Review John Glubb, Arabian Adventures, Ten Years of Joyful Service, Cassell, 1978

  

John Glubb was an English soldier and official in Iraq during the British Mandate. He was proud to serve the empire believing that it developed what he saw as primitive societies. At the same time he had some issues with the way that the Mandate was run. Most of his Arabian Adventure, Ten Years of Joyful Service is his impressions of Iraq’s tribal society which he believed was disappearing.

Review Nicholas Schlosser, U.S. Marines in Battle, Al-Qaim, September 2005-March 2006, Marine Corps University, 2014

Schlosser, Nicholas, U.S. Marines in Battle, Al-Qaim, September 2005-March 2006, Marine Corps University, 2014

 

U.S. Marines in Battle, Al-Qaim, September 2005-March 2006 is one of the better volumes in the Marine history of the Iraq War series. That’s because it includes both background and the aftermath to the Marine deployment to western Iraq. It’s main argument is that how the Marines stayed in cities while working with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and local tribes starting in 2005 created a new dynamic that would dramatically change the security situation in Anbar province in the following years.

Review The Shi’is Of Iraq

Nakash, Yitzhak, The Shi’is Of Iraq, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003

 

The Shi’is Of Iraq by Yitzhak Nakash has a wealth of information about the development of the Shiite community in Iraq. It discusses how and why the Arab tribes were converted in the 1800s and how the lack of a strong leadership hurt the community once the Iraqi state was established in 1920. The author’s goal was to highlight the uniqueness of Iraq’s Shiites since most studies of the sect only focus upon Iran which had a much different experience. That’s not to mention that until the Iraq War Shiites were largely ignored and unknown in the West so this was a needed addition to the cannon.

U.S. Army History Iraq War Vol 1 - Chapter 21 Hope In Ramadi

Chapter 21 of the U.S. Army History of the Iraq War is about Ramadi in Anbar province finally being a turning point in the war against Al Qaeda in Iraq. Tribes in the governorate had been upset with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s ideology and leadership since 2004. In 2006 some sheikhs finally got the backing of the United States leading to the Anbar Awakening.

Review Fallujah Awakens, Marines, Sheikhs, and the Battle Against Al Qaeda

Ardolino, Bill, Fallujah Awakens, Marines, Sheikhs, and the Battle Against Al Qaeda, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013

 

Fallujah Awakens, Marines, Sheikhs, and the Battle Against Al Qaeda is Bill Ardolino’s tale of how the Marines forged an alliance with sheikhs from the Albu Issa tribe in the Fallujah peninsula south of the city to battle the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in 2007. The area was a base for ISI and split the Albu Issa literally in half. A few sheikhs were tired of the insurgents taking over their territory and asked the Americans for help. The story is about how ISI alienated members of the Albu Issa while the Marines tried new tactics which turned around the security situation.

U.S. Army History of Iraq War Vol 1 - Chapter 17 Innovation In The Face Of War, Summer-Fall 2005

During the summer of 2005 the United States was still struggling in Iraq. New commander General George Casey wanted to change tactics but didn’t listen to experts while the rebuilding of the new Iraqi Security Forces was running into major issues including sectarianism and corruption. On the other hand, some American units were creating successful tactics on a local level but they weren’t sustainable. Finally, more splits were happening between Al Qaeda in Iraq and tribes in western Anbar. The U.S. failed to exploit this development because the Iraqi government was opposed to any aid going to Sunnis.

Review The Making of Iraq 1900-1963, Capital, Power and Ideology

Haj, Samira, The Making of Iraq 1900-1963, Capital, Power and Ideology, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997

 

The Making of Iraq 1900-1963, Capital, Power and Ideology is a detailed academic book on how the development of Iraq’s economy under the Ottomans and then the British created a political system that would eventually bring down both the monarchy and General Abd al-Karim Qasim’s government. The author Samira Haj argues that the agriculture system dominated by large estates distorted the economy and limited the government which created conditions for a coup in 1958 led by General Qasim. The forces that backed him would eventually split over ideology and class and led to his demise as well. Haj emphasizes that internal dynamics rather than foreign influence or international capitalism led to these changes

Review A Short History of Iraq, Second Edition

Abdullah, Thabit, A Short History of Iraq, Second Edition, Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2011

 

Professor Thabit Abdullah wrote a short and concise book in A Short History of Iraq. It starts with the Arab conquest of what would become Iraq in the 7^th Century and goes up to U.S. occupation. Throughout each period he talks about the political and economic developments with a bit on culture as well. Abdullah emphasizes that Iraq has constantly seen conflict and divisions but also periods of stability and growth.

