Review The Making of Foreign Policy in Iraq, Political Factions and the Ruling Elite

Gulmohamad, Zana, The Making of Foreign Policy in Iraq, Political Factions and the Ruling Elite, London, New York, Oxford, New Delhi, Sydney: I.B. Tauris, 2021

 

Zana Gulmohamad set out to try to explain the complicated story of how Iraq formulates its foreign policy in The Making of Foreign Policy in Iraq, Political Factions and the Ruling Elite. His thesis was that Iraq’s foreign affairs are shaped by each ethnosectarian group, political party, and leading officials in Iraq under the influence and interference of foreign nations. That leads to a contradictory stance as each actor follows its own path to the detriment of the country.

Review The Foreigner’s Gift, The Americans, the Arabs, and the Iraqis in Iraq

Ajami, Fouad, The Foreigner’s Gift, The Americans, the Arabs, and the Iraqis in Iraq, New York, London, Toronto, Sydney: Free Press, 2006

 

The Foreigner’s Gift reads like a journal of Fouad Ajami’s trips to Iraq but it’s really an argument for the war. Ajami acknowledges the great difficulties the Americans faced in the country but thought they would prevail for two reasons. First he believed in the universalism of democracy and thus with time Iraqis would take up the new political system. Second he brings up individuals he met as a panacea for all of Iraq’s problems. Thus almost everyone he met justified his belief in the invasion. There are some serious faults with this point of view.

Review The Man Who Pushed America To War, The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi

Roston, Aram, The Man Who Pushed America To War, The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi, New York: Nation Books, 2008

 

To people who know about the 2003 invasion of Iraq Ahmad Chalabi is a polarizing figure. Is he a hero or a villain? Is he a con man or a visionary? The Man Who Pushed America To War, The Extraordinary Life, Adventure, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi by Aram Roston attempts to answer those questions. The book goes through the major points in Chalabi’s life from his time growing up under the Iraqi monarchy to his exile after the 1958 coup to his family’s financial problems to joining the opposition to Saddam Hussein. The author believes that Chalabi helped convince the U.S. to go to war with Iraq but that was only because Americans wanted to hear what he said.

Review The Occupation, War And Resistance In Iraq

Cockburn, Patrick, The Occupation, War And Resistance In Iraq, London, New York: Verso, 2007

 

The Occupation, War And Resistance In Iraq by journalist Patrick Cockburn is a short overview of the mistakes the U.S. made during its time in Iraq from its lack of knowledge of the country before it invaded to the constant political blunders it made afterward. The book starts in the 1990s to give some background to what Iraq was like before the war started, and then mostly focuses upon the period the Coalition Provisional Authority ruled the nation. It ends in 2006. Cockburn argues that America’s hubris before and after the invasion undermined the new Iraq it was trying to create.

Review U.S. Marines in Battle, An-Najaf August 2004

Review Kozlowski, Francis, U.S. Marines in Battle, An-Najaf August 2004, Department of Defense, Marine Corps History Division, 2008

U.S. Marines in Battle, An-Najaf August 2004 is the official Marine history of the second battle for the southern Iraqi city. It gives a detailed day by day account of the Marines, later backed by the Army and Iraqi forces as they attempted to destroy Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army. It does an excellent job describing the American side of the fight. What it lacks is an Iraqi perspective and a political understanding of the battle.

Review The Occupation of Iraq, Winning The War, Losing The Peace

Review Allawi, Ali, The Occupation of Iraq, Winning The War, Losing The Peace, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007

Initially, the dominant narrative about the 2003 invasion of Iraq came from the Americans and the British. As time passed, Iraqis were able to add their voice to what happened to their country. One of the most prominent was Ali Allawi. He had an interesting background as he was involved in exile opposition politics in the 1990s. Then, after the overthrow of Saddam, he served in the 2004 interim government and then the 2005 Jaafari administration. That insider perspective was what made his The Occupation of Iraq, Winning The War, Losing The Peace a standout book about post-Saddam Iraq. Allawi’s main thesis was that Iraq was a lesson in unintended consequences. The United States invaded a country which it took no time to study and never seriously planned for. The result was unleashing a firestorm of forces that were completely out of control of the Americans. The new Iraqi elite that took power was little better as they provided no national vision for the new Iraq, something that had been a problem since Iraq was formed after World War I. Allawi therefore believed that Iraq was an unmitigated disaster.

Ziad Qatan, Allawi Govt Defense Official Wanted For Corruption Extradited By Jordan

On April 15, 2018, a former Defense Ministry official under Prime Minister Iyad Allawi was extradited by Jordan. In September 2017, a Jordanian court approved Ziad Qatan’s deportation to Iraq, and he was arrested in January 2018. He finally arrived in Baghdad in April to coincide with the 6^th ministerial conference of the Arab Network for the Promotion of Integrity and Combating Corruption. Premier Haidar Abadi’s office trumpeted his detention as a sign that the government was following through with its promise to fight corruption. That is a main part of the PM’s re-election campaign. Ziad Qatan is accused of stealing up to $800 million during the Allawi period.

Iran Had Both Sides In The 2004 Najaf Battle

In August 2004, the Americans took on the Mahdi Army in Najaf city. Earlier that year Moqtada al-Sadr’s militia led a failed uprising, and then continued attacks upon the Coalition in southern Iraq. That led the White House to authorize offensive operations against his forces, which led to the Battle for Najaf. During the fighting, Iran was intimately involved on both sides. On the one hand, it had advisers with the Mahdi Army helping them battle the Americans. On the other hand, it facilitated peace talks with the Iraqi government and Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to end the conflict. While that might seem like a contradiction, it perfectly encapsulated Tehran’s role in Iraq, which was to have connections to all sides to exert influence throughout the country.

Allawi Iraq’s Absent Prime Minister

Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi took power in June 2004 as the Coalition Provisional Authority closed up shop. He had the support of both the United States and the United Nations envoy Lakhdar Brahimi. The Americans quickly found several issues with the new premier. One of them was Allawi’s constant trips outside of the country. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice for example, noted that the prime minister was always flying around the region, and could not always be contacted. Rice asked, “Are we worried that Allawi is spending ten to eleven days [a month] outside the country?” Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Richard Myers agreed with Rice that Allawi’s constant foreign travel was an issue. The next year when Allawi was replaced as prime minister he left Iraq for nearly four years even though he was elected as a member of parliament. When his Iraqiya list won first place in the 2010 elections he again decided to take extended tours around the region thinking that would help his chance to become the prime minister once again, but that only backfired against him. Allawi’s Iraqi National List was created in 1990 with the help of the intelligence agencies of Turkey, the Gulf States, and the west. He has maintained those ties ever since hoping they would help his political career. Given most of those states antagonistic stance towards the new Iraq they have not served him well.

