Review George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, My Years at the CIA, Harper Collins, 2007

  

George Tenet was the director of the Central Intelligence Agency under Presidents Clinton and Bush. He eventually resigned because of the controversy over Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. His book At The Center of the Storm is very interesting because it shows that he was very sensitive about his time at the Agency with several chapters responding to criticisms of his tenure.

Review Iraq, A Report From The Inside

Hiro, Dilip, Iraq, A Report From The Inside, London: Granta Books, 2003

 

This book got two releases. It was originally published as Iraq, In The Eye of the Storm in 2002. Then it switched publishers and came out as Iraq, A Report From The Inside the next year. There was absolutely no difference between the two other than the title. Dilip Hiro was one of the few people consistently writing about Iraq from the 1980s-2000s. This book covers the country from the Gulf War to just before the 2003 invasion. The two most interesting parts were the plots against Saddam and the U.N. inspections.

Review Arrows of the Night: Ahmad Chalabi and the Selling of the Iraq War

Bonin, Richard, Arrows of the Night: Ahmad Chalabi and the Selling of the Iraq War, New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, Auckland: Doubleday, 2011

 

Arrows of the Night: Ahmad Chalabi and the Selling of the Iraq War by 60 Minutes producer Richard Bonin was the second book on the controversial figure. Much of it is based upon conversations the author had with Chalabi. The book highlights his greatest achievement of helping to convince the United States to overthrow Saddam Hussein to his many faults from his financial corruption to his turn towards sectarian politics. The book starts off giving Chalabi’s view of Iraq and then becomes more critical as it progresses.

Review The Man Who Pushed America To War, The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi

Roston, Aram, The Man Who Pushed America To War, The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi, New York: Nation Books, 2008

 

To people who know about the 2003 invasion of Iraq Ahmad Chalabi is a polarizing figure. Is he a hero or a villain? Is he a con man or a visionary? The Man Who Pushed America To War, The Extraordinary Life, Adventure, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi by Aram Roston attempts to answer those questions. The book goes through the major points in Chalabi’s life from his time growing up under the Iraqi monarchy to his exile after the 1958 coup to his family’s financial problems to joining the opposition to Saddam Hussein. The author believes that Chalabi helped convince the U.S. to go to war with Iraq but that was only because Americans wanted to hear what he said.

Review The Assassins’ Gate, America In Iraq

Packer, George, The Assassins’ Gate, America In Iraq, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005 

George Packer of the New Yorker wrote The Assassins’ Gate, American In Iraq in an attempt to explain the ideas behind the 2003 U.S. invasion, and how they came undone. He begins with Iraqi exile Kanan Makiya and the neoconservatives who argued for creating a democratic Iraq using American military force to overthrow Saddam Hussein. He then explains all the problems America faced when it occupied Iraq starting with the fact that it had no strategy and quickly lost the trust of Iraqis. Packer was a believer in the war having been won over by Makiya’s conviction. Afterward however he became disillusioned feeling that no one from the Americans to the Iraqi exiles really wanted Iraq to succeed.  

Review Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco

Phillips, David, Losing Iraq, Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco, Westview Press, 2005

Losing Iraq, Inside the Post War Reconstruction Fiasco by former State Department official David Phillips argues that the United States failed in Iraq. Phillips was involved with the Future of Iraq Project, which brought together Iraqi opposition figures to plan for a post-Saddam Iraq. He adds important information about what the State Department was doing before the 2003 invasion, which has largely been overlooked for the activities of the Pentagon, the CIA, and the White House. Phillips believes that Washington didn’t plan for postwar Iraq, and made things worse during the occupation.

Revised Review Iraq and the Politics of Oil, An Insider’s Perspective

Revised Review Vogler, Gary, Iraq and the Politics of Oil, An Insider’s Perspective, Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2017

Iraq and the Politics of Oil, An Insider’s Perspective is a classic tale of experts being stifled from achieving their goals by the bureaucracy and political appointees. Gary Vogler spent 21 years working for Exxon-Mobile. In 2002 he was asked by the Pentagon to join a planning group for the Iraq invasion. That led to years working in that country. From 2003-04 he was with for the Pentagon, then the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), and finally the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). He would return from 2006-11 as a contractor for Wheeler Energy Ltd. During that time he found that there were committed Americans and Iraqis that wanted to develop Iraq’s oil industry and rebuild the country, but they ran into all kinds of problems due to Washington and Baghdad.

Review State of War, The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration

Review Risen, James, State of War, The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration, New York, London, Toronto, Sydney: Free Press, 2006

James Risen of the New York Times focused upon the war on terror in State of War, The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration. The book covers the fight against terrorism after 9/11, the Iraq war, and spying on Iran and its nuclear program to name a few. Risen argued that more things went wrong then right for the Bush presidency, and that there were abuses along the way.

Revised Review Iraq, In the Eye of the Storm

Revised Review Hiro, Dilip, Iraq, In the Eye of the Storm, New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press/Nation Books, 2002

Dilip Hiro was one of the few people consistently covering Iraq from the 1980s-2000s. Iraq In The Eye of the Storm covers the country from the Gulf War right up to before the 2003 invasion. Each chapter has a theme such as life for ordinary Iraqis under sanctions, the Iraqi opposition, the Kurds, the impact of 9/11, etc. The three most interesting parts were on the mid-1990s plots against Saddam, the coup proofing of the regime by Saddam, and the U.N. weapons inspections.

Inside Iraq’s Oil Sector Interview With Gary Vogler

Gary Vogler worked extensively in Iraq’s oil sector starting in 2002 when he was recruited by the Pentagon to plan for postwar situations. That group was then folded into the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and then the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Vogler would later work as a contractor and consultant in Iraq until 2015, and was involved in several major projects. He recently published a book about his experiences Iraq and the Politics of Oil, An Insider’s Perspective.

Origins Of Iraq’s Ethnosectarian Quota System

Iraq’s ethnosectarian quotas are a mainstay of the country’s political system. There are arguments going on about it right now as Prime Minister Haidar Abadi is unsuccessfully trying to name his own ministers without having to follow them. Most people blame the American Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) for institutionalizing the quotas when it put together the Iraqi Governing Council based upon sect and ethnicity, which was then duplicated in the interim government led by Iyad Allawi and every administration afterward. What is far less known is that the opposition to Saddam came up with quotas long before the U.S. invasion.