Review The Death of the Mehdi Army, The Rise, Fall, and Revival of Iraq’s Most Powerful Militia

Krohley, Nicholas, The Death of the Mehdi Army, The Rise, Fall, and Revival of Iraq’s Most Powerful Militia, London: Hurst & Company, 2015

Nicholas Krohley was a member of a U.S. Army Human Terrain Team working in east Baghdad during the Surge. This was part of the military’s attempt to understand the socio-cultural dynamics of the areas it was operating in Iraq. He was in the capital when the U.S. and Iraqi forces challenged Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army in its home turf of Sadr City and the surrounding area. The Death of the Mehdi Army attempts to tie in the history of east Baghdad and the rise of the Sadr movement to explain how its militia collapsed in 2008.

Glimpse At Some Of The Liberated Areas Of Iraq

Aid groups are really the only ones consistently reporting on the liberated areas of Iraq. Many of these places are rural and the government isn’t even that present. The United Nations’ Migration Agency, Returns Working Group, and Social Inquiry released a paper on the displaced returning home that contained information on the Ramadi district in Anbar, Sadiya and Jalawla in Diyala, Abbasi in Kirkuk, west Mosul, Sinjar, and Tal Afar in Ninewa, and Baiji and Tuz Kharmato in Salahaddin. All were considered hotspots due to local tensions, the lack of housing and services, and other issues they are encountering since they were freed from the Islamic State.

Revised Review Fallujah Redux, The Anbar Awakening and the Struggle With Al-Qaeda

Revised Review Green, Daniel and Mullen, William, Fallujah Redux, The Anbar Awakening and the Struggle With Al-Qaeda, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2014

Fallujah Redux is not about the two well known Battle of Fallujah fought in 2004, but rather how the U.S. and Iraqi forces along with local tribes attempted to secure the district during the 2007 Surge. It was written by Daniel Green who was a Naval Reserve officer and General William Mullen III who commanded the 2^nd Battalion of the 6^th Marines at the time. Green worked with the Fallujah government and on a tribal outreach effort, while Mullen was involved in combat operations. The book is written in an interesting style with each author trading off chapters writing about their specific experiences. When they arrived in the city in 2007, it was feared that the insurgents had almost regained the initiative, and the Anbar Awakening, which had started in Ramadi had not stretched east yet. Green and Mullen were part of the U.S.-Iraqi effort that helped bring Fallujah back from the brink.

Review The Ba’thification of Iraq, Saddam Hussein’s Totalitarianism

Review Faust, Aaron, The Ba’thification of Iraq, Saddam Hussein’sTotalitarianism, Austin: University of Texas Press, 2015

The Ba’thification of Iraq, Saddam Hussein’s Totalitarianism starts off with a dramatic story of a bicycle repairman in Wasit province who shot his son for deserting the army during the Iran-Iraq War. The man wrote to the Baath office for deserters asking to be pardoned for his crime. The secretary of the office passed his request all the way to Saddam Hussein who not only amnestied him, but gave him a commendation and entered his account into the official records of the war. The point of Aaron Faust’s book is to explain why people like this lowly laborer would kill his own child for a dictatorship like the one in Iraq. Was it because people loved Saddam as thousands of letters and speeches proclaimed each year, were they loyal to the regime, or was it because they were terrified into submission as writers such as Kanan Makiya wrote about? What Faust argues is that the Baath Party and Saddam created an all encompassing system, which offered rewards and punishments and attempted to control every facet of Iraqi life from marriage to where people lived to their education to their jobs and future. Under such a system the vast majority had to comply to ensure their livelihood and that of their families.

