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| (LA Times) |
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani is the leading Shiite cleric
in Iraq. Although he comes from what is known as the quietist school of thought
that is supposed to mean staying out of politics he played an active role in
shaping the post-Saddam government in the early years of the U.S. occupation.
Since then he has not been so publicly involved in affairs, but he did try to
quell the violence during the civil war, and today has become a critic of the
poor governance in the country. To help explain the Ayatollah’s role in Iraqi
society since 2003 is Fadel Reda al-Kifaee a senior adviser at Management
Systems International who has extensively studied the Hawza, the Shiite
religious establishment.
1. Ayatollah Sistani
was a vocal critic of the U.S. occupation under the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA). Paul Bremer came into the country with his own vision of how
he wanted the new Iraq to develop that included a two-year transition to put
together a constitution, develop democratic principals amongst the society, and
then eventually hold elections for a new government. What problems did Sistani
have with Bremer’s plans, and who won this battle of wills?
I think the main
concern on the part of Ayatollah Sistani regarding the CPA's approach was the
Islamic identity of the Iraqi people. The Ayatollah feared Americans would
engineer the constitution in such a way that fixed the western style of liberal
freedoms. I think he also feared that the CPA would ignore, or marginalize, the
role of Islam in the judiciary and legislation. Ayatollah Sistani was sure that
the Shi'a would revive even with the CPA's original plans realized. Sistani also
seemed to worry about the American presence in Iraq. He may have feared that
having a political process based on the American roadmap would produce
governments that legitimized a long military presence, which in turn was likely
to compromise the social identity of Iraq.
It seemed that both
sides, the CPA and the supreme Marji', ended up with a deal that secured, or so
they thought, their respective minimum level of demands. The result
constitution’s Article 2 states that, "Islam is the official religion of
the state and is a foundation source of legislation," and it prohibits enacting
laws that violate one of Islam's pillars. At the same time, it mentions that no
law is passed if it violates democratic principles or the rights and freedoms
mentioned in the constitution. In the same article, it comes back to emphasize
that "the constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of the majority of
the Iraqi people…". No doubt that Sistani won the battle over having a
direct-elected constitutional assembly, but it turned out that it was a battle
within a war of wills.
2. After the CPA seemed
to give in to Sistani’s demands it went ahead and drafted the Transitional
Administrative Law (TAL) that acted as the constitution until a new one was
drafted by the Iraqis. Why do you think the Americans went ahead with this
move, and what was the Ayatollah’s reaction?
The TAL represented the
CPA's counter attack to Sistani's moves, if we continued calling it a war.
Bremer made use of his relations with Iraqi politicians, including the Shi'a,
in his Iraqi Governing Council in passing this dangerous legal document. The
Americans were trying to make sure that they would end up with a constitution
that led to a 'liberal state' that didn’t threaten its neighbors even if that
came at the expense of its internal cohesion. The Americans also feared that
Sistani would urge his followers to ask for a sort of religious constitution,
one that didn’t embrace the Iranian style of vilayat al-faqih but granted the
religious establishment a considerable role over state institutions.
Sistani immediately
realized that the TAL was formulated to be a blueprint for the permanent
constitution. His stance over this move was one of his most powerful positions.
In addition to issuing many communiqués condemning the TAL, the Ayatollah warned
the Security Council not to mention the TAL in its then prospective resolution on
Iraq and the council respected Sistani's will. Sistani's main objection was
that the TAL would threaten Iraq's unity by promoting sectarian politics and
racist divisions.
A man kisses a Jan.
2005 election poster featuring the image of Grand Ayatollah Sistani in Najaf (AP)
3. Iraq held two
elections in 2005. The first was to put together a temporary parliament that
would draft a new constitution, and the second was to create a permanent
government. Sistani was largely responsible for putting together the United
Iraqi Alliance (UIA), which was made up of the largest Shiite Islamist parties
such as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the Dawa Party, the Fadhila Party,
some Sadrists, and others. In turn, the UIA used Sistani’s image in its
campaigning. What was the Ayatollah’s thinking behind putting together this
list?