Blame for Iraq’s ethnosectarian quotas usually rests with the United States, and for good reason. In July 2003 the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) created the Iraqi Governing Council. The 25 member group was made up of 13 Shiites, 5 Sunnis, 5 Kurds, 1 Turkmen, and 1 Assyrian Christian. In doing so, the U.S. institutionalized the idea that the government should be broken up proportionally according to the country’s different groups. The cabinet of interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi followed that pattern, and every government that came afterward. Because of that history most would think that was the start of the practice, but it actually began years beforehand amongst Iraqi exiles.

During the 1990s there were several conference of Iraqi parties opposed to Saddam Hussein, one of which took place in Vienna in June 1992 that was based upon quotas. Most of the major groups except for the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) attended. There were 170 delegates that were determined by a quota system to try to balance the Islamist parties with the others. The religious parties got 35.5% of the representatives, the western style liberal democrats and independents, received 35.5%, the Kurds 23.5%, and the Turkmen 5.8%. The meeting led to the creation of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), which was supposed to be an umbrella organization. The decision on the representatives, while not completely based upon ethnicity and sect nonetheless set the stage for more explicit ones later on.

Massoud Barzani called for another conference to be held in Kurdistan in October 1992 dubbed the Salahaddin meeting. Again, the organizers came up with fixed numbers for those attending, this time more explicitly mixing religion and ethnicity along with political ideology. There were to be 33% Shiite Islamists, 25% Kurds, 16% Arab nationalists, 6% Turkmen, 4% democrats, 4% liberals, 4% Iraqi tribes, 3% Communists, 3% Assyrians and Christians, and 2% Sunni Islamists. In total, 234 people showed up that included the Iraqi National List, the Iraqi Communist Party, the Iraqi Democratic Party, the Independent Iraqi Authority, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, Dawa, the Islamic Action Organization, the Iraqi National Turkmen Party, and others that covered 90% of the opposition parties. At the end a three man presidential council was decided upon to lead the Iraqi National Congress. Again, the presidents were given to one Shiite, one Kurd, and one Sunni, which were Mohammed Ibrahim Bahr Uloom, Massoud Barzani, and General Hassan Mustafa Naqib. The Salahaddin conference showed that the anti-Saddam groups believed they needed quotas to include the wide variety of groups committed to the cause. They were also moving towards having those based more upon ethnosectarian criteria, than politics, which was the original reason they were used at the Vienna meeting.

In February 1993 there was another meeting of the INC’s presidential council in Irbil. It was decided that a consultative committee should be formed. Originally that was made up of 10 people, but then expanded to 26 to become an executive council, which was led by Ahmed Chalabi. Of those members, 33% were given to Shiite Islamists, 25% to Kurds, 7% to Sunnis, 6% to Turkmen, 6% to Assyrians, and 3% to secular and liberal parties. Here the participants were almost all based upon ethnosectarianism.

Many of these parties would return to Iraq after the 2003 U.S. invasion and become involved in politics. Some would gain seats on the CPA’s Iraqi Governing Council, and then the governments formed after 2005. It’s not clear whether they suggested quotas to CPA head Paul Bremer or the Americans thought of it their own. What the 1990s meetings showed was that the exiles were all familiar and comfortable with them as they had been using them for over a decade.  

SOURCES

Aaron, Daniel Meyers, Marisa, “Cost of Exile: The Role of the Returning Exiles In Post-2003 Iraq,” The Institute for Middle East Studies, The Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, May 2014

Al-Ahram, “Untying the knot,” 2/19/03

International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Shiites Under Occupation,” 9/9/03

Al-Shamrani, Ali, “The Iraqi Opposition Movement: The Post-Gulf War Era 1990-1996,” Department of War Studies, King’s College, 2001

Origins Of Iraq’s Ethnosectarian Quota System

Many are wondering what a post-Nouri al-Maliki government will be like, but one thing that will stay the same are the ethnosectarian quotas. Many believe that the Americans created this system during the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). While the U.S. did institutionalize the concept, it actually came from the Iraqi opposition groups that were formed during the reign of Saddam Hussein. Starting in the 1990s a series of meetings were held in an attempt to unify the multiplicity of anti-Saddam organizations. Quotas were originally created to try to give proper representation to each one of the factions. Those quickly moved to be based upon sect and ethnicity, which was then taken up by the Americans in their attempt to build a new Iraq. Today these quotas continue to exist and are a major structural impediment to a healthy and functional government, because they create a divided administration that works at cross purposes with itself.

Left to right Jalal Talabani of the PUK, Zalmay Khalilzad of the U.S., Massoud Barzani of the KDP, Ezzidin Salim of Dawa and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim of ISCI at 1992 Salahaddin conference where ethnosectarian quotas were solidified amongst the Iraqi opposition to Saddam Hussein (Al-Ahram)

