Review The Making of Foreign Policy in Iraq, Political Factions and the Ruling Elite

Gulmohamad, Zana, The Making of Foreign Policy in Iraq, Political Factions and the Ruling Elite, London, New York, Oxford, New Delhi, Sydney: I.B. Tauris, 2021

 

Zana Gulmohamad set out to try to explain the complicated story of how Iraq formulates its foreign policy in The Making of Foreign Policy in Iraq, Political Factions and the Ruling Elite. His thesis was that Iraq’s foreign affairs are shaped by each ethnosectarian group, political party, and leading officials in Iraq under the influence and interference of foreign nations. That leads to a contradictory stance as each actor follows its own path to the detriment of the country.

U.S. Army History Of Iraq War Vol 1 – Chapter 13 The Changing Of The Guard, Again, Spring-Summer 2004

The spring 2004 uprising by Moqtada al-Sadr and the 1^st Battle of Fallujah killed any hope the U.S. might have of a short occupation and immediate withdrawal from Iraq. That led to a period of transition during the summer. There was a new U.S. commander General George Casey who created the first campaign plan for the war although the goal was the same, to get out. There was a new effort to rebuild the Iraqi security forces, the United Nations was finally able to broker a deal for the return of Iraqi sovereignty, while the Americans were hit with a new scandal.

Breakdown Of The Iraq Election Results

Analyzing the returns from Iraq’s May 2018 parliamentary elections shows some interesting trends. First, the most well organized parties did the best. Some lists were focused upon the wrong themes, and there was widespread charges of fraud.

New Iraq Poll 2018 Election Looks To Return Familiar Faces To Govt

Parliamentary elections in Iraq are only a month away. Dr. Munqith Dagher recently presented polling data on voting patterns at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The results showed a divided electorate that is becoming increasingly unhappy with the ruling parties, but the lack of alternatives means those same groups will still hold onto power.

Allawi Iraq’s Absent Prime Minister

Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi took power in June 2004 as the Coalition Provisional Authority closed up shop. He had the support of both the United States and the United Nations envoy Lakhdar Brahimi. The Americans quickly found several issues with the new premier. One of them was Allawi’s constant trips outside of the country. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice for example, noted that the prime minister was always flying around the region, and could not always be contacted. Rice asked, “Are we worried that Allawi is spending ten to eleven days [a month] outside the country?” Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Richard Myers agreed with Rice that Allawi’s constant foreign travel was an issue. The next year when Allawi was replaced as prime minister he left Iraq for nearly four years even though he was elected as a member of parliament. When his Iraqiya list won first place in the 2010 elections he again decided to take extended tours around the region thinking that would help his chance to become the prime minister once again, but that only backfired against him. Allawi’s Iraqi National List was created in 1990 with the help of the intelligence agencies of Turkey, the Gulf States, and the west. He has maintained those ties ever since hoping they would help his political career. Given most of those states antagonistic stance towards the new Iraq they have not served him well.

SOURCES

Allawi, Ali, The Occupation of Iraq, Winning The War, Losing the Peace, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007

BBC, “Profile: Iyad Allawi,” 3/27/10

Galbraith, Peter, “Iraq: The Bungled Transition,” New York Review of Books, 9/23/04

Gordon, Michael and Trainor, General Bernard, The Endgame, The Inside Story Of The Struggle For Iraq, From George W. Bush To Barack Obama, New York, Pantheon, 2012

Political Re-Alignment In Iraq

Iraq is currently facing deep ceded political divisions. Old alliances are being torn apart, while long-time rivalries are coming to the fore again. This is happening within all three major alliances amongst the Sunnis, Kurds and Shiites. This will lead to increased instability and political stalemate until the parties re-align themselves into new coalitions.

The Kurdish parties used to have a rough consensus and acted as a unified bloc in Baghdad, but that is now breaking down. For years the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) divided up the administration of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and positions in Baghdad between them. Then in 2009 the emergence of Gorran (Change), which broke away from the PUK promoting a reformist agenda, disrupted that power sharing. That year Gorran would come in second in Kurdish elections behind the KDP. This obviously caused huge problems for the PUK, but it and the KDP eventually attempted to co-opt Gorran into the Kurdish administration. That in turn broke down in 2015 when President Massoud Barzani’s term as Kurdish president expired. He had already been extended in office once before, but this time Gorran wanted changes in the KRG political system in return for Barzani to stay in power. That set off a huge political dispute topped off by the KDP removing Gorran’s ministers from the KRG and refusing the speaker of parliament, a Gorran member from entering Irbil in October 2015. The KDP took over all of Gorran’s positions and the Kurdish parliament has not met since then. Eventually that brought the PUK and Gorran back together in a recently agreed upon alliance to oppose Barzani who they accuse of acting unilaterally on major decisions such as independence, and portraying himself as the only Kurdish leader. Barzani has also written off cooperation with the central government because he does not believe it ever follows through with any of its agreements with the KRG. The PUK and Gorran however are more open to accommodation with Baghdad marking the possible end of the Kurds united front in the capital. This crisis has left Kurdistan with no parliament, and an illegal presidency.