Formulating the UIA
seemed controversial considering the Ayatollah's anti-sectarian methodology. I
think Ayatollah Sistani was mainly trying to have a major block in the
constitutional assembly that would be able to embed the principles Sistani had
long advocated, some of which were mentioned above, in the permanent
constitution as well as preventing the attempts of transferring some of the TAL's
articles into the constitution. What happened after winning the election was
that Sistani seemed to lose control over the leadership of the UIA. Although
the UIA's leaders pressed and managed to include some of Sistani's major demands in
the constitution, they began acting independently in many political fronts.
Their control over the state's resources after forming the government led by
Ibrahim al-Ja'afari made them feel confident to the extent that they built the
second UIA, formed prior to the December 2005 elections, basically without
consulting the supreme Marji' ! Eventually, some controversial articles of the TAL
were copied to the constitution; for instance, the condition that the
constitution could be vetoed once three provinces voted against it, a matter,
which Sistani openly opposed.
The apparent outcome
of formulating the UIA was avoiding the dispersal of Iraqi Shi'as' votes by the
one list-one constituency electoral system that helped the Shi'i political
parties consolidating power inside the first elected parliament. If this was
what Ayatollah Sistani envisaged, then this would be a contradiction to his
many fatwas that called for a government based on a political majority rather
than a sectarian one. I think the main goal on the part of Sistani on the UIA
matter was to draft a constitution away from the TAL and the American
influence.
Another factor may
have been trying to help these Shi'i parties to sit together and practice
dialogue because Sistani sensed the high level of hostility among some of them,
one that might have risked the security of holy Shi'a cities and that was what
happened latter on in some occasions.
By formulating the
UIA, I don't think Ayatollah Sistani was planning to have those Shi'ite
Islamist parties permanently ruling the country for a simple reason; those
parties believed in versions of vilayat al-faqih, and that methodologically
contradicted the school of thought of Sistani.
4. Sistani’s role in
putting together the constitution and Iraqi government brought up questions
about what his position was towards democracy. Did he just want elections so
that Shiite Islamists could come to power, did he believe in some kind of
compromise between Islam and constitutional rule, etc. What are your thoughts
on Sistani’s views?
Although the Grand
Ayatolah avoids directly announcing his stance towards democracy, I can say
that he at least believes that the people should be a source of political
legitimacy. The tone of his fatwas and statements dealing with elections and
related issues uncovers a methodological tendency rather than mere pragmatic tactics
to help Shi'ite Islamists winning. Ayatollah Sistani went further than many
other Shiite Ulama in this regard as he frequently emphasized that parliament whether
being a constitutional assembly or not must be directly elected by the people
underscoring the issue of representativeness. In short, he not only accepts but
also adopts democracy. At the same time, he makes sure that the religious
authority has the right to dictate a democracy's outcomes should this process
produce something the marji' believes threatens the Islamic social identity or
the well being of society. The subject marji' should use his social powers to
practice this dictation.
5. In 2006 the Shiite
shrine in Samarra was bombed and Iraq moved towards full-scale civil war. What
was Sistani’s response, and was he able to stem the violence at all?
The Ayatollah’s response
was issuing a statement asking believers to peacefully protest the action
asking not to involve in any retaliatory reactions. This fatwa and all the
meetings the Supreme Marji' had with various political and social players was
not enough to prevent the violence. It seems that all Sistani's efforts to stem
the anger of Shi'a during the 2004-2005 escalating violence were gone with the
wind. One important factor was the role of the Sadrist militia. Without this
role, I think the country wouldn't have gone to full-scale civil war. The issue
was that Moqtada al-Sadr's followers didn’t emulate Sistani and so were not religiously
bound by his fatwas.