A series of meetings in the 1990s gave rise to quotas to incorporate the plethora of parties interested in removing Saddam Hussein from power. The first took place in March 1991 in Beirut, Lebanon, which was in part organized by Syria and Saudi Arabia, two of the major financiers of the Iraqi opposition. Over 300 delegates attended from 20 different parties. The result was the Free Iraqi Council headed by Saad Salih Jabr. Nothing much came of it however because the groups disagreed about who should have more influence, what percentage each party should have within the council, and voting rights. This reflected the fact that there were far too many organizations, many of which were personal vehicles for individuals with large egos. In June 1992 there was another conference in Vienna, Austria, which led to the creation of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) as an umbrella group. 160 delegates attended with the absence of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and the Dawa Party only sent observers. What was important about the meeting was that after the disagreements in Beirut, a quota system was initiated to try to give each major group some type of say. Islamist parties were given 35.3% of the representatives, democrats, liberals and independents 35.3%, Kurds 23.5%, and Turkmen 5.8%. During the meeting a 17 member executive committee was then put together that included Muhsen Dazai and Hoshyar Zebari of the KDP, Latif Rasheed and Saadi Ahmed Pit of the PUK, Akram al-Hakim of the Supreme Council, Ahmad Chalabi, and others. The INC quickly fell to divisive politics, leading Massoud Barzani to call for another get together in October 1992 known as the Salahaddin conference. Again quotas were set up for representatives with Shiite Islamists getting 33%, Kurds 25%, Arab nationalists 16%, Iraqi tribes, democrats and liberals 4% each, Assyrians and Christians and Communists 3% each, and Sunni Islamists 2%. 234 figures ended up attending representing roughly 90% of the anti-Saddam forces, and a plan was made to reform the Iraqi National Congress. First its National Assembly was expanded from 87 to 234, a 26 member executive council was formed, and a 3 man presidential council was made up as well. The latter two each had quotas. The presidential council was split between a Sunni a Shiite and a Kurd consisting of former general Hassan Mustafa Naqib, Mohammed Ibrahim Bahr Uloom, and Massoud Barzani, while on the executive committee a secular Shiite, Ahmed Chalabi was elected president, along with Hani Fakaiki a Sunni, Latif Rasheed a Kurd from the PUK, and Sheikh Human Hammoudi a Shiite Islamist of ISCI who were the vice presidents. Syria was not happy with the results of the meeting, and called its own in October 1992. Again a three man presidential council was formed made up of a Sunni, a Shiite, and a Kurd. Finally, in February 1993 another meeting of the INC was held in Irbil where a new consultative committee was created to represent the major groups. It originally had 10 people, but that was later expanded to 26. Once more quotas were implemented with Shiite Islamists getting 33% of the seats, Kurds 25%, Sunnis 7%, Turkmen 6%, Assyrians 3%, and the rest going to secular and liberal parties. What was originally created as a means to incorporate all the different anti-Saddam groups whether that was the religious parties or liberal ones or the communists or Kurds eventually became more and more based upon ethnosectarian categories. Hence in June 1992 only 29.3% of the representatives to Vienna were explicitly based upon ethnicity. That turned into 77% of the members of the Salahaddin conference in October, and 100% of the INC’s presidential council that was created there. The eclipse of the secular, democratic, etc. parties was due to two factors. First, Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship had shut out and destroyed most of the Iraqi parties that had developed since the British Mandate and post-independence period. The Iraqi Communist Party for example went from one of the largest in the country to being hunted down by the Baathists in 1963 and 1968, and then being undone by an alliance with that very same party in 1973. With these traditional organizations being repressed more and more people began turning to ones based upon religion and ethnicity as two of the only avenues available within the country. This was spurred on by regional events and actors as well such as the Shah of Iran’s support for the Kurdish parties to pressure Saddam, the 1979 Iranian Revolution and Iran-Iraq War that gave rise to ISCI, Syria’s backing of factions within Dawa, and the growth of Islamism in general in the 1990s. By the time the 2000s rolled around those ethnosectarian parties were some of the main ones talking and working with the Americans.

When the Coalition Provisional Authority was created in April 2003 it believed in the necessity of creating ethnosectarian quotas as well to try to ensure all the various groups were represented just like the earlier opposition meetings had, as well as to ensure that the Shiite majority would finally have its fair share in the new Iraq. It set up the 25 member Iraqi Governing Council with 13 seats for Shiites, 5 for Kurds, 5 for Sunnis, and one each for Assyrians, Turkmen, and women. These positions were all filled by individuals who had taken part in the anti-Saddam movement such as Mohammed Uloom who had been on the INC’s presidential council, Ahmed Chalabi the head of the INC, Jalal Talabani the head of the PUK, Massoud Barzani the leader of the KDP, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim from ISCI, and others. More than that these council members were then given control of ministries, which allowed them to pack them with their followers and become the basis for their patronage networks. This had the effect of institutionalizing the ethnosectarian system the Saddam opposition had already created on its own during the 1990s. Now it became expected that the top government positions would be handed amongst the major sects and ethnicities, and so would the government offices. This was a major cause for dysfunction as it created a government made of many parts that worked at cross purposes rather than committed to the prime minister. Hence there have been both opponents and supporters of the premier within each ruling coalition since 2005. It also meant government positions were distributed based upon party loyalty rather than competence. This trend continues to today. In July 2014 a new speaker of parliament and his deputies were elected. That followed the precedent set in 2005 when the first post-Saddam government was formed with the speakership going to a Sunni, Salim Jabouri of Mutahidun, while his deputies, Haidar Abadi of State of Law and Aram Sheikh Mohammed of Change were a Shiite and Kurd respectively. With the subsequent nomination of Abadi for premier he will have to put together a ruling coalition where the ministries will be split along ethnosectarian lines. It wasn’t the Americans who created these divisions, they just built upon what the anti-Saddam groups had been doing in the previous decade, and made it a practice that every Iraqi government would followed afterward.

Ethnosectarianism has become a dominant factor in Iraqi politics. It represents one of the main structural problems the Iraqi state faces, which constrains the development of democracy, and perpetuates divisiveness. It wasn’t just the Americans fault that the CPA came along and broke up offices and ministries in this way. It was the Iraqi opposition that originally came up with these quotas. The U.S. simply accepted this concept in 2003 and then used it itself. This system persists to this day and has become more entrenched. That doesn’t meant ethnicity and sect will always dominate Iraq as there have been times in Iraqi history where ideology was the driving force. It’s just that the major parties are now organized around identity politics. It will require them or a new political class to move away from these ideas for Iraq to change. Until then it will suffer through one dysfunctional government after another.

SOURCES

Al-Ahram, “Untying the knot,” 2/19/03

European Institute for Research On Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation, “Iraqi National Congress – INC”

Gunter, Michael, The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: A Political Analysis, (St. Martin’s Press, 1999)

Katzman, Kenneth, “Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime,” Congressional Research Service, 10/3/02

- “Iraq’s Opposition Movements,” Congressional Research Service, 6/27/00

Rabil, Robert, “Iraqi opposition: From conflict to unity?” Asia Times, 1/18/03

Al-Shamrani, Ali, “The Iraqi Opposition Movement: The Post-Gulf War Era 1990-1996,” Department of War Studies, King’s College, 2001

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09

Tyler, Patrick, “Iraq pieces together its first postwar governing council,” San Francisco Chronicle, 7/13/03

Pressure Grows On Iraq’s Premier Maliki To Give Up On A Third Term

 

Iraq’s politicians have taken some important steps towards forming a new government. A speaker of parliament and a new president were elected in July 2014. Now President Fuad Masum must pick a candidate for prime minister from the largest bloc in parliament, which is the National Alliance (NA) made up of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law (SOL), the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq’s Citizen’s Alliance, Moqtada al-Sadr’s Ahrar bloc, and Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Trend. That’s the last major barrier as Premier Maliki has refused to step aside despite opposition from within the NA, his own State of Law, the religious establishment in Najaf, and Iran.

