inspires new generation of tahrir squares in iraq and beyond,” Niqash, 4/6/11

Haugh, Maj. Timothy, “The Sadr II Movement: An Organizational Fight for Legitimacy within the Iraqi Shi’a Community,” Strategic Insights, May 2005

Ibrahim, Waleed, “Is free Iraq becoming a more Islamic state?” Reuters, 12/15/10

Isami, Hadi, “Political party demands banning alcoholic liquor in Iraq,” AK News, 4/17/11

Khallat, Khudr, “Baghdad liquor stores shut down by provincial council,” AK News, 3/9/11

Leland, John, “Baghdad Raids on Alcohol Sellers Stir Fears,” New York Times, 1/15/11

Londono, Ernesto, “Crackdown on alcohol seen as part of conservative moment in Iraq,” Washington Post, 1/4/10

Mohammed, Abeer, al-Sharaa, Hazim, “Minority Businesses Fear Alcohol Bans,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 3/17/11

Al-Rafidayn, Al Arabiya, Al-Mada, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, “The Crisis of Closing Down Baghdad Night Clubs Escalates,” MEMRI Blog, 12/9/10

Sly, Liz, “Baghdad crackdown corks drinkers’ spirits,” Los Angeles Times, 1/24/10

Tawfeeq, Mohammed and Carter, Chelsea, “Iraq liquor store owners fear for their lives amid attacks,” CNN, 6/7/11

Al-Wazzan, Saleem, “booze ban in basra,” Niqash, 3/23/10

Partial Iraqi Cabinet Approved By Parliament (REVISED)

On December 21, 2010 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki walked into parliament, rattled off the names of 29 minister nominees, who were then elected by a hand vote by lawmakers. The group then posed for pictures, and the event was over. In those few minutes Iraq took its first step towards having a new acting government.

13 of the 42 ministries still don’t have heads. These include some of the most hotly contested positions such as Defense, Interior, National Security, and Electricity. Maliki is running the security ministries, while newly elected officials are in charge of the rest. The premier has promised to fill all of the posts before the December 25 deadline to form a new government. This was similar to Maliki’s first coalition announced in 2006 when the security ministries were also not filled until almost a month after the initial cabinet was put together.

Despite the Prime Minister’s calls for qualified and competent nominees for each ministry, his new cabinet was cobbled together in just a few hours before they were announced publicly. Maliki later said he didn’t even know anything about some of the officials.

The positions in the new government were distributed by the size of each winning list. The State of Law-Sadrist led Iraqi National Coalition walked away with the most positions as they were the largest bloc. It received the premiership, deputy premier for energy, deputy speaker of parliament, and 21 ministries, seven of which are temporary. Within the list, Maliki’s State of Law got 13 offices, five of which are temporary, the Sadrists received seven posts, two of which are temporary, Fadhila two, and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and Hezbollah Iraq won one each. Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement was next with eleven, followed by nine for the Kurdish Coalition, three of which are temporary, two for the Centrist Alliance, and one for the Assyrian Democratic Movement, a Christian party. Allawi is also going to head the new National Council for Strategic Policy, but it has to be created by new legislation passed by parliament.

Along with ministries, the major Kurdish parties also walked away from the day with a promise by Maliki to fulfill their 19 demands. The prime minister signed onto the 19-points just before the cabinet was made public. The list includes implementation of Article 140 that will determine the future of Kirkuk and other disputed areas and resolving the Kurds’ oil deals. Later the Kurdish Coalition claimed that Maliki pledged to follow through with Article 140 within two years. The previous two administrations made the same deal with the Kurds, but never followed through. Whether Maliki will this time around is one of the most important decisions he will be making because it involves such divisive topics that it could derail his entire government.

On the other hand, the Kurdish opposition group the Change List, ended up leaving the new government. They demanded two service ministries and a deputy premiership, but were only offered one. Disappointed, they decided to go into the opposition instead, claiming that the Iraqi National Coalition tried to marginalize them, while the Kurdish Coalition was pressuring them to rejoin their list. This marked the first time a winning party in post-2003 Iraq has not wanted to partake in the spoils of power.

Overall, Maliki’s new ruling coalition is a mixed bag. Unlike his 2006 government, Allawi, Sunni, and nationalist parties, will have a much larger role this time around. At the same time, there are so many entities involved that they had to create new positions just to satisfy all of them. The major blocs also come with competing agendas over Iraq’s major issues such as oil, federalism, security, and the disputed territories. That will mean the new government will act much like the last one with deadlock, indecision, and procrastination on the problems that beset the country. That may also allow the premier to continue to consolidate his hold on power as he did last time. The near future in Iraq, may look a lot like the recent past.