SOURCES

Allawi, Ali, The Occupation of Iraq, Winning The War, Losing the Peace, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007

BBC, “Profile: Iyad Allawi,” 3/27/10

Galbraith, Peter, “Iraq: The Bungled Transition,” New York Review of Books, 9/23/04

Gordon, Michael and Trainor, General Bernard, The Endgame, The Inside Story Of The Struggle For Iraq, From George W. Bush To Barack Obama, New York, Pantheon, 2012

Ethnosectarian Politics In Iraq, Its Future And Repercussions, An Interview With Univ of Miami Prof. Adeed Dawisha

Sectarian politics has ruled Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Although the Americans are widely blamed for institutionalizing this style of government, the Iraqi opposition was already organizing themselves by sect and ethnicity in the 1990s. Since the U.S. invasion, every Iraqi government has been a national unity one where all the winning lists have been given a seat, and top positions are divided up using ethnosectarian quotas. Washington and others have argued that this system was necessary to include all of Iraq’s diverse population, so that they could work together to form a new democracy. In practice however, it has only led to dysfunctional governments and corruption. To discuss the impact and future of this form of rule is University of Miami Political Science Professor Adeed Dawisha who specializes in democracy and politics in the Middle East.

1. The United States started organizing the Iraqi government along ethnosectarian lines with the Iraqi Governing Council that it formed in 2003. The number of seats was handed out to each group based upon their perceived population size, while also trying to include secular and religious groups. What was the original argument the Americans made for dividing up the council in that fashion?

After the massive conversion to Shiism among Iraq’s tribes from the late 18^th century onward, the ethnographic composition of the country has been roughly 60% Shiites, 20% Sunnis, 18% Kurds, and 2% other minority religions and beliefs. Yet throughout the same period Sunnis dominated the political process. This imbalance was aggravated further, taking on violent forms, during the Saddam era. So after the forcible removal of Saddam, the general sentiment was for a more equitable distribution of political power, something which Iraqis had not had for over two centuries—hence the allocation of seats in the first Governing Council in accordance with the ethnographic composition of Iraqi society.

2. In 2004 Iyad Allawi was named the interim prime minister. He was a secular politician, yet he followed the same quota system, and so did all the subsequent governments. Why did the Iraqis buy into this system when they were in control?

Once a precedent is set, particularly one that is advertised as based on fairness, it is difficult to break it. When you have a majority group (Shiites), as well as a minority group (Kurds), who between them constituted almost 80% of the population, believing that they’d had two centuries of exclusion and persecution, and that they now have finally attained a fair representation in government, no contrary argument, regardless of how pertinent or justifiable it is, could have won the day.

3. Some believe that sect and ethnicity are primordial divisions within Iraq that have always existed, while others have argued that ethnosectarian politics only came to the fore when the state lost legitimacy leading people to look towards other groups and identities for protection. What is your opinion of why ethnosectarian politics became so prominent in present day Iraq?

If the question is suggesting that the state lost legitimacy after the invasion of Iraq, then I have major problem with such an interpretation. The state under Saddam had little, if any, legitimacy among a commanding majority of the country’s population. It was under Saddam’s rule, particularly the last decade and a half, that ethno-sectarianism, tribalism and sub-state identities came to the fore, overshadowing the more inclusive Iraqi identity. What the Americans did was to institutionalize these identities. The American move, as I said earlier, was undertaken with probably the best of intentions, but unfortunately it proved to be an absolutely terrible decision in terms of Iraq’s post-invasion political development.

4. You’ve argued that the quota system is the reason why Iraq’s politicians run the ministries like personal fiefs. Can you explain the connection between the two?

The apportionment of cabinet portfolios stems from the original American decision to create ethno sectarian balance within the first Governing Council. The practice was taken a step further when after the January 2005 elections, Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari apportioned cabinet seats not only to the various ethnic and sectarian groups but also to different grouping within the winning coalition. The result was that Jaafari’s authority over his ministers became marginal at best. This continued through Maliki’s first term (2006-2010) and right into his second term. The result was that ministries became separate cantons in which the loyalty of the minister was directed more to the leader of his party or his ethnosectarian group than to the prime minister. From around the fall of 2011, Maliki has used the inevitable paralysis in the cabinet to sideline the ministers and take unilateral decisions. 

5. Federalism has been another problem for Iraq. Originally, the U.S. wanted to devolve power away from Baghdad to the provinces to try to prevent another dictatorship being formed. What the country ended up getting was the recognition of the Kurds’ control of Irbil, Dohuk, and Sulaymaniya. Provinces were also given the right to form their own federal regions, and some tried recently, but were stopped by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. How could decentralization help with the governance of the country, and why have the premier and other parties opposed it?

After years of centralized authoritarian politics, which attained an absolutist form under Saddam, it was obvious to many analysts that creating a federalist political structure, where power devolves away from the center to the regions, was the best way to ensure that dictatorship does not return. Post-Hitler Germany is the best illustration of this argument. But what transpired in Iraq, mainly through purposeful Kurdish advocacy, was not the kind of territorial federalism that had been suggested, but one that was based on ethnosectarianism. This kind of federalism goes beyond creating a power balance between center and regions; it encourages cultural separatism and political division. The Kurdish region today is independent in everything but name! On this issue, I sympathize with Maliki, because if southern Shiite provinces and Sunni provinces in the middle of Iraq are allowed to follow in the footsteps of the Kurds, then this probably would be the first steps to the disintegration and demise of the state of Iraq.   

6. For the last several years Prime Minister Maliki has talked about forming a majority government. What would have to change in Iraqi politics for the elite to give up on national unity coalitions, and instead agree to ruling and opposition parties?

Many are waiting for the 2014 general elections as the possible beginning of a new political era. The thesis is that the present political elite will have recognized, after more than a decade of fruitless governance, the bankruptcy of the idea of national unity government, and that they’d be compelled to move to a majoritarian form of government, where a strong and decisive government will be balanced by an equally strong opposition. The problem here is twofold. One, Iraq’s proportional representation electoral system (PR) is not conducive to majoritarian rule. PR is geared toward producing coalition governments. So a drastic change of the electoral law to a kind of constituency based, first past the post system would be needed, and I very much doubt this would happen. Two, the party system (if one can call it that) is fragmented, and has been in a state of constant flux, with alliances continuously shifting. This is the worst environment for creating a majoritarian system.       

7. Another part of creating a democratic society is rule of law and strong institutions. Iraq so far has neither, and instead the elite like to rule through personal connections and patronage, something that previous leaders have used such as Premier Nuri al-Sa’id from the monarchy period. Why haven’t the political parties put more emphasis upon building institutions?

If you examine the various parties, you would see that they are not the kind of parties we associate with democratic systems. They are not stable organizations that draw support from segments of society because of clearly defined and articulated ideologies and/or political and economic programs. In Iraq, parties are groupings that coalesce around personalities. Parties are no more than labels created by individual leaders, and therefore, in stark contrast to Western democracies, their status and coherence are completely dependent on the leaders’ legitimacy, and his continued desire to keep the party going. The State of Law has no credibility independent of Maliki. People who vote for al-Ahrar are in fact voting for Sadr. If Maliki and/or Sadr were to decide to move on to another label, their “parties” would instantly disappear from Iraq’s political theater. And this is true of all parties. Once politics is dominated by individuals, not rule-based organizations, then personal interest is apt to supersede the national interest, and the energies of various, and often bickering, individuals are expended not on building national institutions, but on maneuvering and conspiring to achieve personal power.                 