Iraq’s Sunnis have always been divided, but they are even more so now. In 2010 they coalesced around Iraqiya and Iyad Allawi and came in first in national elections that year. They were quickly torn apart by the maneuverings of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Today all of those coalition members are acting independently of each other. The Nujafi brothers’ Mutahidun are pushing Sunni federalism and victimization at the hands of the government’s forces. Allawi’s new Wataniya is part of the reform bloc in parliament that includes some Kurdish parliamentarians and ironically Maliki’s followers who together are trying to undermine Prime Minister Haidar Abadi. The Iraqi Islamic Party on the other hand has thrown in its lot with the premier thinking that aligning with the central government is the only way to gain concessions. Other leaders like Salah al-Mutlaq are still around, but with much less influence than they once had. This means Sunnis remain leaderless and still carry out contradictory policies towards Baghdad.

Finally, the Shiite parties are coming apart and facing future challenges as well. The election of Abadi split the Dawa Party in two between his faction and that of Nouri al-Maliki. The latter is constantly attempting to undermine the prime minister and has aligned himself with Iran and pro-Iranian Hashd groups such as Badr, Asaib Ahl Al-Haq and others to plot his comeback. Moqtada al-Sadr attempted to strong arm Abadi and the entire political class to follow his lead by threatening them with mob rule if they didn’t listen when his movement co-opted the anti-corruption, pro-services protest movement and took over the Green Zone twice. Not only was no one willing to listen to Sadr, but it blew up parliament as a result, which did not meet for several months afterward. Sadr also stands opposed to Maliki’s return and his allies, many of which broke away from the Sadr movement. They all have a long history of not only competing for votes amongst the same constituency but armed confrontations as well. That’s only likely to increase as many of those Hashd groups want to turn their prowess on the battlefield against the Islamic State and the high esteem they have amongst the Shiite community into political power in the next round of elections. Ammar Hakim and his Supreme Council at one time threw their lot behind Abadi, but then became frustrated by his announcing major decisions like merging ministries and appointing technocrats without consulting with them. They along with Sadr are also worried about their potential loss at the ballot box to the Hashd. The Shiite parties were never a monolithic force, and these differences existed for years. However, they often came together on major issues. Now they are all competing with each other. Not only that, but there is growing fear that these arguments could lead to political violence as happened before between Sadr and Badr and the Sadrists and Asaib Ahl Al-Haq.

This period of political upheaval came be traced back to two events, the concentration of power amongst Iraq’s leaders and the return of the Islamic State. First, when Maliki was premier he played divide and conquer and split the Sunni alliance behind Iraqiya, and they have never recovered since then. That’s actually not new as they were not that unified beforehand. Second, Maliki went after so many of his rivals amongst all the political factions that he ended up splitting his own Dawa party. His removal from power opened the door for the other leaders such as Sadr to make a play for leadership. Third, the war with IS has led to political aspirations amongst factions of the Hashd that threaten the established Shiite parties. Finally, Barzani’s unwillingness to make any concessions over his maintenance of the Kurdish presidency has brought the rival PUK and Gorran together to oppose him. All of these struggles along with the threat of future violence puts Iraqi politics in a dangerous place. There will likely be a long period of instability in both Baghdad and Irbil until the elite work out new alliances. That will make Iraqi politics even more fractious and dysfunctional than it already was.

SOURCES

Hassan, Hayman, “To Baghdad, Or Not To Baghdad? Bad Relationship With Central Govt. Threatens To Split Iraqi Kurdistan,” Niqash, 7/7/16

Al Mada, “Secret meetings to form new alliances to isolate the Sadrists and end the paralysis in parliament and the government,” 5/7/16

Rudaw, “Calls for resignation of parliament speaker still strong, Iraqi MP says,” 7/13/16

Salih, Mohammed, “How new alliance among Iraq’s Kurds might actually deepen divisions,” Al Monitor, 7/5/16

Sowell, Kirk, “Iraq’s Fake Populism and Anti-sectarianism,” Sada, 6/9/16

Complaints About Iraq PM Abadi Undermine His Cabinet Reshuffle

Iraq’s Prime Minister Haidar Abadi finally presented his new cabinet of technocrats to parliament. It now has a little over a week to discuss the nominees. The whole process to come up with the ministers has been fraught with problems with the majority of the ruling parties opposing Abadi’s plans. The main problem is that Abadi’s cabinet threatens the ruling parties hold on the government. What has made the situation worse is Abadi’s unwillingness to consult with others and to present a clear plan. The premier is already facing a difficult situation, and his alienating the other lists is only making the situation worse.

On March 31, 2016 a list was presented of Premier Abadi’s nominees for his new cabinet. That led Moqtada al-Sadr to call off his protests at Baghdad’s Green Zone, which had annoyed the prime minister, but it created more problems in the process. First, the nominee for Oil Minister Nizar Salim withdrew his candidacy claiming there was no agreement amongst the ruling blocs over the new cabinet. Salim was correct. Sadr is the only national leader who seemed to agree with Abadi’s move. It was reported that the Sadrists, the Supreme Council and Dawa Iraq Organization were the only ones to submit candidates to Abadi. All the others refused to go along with the move. First, the Kurdish Alliance complained that Abadi never explained how their ministers had failed, why they should be replaced, that the nominees don’t represent the political parties, and that the prime minister was ignoring the right of the Kurd to choose their own representatives. In turn, they claimed they would not vote on the new minister in parliament. The Solution List, which is part of the Sunni alliance, said that the cabinet was a way to exclude some parties from power. Beforehand, Iyad Allawi and Mutahidun stated that they would not give up their ministries. The Supreme Council countered Abadi’s reforms by saying that if the government were to be technocratic and non-partisan than Abadi should resign as well. Needless to say, Abadi’s program has angered almost everyone. The ministries are how the ruling parties control the government. Each one is run like a private fiefdom, and allows the parties to hand out patronage via jobs and steal via corrupt contracts. It would be expected that if the technocrats were to be approved they would move to get rid of all the political hacks that occupy the director generals, the managers, etc. That is a major threat, which none of the parties are willing to agree to as of now.