Review The Marines Take Anbar, The Four-Year Fight Against Al Qaeda

Review Shultz Jr., Richard, The Marines Take Anbar, The Four-Year Fight Against Al Qaeda, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013

The Marines Take Anbar is a good read on the struggles the Marine Corps went through in Anbar from 2004-2008, but it is not without faults. The book starts with the Marines first several years in Iraq where they had a hard time finding the right tactics, doctrine, and manpower to deal with Anbar. It wasn’t until 2006 that the Corps was able to turn things around by embracing a strategy focused upon protecting the population. That coincided with some tribes around Ramadi turning against Al Qaeda in Iraq, which became known as the Anbar Awakening. That completely changed the security dynamics. The book argues this transformation was due to the Marines’ ability to learn and adapt, which is not always an easy thing to do with a large organization. The major drawback with the book is the linear history style Shultz employs. That means he starts off with the Marines losing and then portrays their experience as a natural positive progression towards victory. The fight for Anbar did not follow such a straight line, and there were several setbacks, which the book underplays.

Review Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied

Review Dodge, Toby, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied, New York: Columbia University Press, 2003

The Americans would have been well served to have read Inventing Iraq during their occupation of the country. Toby Dodge wrote the book attempting to explain the ideology largely based upon stereotypes of the Ottoman Empire and colonial territories that shaped British rule during the Mandate period from 1920-32. Those ideas mixed with budget constraints and fading interest in London combined to undermine the creation of the modern state the English wanted in Mesopotamia. The book makes some excellent observations about the troubles the British ran into, which are directly comparable to what happened to the Americans when they occupied Iraq. Unfortunately, the book is a bit inconsistent in its writing and content. 

Fallujah Redux Interview With Daniel Green On Fallujah During The Surge

Throughout post-Saddam Iraq Fallujah was a trouble spot for the new Iraqi government and the Coalition forces. During the Surge, Navy Reservist Daniel Green worked with tribes in the district and the local government to get them into the fight against the insurgency and help turn the city around. He wrote about his experiences in Fallujah Redux along with General William Mullen III. This is an interview with Green about what happened in Fallujah in 2007. He can be followed on Twitter at @fallujahredux.

Mosul Campaign Day Seventeen, Nov 2, 2016

The Iraqi army, Federal Police and Hashd were moving forward on November 2, while the Golden Division had a temporary pause for other forces to catch up with it. The Golden Division entered the outer eastern outskirts of Mosul, but then halted as it was far ahead of other units. Being so far ahead opens up the forces to counterattacks from the flanks and rear by Islamic State fighters. Two of those eastern areas Gogjali and Karama were declared freed by the Golden Division, but fighting was still going on in the former and the latter was just entered. In the south the army and Federal Police seized 15 villages, in the north one more, while the Hashd took 8 in the southwest, although one was said to have been liberated a few days before. 15 Hashd were killed and 46 wounded during the fighting. Only occasional press reports have any coverage of casualties.

Some Iraqi units have made better progress than others. So far the Golden Division has advanced the farthest having reached the industrial districts of eastern Mosul. The army’s 9^th Division is moving in two columns in the south with one 3.5 km from Mosul and the other caught up in IS defenses 25 km away. The latter is now giving up that line of advance and shifting to the east to joint the Golden Division. The Federal Police are 15 km to the south, the 15^th Division 30 km to the south, and the 16^th Division and ex-Governor Nujafi’s Hashd al-Watani 9 km to the north. The Kurds have stopped their operations and are digging in 4-10 km northeast of the city. The joint forces are now focusing upon three main corridors towards Mosul from the west, east and northeast.

The Wall Street Journal interviewed two commanders in the Golden Division who talked about not repeating the mistakes made by the Iraqi forces before in Ninewa and the opportunity this campaign provided to win back locals. General Abbas Jubouri told the Journal that his unit needed to make sure they did not act like the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) performed before in the Mosul area, referring to how they alienated the populace. He went on to note that led to people feeling marginalized, which opened the door for the Islamic State to gain support. General Abdul Wahab al-Saadi added that now the population wanted the army to free them. This highlighted a point made by Michael Knights of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in a paper he wrote about past attempts to secure Mosul that this campaign offers the first opportunity since 2003 for the ISF and central government to win over the locals and be seen as liberators. Unfortunately the first signs of abuse have arisen.