New Iraqi President Masum is waiting for the National Alliance to name its candidate for premier. Will it be Maliki, another figure from State of Law or a politician from another list within the coalition? (Al Arabiya)

In mid-July a new speaker of parliament and president of Iraq were elected. On July 15, Salim Jabouri of Mutahidun was elected the new speaker, with Haidar Abadi of State of Law his first deputy and Aram Sheikh Mohammed of the Change List his second deputy. It took two rounds of balloting to select Abadi as he was challenged by Ahmed Chalabi who was elected to parliament as part of the Citizen’s Alliance. Chalabi did not actually desire the position, but wanted to make a point that Maliki could be stopped from being elected to a third term by his opponents. Then after some internal divisions within the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) were overcome Fuad Masum was elected the new president of Iraq on July 24. This was a break from former elections when the speaker, president and premier were all part of a package deal worked out by the winning lists. That was impossible this year since Maliki insisted that he be the candidate for prime minister, while his critics within the NA could not agree upon an alternative. What did hold was the ethnosectarian quota system with a Sunni becoming speaker and a Kurd being president. Likewise the premiership will remain with the Shiite parties.

Maliki is trying to wait out his opponents like he did in 2010, but there is more writing on the wall each week that he will not be able to hold onto power. Moqtada al-Sadr’s Ahrar bloc and the Supreme Council’s Citizen’s Alliance ran against the prime minister and have continued to demand that his State of Law replace him. Both Ahrar and Citizen’s said they had their own candidates such as former vice president Adel Abdul Mahdi, Ahmed Chalabi, and ex-Finance Minister Bayan Jabr, and that State of Law had alternatives like Maliki adviser Tariq Najm, Deputy Premier Hussein Shahristani and Transportation Minister Hadi Ameri, but could not move forward as long as Maliki demanded to remain in office showing the divisions within the National Alliance. The Najaf clergy has become more and more vocal against the prime minister. July 16 Sheikh Ali Najafi the spokesman for his father Ayatollah Bashir al-Najafi said that a new government needed to be formed quickly without Maliki to solve the on going crisis in the country. July 25 during Friday prayers Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani released a statement that Iraq’s leaders should not “cling” to power obviously referring to Maliki. Third, Iran has apparently come out against the premier’s third term. According to the Associate Press, the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force General Qasim Suleimani talked with Maliki about stepping down, but he refused. Last splits have arisen within State of Law as well. After Sistani’s remarks the prime minister’s own Dawa Party said that it would follow the Ayatollah’s guidance. July 28 ISCI’s Buratha News reported that the Badr Organization left State of Law because of Maliki’s obstinacy. SOL has responded to all of these attacks by claiming that since it won the most seats it therefore has the right to pick the next premier. Maliki even went to the courts trying to get them to declare State of Law not the National Alliance as the largest bloc in parliament and thus giving it the sole right to name the premiership, but he was turned down. In 2010 the victorious parties took ten months to put together a new ruling coalition. Maliki dragged out the process and brought the courts, Tehran, and Washington eventually to his side. The Supreme Court for example ruled that the party that was able to put together the largest alliance after the election not the one that won the most votes had the right to name the candidate for premier. This has now come back to haunt Maliki as it makes his claim that the SOL’s victory in the polls gives him the right to stay in office invalid. Instead it is up to the divided NA to make that decision. His opponents within the coalition now have the backing of Najaf and Tehran if the AP story is correct. The latter was instrumental in ensuring Maliki a 2^nd term after the last elections, but the Iranians may now seem him as a source of instability and want him out. Finally State of Law has lost its internal cohesion. The report about Badr leaving SOL may not be true, but there is definitely dissension within its ranks. The Iraqi elite is still not following the timetable laid out in the law to form a new government, but it is making slow progress as the election of Jabouri and Masum show. That means the final step of naming a candidate for prime minister may occur sooner rather than later as Maliki’s support is being worn down.

Nouri al-Maliki was the resounding winner in the 2014 elections, but that does not assure him staying in power. Ibrahim Jaafari became premier in 2005 not because his Dawa party won the most votes, but because it was part of the largest bloc the United Iraqi Alliance. Maliki was named prime minister in 2006, because the U.S. and others had lost confidence in Jaafari with the escalating civil war. Again, his Dawa was not the largest party, but he was chosen within the United Alliance as a compromise candidate. In 2010 the Iraqi National Movement won the most seats, but thanks to the Supreme Court ruling Maliki was able to put together the largest coalition after the voting and win a 2^nd term. Coming out victorious in 2014 was therefore an important step for Maliki, but not the final word. Immediately after the election it looked like he had the momentum, but then the insurgent summer offensive came and most of northern Iraq fell, and the prime minister’s star began to fall as more and more groups from Najaf to Iran added their voices calling for him to step down. This whole process still has minutes left on the clock, but they are counting down for Maliki.

SOURCES

Abbas, Mohammed, “Iraqi Shiite cleric tells AFP: PM Maliki must go,” Agence France Presse, 7/16/14

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim Salama, Vivian, “Talabani ally is Iraqi Kurds presidential choice,” Associated Press, 7/23/14

Associated Press, “Iraq elects new president as attacks kill dozens,” 7/24/14

- “Iraqi cleric urges leaders not to ‘cling’ to power,” 7/25/14

Buratha News, “After news of its withdrawal from the state of law coalition….Badr Organization declares its commitment to the decision of the National Alliance for the prime minister post,” 7/28/14

- “Ibrahim al-Jaafari:: National Alliance is the largest parliamentary bloc, not the rule of law we have all started and announced that,” 7/27/14

Independent Press Agency, “Bayraktar: deny the issuance of a new resolution concerning the largest parliamentary bloc,” 7/24/14

Al Mada, “Differences within Maliki’s bloc: Will the call bring together more than one candidate for premier?” 7/19/14

- “Liberals and the Council: our deal with al-Maliki to withdraw and his replacement a condition that has been accepted by National Alliance,” 7/17/14

Al Masalah, “Dawa Party renews its commitment under the guidance of reference and timings of the constitution on forming of government,” 7/26/14

- “State of Law: Maliki, the only candidate for prime minister,” 7/17/14

Visser, Reidar, “The Iraqi Parliament Elects Its New Speakership,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 7/15/14

UC SANTA BARBARA VIDEO: The Reckoning: Iraq And The Legacy Of Sadddam Hussein, Sandra Mackey Feb. 2003

MSNBC VIDEO: Hubris: Selling The Iraq War

Ahmad Chalabi Was Not President Bush’s Man For Iraq

In January 2004, President Bush gave his State of the Union speech. Part of the address was about the war on Iraq. Afterward, many pointed out that Ahmad Chalabi, the head of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) was seated in the gallery right behind First Lady Laura Bush. Commentators took that as an endorsement by the White House. In fact, despite many in the administration being fans of the INC, the President felt the exact opposite. Bush did not believe that Chalabi should be the next ruler of Iraq.