What has made the whole process worse for the prime minister is his apparent inability or unwillingness to consult with others. Since Abadi first started talking about reforms last year, he has never offered a clear or coherent program. It was a surprise to all when he first came out with his proposals. Since then the complaints have mounted into a chorus. Members from within his own Dawa and State of Law wanted him to talk to them before making major decisions, but he didn’t. Abadi’s two main allies, the Supreme Council’s Ammar Hakim and Moqtada al-Sadr have repeatedly made similar statements. The National Alliance, which all those parties belong to said that it would not follow Abadi’s program if they didn’t know about the details. Members of the Kurdish Alliance have told the press that Abadi’s plan has never been made clear to them. Finally, Allawi’s bloc complained about the lack of transparency in Abadi’s decisions. There is no way the premier can be successful unless he builds consensus. None exists right now. A major reason why so many parties turned on Maliki was that he only talked with his small core of advisers when making policy. Abadi, who was supposed to be the anti-Maliki, and came in talking about repairing relations with the other parties, has instead followed in his predecessor’s footsteps. That makes a successful transition with the cabinet all the more difficult.

SOURCES

AIN, “Solution: afraid new technocratic government is an attempt exclude,” 4/1/16

International Crisis Group, “Iraq: Conflict Alert,” 8/24/15

Kazimi, Nibras, “What is happening in Iraq?” Talisman Gate, Again, 10/29/15

Al Mada, “Abadi staggering to present his cabinet to parliament for fear of his government being overthrown,” 3/26/16

- “Citizen and Kurdish MPs criticize ambiguity of Ministerial Committee,” 3/27/16

- “”Commander of necessity” and not cooperating with the quartet raise the wrath of State of Law against the Prime Minister,” 10/28/15

- “Kurds and Sunnis are waiting for clarification of the Prime Minister: We reject the removal of our ministers without justification,” 3/30/16

- “Large blocs reluctant..and small ones send their candidates to the ministerial committee,” 3/24/16

- “The new government is in a closed envelop until next week pending parliamentary vote,” 4/1/16

- “Sayadi: 45 deputies from the State of Law withdraw authority from Abadi,” 10/28/15

- “Shiite parties leave presidencies commission … the Kurds and Sunnis hold the balance,” 3/24/16

Mamouri, Ali, “Will Abadi put his money where his mouth is?” Al Monitor, 3/1/16

Mardini, Ramzy, “No Authority: Shiite Minimization in a Fragmented Iraq,” World Politics Review, 12/8/15

Martin, Patrick with Anagnostos, Emily, Bessette, Rachel and Werman, Hannah, “Warning: Iraq’s Shi’a Parties Split Over Cabinet Reshuffle Amidst Protests,” Institute for the Study of War, 3/25/16

New Sabah, “Abadi identifies two paths of reform and choice of ministers reached an advanced stage,” 2/29/16

- “Kurdistan objects to Abadi’s list and calls on the government to obtain its representation,” 4/1/16

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Premier To Elevate Technocrats, Demote Politicos In Cabinet,” 2/10/16

Rasheed, Ahmed, “Iraq’s coalition members press PM to consult before ordering reforms,” Reuters, 10/28/15

Rudaw, “Kurdish ministerial nominee withdraws from new Iraqi cabinet,” 4/1/16

Sotaliraq, “Kurds threaten to withdraw from the government, will not vote on any candidate in the new cabinet,” 4/2/16

Xinhua, “Iraqi parliament says Abadi’s reforms should comply with constitution,” 11/2/15

A Look At Iraq’s 2014 Election, Interview With Reidar Visser

In April 2014 Iraq held its latest parliamentary elections. The vote was all about Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. His State of Law walked away with by far the most seats, 95 in total, while his rivals only got around 20-30 seats each. In the months that follow Maliki and his supporters and detractors will hold a series of protracted negotiations to form a new Iraqi government. To help explain the results and the possible outcomes of the balloting is Reidar Visser, a noted Iraq historian. He runs two blogs Iraq and Gulf Analysis and historiae.org, and has written and co-authored three books, Basra, the Failed Gulf State: Separatism and Nationalism in Southern Iraq, An Iraq of Its Regions: Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy?, and A Responsible End?: The United States and the Iraqi Transition, 2005-2010. He can be followed on Twitter @reidarvisser.

Maliki's State of Law came away as the big winner in the 2014 elections (BBC)

1. Maliki’s State of Law walked away with 95 seats in this year’s election. Approximately how many other parties are aligned with him right now and around how many seats will that give him?

Maliki’s potential support base outside State of Law can be conceptualized as a set of concentric circles with increasingly weaker loyalty to him. Immediately outside State of Law with 95 seats, and with good chances of future loyalty, is a stratum of a couple of deputies with a history of close ties to the State of Law, who have continued to maintain friendly relations with Maliki despite running separately. They include Haytham al-Jibburi of the Kafaat & Jamahir movement and Ali Taleb Abd al-Hasan of the Solidarity in Iraq movement, a party affiliated with the Dhi Qar cleric Muhammad Mahdi al-Nasiri who is considered pro-Maliki, and Ali Subhi al-Maliki of the Just State movement (who had Maliki’s picture on his own election poster). Subsequent to the publication of the results, politicians from the two first of these movements went on to claim they had formally enrolled in the State of Law alliance, as did two deputies from a local list in Najaf with a somewhat more secular profile. This segment also includes one seat for the Sadiqun party considered close to the Asaib Ahl al-Haq militia, although it is noteworthy that this movement, despite much hype about it in Western media, failed to make much of an impression on the Iraqi electorate. Nothing is set in stone, though. Another deputy from Kafaat & Jamahir, former interior minister Jawad al-Bolani, first reportedly joined the pro-[Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq] ISCI Muwatin bloc before subsequently joining Maliki, bringing the total of his State of Law bloc to around 101 seats plus the 1 Asaib Ahl al-Haq seat (which probably no one else will have anything to do with anyway).