8. Finally, Iraqi politics are always hard to predict, but what direction do you think things are heading?

I still believe strongly that Iraq today with all the near chaos and uncertainty is a far better place than the supposedly “stable” country under the malevolent rule of Saddam Hussein. That being said, it is sad to say that when one looks into the future, one is hard put to find any real indication of a palpable and meaningful political transformation over the horizon. My main concern is that the same personalities, who so far have failed miserably to reform the country, would be dominating Iraq’s politics over the next one or two decades. There is a troubling dearth of new leaders within these parties and grouping, or outside of them, who are emerging with new and substantive ideas. Even if there is a pool waiting in the wings, its upward trajectory would go through routes predetermined and controlled by the existing system of patronage, and religious allegiances.

Given the resulting stagnation of the political process, state institutions will continue to be ineffective. The party that has profited most from the persistent weakness of central authority, and will thus continue to benefit from such a circumstance, are the Kurds. For the rest of Iraq, it might be a case of plus ca change, plus c’est la meme chose.  

SOURCES

Dawisha, Adeed, “Iraq: A Vote Against Sectarianism,” Journal of Democracy, July 2010

- “The Unraveling of Iraq: Ethnosectarian Preferences and State Performance in Historical Perspective,” Middle East Journal, Spring 2008

Dawisha, Adeed and Dawisha, Karen, “How to Build a Democratic Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2003

Ghanim, David, Iraq’s Dysfunctional Democracy, Santa Barbara, Denver, Oxford: Praeger, 2011

Al-Qarawee, Harith, Imagining The Nation, Nationalism, Sectarianism and Socio-Political Conflict in Iraq, Lancashire, Rossendale Books, 2012

Russian Arms Deal Follows Pattern Of Corrupt Purchases By Iraq

Iraq is in the midst of finalizing a multi-million dollar arms deal with Russia. The contract was surrounded in controversy when it was originally announced in late-2012 with accusations of corruption. Now Baghdad is moving ahead with it claiming that it was re-negotiated, but the same claims of kickbacks and commissions for officials and businessmen have resurfaced. This follows a pattern started when Iraq first regained control of its government in 2004 using middlemen in weapons procurement contracts that skim off millions of dollars. It is deals like these that make the country one of the most corrupt in the world.

Baghdad has a contract to buy 30 Mi-28NE attack helicopters from Russia, but the deal involves large commissions to Iraqi officials and middlemen taking a large cut as well (Wikipedia)

Baghdad has been attempting to buy two weapons systems from Russia for the last several months, but it was held up over corruption charges. In June 2013, Russia said it received the first payment of the $4.2 billion deal for 30 Mi-28NE attack helicopters and 50 Pantsir-S1 mobile anti-aircraft systems. Negotiations for the systems was first announced in October 2012, but then cancelled the next month over corruption allegations. The Iraqi government then began new talks. By February 2013, Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said that the deal had been completed. In March an Iraqi delegation went to Moscow to finalize things. The purchase will make Russia the second largest arms supplier to Iraq. Most of the country’s weapons come from the United States through the Foreign Military Sales program, but Iraqis have complained about the long wait time it takes to receive the equipment. That has led Iraq to increasingly look for other suppliers, but the large amounts of money included in these contracts also offers another way for officials to steal money.

The new Russian arms contract has come under criticism just like the first one. A member of parliament’s integrity committee stated that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was insisting on buying the weapons from Moscow despite the last deal including major pay offs to officials. The lawmaker went on to say that documents pointed to continued corruption. Originally, it was the Sadrists who raised questions about the October 2012 negotiations with the Russians claiming there were kickbacks. The integrity committee started an investigation in November. (1) The head of the committee ended up asking the premier to cancel the contract, but Maliki said he had no strong proof of any wrongdoing. Of course the prime minister was uncooperative as well, refusing to answer any questions made by investigators, while the Defense Ministry did not provide any documentation on the contract. Despite that, the committee did find discrepancies between the prices for the equipment initially given and then what was later stated ranging from 9-30%. A Kurdish parliamentarian claimed that middlemen were taking 30% of the contract, while the Russian press reported that up to $500 million had been given to Iraqi officials in commissions. The committee eventually named fourteen senior officers that it suspected of taking illegal money from the Russians including acting Defense Minister Sadoun Dulaimi, government spokesman Ali Dabbagh, State of Law parliamentarian Izzat Shabandar, adviser to Iraqi President Jalal Talabani Abdul Aziz al-Badri, Maliki media adviser Ali Musawi, various generals, and members of the Defense Ministry staff. Sadrists and Dabbagh went on to accuse the prime minister’s son Ahmed Maliki of also being involved as well. Iraqi and Lebanese businessmen Majid al-Qaisi and Hassan Fahadh, and Jordanian arms dealer Qasim Rawi were mentioned as the middlemen who worked out the deal between Moscow and Defense Minster Dulaimi. In November 2012, Dabbagh was forced to resign over these accusations, in what appeared to be a calculated campaign by Maliki to scapegoat him. Dabbagh was the only one in this entire affair who faced the least bit of punishment. A criminal case was later dropped for lack of evidence, and Maliki moved ahead with the new deal claiming that all the problems had been resolved. That’s highly unlikely given this history, and past arms contracts.

Defense Minister Shalan was accused of signing millions of dollars in corrupt arms deals that delivered few weapons and goods to the Iraqi military (Getty)

As soon as Iraq regained control of its government in 2004 it set about to rearm its military, but many of these deals were surrounded in controversy. A 2007 U.S. Embassy report from Baghdad noted that these purchases were a major source of corruption with up front payments, no performance benchmarks, and often including middlemen that charged large amounts. (2) Hazim Shalan, the Defense Minister under interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi set this precedent using front companies and businessmen in a number of arms contract. The Board of Supreme Audit looked into 89 deals made by the Defense Ministry from June 2004 to February 2005, and found that Shalan used three middlemen and a select few companies that took large kickbacks, and bought overpriced, unnecessary, and sometimes unusable equipment. Nair Mohammed Jumail received 43 of the 89 contracts for at least $759 million. Two of the businesses used were Al Aian Al-Jareya and Safin. They were actually fronts set up by relatives of Defense Ministry officials, including Shalan’s brother-in-law, the chief of staff of one of the two vice presidents of Iraq, and Nair Mohammed Jumail. Al Aian Al- Jareya was given $850 million to buy 64 M18 attack helicopters. It ended up only purchasing four that turned out to be 25 years old. The Iraqi Army rejected them as a result. The Defense Minister signed a no bid contract with another Baghdad based company to buy armored cars from Pakistan. The money was paid up front, and the vehicles proved unusable, because of poor armor and mechanical problems. A third example was the Defense Ministry using the American Wye Oak Technology to refurbish old military equipment. The owner of the company told the U.S. government that he suspected Iraqi officials of taking kickbacks in the deal. He went on to say that the Ministry was using a Lebanese businessman as a middleman, who Baghdad gave three separate checks for $24.7 million, which was then to be passed along to Wye Oak Technology. That money was never delivered to the U.S. business. Minister Shalan later blamed the procurement chief at the Defense Ministry Ziad Cattan for all these problems. An arrest warrant was later issued for Cattan leading him to flee the country. Shalan ended up leaving as well when he was publicly implicated in these corrupt deals. There were many other cases involving Shalan and other Defense Ministers. When Iraq uses the United States to buy weapons it has to file papers, and go through a detailed process that takes a while to complete, which is one reason why Iraqis complain about it. Other countries do not have such strict regulations, and in some cases the middlemen didn’t appear to even go to other governments, but rather used arms dealers. Since graft and bribery is common in Iraq, the post-2003 prime ministers have done nothing about their Defense Ministers partaking in these corrupt deals. Maliki only reluctantly admitted to corruption in the Russian deal, then put the blame on Dabbagh, so that he could restart negotiations with Moscow. Iyad Allawi and Ibrahim Jaafari never took responsibility or action either. This is simply part of how Iraq does business.