New Iraqi Government

Top Posts

• Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Dawa, State of Law, Iraqi National Coalition, and acting Minister of Defense, Interior, and National Security
• President Jalal al-Talabani, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Kurdish Coalition
• Speaker of Parliament Osama Nujafi, Iraqi National List, Iraqi National Movement

Deputies

• Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq, Iraqi National Dialogue Front, Iraqi National Movement
• Deputy Premier Roj Nouri Shaways, Kurdistan Democratic Party, Kurdish Coalition, and acting Minister of Trade
• Deputy Premier for Energy Hussein al-Shahristani, State of Law, Iraqi National Coalition, and acting Minister of Electricity
• Deputy Speaker of Parliament Qusay Abdul Wahab Suhail, Sadr, Iraqi National Coalition 
• Deputy Speaker of Parliament Aref Tayfour, Kurdistan Democratic Party, Kurdish Coalition

Cabinet

• Minister of Agriculture, Izz al-Din al-Dawla, Iraqi National List, Iraqi National Movement
• Minister of Communication Muhammad Tawfaq Allawi, Iraqi National List, Iraqi National Movement
• Minister of Culture Sadoun Dulaimi, Unity of Iraq, Centrist Alliance
• Minister of Education Muhammad Tamim, Iraqi National Dialogue Front, Iraqi National Movement
• Minister of Environment Sargon Sliwa Lazar, Assyrian Democratic Movement
• Minister of Finance Rafi Issawi, National Future Gathering, Iraqi National Movement
• Minister of Foreign Affairs Hoshyar Zebari, Kurdistan Democratic Party, Kurdish Coalition, and acting Minister for Women Affairs
• Minister of Health Muhammad Amin, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Kurdish Coalition
• Minister of Higher Education Ali al-Adeeb, State of Law, Iraqi National Coalition, and Acting Minister of National Reconciliation
• Minister of Housing Muhammad Darraji, Sadr, Iraqi National Coalition, and acting Minister of Public Works
• Minister of Human Rights Muhammad Shaia’a Sudani, State of Law, Iraqi National Coalition 
• Minister of Immigration and Displacement Dindar Shafiqq, Kurdistan Islamic Union, Kurdish Coalition, and acting Minister of Civil Society
• Minister of Industry Ahmad Nasser al-Dali Karbuli, Renewal List, Iraqi National Movement
• Minister of Justice Hasan Shammari, Fadhila, Iraqi National Coalition
• Minister of Labor Nassar Rubaie, Sadr, Iraqi National Coalition, and acting Minister Of Planning
• Minister of Oil Abdul Karim Luaibi, State of Law, Iraqi National Coalition
• Minister of Science and Technology Abdul Karim al-Samarraie, Renewal List, Iraqi National Movement
• Minister of Sports Jasim Muhammad Jaffar, State of Law, Iraqi National Coalition
• Minister of State Salah Muzahim Darwish, Iraqi National Dialogue Front, Iraqi National Movement
• Minister of State Abdul al-Mahdi al-Mutayri, Sadr, Iraqi National Coalition
• Minister of State Salah Jabouri, Iraqi National Dialogue Front, Iraqi National Movement
• Minister of State Hassan al-Sari, Hezbollah Iraq, Iraqi National Coalition
• Minister of State Bushra Hussain Saleh, Fadhila, Iraqi National Coalition 
• Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ali al-Sajri, Unity of Iraq, Centrist Alliance
• Minister of State for Government Spokesmanship Ali al-Dabbagh, State of Law, Iraqi National Coalition
• Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs Safi al-Din al-Safi, State of Law, Iraqi National Coalition
• Minister of State for Provincial Affairs Turan Matthaw Hassan, Iraqi Turkmen Front, Iraqi National Movement 
• Minister of State for Tribal Affairs Jamal Batikh, Iraqi National Movement
• Minister of Tourism Lewaa Smisam, Sadr, Iraqi National Coalition
• Minister of Transportation Hadi al-Ameri, Badr Organization/Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, Iraqi National Coalition

Positions By List

• Iraqi National Coalition: Prime Minister, Deputy Premier for Energy, Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Ministries of Defense (temp), Education, Electricity (temp), Housing, Human Rights, Interior (temp), Justice, Labor, National Reconciliation (temp), National Security (temp), Oil, Planning (temp), Public Works (temp), Sports, State x3, State for Foreign Affairs, State for Government Spokesmanship, State for Parliamentary Affairs, Tourism, Transportation - 21 ministries total, 7 temporary