Amnesty International received stories that a Sabawai tribal armed group, Hashd al-Ashairi carried out abuses in three towns south of Mosul. Amnesty talked with local officials and eyewitnesses that said the tribal fighters entered Makuk, Tal al-Shaeir and Douizat al-Sufla before the Iraqi security forces arrived and abused people they accused of being Islamic State members and sympathizers. That included beatings, electrocutions, tying people to vehicles and being driven around, as well as being put into cages. Amnesty believed these actions were not only motivated by revenge for IS crimes, but tribal feuds as well. Much is put on the threat of Shiite forces abusing Sunnis in security campaigns, but there are also tribal groups like this that show Sunni-Sunnis splits, and how deeply the Iraqi nation has been wounded by the war against the Islamic State, and how difficult it will be to heal them.

Another Hashd group talked about expanding the war into Syria after Mosul is liberated. The secretary general of Kataib Sayid al-Shuhada told the press that they would fight IS in Syria after Tal Afar was taken. He joined several others who have made similar comments in the last few days. There are already thousands of Iraqis fighting in militias sponsored by Iran to support Assad’s government, but these most recent words seem to imply that Iraqi units could formally cross the border into Syria from Ninewa after this campaign is done. Prime Minister Haidar Abadi has said nothing on this matter, although his National Security Adviser supported the idea.

In Mosul itself there were more reports that small resistance groups were attacking IS members. 90 former ISF members were also said to have been arrested out of fear that they were providing intelligence to the government and placed in a school converted into a military outpost.

Finally, Premier Abadi warned Turkey that if they entered Iraq to take part in the Mosul operation they would pay for it. Turkey’s Foreign Minister responded by saying that Iraq had no better friend then Ankara. This was just the latest in the war of words between the two countries, and came after Turkey deployed extra forces to the border near Tal Afar threatening the Hashd if they took the town.

SOURCES

Amnesty International, “Iraq: Tribal militia tortured detainees in revenge attacks during Mosul offensive,” 11/2/16

BBC, “Mosul battle: Iraqi troops secure foothold in eastern outskirts,” 11/2/16

Buratha News, "Recent development in the field, until 21:45 pm Wednesday 02 11 2016," 11/2/16

Al Forat, "Announcement of freeing 14 villages and reach the outskirts of Hamam al-Alil," 11/2/16

El-Ghobashy, Tamer and Nabhan, Ali, “Iraqi Forces Show New Face in Mosul,” Wall Street Journal, 1/2/16

Iraq Oil Report, “Inside Mosul: Nov. 2, 2016,” 11/2/16

Knights, Michael, “How to Secure Mosul, Lessons from 2008-2014,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 2016

- “IS conflict: Battle for Mosul on schedule, but not exactly to plan,” BBC, 11/2/16

Al Mada, "Freed village in Bashiqa and raised the Iraqi flag over the buildings," 11/2/16

Al Masalah, "Badr announces the liberation of four villages in Nineveh," 11/2/16

Mostafa, Mohamed, “ISIS inside Syria after liberating Tel Afar,” Iraqi News, 11/2/16

Rudaw, “After warning by Iraqi PM, Turkey says Baghdad has no greater friend than Ankara,” 11/2/16

- "MOSUL OFFENSIVE, DAY 17: LIVE UPDATES," 11/2/16

Fallujah: Tribal Revolt Or Insurgent Disagreement In Iraq?

In mid-February 2016 reports emerged of clashes between tribes and the Islamic State in the city of Fallujah. Local officials and sheikhs called it a rebellion against the insurgents, while others said events were being blown out of proportion. One Anbar politician even said it was a disagreement between militant factions. Either way, IS squashed the fighting, and now there is speculation about its meaning.