It is not by mistake that Iraq is considered such a corrupt country. The Defense Ministry under various ministers has partaken in one crooked arms deal after another. These all involve front companies or middlemen that skim money off the top, and Iraqi officials who receive payoffs as well. This started in 2004 under the interim government of Iyad Allawi and has continued all the way to the present regime of Nouri al-Maliki. The current prime minister is set on completing the arms deal with Russia even though it’s known that it involves large commissions and kickbacks. This is a reflection of how corruption has become institutionalized within the country, and is used as part of governing. Each ruling party takes as much money as it can get while in office, and distributes it to its followers as part of patronage networks. Since everyone does it, no one is willing to put an end to it since everyone could be implicated. Instead, they deny it is happening, and continue on as if everything is normal. That’s the reason why there is no serious effort to stop the graft and bribery as the current Russian weapons procurement highlights.

FOOTNOTES

1. Sabah, Mohammad, “A parliamentary committee: Prime Minister and Minister of Defense declined to provide a copy of the Russian arms deal contacts,” Al-Mada, 1/13/13

2. U.S. Embassy, “Review of Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq Working Draft,” 2007

SOURCES

Adhoob, Salam, “An Inside View of the ‘Second Insurgency’: How Corruption and Waste Are Undermining the U.S. Mission in Iraq,” Senate Democratic Policy Committee Hearing, 9/22/08

AIN, “Breaking News …Maliki instructs to change negotiating delegation over Russian armament deals, Says Jihad,” 11/9/12

- “Dabbagh key figure in corruption of armament deal with Russia, says Bazouni,” 11/23/12

- “Dabbagh: “Maliki’s son, Sinaid involved in corruption accompanying Russian armament deals,”” 2/7/13

- “Integrity Committee: “New evidences over corruption accompanying armament deal with Russia,” 1/22/13

- “Investigation Commission: “Maliki decline to answer our questions over armament deal with Russia,”” 1/21/13

- “Maliki denies firm proofs over corruption in armament contracts,” 11/30/12

- “Source informs AIN details over Dabbagh’s involvement in Russian armament deal,” 11/22/12

- “Vice Chest: Maliki’s son among defendants with Russian arms deal corruption,” 11/25/12

Allam, Hannah, “Audit: Fraud drained $1 billion from Iraq’s defense efforts,” Knight Ridder, 8/11/05

Aswat al-Iraq, “Corruption shrouding arms deal – MP,” 5/16/08

- “Maliki denies Dabbagh informed him of Russian deal corruption,” 11/21/12

- “Pressures block questioning some ministers – MP,” 4/18/09

BBC, “Iraq cancels $4.2bn Russian arms deal over ‘corruption,’” 11/10/12

Cockburn, Patrick, “What has happened to Iraq’s missing $1bn?” Independent, 9/19/05

           

Elliot, DJ, “Iraqi Arms Purchases October 2012,” Montrose Toast, 10/15/12

Filkins, Dexter, “Iraq can’t find $300 million taken abroad to buy weapons,” San Francisco Chronicle, 1/22/05

Garaa News, “Disappearance adviser to Iraqi President Abdel-Aziz al-Badri in Jordan,” 12/2/12

Al-Mada, “Criminal denounce the integrity decision regarding the closure of Russian arms suit and return to court,” 5/15/13

Moore, Solomon, “Secret Iraqi Deal Shows Problems in Arms Orders,” New York Times, 4/13/08

Mroue, Bassem, “Defense Ministry accused of corruption in overspending,” San Francisco Chronicle, 8/3/05

National Iraqi News Agency, “Government Spokesman : fired,” 11/29/12

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Confusion Over $4.2 Billion Iraqi Arms Deal With Russia,” 11/10/12

Al Rayy, “Mehdi Haji: on the government to continue the Russian arms deal without going through agents,” 7/22/13

Sabah, Mohammad, “A parliamentary committee: Prime Minister and Minister of Defense declined to provide a copy of the Russian arms deal contacts,” Al-Mada, 1/13/13

Shafaq News, “Integrity Commission announces names of wanted in the Russian arms deal investigation,” 11/29/12

- “Russian arms committee limit the responsibility of the deal on eight people,” 12/26/12

Silverstein, Ken, Miller, T. Christian, and McDonnell, Patrick, “U.S. Contractor Slain in Iraq Had Alleged Graft,” Los Angeles Times, 1/20/05

Sowell, Kirk, “Inside Iraqi Politics No. 50,” 11/21/12

- “Inside Iraqi Politics No. 51,” 12/5/12

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/12

Strategy Page, “Iraq Invaded By Russians,” 6/20/13

Al-Tamimi, Iyad, “The integrity of Parliament: the government fears the penalty clause for a deal corrupt Russia and bought a 9 storey building,” Al-Mada, 7/15/13

U.S. Embassy, “Review of Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq Working Draft,” 2007

Vulliamy, Ed and Norton-Taylor, Richard, “Millions embezzled at Iraqi ministry,” Guardian, 8/22/05

The Baathist Purge In Post-Saddam Iraq, A Short History Of DeBaathification

DeBaathification is one of the lasting legacies of the American occupation of Iraq. Passed in May 2003 by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) the effort to rid the country of the Baath Party quickly took on a life of its own that continues with the current Iraqi government. DeBaathification was not a vetting process meant to weed out the good and the bad. Rather it set out to ban the top ranks of the party, but then quickly expanded to any Baathist in a politicized, open ended effort that lacked due process, and coherent guidelines. While it had many supporters in both the U.S. and Iraq, there were just as many detractors. It ended up dividing the country, and hindered the development of a new Iraqi government and democracy.