Ahmed Chalabi at the 2004 State of the Union standing in the back left next to Foreign Minister Zebari back right, front row center First Lady Bush, front row right Iraqi President Pachachi (White House)

Originally, Ahmad Chalabi was not supposed to attend the State of the Union. When he found out that the Adnan Pachachi, who was then the president of the Iraqi Governing Council, was going, Chalabi added himself to the entourage. At the event, Chalabi was seated next to Iraq’s Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, and right behind First Lady Laura Bush. During the speech, the President said, “And tonight we are honored to welcome one of Iraq’s most respectable leaders, the current president of the Iraqi Governing Council, Adnan Pachachi.” One TV cameraman then confused Chalabi for Pachachi, and gave the former a close-up. The next day, at a meeting of the National Security Council, the President asked Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage how Chalabi got into the speech. Armitage said he didn’t know, and neither did anyone else at the meeting. Bush was perturbed, because he did not like Chalabi, and did not think that he should have been there.

The press immediately seized upon Chalabi’s appearance. Five months later for instance, Ray Suarez of PBS’ Newshour said, “As recently as January, Ahmad Chalabi held a place of honor at President Bush’s State of the Union address. The former Iraqi exile was seated just behind the first lady.” This fed upon all the stories that had already come out about members of the administration promoting Chalabi to take over Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. At the top of that list was Vice President Dick Cheney. Others included Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, chairman of the Defense Policy Board Richard Perle, and Cheney’s chief of staff I. Lewis Scooter Libby. Since the late-1990s, Chalabi had been courting members of the Republican Party, and when President Bush was elected it seemed like that work paid off. He had several high-level members of the new administration supporting him, and he believed that was a means to gaining power in Iraq. These feelings were widely known throughout the media, which was why they all took Chalabi sitting behind the First Lady as just another example of how the White House backed the INC.

The truth of the matter was far different. Rather than being a supporter of Ahmed Chalabi, the President was consistently critical of him. In January 2003 for instance, Bush said that Iraqi exiles would not rule Iraq after the invasion. In March at a meeting of the National Security Council the President reiterated that point by saying, “The people in Iraq have suffered under Saddam Hussein, and they will have some resentment towards those Iraqis that were outside the country during Saddam’s rule.” Bush later stated that he was not going to pick the new leader of Iraq. That same month, Bush complained about American support for Chalabi. He told Rumsfeld that the U.S. assistance to the INC should be stopped. After the invasion, people like Feith would blame the State Department and Perle the CIA for not supporting Chalabi, and claimed that was a reason why things went so bad immediately after the fall of Saddam. They never acknowledged that Chalabi lacked the approval of the most important person, the President of the United States.

Rather than being a sign of support, Ahmad Chalabi’s appearance at the January 2004 State of the Union speech was an act of opportunity. Chalabi attached himself to Adnan Pachachi's delegation, and by accident was shown on American TV. Because so many prominent members of the Bush administration were advocates for Chalabi, the press thought that he was supposed to be at the event. Instead, the President was a constant critic of the Iraqi National Congress, and did not want him to take power after the 2003 invasion. Very few seemed to notice that fact even to this day. That’s why those for and against Chalabi still accuse each other for the problems with Iraq. They overplay the role of the INC, and oddly overlook the centrality of the President in decision-making.

SOURCES

Gordon, Michael and Trainor, General Bernard, The Endgame, The Inside Story Of The Struggle For Iraq, From George W. Bush To Barack Obama, New York, Pantheon, 2012

Isikoff, Michael and Corn, David, Hubris, New York: Crown, 2006

Landay, Jonathan and Strobel, Warren, “No real planning for postwar Iraq,” Knight Ridder Newspapers, 9/11/03

Packer, George, The Assassins’ Gate, America In Iraq, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005

PBS Frontline, “Interview Gen. Jay Garner,” Truth, War and Consequences, 10/9/03

- “Interview Richard Perle,” Truth, War and Consequences, 10/9/03

- “INTERVIEWS Elisabeth Bumiller,” Bush’s War, 3/24/08

PBS Newshour, “Former Friend: Ahmad Chalabi,” 6/2/04

Roston, Aram, The Man Who Pushed America To War, The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi, New York: Nation Books, 2008

Strobel, Warren and Walcott, John, “Post-war planning non-existent,” Knight Ridder Newspapers, 10/17/04

Suskind, Ron, The One Percent Doctrine, Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11, Simon & Schuster: New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, 2006

Woodward, Bob, Plan of Attack, New York, London, Toronto, Sydney: Simon & Schuster, 2004

- State of Denial, Bush At War, Part III, New York, London, Toronto, Sydney: Simon & Schuster, 2006

How The United States Abandoned The Idea Of An Interim Government For Iraq After The 2003 Invasion

The United States suffered from poor planning when it came to preparing for post-war Iraq. There were always a number of different groups tasked with the job, but they were not coordinated. One of the few things that was agreed upon was the creation of an interim Iraqi government shortly after the fall of Saddam Hussein. President Bush signed off on this idea just before the 2003 invasion. Iraqi exiles were consulted, and several meetings held, but then suddenly Paul Bremer, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), scrapped the plan. Bremer reversed course from the U.S. wanting to quickly leave Iraq to launching a long-term occupation of the country.