Beyond these 102 deputies, I think the loyalties of the parties considered close or potentially close to Maliki is far more open to negotiation. Despite some points of contact in the past, there has also been periods of friction with Maliki. This includes the 6 seats of the Shia Islamist Fadhila, the one seat of the Tanzim al-Dakhil branch of the Daawa (they broke acrimoniously with Maliki in August 2009 when they joined [Iraqi National Alliance] INA ahead of the 2010 general election), and the 6 seats of Ibrahim al-Jaafari (whose role as unofficial PM candidate of INA and thus a challenger to Maliki in 2010 is often forgotten). That’s 15 extra seats, but their alliance with Maliki is no more of a foregone conclusion than the case is with respect to some of the smaller secular and religious minority parties such as the Iraq Coalition (5 seats) or the two Anbar lists (3 plus 2 seats) often cited as potential Maliki allies.

2. There was some talk before the vote about how many seats the prime minister would need to win to give him the upper hand in the government formation talks. Do you believe there was such a tipping point and if so did he achieve that amount?

Maliki would have needed closer to 120 seats in order to truly achieve the upper hand. With the results that materialized, Maliki will need to compromise with at least one (and probably two) of his main opponents – the Kurds, Sadr, Hakim, Nujafi or Allawi.

3. For the last several years Prime Minister Maliki has talked about forming a majority government. Do you think that’s possible after the 2014 elections, and would it make a more effective administration?

I think the concept of a political majority would be good for Iraq if it was attainable. In 2010, Allawi and Maliki could have achieved it if they hadn’t been strong personal enemies. This year, I don’t think the numbers will add up but they are tantalizingly close to the required majority and I fear Maliki’s hubris will make him expend a lot of energy trying to reach such a majority anyway. It should be remembered that even in the previous Iraqi parliament, State of Law deputies would frequently talk about a “political majority” in contexts when they were very far from achieving this. One potential variation of the theme would be Maliki joining with the Kurds, which could be sufficient basis for a majority. The only thing that would keep them united, though, would be agreement on a third Maliki term. Indeed, most of Maliki’s rhetoric in favor of a political majority has focused on criticism of Kurdish independent oil policy. Still, the possibility of Maliki turning around and offering some concessions for a guarantee of a third term should not be ruled out.

4. Maliki’s stated opponents, Moqtada al-Sadr’s Ahrar/Liberals, Ammar Hakim’s Mowatin/Citizen’s Alliance, Speaker Osama Nujafi’s Mutahidun/Uniters, Kurdish President Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and Iyad Allawi’s Wataniya/Nationalist Coalition won 138 seats between them. That would seem to give them the advantage over the prime minister, but as ever their main problem is keeping a unified stance. Do you think they have any better chance to achieve that than in 2012 when some of these same parties attempted a no confidence vote against Maliki?

The relative numerical strength of these parties vis a vis Maliki is less now than in 2012, where it may have been close to 160 out of 325 at its height – before Iran ordered the Sadrists to back down. When it comes to manipulating the segment of parties in the range from 1 to 3 deputies, Maliki probably has an advantage of incumbency compared to his enemies.

Allawi (left), Speaker Nujafi (center), Dep PM Mutlaq (right) are trying to create a Sunni Alliance (Shafaq News)

5. As a follow up to that Speaker Nujafi is talking about creating a grand Sunni alliance consisting of him, Allawi and Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq. What chance does that have of working out?

I think the chances of it working out are limited, not least because they have spent a good deal energy splitting up from the 2010 alliance. Additionally, it is unlikely to become politically relevant since Maliki’s interest in these groups mainly relates to the prospect of one of them breaking ranks with the others and then joining Maliki.

6. In a similar vein, Sadr and Hakim seem to be focusing upon reforming the National Alliance that they were part of in 2010. What do you think they hope to achieve with that?

Sadr and Hakim may have been hoping to reconstitute the Shiite alliance and then have Maliki replaced with someone they like better personally. That plan lost some of its momentum because of Maliki’s relative success in term of a good personal vote and an increase of his share of the parliament seats despite the Najaf clergy clearly sending signals about the desirability of replacing him with someone else. At the time of the election there was much talk of Tareq Najm [parliamentarian from State of Law] as a possible substitute for Maliki. Already that kind of talk has faded somewhat.

7. With every vote in Iraq there come complaints about the winners cheating. Maliki’s opponents are all claiming that he fixed the balloting one way or another, while most of the Kurdish parties are accusing the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan of fraud as well. Do you think there is any merit to these charges, and more importantly could they change the results if the Iraqi Election Commission takes any of them up?