The Baath was one of the most successful authoritarian parties in modern history. By the end of 2002, it had just under 4 million members. From 1986 to 2002 it increased 140% as Saddam Hussein attempted to maintain control of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, and then the sanctions period following the Gulf War by reaching out to young people and women. Out of an estimated 25 million people in 2002, Baathists were 16.5% of the population. That was much higher than the Communist Party in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. Party members who had actual power were only about 4% of Iraq, while the party elite was around 2.4% of the populace. Towards the top of the party were Secretary Generals, amin sir, who set policies and had power over the military. Branch members, udhu fir, led party sections, could order arrests, use weapons, and had some authority over the security forces. A section member, udhu shu’ba, led cells, and supervised and could work with local security forces. A division member, uhdu firqa, implemented orders, and could oversee the security forces and local administrators. Below that were the lower level party members consisting of active members, udhu amil, apprenticed members, udhu mutadarib, candidates, murashih, advanced supporters, nasir mutaqadin, supporters, nasir, and sympathizers, muayid, all of which belonged to party cells. By 2002 there were 69 party branches across the country, 612 sections, 3,787 divisions, 32,852 cells run by 76 Secretary Generals, 1,027 branch members, 6,128 section members, 45,537 division members, 223,662 active members, 254,081 apprenticed members, 27,242 candidates, 1,113,211 supporters, and 2,328,080 sympathizers. DeBaathification was originally supposed to only affect the top four party levels, approximately 52,700 people, that it was assumed had participated in crimes. It was later applied to far more than that with many exceptions. DeBaathification was not a vetting process to see which Baathists could remain in office, and which could not, but was rather more like a purge of anyone the authorities felt needed to be removed or retired.

The Bush administration liked to compare Saddam’s Iraq to Nazi Germany, but was divided on what to do with the Baath Party. The State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency wanted to get rid of Saddam and a couple of other leaders only, while the Pentagon and Vice President Dick Cheney called for a broad purge of Baathists. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice was in the middle. Early in 2003 the Defense Department and Cheney won the debate. Ahmad Chalabi had the ear of both of them, and pushed the idea that Saddam was like Hitler and needed a deNazification process. That comparison didn’t quite hold up. DeNazification did not hold all senior Nazis accountable or stop them from returning to office. It was more of a vetting process meant to keep the German government running after World War II. More importantly, it didn’t seem that the administration even studied how deNazification worked to help plan the deBaathification it would soon order.

How to deal with the Baath Party on the ground in Iraq also created divisions. After the fall of Baghdad in April 2003, General Tommy Frank’s Freedom Message to Iraqis bared the Baath Party. Afterward, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) under Jay Garner followed a mild deBaathification approach. It only disqualified the 55 top party members on the deck of cards wanted list,  and anyone implicated in crimes. Otherwise, it allowed hundreds of Baathists to return to work. That quickly changed when Paul Bremer arrived in Iraq in May and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was announced. Bremer received a draft deBaathification law from Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith who wanted it implemented immediately. Four days after Bremer landed in Baghdad he issued CPA Order 1 banning the Baath Party. The top four party ranks, Secretary General, branch member, section member, and division members were barred from working in the government. That was quickly expanded to the three highest levels of administration in each office, and criminals. That meant that any Baathist could be included no matter what the rank. That immediately created opposition from people like Garner, and the CIA station chief in Baghdad Charlie Sidell. They went to Bremer warning him that such a broad deBaathification effort would create tens of thousands of opponents to the CPA. They pushed for only the top two tiers of the party to be excluded. Bremer replied that he was under orders from Washington. He also believed in getting rid of the Baathists, and thought it would be a strong statement about the dramatic transformation the U.S. was hoping to bring to the country. The CPA head went on to promote deBaathification as being just like deNazification to help justify it. (1) After the order came out others came out against it as well. That included General David Petraeus who was then the commander of the 82^nd Airborne Division in Mosul, and General Ricardo Sanchez, the commanding general of Coalition forces in Iraq. The former was afraid that getting rid of Baathists would cause people to turn against the Americans and deprive the government of needed officials, while the latter thought that the CPA never paid attention to how to implement the order or its effects. By the end of his time in Iraq, Bremer also understood that deBaathification had backfired, cutting into the bureaucracy much deeper than he thought, and banning far more than he had envisioned. The executive director of the deBaathification Commission Ali al-Lami later told the Washington Post that 150,000 people were banned from May to September 2003. The Pentagon and Bremer wanted to make their mark on Iraq. They considered the Baath a totalitarian party that needed to be rooted out of Iraqi society. The various officials who came out against it were not able to change the policy, but eventually Bremer saw the error of his ways. The problem was that by then, the process was out of his control.

Ahmad Chalabi quickly took over deBaathification, and ran with it. In July 2003, the CPA created the Iraqi Governing Council. The next month, when Chalabi was the rotating president of the Council it created the deBaathification Commission. Then in September, Chalabi became its chairman, and appointed Mithal al-Alusi as its director. Alusi was a former Baathists himself who went into exile in the 1970s. The staff that was hired mostly came from the Shiite religious parties, while Chalabi centralized control over the commission. He immediately expanded its scope by adding more party levels, including people who had been kicked out of the party before 2003, banned those belonging to “oppressive institutions” or involved in stealing or corruption, and created deBaathification offices in each ministry. He then cancelled all previous reinstatements, and took over the appeals process, even though there were no rules for how that would work. In early 2004 the Commission issued regulations about its powers. It said it would oversee all information about the Baath, all personnel in the ministries, control all exemptions, said that only certain party members had the right to appeal, and if they did, they would lose their pension if they were rejected. This new approach led to a dispute with the CPA, but by then the Americans had no real influence over the matter. In April 2004, Bremer attempted to add due process procedures, and later rescinded the order authorizing the Commission, but they had little actual effect. At the same time, the Dawa Party, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan supported deBaathification, which was more than enough to keep the process moving forward. At the same time, the Shiite religious parties saved some Shiite Baathists, and re-employed them making them dependent upon those same organizations. This was part of a larger process where a little over 100,000 former Baathists were brought back into the government to help with administration. Under Chalabi deBaathification became an open ended and politicized process. Any Baathist was open to investigation even if they had left the party before the 2003 invasion. The ruling parties could pick out people they wanted, and exempt from the process. This was when Bremer saw the errors of the policy, but it was too late. The Iraqis were now in control, and they were not going to let go.

In June 2005 when Iyad Allawi was made interim prime minister, he immediately came into conflict with Chalabi and the deBaathification Commission. The new premier wanted to limit deBaathification to only a small group of party leaders, as he was a former Baathist himself, and did not see the party in the same light. Chalabi refused to change his policy. This feud was not just about politics, but became a personal one between Allawi and Chalabi. The Commission went to the Shura Council, a part of the Justice Ministry, and got a favorable ruling to continue with its work. At the same time, the Council said that there could be new limits placed on deBaathification. Afterward, the cabinet said that all contacts with the Commission had to go through it. Shortly after that, Mithal al-Alusi faced criminal charges, and was removed from his position. The government then got rid of three more members of the Commission, cut its funding, and attempted to evict it from its offices in Baghdad. It also drafted a new law to replace the Commission. Unfortunately for Allawi he was not in office long enough to carry through with his plans. Allawi’s Iraqi National List was based upon former Baathists like himself and ex-military men. He therefore had the exact opposite opinion of Chalabi and the deBaathification Commission, which was to go after any former regime member they wanted to. He could not win this war however as he made way for a new government in 2005.