There were two competing ideas about what the U.S. should do in Iraq after the 2003 invasion. One would be to quickly set up an interim government. Supporters of this idea said that the new authority should be made up of both Iraqi exiles and those who had stayed in the country. The other would be for the United States to run the country. President Bush, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, members of his staff, U.S. representative to Iraqi exiles Zalmay Khalilzad, and deputy head of the Central Command (CENTCOM) General John Abizaid all supported the first plan. Before the war, Bush told a meeting, “We need to give this to the Iraqis as quickly as possible to form a government.” This was in line with Bush’s statements when he ran for president when he stated that he was opposed to nation building. Bush campaigned on the fact that he would not be like President Clinton who got the United States involved in a series of humanitarian and failed state situations such as Haiti and the former Yugoslavia. Other members of his cabinet such as Rumsfeld were equally opposed to long-term overseas engagements. These ideas largely shaped the strategy in Afghanistan when the United States overthrew the Taliban, held a meeting of Afghans, and quickly set up a government, which allowed the Americans to draw down their forces. It seemed initially that Iraq would follow that exact same path.

Right before the invasion, National Security Advisor Rice tried to make an interim government official policy. Rice set up a postwar planning group within the National Security Council (NSC) under Frank Miller. On March 10 and 12, 2003, Miller briefed the NSC on postwar plans, which included putting Iraqis quickly in charge of their country after the fall of Saddam Hussein. The president signed off on the idea. The problem was that this had no actual affect. The administration was dysfunctional when it came to strategizing for post-war Iraq. It always had several organizations planning for the situation, but none of them were coordinated, and hardly anything was every operationalized. Miller’s group was just one of many.

The U.S. military actually did try to act upon this plan, but it fell apart. Deputy CENTCOM commander General Abizaid told Zalmay Khalilzad that he needed to meet with Iraqi exiles to prepare them for an interim government so that an Iraqi face could be placed upon the war. Khalilzad wanted internal Iraqis included in any new authority, but he didn’t know any. Abizaid was not concerned, and wanted exiles quickly brought to Um Qasr in Basra right behind the invasion force to announce that they were the new rulers of Iraq. As the war began, and the Coalition quickly moved towards Baghdad, the interim government idea was dropped. Some in the U.S. armed forces were concerned that the invasion could turn out to be a drawn out affair, and not proceed as quickly as Rumsfeld had envisioned. That was what led people like General Abizaid to push for an interim government being established even before the war was over. When the Iraqi forces began disintegrating before the U.S. and British armies however, it wasn’t deemed necessary to involve Iraqi exiles, because the conflict was going to come to an end quickly.

In April 2003 Khalilzad met with Iraqis in Nasiriyah and told them that the U.S. had “absolutely no interest in ruling Iraq.” (BBC)

After Saddam was deposed Jay Garner and the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) was placed in charge of Iraq. Garner envisioned turning over the country to an interim government in just a few weeks as well. On March 12, 2003, President Bush approved his plan at an NSC meeting. Garner later told two Senate staffers as he was waiting in Kuwait to enter Iraq that a new government would be created by August. Khalilzad assisted in this process by holding a meeting with both internal and external Iraqis in Nasiriyah just after Baghdad was taken. On April 22, Garner went to Kurdistan to meet with Massoud Barzani, Jalal Talabani, and exile leaders to continue the discussion. Many opposition groups had been trying to come up with a government in waiting since late-2002, but to no avail. Now it seemed within their grasp. The only problem was that Garner wanted to include some internal Iraqis. Ahmed Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress and Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq objected, because they believed that would dilute their power in any new ruling coalition. With fewer parties involved, the more influence each would hold. Still, Chalabi told the press that an interim government would be in place by July. Garner always thought that his job would be a short one in Iraq. He originally thought that the war would lead to a humanitarian crisis with refugees and food shortages, but that the government would be up and running, and it would only be a few months before everything would return to normal. It would be his job then to just provide assistance, and then give Iraqis the reigns, and leave.

Officials from the Pentagon were pushing in the same direction. Rumsfeld’s spokesman Larry Di Rita was sent to Kuwait to watch over the ORHA before the war started. There he told a meeting of the organization that the State Department under Clinton had failed in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the Defense Department would not make the same mistakes this time. Di Rita stated, “We’re going to stand up an interim Iraqi government, hand power over to them, and get out of there in three to four months.” Harold Rhode of the Office of Special Plans in Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith’s office was in Kuwait at the same time, and pushed for Chalabi to be the new leader of Iraq. Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress were favorites of the neoconservatives in the United States, many of which held prominent positions within the Pentagon. Rhode expressed their belief that Chalabi was a Westernized Iraqi who could create a democracy in the country. Di Rita had the same view as his boss Rumsfeld, who did not want to get bogged down in any post-war situation. They both wanted to withdraw as quickly as possible after Saddam had been kicked out of office.

All of these ideas were thrown out the window when Paul Bremer assumed control of Iraq. On May 12, Bremer flew into Baghdad, and took over from Garner. At first, it was expected that he would follow in Garner’s footsteps, and continue with forming an interim government. That was not to be. Khalilzad thought that he was going to go with Bremer to Baghdad, so that he could introduce him to the Iraqis that he’d been talking to. He even set up a date for that event on May 15. Instead, Bremer dismissed Khalilzad’s plan. He was told right before the White House announced that Bremer was taking over Iraq that an interim government was no longer in the plans. When Secretary of State Colin Powell heard about that he called Rice warning that Khalilzad’s work should not be discarded. Rice said that one of Bremer’s prerequisites for taking the job was that he could run things the way he wanted. On May 16, Bremer announced his plan for Iraq. That did not include an interim government. Instead there would be a seven-step process to write a new constitution, get it ratified, and then form a government, which would take over a year. Iraqis immediately began complaining about the change. Followers of Moqtada al-Sadr held a demonstration in Baghdad on May 19 against the U.S. occupation. The next day, Iraqis met with the British representative to Iraq Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock demanding that sovereignty be returned to the country. Then on May 22, the United Nations passed Resolution 1483 that recognized the United States and the British as the occupying powers in Iraq. Bremer would use that document as another reason why he should be in charge, and that people should follow his strategy. Before Bremer departed for Iraq he met with President Bush who said that he had as much time as he needed to transform Iraq. Bremer took that promise literally, and completely changed America’s stance. No longer was Iraq to be like Afghanistan where the U.S. would quickly withdraw. Instead they were there for the long-term.