A couple of points on this. I think if IHEC was as corrupt as some claim, Maliki would have got a bigger win and he would not have lost so many key allies and friends (who lost out in the personal vote). It is still unclear which way IHEC’s decision will go with respect to the complaints. They have released data from the special vote for the security forces as well as the “Baghdad belt” (where accusations of ballot-stuffing to Maliki’s advantage materialized). Questions still remain after these attempts at creating enhanced transparency. For example, in the security force vote, the Maliki vote in Diyala and the PUK vote in Sulaymaniya seem artificially high. Similarly, with respect to the “Baghdad belt” vote, IHEC has released data that show suspiciously high participation at some stations, but it has released results only at the aggregate level of the counting centers. To allay fears about ballot stuffing, it should release results for individual stations in the “Baghdad belt”, and in particular those with participation rates in the 80-95% range.

8. Quite a few prominent Iraqi parliamentarians were defeated in this year’s balloting. Can you name some of them, and do you think this points to some accountability being established in the country?

Deputies who lost their seats include Hassan al-Sunayd, Ali Shalah, Khalid al-Attiya, Yasin Majid, Walid al-Hilli, Ihsan al-Awwadi, Sami al-Askari and Izzat al-Shabandar from the Maliki camp. Similarly Nassar al-Rubayyie and Maha al-Duri, from the Sadrist list, lost their seats.

This is the beauty of the personal vote in Iraq, and, incidentally, I think, an indication of the integrity of what IHEC is doing. Using the personal vote has become the norm with 80-90% of all voters expressing a candidate preference in the materials that I have been working with. In the big cities, in particular, personal votes radically affect the ranking of the candidates, with people far down on the lists promoted to top positions through the actions of the electorates in places like Basra, Baghdad and Mosul.

9. Internal issues are only part of the picture when it comes to Iraqi politics. The United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran all have tried to play a role in the country. How might each attempt to influence the government formation process?

I think there is a real difference between these regional powers as regards their ability to micro-manage the government formation process. Iran may want to see the next Iraqi PM emerge as the result of a decision by a united Shiite alliance. It can exercise leverage to have that alliance reconstituted and in turn influence the process of PM candidate selection within the alliance. Turkey may influence the preferences of the Iraqi Kurdish parties, though it is noteworthy that in theory the Shiites can form a government without Kurdish support this time. This fact somewhat reduces Turkish leverage. Finally, the influence of Saudi Arabia is much less than the two others, and primarily relates to the precise level, intensity and sourness of discontent expressed by its friends among Iraqi Sunnis and seculars.

Will Iraq’s Prime Minister Gain A 3rd Term?

Iraq’s 2014 parliamentary elections were all about Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Most of the major lists explicitly ran against the premier. Those included Moqtada al-Sadr’s Ahrar/Liberals, the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq’s (ISCI) Mowatin/Citizen’s Alliance, Speaker Osama Nujafi’s Mutahidun/Uniters, Kurdish President Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and Iyad Allawi’s Wataniya/Nationalist Coalition. Since the vote on April 30 all of those parties have said Maliki staying in office was a redline, and have talked about forming a government of their own. The problem is that these parties have never been able to stay united opening opportunities for the prime minister to split them apart.

Maliki’s State of Law (SOL) was the undisputed winner of the 2014 balloting. His list came away with 95 seats, up from 89 in 2010. Given all the opposition he was facing it was notable that he was able to make a slight gain. After that Moqtada al-Sadr’s Ahrar, and his two other parties he ran received 34 seats down from 39 in 2010. ISCI won 31 up from 20, Speaker Osama Nujafi’s Mutahidun got 27, President Massoud Barzani’s KDP’s finished with 25 down from 28, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) got 21 up from 14, Iyad Allawi’s Wataniya had 21 down from 31, Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Arabiya got 11, a six seat increase. Goran/Change won 9 up from 7, Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Trend finished with 6 up from 1, Fadhila/Virtue got 6 seats down from 7. The new Iraq Coalition and Civilian Democratic Alliance won 5 and 4 seats respectively. Finally the Kurdish Islamist parties the Kurdistan Islamic Union got 4 seats and the Kurdistan Islamic Group 3, with the latter losing one seat from 2010.

Parliamentary Election Results 2010 vs 2014

	2010	2014
State of Law	89	95
Sadrists/Ahrar	39	34
ISCI + Iraqi National Congress/Mowatin	20 + 1	31
Mutaihudin/Uniters	-	27
KDP	28	25
PUK	14	21
Wataniya/Nationalists	31	21
Arabiya	5	11
Goran/Change	7	9
National Reform Trend	1	6
Fadhila/Virtue	7	6
Iraq Coalition	-	5
Civil Democratic Alliance	-	4
Kurdistan Islamic Union	4	4
Kurdistan Islamic Group	2	3
Others	69	18
Minorities	8	8
Total	325	328

(2014 results Via Akiko Yoshioka, Senior Researcher at Institute of Energy Economics Japan)

Maliki’s opponents have all said they would not allow him another term. May 21 for example, President Barzani allegedly hosted a meeting with Iyad Allawi and the Supreme Council’s Adel Abdul Mahdi to discuss forming an alliance against the premier. If all the opponents actually came together they would have 170 seats, five more than is required to form a new government. The problem as ever is that this is a loose and fractious coalition. Mutahidun for example is proposing a grand Sunni alliance made up of itself, Allawi’s Nationalists and Mutlaq’s Arabiya. The problem is that Mutlaq has been open to working with Maliki in the past and may be so in the future. Another issue is that the only thing holding these parties together is their hatred of the prime minister. Otherwise they have different views on policy. For example, the Sadrists and Supreme Council believe in the central government controlling oil exports, while the Kurdish parties want to be able to export on their own while still agreeing to revenue sharing with Baghdad. This time around however, Maliki might have made these parties so mad at him that they may be able to overcome their differences and maintain their unity enough to push him out. That will be far in the future as the government formation process may take up to a year. In the meantime the lists are stuck in the complaints phase with most of the anti-Maliki factions claiming that he cheated. After the Election Commission deals with each of these accusations, the lists will then move into the negotiation phase. That provides plenty of time for Maliki to persuade and cajole these lists to join him instead.