6. You mentioned how Sistani
has had a mixed relationship with the Shiite religious parties that took power
after 2005. Moqtada al-Sadr for example has fluctuated between trying to usurp
Sistani’s position, sometimes through violence, while relying upon the
Ayatollah to save him from crises like the August 2004 uprising and Premier
Maliki’s 2008 Charge of the Knights offensive against the Mahdi Army. The
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq claimed Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei as
their spiritual leaders, but then claimed they switched to Sistani. The Dawa
Party on the other hand, has consulted with Sistani, but do not claim to
emulate him. In recent years, Sistani’s representatives have issued a steady
stream of criticisms of the ruling parties in Baghdad about the lack of
services, the deadlock in parliament, etc., and he has refused to meet with
politicians. Why hasn’t he been more influential over these parties that he
helped put into office?
The relationship
with the Da'wa Party has been relatively impacted by historic complications.
The traditional current in Hawza has been basically against having clerics involved
in politics. There is also the fact that the Hawza's clerics have felt
uncomfortable towards persons with western style outfits let alone having those
same gentlemen specialize in Shari'a. The early leadership of the Da'wa was composed
of both kinds of men; clerics involved in politics and suited men educated in
Islamic jurisprudence. However, Ayatollah Sistani positively interacted with
Da'wa leaders after they came back from exile as part of his openness to the
exile opposition.
Sistani has been
known to have a warm relationship with the Al-Hakim family, which introduced
prestigious religious figures to the community of Hawza. The late Ayatollah
Mohamed-Baqir al-Hakim, who led the ISCI since 1982 until his death in a
bombing in Najaf in 2004, made use of this relationship and so did his brother
Sayed Abdul-Aziz who succeeded him at the top of the ISCI.
Regarding the
Sadrist Current, there has been clear alienation between them and the Grand
Ayatollah. This current represents a Shiite social class of mostly poor and
uneducated persons who feel they are discriminated against by other Shi'a
especially the traditional Hawza.
Away from the
Sadrists, the relationship between Sistani and both ISCI and Da'wa has gone
through many phases. The constitutional phase that lasted from 2003 to late
2005 witnessed relatively positive interactions. As shown above, Sistani helped
those parties rise to power aiming at influencing the process of drafting the
constitution. Since 2010 this relationship has been damaged with the Grand
Ayatollah refusing to host leaders of those parties at his office. Sistani
sounds fed up with the leadership of these parties, which has begun to openly disobey
his guidance. The Ayatollah also may feel that they let him down for what the
country ended up with in terms of corruption, public services, and security.
In 2012 there was talk that Iran was promoting Ayatollah
Shahroudi as Sistani’s replacement (Reuters)
7. In 2012 there was
a tidal wave of articles about Iran trying to find a successor to Sistani,
specifically with Ayatollah Mahmoud Shahroudi. Was there any basis for these
reports, and overall what role will Tehran play in determining who becomes the
head cleric after Sistani passes?
I acknowledge that
promoting Shahroudi to Marji'iya (the Hawza's supreme leadership) is
implausible, in the foreseen future at least, considering the well-established
doctrine of quietism in Najaf. The move of opening an office for Shahroudi in
Najaf came as a part of integrated, well-organized efforts to influence the
Hawza. The Iranians seemed to have long-term plans in Najaf. They are building
socio-religious networks in mid and southern Iraq in general and in Najaf in
particular, a matter that they envisage using at a later stage to influence the
process of having a new supreme marji' in Najaf. Such a process is too
unofficial in Shi'ism and so the post-Sistani era will witness a transition in
which no clear candidate will rise to the supremacy. Tehran will use its
networks of institutions, students, teachers and scholars at the Hawza to promote
publicity their desired candidate. The effectiveness of such efforts will
partly depend on whether the camp of the traditional Hawza of Najaf has formed
a consensus over whom to succeed Sistani.