1. State of Law: Prime Minister, Deputy Premier for Energy, Ministries of Defense (temp), Education, Electricity (temp), Human Rights, Interior (temp), National Reconciliation (temp), National Security (temp), Oil, Sports, State for Government Spokesmanship, State for Parliamentary Affairs - 11 ministries total, 5 temporary
2. Sadrists: Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Ministries of Housing, Labor, Planning (temp), Public Works (temp), State, Tourism - 6 ministries total, 2 temporary
3. Fadhila: Ministries of Justice, State - 2 ministries total
4. Hezbollah Iraq: Ministry of State - 1 ministry total
5. Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: Ministry of Transportation - 1 ministry total

• Iraqi National Movement: Speaker of Parliament, Deputy Premier, Ministries of Agriculture, Communication, Education, Finance, Industry, Science and Technology, State x2, State for Provincial Affairs, State for Tribal Affairs - 10 ministries total

1. Iraqi National List: Speaker of Parliament, Ministries of Agriculture, Communication - 2 ministries total
2. Iraqi National Dialogue Front: Deputy Premier, Ministries of Education, State x2 - 3 ministries total
3. National Future Gathering: Ministry of Finance - 1 ministry total
4. Renewal List: Ministries of Industry, Science and Technology - 2 ministries total
5. Iraqi Turkmen Front: Minister of State for Provincial Affairs - 1 ministry total

• Kurdish Coalition: President, Deputy Premier, Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Ministries of Civil Society (temp), Foreign Affairs, Health, Immigration and Displacement, Trade (temp), Women Affairs (temp) - 6 ministries total, 3 temporary

1. Kurdistan Democratic Party: Deputy Premier, Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Trade (temp), Women Affairs (temp) - 3 ministries total, 2 temporary
2. Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: President, Ministry of Health - 1 ministry total
3. Kurdistan Islamic Union: Ministries of Civil Society (temp), Immigration and Displacement - 2 ministries total, 1 temporary

• Centrist Alliance: Ministry of Culture, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs - 2 ministries total
• Assyrian Democratic Movement: Ministry of Environment - 1 ministry total

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “A lone woman in Iraq’s new cabinet,” 12/21/10

Alaadin, Ranj, “#Iraq names cabinet – finally,” Ranj Alaaldin Blog, 12/21/10

Ali, Yaser, "KBC: Maliki signs agreement to Kurdish conditions," AK News, 12/21/10

Ali, Saman, "Maliki signed to implement article 140 in two years," AK News, 12/21/10

Ashur TV, “Ashur t.v. Interview with Mr. Sargon Lazar, of Foreign the Assyrian Democratic Movement,”  Christians Of Iraq, 2/29/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “Nejeifi named parl. Speaker, Suhail and Tayfour deputies,” 11/11/10
- “The new cabinet line-up announced by al-Maliki,” 12/21/10
- "North Iraq Kurdistan's "Change" Bloc withdraws from new cabinet," 12/21/10

BBC, “Iraqi parliamentary approves new government,” 12/21/10

Chulov, Martin, "Iraq names cabinet after nine-month power struggle," Guardian, 12/21/10

Healy, Jack, "Cleric's Anti-U.S. Forces Poised for Gains in Iraq," New York Times, 12/19/10

Ibrahim, Haider, “No minister assigned without my consent says Maliki,” AK News, 11/27/10

Katzman, Kenneth, "Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks," Congressional Research Service, 4/22/09
- "Iraq: Reconciliation and Benchmarks," Congressional Research Service, 5/12/08

Kazmi, Haider, "Maliki spoke frankly and undermine his confidence: I am not convinced I do not know anything about some ministers," Al-Aalem, 12/21/10

Long, Austin, “Why Anbar voted for Allawi,” Foreign Policy, 4/5/10

Omaima, Younis, “Iraqiya got 9 ministries and the Sadrists 8, and 6 for the Kurds, and only 4 of the State of Law,” Al-Aalem, 12/21/10

Surk, Barbara and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, "Iraq finally has a new government," Associated Press, 12/21/10

Visser, Reidar, “Change Inside Iraqiyya?” Iraq And Gulf Analysis, 11/14/10
- “Parliament Approves the Second Maliki Government,” Historiae, 12/21/10

Wikipedia, “Rafi al-Issawi”