While many Iraq observers believe that the prime minister’s 90 plus seats has guaranteed him another term it doesn’t appear as clear-cut as that. His opponents have enough seats to make a government. Iraqi politics is never that easy however. There are still months of talks lying ahead during which Maliki’s opposition will have to show staying power otherwise he will play divide and conquer with them as he has done in the past. In 2012 for instance there was a no confidence move against the premier, but the Sadrists pulled out and the effort failed. In those two years the dislike and distrust in the prime minister has grown. The question is, is that enough to make a new government? Only time will tell.

SOURCES

Abbas, Mushreq, “The uncertain prospects for an Iraqi ‘Sunni Alliance,’” Al Monitor, 5/13/14

Al Rafidayn, “Barzani sponsors a secret meeting with Allawi and paints a role for the dagger to finance front against state of law,” 5/21/14

Major Winners In Iraq’s 2013 Provincial Elections (REVISED)

On May 4, 2013, Iraq’s Election Commission announced the final results for the 2013 provincial ballot. There were only a few small differences from the early count. Overall, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law was still the biggest winner, taking seven out of twelve provinces, and tied for an eighth. Amongst the other Shiite religious parties, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) recovered from its sweeping losses in 2009, while the Sadrists largely treaded water. Speaker Osama Nujafi’s Mutahidun, The Uniters List, emerged as the main Sunni party, while Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Arab Iraqiya did rather poorly. Iyad Allawi ran across the country on a secular and nationalist agenda, and did even worse. What comes next is even more important as these victorious lists negotiate with each other to put together new coalitions in each governorate. The big question is whether the Shiite religious parties will work together or whether the Supreme Council and the Sadrists will conspire against Maliki. In the end, this may be all talk, as the 2013 vote does not look to be changing the current political status quo in the country.

State of Law was the overwhelming victor in the 2013 election. It won Baghdad, Basra, Babil, Qadisiyah, Dhi Qar, Karbala, and Muthanna provinces, and was tied with the Supreme Council in Wasit. That was a drop from its 2009 finish when it took nine of the twelve provinces that voted this year. State of Law included more elements in this round of balloting like Fadhila and the Badr Organization. That meant its loss was even greater, which was shown in the number of seats it won. In 2009 it took 126 seats across twelve provinces, and this year it only won 108. In the larger picture, this was a defeat for Maliki who was hoping for a more sweeping victory to prepare him for the 2014 parliamentary elections.

The Supreme Council made a tremendous rebound from its poor showing in 2009. It finished with a first place tie in Wasit, six second places, two third places, and one fourth place. In 2009, it was punished for being the incumbent, and lost across the south and Baghdad finishing second in seven of twelve provinces. Now it came out with 61 seats compared to 55 in 2009. ISCI head Ammar Hakim has been trying to build his base back-up. It appeared that effort has reaped some rewards. ISCI could have also benefited from those unhappy with State of Law’s rule over the last couple years, and gotten their votes.

The Sadrists only saw a slight improvement. It won in Maysan, came in second in Karbala, along with five 3^rd place and three fourth place finishes. That compared to 2009 when the best it could do was coming in second in Dhi Qar, along with five third places, and one fourth place. Still, that resulted in taking 47 seats this year, compared to 41 in 2009. Sadr would like to eventually replace Maliki and his State of Law as the main Shiite list in the country. It appears that Sadr is still quite some time away from being able to challenge the premier.

Speaker Nujafi’s Uniters List emerged as the main Sunni party (Reuters)

The Sunni vote in Iraq was split across various parties. That was the result of the Iraqi National Movement (INM), which won the most seats in the 2010 parliamentary vote, splintering. Speaker of Parliament Osama Nujafi’s Mutahidun, Uniters List, did the best, coming in second in Baghdad and Salahaddin. Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Arab Iraqiya completely fell apart. In 2009, he ran as the head of the Iraqi National Project and came in second in Diyala, third in Salahaddin, and 5^th in Baghdad. This year the deputy premier only took sixth place in Baghdad and Salahaddin. That disappointing finish was reflected in the fact that Mutlaq went from 13 seats in 2009 to only 5 in 2013. Iyad Allawi and his Iraqiya did the worst. He was the only candidate to run in all twelve provinces on a nationalist and secular agenda. He barely registered in the south, and could only take fourth in Diyala and Salahaddin, fifth in Baghdad, and sixth in Babil. In 2009, he took second in Salahaddin, third in Qadisiyah, fourth in Baghdad, Diyala, and Wasit, and fifth in Basra showing a much wider appeal in much more of the country. His seat count went from 24 in 2009 to 15 in 2013. Nujafi and Mutlaq also ran together in Diyala where they finished second, so they are going to add some more seats there. The INM was always an unwieldy list of too many leaders and parties. It quickly fractured after the 2010 election, and has now officially come apart. From those remnants Speaker Nujafi has emerged as the largest vote getter. He has championed opposition to Maliki, and the empowerment of Sunnis. Mutlaq on the other hand tried to align with the prime minister, and failed miserably. He appeared to be in trouble far before the vote however. Finally, Allawi’s decline may have been as much the result of his constant travelling outside the country, and poor leadership of the INM as much as the drop in popularity of nationalist and non-sectarian politics in Iraq.