The parties that wanted to rid the country of the Baath Party were the ones that took power in the 2005 elections. After the January 2005 vote, the United Alliance led by the Shiite religious parties won the most seats in parliament, and eventually got Ibrahim al-Jaafari of the Dawa Party elected prime minister. Chalabi was named his deputy. Shortly afterward, the new government was ordered to cooperate with the deBaathification Commission. Its work was later included in the 2005 constitution, it banned candidates in the 2005 elections, and influenced the trial of Saddam Hussein. Article 7 and 135 prohibited the Baath Party, and said that all government offices were subject to deBaathification. Before the December 2005 balloting, the Commission tried to bar 170 candidates even though both Chalabi and the new director Ali al-Lami were candidates. The Election Commission objected, claiming that it was given multiple lists of banned politicians with different names on them just before the voting with little evidence against them. The Election Commission only ended up banning 40 candidates. Finally, the deBaathification Commission tried to insert itself into the trial of Saddam. First, it objected to many of the judges and staff on the tribunal being former Baathists. Three times it stopped personnel from participating for their ties to the former regime, and eventually got 19 employees of the tribunal to quit including the administrative director. The U.S. stepped in and stopped any of the judges from being dismissed, but the Commission did succeed in getting the president Judge Said al-Hammashi being transferred. Giving into this pressure, the tribunal eventually created its own deBaathification committee in 2006, and agreed to get rid of more of its staff. After Saddam was sentenced to death, the Commission told four judges they could transfer or face deBaathification. Given the make-up of the new government, and the support it gave to deBaathification it was no surprise that the commission would expand its power and try to influence the new political system. Although not always successful it did play a role in the voting process and Saddam’s trial, and most importantly was given constitutional legitimacy. The Commission therefore could continue its work as long as it wanted. For the Shiite religious and Kurdish parties, they supported the process, because they still feared the return of the Baath Party, and believed that many party members deserved to be excluded and prosecuted for their crimes.

When the civil war took off into high gear in 2006, the new government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki came under increasing pressure from Washington to reform the deBaathification process in an effort to appease Sunnis. In June 2006, Maliki said he would revise the process in an attempt at reconciliation, but nothing came of it. In March and August 2007 he tried again, but was shot down by the Shiite and Kurdish parties. Chalabi even offered to loosen the deBaathification rules, and claimed that 2,300 high-ranking Baathists would get their jobs back or pensions in 2007. Eventually these different ideas coalesced into the Accountability and Justice Law, which was passed in January 2008 despite much opposition. It basically continued the same process, but simplified it, and offered more opportunities for some Baathists to receive pensions. The new Accountability and Justice Commission immediately became a point of contention. First, Chalabi and Lami argued that the new law allowed the old deBaathification members to maintain their positions in the new commission. Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi believed that an entirely new leadership should be appointed. Not only that, but Lami called for all former Baathists in the government to apply for reinstatement or retirement under the new law, and received 41,000 applications as a result. This started another argument over the approval process in the cabinet and parliament. That controversy finally ended when the Americans arrested Lami in September for alleged connections to Iranian backed Special Groups. He was not released until July 2009 as part of a political deal. Without Lami, the new commission stalled, and the cabinet was successful in stopping some of its work. When Lami returned to office, he went to the Supreme Court and Shura Council, and successful got the old deBaathification Commission to become the new Accountability and Justice Commission. Ironically, by the time the Accountability and Justice Law was passed, the civil war was coming to an end, and there was not as much pressure to appease the Sunnis so that they would give up fighting. Instead, the new Accountability Commission caused a battle over who would control it. Chalabi and Lami were eventually able to win that match, and stay in power.

The Accountability Commission would soon make its mark in the 2010 parliamentary elections. Like in 2005, Chalabi and Lami were once again running for office, which would make their decisions all the more controversial. In January 2010 the commission went after former Baathists, intelligence and security officials, and those they claimed promoted the Baath Party just before the vote. In total, it wanted to ban 511 candidates including some sitting parliamentarians, 15 parties, and 376 military and police officers. That included Salah al-Mutlaq the head of the Iraqi National Dialogue Front, the director of military intelligence, the commander of the Federal Police, and many members of secular and Sunni parties. After a long drawn out battle more than 170 candidates appealed their cases, and 26 won. The Election Commission also refused to disqualify 52 others. After the balloting, the Accountability Commission went after some of the winners. When negotiations started for putting together the new ruling coalition, the ban on the lawmakers was dropped. That eventually allowed Mutlaq to become a deputy premier. At the same time, Lami became the head of the commission as Chalabi was elected to the legislature. In May 2011, Lami was assassinated, and the commission lost much of its power without its dynamic leader. The next month, Maliki dismissed Chalabi from the commission, and replaced him with Human Rights Minister Mohammed Soudani from the Dawa Party. In September, the prime minister dismissed two Chalabi allies from the commission and replaced them with his own followers. This political struggle meant that the 7 commissioners were not appointed until July 2012. Falah Shanshal of the Sadr trend was elected its head with Omar al-Qadhi of the Kurdish Coalition his deputy. That didn’t stop Maliki from trying to replace Shanshal in February 2013. That same month, Maliki issued orders through the cabinet to cancel all the decisions of the Accountability and Justice Commission while it was under Shanshal’s leadership. It wasn’t until July that parliament confirmed Shanshal in his position in a deal between the Sadrists, Supreme Council, and Mutahidun. DeBaathification was always open to political manipulation by Chalabi and the ruling parties. Its bold attacks upon candidates in the 2010 elections showed that it could be used as a powerful tool in shaping new governments. That led Maliki to attempt to take over the Accountability Commission, which was eventually spoiled by his rivals that did not want the premier to extend his influence into the deBaathification process.

Today, there is renewed talk of reforming the anti-Baathist legislation. In the spring of 2013, the cabinet agreed to amend the Accountability and Justice Commission by allowing division members to no longer face disqualification as part of a reconciliation deal between Maliki and Mutlaq aimed at the protests, which started in Sunni provinces at the end of 2012. The Sadrists, Fadhila, and Badr parties all expressed reservations about changing the law. Even a member of Maliki’s own State of Law came out against any amendments saying that the Baathists should be given no concessions. The Iraqi National Movement (INM) initially supported the changes, because it backed the protest movement, but now may not be willing to back it, because Maliki could claim it as a victory. The Shiite parties have always been the strongest supporters of deBaathification, and see no reason to appease the demonstrations, especially because they have taken on a sectarian tone, and some have joined the insurgency. They along with the INM and others are also thinking about the 2014 parliamentary elections, and see Maliki as their main rival. They do not want to give him any successes, which could help him out with voters. That means this talk of amending the Accountability and Justice law will likely go nowhere.