8. The conventional
wisdom about Ayatollah Sistani is that he comes from the quietest school of
Shiite clerics as opposed to the activists such as Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,
Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, and Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr who
believed in some form of direct clerical rule over society. There are all kinds
of interpretations of Sistani’s stance towards politics ranging from the
quietist school doesn’t mean complete absence from social affairs, to the Ayatollah
having his own form of activism or that he has developed a middle road between
the two. What’s your theory on Sistani’s stance towards involvement in
politics?
In a previous
publication I called Ayatollah Sistani a 'neo-quietist' marji''. I know these classifications
may be confusing, but they are generally valid. Sistani still adheres to the
mainstream of quietism; having clerics abstaining from directly involving in
politics unless a sociopolitical threat emerges. Meantime, the development
Ayatollah has brought in to quietism has been in two integrated aspects; one is
political and the other is social. Political wise, the Ayatollah advocates a principle
according to which the religious establishment must act as the guardian of the
society's Islamic identity. What he differs in from those Shiite constitutional
clerics (Na'ini and clerics of Iran's 1906 constitutional revolution) and
others is that he believes that the marji' must practice this guardianship
using his social powers within the community of believers and must practice
that from outside the government's apparatus. The ulama that supported the 1906
revolt in Iran demanded having a quota for clerics in parliament mandated to observe
the accordance of laws with Shari'a. In short, Sistani accepts democracy but
with having an uncodified veto over its outcomes in exceptional occasions.
In the social dimension
of Sistani's neo-quietism, I think the Grand Ayatollah is in favor of a
principle in which the Islamic authority, the supreme marji' in Shi'ism, must
have the society's 'authorization' to intervene to impose a social, or
political, measure. By authorization I mean the readiness of the subject
society to socially and politically accept this measure. I think that this approach on the part of Sistani
is in accordance with his approach that a reform must be a bottom-up process
that starts from society. The Ayatollah is a strong opponent of the Khomainian
style of imposing Islamic virtues by state forces because according to the quietist
doctrine the government has no legitimacy to impose Islamic measures in the age
of occultation (Shi'as call the current age as the time of the hidden Imam).
These two political
and social aspects are integrated. Sistani encourages civil society to
facilitate government reforms. The Ayatollah supports competent civil society
organizations that try to be a partner in the public policy making process
through communicating with policy makers and encouraging them to meet the real
needs of citizens as the Grand Ayatollah sees them. These organizations are
well-funded and employ prominent figures.
In the long run,
Grand Ayatollah Sistani seems to be preparing society in a way that would make
the outputs of democracy in accordance with Islam's core values and so the incidents
of religious intervention in politics would be considerably minimized. This
future condition would eliminate, if realized, the pretexts that a society
needs the vilayat al-faqih system to preserve its Islamic identity.
SOURCES
Arango, Tim, “Iran Presses for Official to Be Next Leader of
Shiites,” New York Times, 5/11/12
Baram, Amatzia, “The Iraqi Shi’i Community: Between Sistani,
Muqtada, the IGC, and the CPA, Testimony by Amatzia Baram, senior fellow at the
U.S. Institute of Peace, before the U.S. House of Representatives Armed
Services Committee,” United Sates Institute for Peace, 4/21/04
Cole, Juan, “The United States and Shi’ite Religious
Factions in Post-Ba’thist Iraq,” Middle East Journal, Autumn 2003
International Crisis
Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, The Sadrists And The Surge,” 2/7/08
Al-Khoei, Hayder, “why iran-sponsored cleric can’t become
iraq’s next religious leader,” Niqash, 6/28/12
Al-Kifaee, Fadel Reda, “The Role of the Hawza of Najaf and
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in Restructuring the Iraqi Governance System in
Post-Ba’athist Iraq,” Masters Thesis American University of Cairo, May 2010
McGeough, Paul, “Speculation grows Iranian cleric may lead
Iraq’s Shiites,” Newcastle Herald, 4/28/12
- “The Struggle to Succeed Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani,”
Foreign Affairs, 5/23/12
Rizvi, Sajjad, “Political mobilization and the Shi’i
religious establishment (marja’iyya),” International Affairs, November 2010
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