Finally, the Kurdish parties did about the same this year as 2009. The main Kurdish groups ran as the Brotherhood and Coexistence List, and finished third in Diyala, just as it did in 2009, and seventh in Salahaddin. That gave it six seats versus four in 2009. That is a small amount, but they are important coalition partners in Diyala. The Shiite and Sunni parties will be coming to the Kurds to win them over to take control of that province.

Seats Won In 12 Provinces By Major Lists 2009 vs. 2013

Major Lists	2009 Seats Won	2013 Seats Won
State of Law	126	108
ISCI	55	61
Sadrists	41	47
Iraqiya	24	15
Uniters	NA	14
Arab Iraqiya	13	5
Kurds	6	6

Comparison of Winners in 12 of Iraq’s Provinces 2009 vs. 2013

List	Finish 2009	Finish 2013
Major Lists
State of Law	1st Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiyah, Wasit (9 total)	1st Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Muthanna, Qadisiyah, Wasit (7 total)
	-	2nd Maysan
	3rd Karbala	3rd Najaf
ISCI	-	1st Wasit
	2nd Babil, Basra, Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiyah, Wasit (7 total)	2nd Babil, Basra, Dhi Qar, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiyah (6 total)
	-	3rd Baghdad, Maysan (2 total)
	-	4th Karbala
Sadrists	-	1st Maysan
	2nd Dhi Qar	2nd Karbala
	3rd Babil, Baghdad, Maysan, Najaf, Wasit (5 total)	3rd Basra, Dhi Qar, Muthanna, Qadisiyah, Wasit (5 total)
	4th Basra	4th Babil, Baghdad, Najaf (3 total)
National Coalition of Diyala, Salahaddin (State of Law, ISCI, Sadrists)	NA	1st Diyala
	NA	5th Salahaddin
Uniters	NA	2nd Baghdad, Salahaddin (2 total)
Iraqi National Project/Arab Iraqiya	2nd Diyala	-
	3rd Salahaddin	-
	5th Baghdad	-
	-	6th Baghdad, Salahaddin (2 total)
Iraqiya	2nd Place Salahaddin	-
	3rd Qadisiyah	-
	4th Baghdad, Diyala, Wasit (3 total)	4th Diyala, Salahaddin (2 total)
	5th Basra	5th Baghdad
	-	6th Babil
Iraqiyat Diyala (National Assembly of Iraqis & Arab Iraqiya)		2nd Diyala
Kurds	3rd Diyala	3rd Diyala
	-	7th Salahaddin
Independents
Alliance of Iraqi People	-	1st Salahaddin
Loyalty to Najaf	4th Najaf	1st Najaf
Dignity Alliance of Iraq	-	3rd Salahaddin
Iraq Independent Professionals	-	3rd Babil
Youssef Majid al-Habboubi	1st Karbala	3rd Karbala
Basra Independent Coalition	-	4th Basra
Alliance of Independent People of Diwaniya	-	4th Qadisiyah
Communists	-	5th Babil
Justice and Unity	-	5th Basra
Salahaddin Turkmen List	-	6th Salahaddin

Major Winners In 2013 Provincial Voting By Governorate

Babil
List	Seats Won
State of Law	8
ISCI	7
Iraq Independent Professionals Group	4
Sadrists	3
Communists	2
Iraqiya	1

Baghdad
List	Seats Won
State of Law	20
Uniters	7
ISCI	6
Sadrists	5
Iraqiya	3
Arab Iraqiya	3

Basra
List	Seats Won
State of Law	16
ISCI	6
Sadrists	3
Basra Independent Coalition	4
Justice and Unity	1

Dhi Qar
List	Seats Won
State of Law	10
ISCI	7
Sadrists	5

Diyala
List	Seats Won
Diyala National Coalition (State of Law, ISCI, Sadrists)	12 (10 State of Law, 2 Sadr)
Iraqiyat Diyala (Nujafi & Mutlaq)	10
Kurds	3
Iraqiya	2

Karbala
List	Seats Won
State of Law	7
Sadrists	4
Youssef Majid al-Habboubi	3
ISCI	3

Maysan
List	Seats Won
Sadrists	9
State of Law	8
ISCI	6

Muthanna
List	Seats Won
State of Law	8
ISCI	7
Sadrists	3

Najaf
List	Seats Won
Loyalty To Najaf	9
ISCI	6
State of Law	5
Sadrists	3

Qadisiyah
List	Seats Won
State of Law	8
ISCI	5
Sadrists	4
Alliance of Independent People of Diwaniya	4

Salahaddin
List	Seats Won
Alliance of Iraqi People	7
Uniters	5
Dignity Alliance of Iraq	5
Iraqiya	3
National Coalition in Salahaddin (State of Law, ISCI, Sadrists)	3 (1 State of Law, 1 ISCI, 1 Sadrists)
Arab Iraqiya	2
Salahaddin Turkmen List	1
Kurds	1

Wasit
List	Seats Won
State of Law	7
ISCI	7
Sadrists	5

There has been talk that Hakim (left) and Sadr (right) will align to shut out Maliki from the new governments in the south, but it might be just talk (Reuters)