DeBaathification has had a profound impact upon Iraq. Thousands of Baathists were banned from office, crippling much of the bureaucracy. The process was not evenly felt across the government however. Many former regime members were able to get jobs in the security forces for example. The Foreign Affairs Ministry gave lots of exemptions as well, because of its need for specialized skills in international relations. The Education Ministry on the other hand lost over 18,000 of its staff, four more times than any other ministry. In comparison, the Higher Education Ministry only lost 4,361, the Agriculture Ministry 999, the Health Ministry 236, and the Science Ministry only 120. The politicization of the process allowed many public servants to get their jobs back for ties to the ruling parties. Since 2006 deBaathification has mostly been concerned with retirements and reinstatements. The basic problem with banning the Baath Party was that it was based upon mass guilt for the crimes of Saddam. That didn’t take into account the role of Baathists in running the government, and how many were culpable of actual illegal activities. People were initially dismissed with no chance to question their case beforehand. The deBaathification Commission then took up appeals, but had no rules for how that would work. There was no due process until 2010 when the Accountability Commission set up a court that heard complaints. Even then, parties were able to cut deals to get their followers exempted. Most importantly, it caused grave mistrust amongst Sunnis who believed that they were being singled out for sectarian reasons even though plenty of others were party members as well. This was one factor leading to the growth of the insurgency. The acts of the deBaathification and later Accountability Commissions in the country’s elections have also discredited the process in the eyes of many.

After the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iraq could have benefited from a reconciliation process. That could have attempted to bring the population together by airing the crimes of the former regime, while at the same time moving forward. The new ruling elite however did not want anything to do with the Baath Party as a whole, and the White House wanted deep institutional changes. That led to deBaathification, which was a politicized purge. Its failure is seen in the fact that the Shiite religious parties still fear the return of the Baathists to power, while the Accountability Commission has become a prize to be controlled by the Iraq parties. It also did not help with building the new government and democracy. Instead it led to resentment amongst many Sunnis, and the insurgency. Since it is an open ended process, getting rid of Baathists will continue for years, banning candidates in elections and forcing members of the bureaucracy to retire.

FOOTNOTE

1. PBS Frontline, “Interview L. Paul Bremer,” Truth, War and Consequences, 10/9/03

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “New Law Allows Baathists to Reclaim Jobs,” Associated Press, 2/3/08

Agence France Presse, “Iraq cabinet unveils sweeping reform of Saddam law,” 4/7/13

AIN, “Sadrist MP elected as head of Justice & Accountability Committee,” 10/8/12

- “SLC MP criticizes amendment of Accountability & Justice Law,” 4/11/13

Anderson, Jon Lee, “Out On The Street,” New Yorker, 11/15/04

Associated Press, “Former Baathists don’t trust job plan,” 1/14/08

Brosk, Raman, “Shalabi denies his dismissal from Accountability and Justice by Maliki,” AK News, 6/8/11

Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq’s Insurgency and Civil Violence,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/22/07

Eisenstadt, Michael and Ali, Ahmed, “’How This Ends’: Iraq’s Uncertain Path toward National Reconciliation,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 7/17/09

Gordon, Michael, “’Catastrophic Success’ Debate Lingering on Decision to Dissolve the Iraqi Military,” New York Times, 10/21/04

Greenwall, Megan, “Iraqi Leaders Reach Accord On Prisoners, Ex-Baathists,” Washington Post, 8/27/07

International Center for Transitional Justice, “Briefing Paper: Iraq’s New ‘Accountability and Justice’ Law,” 1/22/08

Karouny, Mariam, “Row mars Iraq parliament hearing on Baathists bill,” Reuters, 11/25/07

Lannen, Steve and Fadel, Leila, “Iraqi de-Baathification law may force some key officials out,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/3/08

Moore, Solomon, “Ex-Baathists Get a Break. Or Do They?” New York Times, 1/14/08

National Iraqi News Agency, “Iraqiya: we will stand strongly in parliament to pass the amendment of the law of accountability and justice,” 4/13/13

- “Maliki assigns Bakhtiar Omar instead of Shanshal,” 2/18/13

- “Maliki cancels all decisions taken by the Accountability Commission during Shanshal’s presidency,” 2/18/13

- “Parliament vote in favor of MP Falah Shanshal as head of the Justice and Accountability,” 7/22/13

New York Times, “Bush appoints new overseer to run Iraq,” San Francisco Chronicle, 5/7/03

Oppel, Richard and Myers, Steven Lee, “Iraq Eases Curb for Former Officials of Hussein’s Party,” New York Times, 1/13/08

Otterman, Sharon, “IRAQ: Debaathification,” Council on Foreign Relations, 4/7/05

Packer, George, The Assassins’ Gate, America In Iraq, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005

Paley, Amit, and Partlow, Joshua, “Iraq’s New Law on Ex-Baathists Could Bring Another Purge,” Washington Post, 1/23/08

Parker, Ned, “Iraq votes to lift ban on ex-Baathists,” Los Angeles Times, 1/13/08

Partlow, Joshua and Abramowitz, Michael, “Iraq Passes Bill on Baathists,” Washington Post, 1/13/08

PBS Frontline, “Interview L. Paul Bremer,” Truth, War and Consequences, 10/9/03

Sabah, Mohammad, “Hakim and al-Sadr and united agree to keep the ablation of the file pre-election politicking,” Al-Mada, 7/22/13

Sassoon, Joseph, Saddam Hussein Ba’th Party, Inside an Authoritarian Regime, Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo, Delhi, Tokyo, Mexico City: Cambridge University Press, 2012

Senanayake, Sumedha, “Iraq: Will Passage Of New Law Appease Sunnis?” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1/15/08

Shafaq News, “Sadrist movement calls to apply on De-Baathification law,” 5/8/13

- “Shanshal’s nomination withdrawn from Justice and Accountability Commission,” 2/19/13

Al-Shemmari, Yazn, “MP: Sacking of Shalibi is move to take control of JAC,” AK News, 6/9/11

Sissons, Miranda and Al-Saiedi, Abdul Razzaq, “A Bitter Legacy: Lessons of De-Baathification in Iraq,” International Center for Transitional Justice, March 2013

Sowell, Kirk, “Inside Iraqi Politics No. 16,” 6/12/11

Terrill, W. Andrew, “Lessons Of The Iraqi De-Ba’athification Program For Iraq’s Future And the Arab Revolutions,” Strategic Studies Institute, May 2012

Visser, Reidar, “10 Years after the Fall of the Baath, De-Baathification Remains Centre-Stage in Iraqi Politics,” Iraq And Gulf Analysis, 4/9/13

- “IHEC Publishes the Candidate List for Iraq’s Local Elections,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 3/6/13

- “Iraq Gets A New De-Baathification Board but the Supreme Court Becomes a Parody,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 5/7/12

The Board of Supreme Audit, Part III Of Washington And Baghdad’s Failed Attempt To Fight Corruption

Corruption was endemic under Saddam Hussein. During the sanctions period, the government manipulated the Oil for Food Program for instance, and used petroleum smuggling to earn extra cash. Saddam’s extended family and the top leadership within the Baath Party benefited from this system. Corruption continued, and even expanded after 2003 as billions in reconstruction money and oil profits flowed into Iraq with little oversight and management. That opened up opportunities for abuse by the ruling elite. They have divided up the country’s wealth, and created new institutionalized forms of corruption as government contracts are manipulated to enrich the parties. The Board of Supreme Audit, the oldest anti-corruption agency within the country, has seen all of this. During the Saddam era it was emaciated, and then under the Americans it was hampered by a new and complicated set of bureaucrat rules. Today, it suffers from infighting with the other anti-graft groups, and attempts to dominate Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to control it, which has greatly limited its effectiveness.