The decision to abandon an interim government was symbolic of America’s handling of post-war Iraq. The United States went to war with no real strategy for what should be done afterward. There had been planning for returning sovereignty to Iraqis as quickly as possible, and Bush signed off on the idea, but nothing substantive had really been done about it besides a few meetings with Iraqi exiles. When Jay Garner entered Iraq he thought he would have a straight forward humanitarian mission, but he never had the time to fulfill his vision. The White House didn’t like the way things were going in Iraq with the post-war chaos, and violence, and decided to replace him with Paul Bremer. Bremer wanted to be the viceroy of Iraq, and personally guide the country towards democracy. That could only be accomplished if the United States became the occupying power. Bush gave him his support even though it was the exact opposite of what had been discussed before the war. Since so many plans had come and gone with none of them ever coordinated this was just another example. There’s no telling how Iraq would have turned out if nationals were put in charge right after the invasion. Afghanistan for instance, is not close to stability, is considered even more corrupt than Iraq, and still has Coalition forces there, and it went down the path of early sovereignty. The difference is that Iraqis would have been in charge, bringing Iraqi sensibilities to things rather than trying to impose American norms as the Coalition Provisional Authority attempted with few successes.

SOURCES

BBC, “US begins shaping Iraq’s future,” 4/16/03

Chandrasekaran, Rajiv, “U.S. drops assembly idea for interim political council,” San Francisco Chronicle, 6/2/03

Diamond, Larry, Squandered Victory, The American Occupation And The Bungled Effort To Bring Democracy To Iraq, New York: Times Books, 2005

Gordon, Michael and Trainor, General Bernard, The Endgame, The Inside Story Of The Struggle For Iraq, From George W. Bush To Barack Obama, New York, Pantheon, 2012

Packer, George, The Assassins’ Gate: America In Iraq, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09

Walt, Vivienne, “Iraqis to take charge of country by July,” San Francisco Chronicle, 11/16/03

A&E VIDEO: Anatomy Of War Iraq

Push To Make Iraq’s Diyala Province An Autonomous Region Fades

Many of Iraq’s provinces have long standing issues with the central government. Those include the distribution of funds, security operations, and the lack of services. All of those came to the fore in the winter of 2011 when several provinces announced that they were interested in becoming autonomous regions, a right given in the 2005 constitution. Diyala in northeastern Iraq was one such governorate. In November, its’ provincial council formally voted for federalism, which was immediately contested by many groups within the council, province, and in Baghdad. Those protests grew so intense, that some local politicians backed away from their support for the idea, which now makes it very unlikely that Diyala will become its own region.

(BBC)

On November 12, 2011, a majority of Diyala’s provincial council decided to initiate a move towards making the governorate a region. 15 of 29 members voted for the measure, made up of politicians from the Iraqi National Movement (INM) and the Kurdish Alliance. There were no reports on how many councilmen were present during the occasion. The Iraqi constitution states that a province can become a region two ways, either 1/3 of the provincial council votes for holding a referendum on the issue or 1/10 of registered voters in the governorate ask for one. A general election than has to be held, and a majority has to approve. Members of the Iraqi National Movement (INM) first mentioned the idea in early November. They complained about random arrests, the lack of services, and the central government’s concentration of power, and were inspired by Salahaddin’s attempt to become a region. They were able to bring the Kurdish Alliance into the equation by agreeing to back its demand to implement Article 140 of the constitution, which sets out the steps for how disputed territories can be annexed by Kurdistan. Diyala has several such areas, like the Khanaqin district along the Iranian border. Despite later denials, the head of the National Movement in the province confirmed this arrangement. The complaints about the central government are common amongst almost all of Iraq’s governorates. That was why after Salahaddin announced that it wanted to become a region, both Sunni and Shiite politicians came out for the idea as well across Iraq. These problems with Baghdad were so strong, that the Sunnis on Diyala’s council were willing to compromise on the disputed territories with the Kurds, something that the former had never done before. This showed that the move towards regionalism was not a sectarian issue, but rather more about the disparities between the center and periphery of the country.

Diyala’s Provincial Council

Governor Abdul Nasir al-Muntasirbillah – Iraqi National Movement

Deputy Governor Furat Mohammed – Diyala Coalition/Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council

Head of provincial council Taleb Mohammed Hassan – Kurdish Alliance

Iraqi National Movement 18 seats

Kurdish Alliance 6 seats

State of Law 2 seats

Diyala Coalition/Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council 2 seats

National Reform Party 1 seat

Diyala's provincial council building saw days of protests, and was even stormed once by demonstrators opposed to the province becoming a region

The move to make Diyala a region was not a unanimous decision. Members of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law on the council were against it, saying that it was unconstitutional. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Diyala Coalition was also in the opposition. Back in Baghdad, the Sadrists came out against the move as well, claiming that the attempt was illegal, and that Diyala could not become a region because it included disputed territories. Even Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq of the National Movement said that the province was moving too fast on the matter. Opponents of the decision also took to the streets. The day that the council voted for federalism, hundreds of people took to the streets in Baquba, Muqtadiya, Khalis, Baladrooz, and Khanaqin. In the provincial capital of Baquba, a sit in demonstration began outside the provincial council building that lasted for several days. The local councils in all of the other districts said that they rejected the idea of Diyala becoming a region. Officials in Khalis even threatened to break away from the province and join Baghdad. The Office of Tribes in Diyala held a meeting of 150 clan leaders from both Sunni and Shiite tribes, which came out against regionalism. On December 15, tempers boiled over as protesters stormed the council building, and took it over for a few hours. Roadblocks were also reportedly set up across the province, while the council head had his house set on fire, and one of his bodyguards was shot and killed. While some in the press have portrayed the decision to create a region a Sunni move, and the opponents Shiite, the truth of the matter was much more complicated. While Shiites appeared to be the majority of the protesters, Sunni and Shiite politicians and tribes were also against the idea. 

Anti-regionalism protests in Baquba, the provincial capital

 (Buratha News)

The demonstrations and sit-ins scared the Arab and Kurdish councilmen that voted for federalism. On December 17, 18 of them, along with the governor, fled Baquba for Kurdish controlled Khanaqin. This was when all kinds of wild rumors also began to be spread by politicians and the press. The Iraqi National Movement claimed that Shiite militias were operating throughout Diyala, supported by the security forces. The party went on to state that Premier Maliki was using the armed men to intimidate the council. Governor Muntasirbillah for instance, blamed militiamen for the storming of the provincial council building. Which militia these men allegedly came from was disputed as well. The most common group blamed was Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, but there were also reports claiming that it was Dawa gunmen and the Supreme Council’s Badr Brigade. Those stories were contradicted by a spokesman for the peshmerga in charge of the disputed areas of Diyala, as well as the head of the security committee on the provincial council. The province was previously a battleground between Shiite and Sunni militants, so the reports of militiamen could be believed. The fact that some prominent officials involved in security however, countered those claims, could point to politicians exaggerating their stories.