The next move is to form ruling coalitions in each of the twelve governorates. This is moving forward, with lots of contradictory news reports emerging. One had Maliki and Hakim meeting in Baghdad to work out how they would rule in Basra and Baghdad, only to have the Supreme Council head allegedly turn down the premier. Hakim was quoted as saying that Maliki was pushing for a majority government, while Hakim wanted to be more inclusive. That didn’t seem to stop members of State of Law from announcing a new local government in Qadisiyah to be formed with the Citizen’s Coalition. Al-Mada reported that there were talks between the Sadrists to challenge Maliki by joining with ISCI to shut out State of Law. Later Moqtada al-Sadr and Hakim met in Najaf on May 8 where they confirmed that they had formed a partnership. Again, this was contradicted in Maysan, where a Dawa leader told the press that it was aligning with the National Partnership Gathering, which is an ally of the Sadrists. In Diyala, things are just as interesting. There, the Iraqiyat Diyala, which was Nujafi and Mutlaq’s joint list came in with 10 seats, said it would join with Allawi’s Iraqiya that won 2 seats to get the governorship. The problem is the joint Shiite religious list the Diyala National Coalition also has twelve seats. That means the Kurds are the kingmakers because whomever they throw their three seats behind will likely be the next ruler. In the south and Baghdad, the reports of pushing Maliki’s list out of power may be just negotiating tactics to win concessions. On the other hand, there is plenty of rivalry between the premier’s Dawa, ISCI, and the Sadrists. Since the prime minister controls the central government, which holds the real power over budgets and development out in the governments, the other Shiite parties may be convinced and bribed to all come together. Diyala is a much trickier situation. The Kurdish parties have had an on-going dispute with Maliki over a wide variety of issues like the budget and oil policy. At the same time, the Supreme Council has tried to keep up good relations with Irbil. The Kurds also have conflict with the Sunni parties over Kirkuk and the rest of the disputed territories. That means things could go either way. Which ever side offers the most incentives will likely gain the support of the Kurds.

Iraq’s 2013 governorate level elections maintained the current political deadlock within the country. Maliki’s State of Law as predicted came out the biggest winner, yet didn’t do as well as the premier hoped. His list suffered from being the incumbents, which failed to improve the conditions in the areas it ran. Those dissenting votes mostly went to the Supreme Council who staged a comeback after a sweeping loss in 2009. The prime minister faced another defeat when his would be ally Deputy Prime Minister Mutlaq got wiped out in the vote. Speaker Nujafi on the other hand, emerged as the main Sunni politician after the dissolution of the Iraqi National Movement. The coalition building is going on currently, and while there is talk of a possible revolt against the prime minister, his holding of the top office should allow him to cajole and coerce the other Shiite religious parties to fall in line behind him. The only real mystery left is which way the Kurdish Brotherhood and Coexistence list will go in Diyala. Looking forward to next year’s elections, the lines between the parties are pretty much set, and there does not look like any major changes took place within Iraq’s political system. The future therefore points to more bickering and arguing as Prime Minister Maliki lacks the support to create a majority government, which would make his rule easier, while his opponents are still weak, allowing him to play divide and conquer with them. Before, Iraq’s politicians always went to the brink over issues, and then in the final hour were able to come to a compromise. That is becoming harder and harder to achieve as the country’s leaders have become more polarized. The only thing that brings them together is to form ruling coalitions and passing the ballot, because they can then use those to gain power and money through the state. Otherwise, things are progressing in Iraq mostly despite the government, not because of it. 

SOURCES

AIN, “AIN’s Statistic. SLC 96 seats, Citizen 60 seats in results of PC election,” 5/4/13

- “Breaking news…Diyala National Alliance tops elections results in Diyala,” 5/4/13

- “Breaking News…Iraqiya Masses 1^st in Salah ill-Din,” 5/4/13

- “New political alliance formed in Maysan,” 5/1/13

- “SLC, Citizen, Ahrar forefront electoral slates in Basra,” 5/4/13

- “SLC, Citizen Coalition top results of Babel PC slates,” 5/4/13

- “SLC tops electoral slates in Diwaniya,” 5/4/13

- “Strategic agreement between Citizen Coalition and SLC to form Diwaniya local government,” 5/8/13- “Urgent…PCs elections results…..SLC assumes first place in Baghdad,” 5/4/13

- “Urgent…Ahrar bloc 1^st in Maysan,” 5/4/13

- “Urgent…..PCs elections results…..Wafa for Najaf assumes first place in Najaf,” 5/4/13

- “Urgent…SLC wins 7 seats amongst 27 in Karbala,” 5/4/13

Ali, Ahmed, “Iraq’s Provincial Elections and their National Implications,” Institute for the Study of War, 4/19/13

Al-Mada, “State of Law approaching loss of the Governments of Basra and Baghdad,” 5/1/13

National Iraqi News Agency, “Iraqiya Diyala List allies with Allawi’s coalition in Diyala,” 4/25/13

- “Sadr and Hakim discuss, in Najaf, the strategic partnership,” 5/8/13

Schreck, Adam and Yacoub, Sameer, “Iraq PMs group wins largest bloc in several areas,” Associated Press, 5/4/13

Sotaliraq, “The rule of law in Basra ally of other powers and the number one candidate in the Iraqi approaching them,” 5/2/13

Al-Tamimi, Iyad, “Maliki’s coalition retreat from the majority and described “big mistake” ..Hakim refused an offer from state of law exclusively,” Al-Mada, 4/24/13

Visser, Reidar, “Final Results of the Iraqi Provincial Elections 2013,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 5/4/13

- “The Intra-List structure of the State of Law Alliance in Iraq’s New Provincial Councils,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 5/7/13