The Board of Supreme Audit (BSA) has existed for over eight decades. The British created the agency in 1927, to go through the government’s accounts. In 1980, it was given additional power to look into Baghdad’s financial and economic policies. Still, the Board didn’t have any real authority under Saddam Hussein, as it only dealt with corruption when it threatened him or the Baath Party. When the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was created in April 2003, it temporarily abolished the BSA as part of a sweeping order getting rid of Baathist institutions. The head of the Board Dr. Ihsan Ghanim al-Ghazi went to the CPA, to explain to them his duties, and successfully got the Board reinstated in September with CPA Order 57. Unfortunately, the next year, Dr. Ghazi was assassinated in a car bombing in Baghdad. Abdul Bassit Turki replaced him. Their organization was understaffed and lacked equipment. Out of its 1,200 employees, only 100-150 were actual auditors, and it only had five computers. The U.S. didn’t give it much support either, other than some training. Although the Board had such a storied history, before and after the fall of Saddam, it was not that effective. Its teeth had been pulled by the Baath regime, and it had no time to recover after the U.S. disbanded it, and then brought it back. That was unfortunate, because its oversight duties were needed after 2003 as huge sums of money started flowing into the country.

In April 2004, the CPA attempted to integrate the Board of Supreme Audit within a new anti-corruption framework, but the Coalition ended up hamstringing the Board’s work more than facilitating it. The Coalition tired to make the BSA subservient to the U.S. created Inspector Generals (IG) within the ministries and the Integrity Commission. Taking away the Board’s power to send cases directly to the courts did that. Instead, it had to go through the IGs’ and Integrity Commission. The Board greatly resented these new agencies and rules created by the Americans. It felt, as the oldest anti-corruption body in Iraq that it should be equal to or above the inspectors and Integrity Commission. As a result of its hurt pride, it often did not cooperate with them or share information hampering investigations against theft and graft.

At the same time, the Board only had a limited affect upon the wave of corruption that took hold after the 2003 fall of Saddam. One of its largest cases, an investigation of the Defense Ministry under the interim government of Premier Iyad Allawi for example, led nowhere. The BSA found that the Ministry had wasted $1.27 billion on military purchases through kickbacks, middlemen, and useless equipment. This happened just in the first eight months after Iraq got its sovereignty back in June 2004. The Ministry claimed that it was buying equipment from Poland, the U.S., Europe, and Arab countries when in fact it gave contracts to Iraqi companies who were paid up front in cash. Some companies went ahead and actually bought equipment, but most of it was unusable such as a fleet of leaking Armored Personnel Carriers. Another case involved the purchase of 64 Mi-18 attack helicopters from Poland and Russia, which turned out to be just four that were 25 years old. Other middlemen just walked away with the cash, never to be heard from again. One company was partly owned by the Defense Minister Hazim Shalan’s brother-in-law and an adviser to one of the vice presidents. As a result of this investigation, only nine Defense Ministry officials were fired or placed on leave. Minister Shalan later left the country in 2005, and no real punishments were ever meted out. Here, the Iraqis were emerging from decades of dictatorship, and the first thing they decided to do was take off with over one billion dollars of public money. The Board of Supreme Audit was able to discover this massive theft, but because it garnered no domestic support the case went nowhere. This showed to the new Iraqi officials they could do what they wanted with no real repercussions.

Violence also played a role in limiting the effectives of the Board. From 2005-2008 several workers at the BSA were killed. Some were specifically targeted for assassination. One official had a grenade thrown into his car right after he finished doing some work at a ministry. The headquarters of the Board was also often off limits as there were constant gun battles and sniper fire outside on the street. For weeks, workers couldn’t go to their offices as a result, and the Board essentially shut down its work.

The new Iraqi government was not supportive of the BSA doing its work either. Authorities actively attempted to limit its investigations. They went after the Board’s independence and interfered in cases. In 2007, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki told U.S. officials that he was against agencies like the Board investigating corruption. This was true for the other two anti-corruption agencies as well. Because nepotism, bribery, and theft were so rampant within Baghdad, Maliki did not want anyone looking into the government’s books, and causing problems. The premier therefore did anything he could to block the work of the Board.

The premier also tried to manipulate the Board to further his own political aims. In 2012, charges were brought against the head of the Election Commission Faraj al-Haydari for giving $130 to members of the State Property Commission in return for obtaining government land. A Board official said that it had known about corruption in the Commission for years, but not one ever acted upon it. He thought the case was being used by Maliki to gain control over the independent agency. He claimed that Maliki was angry with the Election Commission after his State of Law list came in second place in the 2010 elections. The Board member was not alone in his suspicions, as the case was later dropped, and Haydari found innocent. The charges and amount of money involved seemed minor at best. The fact that it involved the head of the Election Commission a year before provincial elections also raised eyebrows. Given the fact that it also came as the premier attempted to increase the number of Commission members all pointed to Maliki using all means at his disposal to gain sway over the up coming vote. The Board of Supreme Audit simply became a pawn in this game.

In the last 20 years, the Board of Supreme Audit has had a difficult history. First, during the 1990s, it lost much of its authority as Saddam Hussein concentrated power in his hands, his family’s, and that of the upper echelons of the Baath Party. Then when the U.S. came along it didn’t help by setting up new regulations that limited its abilities. As a result, the Board was not able to carry out its duties as corruption not only expanded, but also reached new heights after the fall of the old regime. Today the Board’s work is limited by the political situation. It can find as many cases of corruption as it wants, but nothing will happen with them unless they involve low-level officials or a high level official wants something to happen. The same is true for the other anti-graft agencies. That’s why Iraq consistently ranks as one of the most corrupt countries in the world for the last several years, because there are no real checks and balances within the government.

SOURCES

Adhoob, Salam, “An Inside View of the ‘Second Insurgency’: How Corruption and Waste Are Undermining the U.S. Mission in Iraq,” Senate Democratic Policy Committee Hearing, 9/22/08

Allam, Hannah, “Audit Fraud drained $1 billion from Iraq’s defense efforts,” Knight Ridder, 8/11/05

Dagher, Sam, “Gunfight Breaks Out as Iraqi Soldiers Try to Arrest Trade Officials,” New York Times, 5/3/09

International Crisis Group, “Failing Oversight: Iraq’s Unchecked Government,” 9/26/11

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons, 1/22/09

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Vulliamy, Ed and Norton-Taylor, Richard, “Millions embezzled at Iraqi ministry,” Guardian, 8/22/05