No matter who the protesters were they had immediate affects. The Kurds reconsidered their support for federalism, and withdrew their votes. The head of the Kurdish Alliance told the press that it was not time for Diyala to become a region. Besides the protests, the Kurds also claimed that the National Movement had not kept its promises. Some members of the party for example, said that they would not support implementation of Article 140, and that no deal had ever been made with the Alliance over it. Without the Kurds, the National Movement had lost its only supporter in its drive for federalism. It was probably inevitable for the two sides to split, even without the demonstrations, because the INM had always been against allowing the Kurds to annex any of the disputed areas, seeing it as a division and weakening of the country.

Today, Diyala’s attempt to become a region appears to be dead. The sit-ins outside of the council building have subsided, but the INM and Kurdish Alliance politicians are still in Khanaqin. The Kurds have also withdrawn their support. Even if the two parties had maintained their stance, Premier Maliki said that he was diametrically opposed to any province becoming a region, and would have stood in Diyala’s way. The Election Commission, which would be responsible for administering a referendum on the issue, is also in transition with new members waiting to be appointed by parliament. That was not going to happen anytime soon, because of the political divisions within the legislature. How far the council was going to push the issue is also in question. There were reports that it never officially turned in its request to the central government in the first place, and it must have been aware that the disarray in Baghdad would hinder it moving forward. Altogether that points to the council’s vote as being a mix of political symbolism to show its displeasure with the central government, as well as opportunism to advance the Kurdish claims to the disputed areas, rather than as a legitimate attempt at regionalism. Until Baghdad provides more money, services, and power to the governorates however, these types of complaints will continue, meaning that federalism is far from over in Iraq, despite its failure in Diyala.

SOURCES

Dar Addustour, “Council decided to postpone the emergency meeting to the day .. And maintain threaten to go to court – the failure of the establishment of Diyala province after the withdrawal of signatures of members of Kurdistan,” 12/18/11

Ahmed, Hevidar, “Diyala Sunnis Back Article 140,” Rudaw, 12/21/11

AK News, “Demo in Diyala to denounce federal region in in Iraq,” 11/17/11

Ali, Hussam, “Iraqiya calls on U.N. to stop the abuses in Diyala,” AK News, 12/20/11

Ali, Mandy Samira, “Between the tug of war .. Sustained movement for the formation of regions,” Radio Free Iraq, 12/7/11

Alsumaria News, “Diyala Governor calls for expulsion of “lurking and outlaws” of the security services,” 12/16/11

Alsumaria TV, “Hayali: Head of Diyala provincial council approves region establishment,” 12/13/11

- “Iraq Sadr movement: Diyala Region’s declaration is provocative and challenging,” 12/15/11

- “Iraqi National Dialogue considers Diyala region declaration as “rushed decision,” 12/14/11

Aswat al-Iraq, “Diala demonstrations to reject declaration as ‘region’,” 12/13/11

- “More than 150 tribes and clan leader declaring their refusal to establish a province of Diyala,” 12/16/11

- “Source: about a thousand people continue their sit-in protest in Baquba, Diyala province, the,” 12/16/11

- “Tribal rejection of turning Diala province into a region,” 11/5/11

Azzaman, “Tribal militia force Maliki and the Badr party to withdraw from the streets of Baquba,” 12/16/11

Healy, Jack, “Clash Over Regional Power Spurs Iraq’s Sectarian Rift,” New York Times, 12/23/11

Al-Jabbouri, Mahmoud and Tayyeb, Mouhammed, “KBC supports Diyala’s demand, Ahrar Bloc cries foul,” AK News, 12/15/11

Al-Jobouri, Mahmoud, “Kurds change position over Diyala autonomy,” AK News, 12/20/11

Knights, Michael, “Iraq’s Political Crisis: Challenges for U.S. Policy,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 12/21/11

Al-Mada, “Demonstrations continued and pieces of the ways in Diyala refused to convert to the territory,” 12/18/11

Mardini, Ramzy, “Iraq’s First Post-Withdrawal Crisis,” Institute for the Study of War, 12/19/11

Mohammed, Bryar, “Baghdad bullies try to squash Diyala’s region hopes,” AK News, 12/14/11

- “Fears mount of Shiite-Sunni clash over Diyala autonomy,” AK News, 12/17/11

- “Iraqi Deputy threatened for supporting Diyala,” AK News, 12/17/11

- “Iraqiya did not promise disputed areas to Kurds,” AK News, 12/17/11

- “Protesters move Diyala council’s session to Khanaqin,” AK News, 12/18/11

Morse, Dan and Majeed, Asaad, “Iraq premier Nouri al-Maliki challenges restive provinces,” Washington Post, 12/24/11

Msarbat, Anwar, “Fallujah demo denounces calls for creating Sunni region,” AK News, 11/3/11

National Iraqi News Agency, “Debate in Diyala province, about announcing region or getting more powers,” 12/7/11

- “Dehlaky: Request to convert Diyala into region submitted to Cabinet to be passed to (IHEC),” 12/12/11

- “Diyala PC spokesman: gathering of tribal Sheikhs, members of local councils rejecting the announcement of Diyala as a region,” 12/13/11

- “Iraqiya bloc in Diyala give central government 3-days ultimatum to implement its demands or it will declare the province a region,” 11/1/11

- “Nahida al-Da’yini warn that things might get out of control in Diyala,” 12/16/11

- “Parliamentary delegation meets with Diyala’s security authorities,” 12/17/11

- “Thousands of people from villages in the outskirts of Baquba , demonstrating against the decision to convert Diyala province to a region,” 12/15/11

Rudaw, “Diyala Threatens To Declare Autonomy,” 11/3/11

Sly, Liz, “Iraq political crisis erupts as last U.S. troops leave,” Washington Post, 12/17/11

Sotaliraq, “News of the arrival of the Mahdi Army to Diyala .. And the Peshmerga denies,” 12/17/11

Talab, Mahmoud, “Region status proclamation unconstitutional,” AK News, 12/22/11