There were reports of five days of fighting in Fallujah, although some dispute that. On February 17, the first story emerged of the Jerisat clan fighting IS in the city. By February 20 the Mahamda and Halbsa tribes were said to have joined in the fray with clashes in the Nazzal and Jolan neighborhoods that included burning three checkpoints and a building. The Islamic State responded by arresting 150-180 people effectively ending the conflict. Several Anbar officials and sheikhs called it a revolt against the Islamic State, but there were dissenters from that narrative. Hisham al-Hashimi, a government adviser on the insurgents wrote on his Facebook page that this was just a disagreement between the Jerisat and IS, and an Anbar councilman told Al Mada something similar that this was all due to differences between the insurgents. He went on to say that there was only one day of fighting, and then it ended, not four days as the media had it. The Interior Ministry confirmed the shooting, and a video emerged allegedly of the clashes. What exactly happened is now up for debate.

The general explanation given for the conflict was that the extreme rule of IS and low supplies within the city were the catalysts, but there could be more to it. First, after the fall of Ramadi, locals in Fallujah could be taking the opportunity to show their discontent with IS rule. The local officials and sheikhs who talked about an uprising could also be positioning themselves for a future Fallujah operation to try to argue that the city is not all pro-IS. Fallujah was the first place to fall to insurgents back in January 2014. It took several months for the Islamic State to assert its control over it and push out the other factions, but it has been under its jurisdiction for over a year with no signs of dissent. That could support the argument of Hashimi and the Anbar councilman who claimed this was just a disagreement that was then exaggerated by people outside of the city who had their own agendas. Because Fallujah has been under such tight control for so long the latter point of view appears more believable for now. Until more information emerges its difficult to believe this was any type of revolt.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Clashes in jihadist-held Iraq city halt after residents seized,” 2/21/16

- “Iraq tribesmen battle IS inside Fallujah for second day,” 2/20/16

Alsumaria, “Tribal fighters in Fallujah burn Daash checkpoint and kill two of its men,” 2/19/16

BBC, “Iraqi tribes clash with jihadists in IS stronghold of Fallujah,” 2/19/16

Al Forat, “Clan elder narrates for the news: Euphrates tribes of Fallujah launch uprising against Daash,” 2/19/16

El-Ghobashy, Tamer, “Islamic State Reasserts Control Over Fallujah,” Wall Street Journal, 2/21/16

Al Maalomah, “14 Daash killed including a senior commander in clashes with members of the tribes in central Fallujah,” 2/20/16

Al Mada, “Calm returns to Fallujah after the implementation of Daash mass arrest campaign,” 2/21/16

- “Conflicting news about the outbreak of clashes between the clans of Fallujah and Daash,” 2/20/16

Morris, Loveday and Salim, Mustafa, “Islamic State facing new trouble in Fallujah as Sunni tribesmen target them,” Washington Post, 2/19/16

New Sabah, “Daash repressive practices lead tribes to declare revolution against it,” 2/20/16

Shafaq News, “Daesh Militants Capture 150 Civilians in Central Iraq,” 2/20/16

- “Three clans in Fallujah clashing with Daash in the city and impose control over parts of the Nazzal neighborhood,” 2/19/16

Sotaliraq, "Armed clashes between Jerisat clan and Daash members in Fallujah," 2/17/16

Life In Iraq’s Tikrit Returns To Normal

Tikrit was retaken in March of last year. Afterward elements of the Hashd al-Shaabi and the Jabouri tribe burned down and destroyed sections of the city and several surrounding towns in revenge for the Camp Speicher massacre where the Islamic State (IS) killed over 1,000 cadets. Residents of the area were also not allowed to return for months because they were suspected of being IS sympathizers. Now most of the population is back, and life appears to be returning to normal.

National Public Radio (NPR) recently reported on the situation in Tikrit. NPR’s Alice Fordham found the central market open, people shopping, and 70-90% of the original inhabitants back in their homes. The Hashd controlled the presidential palace, but Sunni policemen were in charge of most of the city. Thousands of people have not been able to return to the area however as they have been labeled IS collaborators. Local Shiite tribesmen are also arguing over blood money for family members they lost while the area was under insurgent control. Given what transpired in the district beforehand this was an amazing transformation.

Tikrit was freed from the Islamic State in March 2015 followed by days of looting and destruction of property throughout the district. Three days after the city’s liberation the Salahaddin council called on Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to intervene and stop the burning of homes and stealing. The governor and head of council also protested violations going on in the area. Two security officers told Reuters that homes were being set afire, and the Hashd were behind the attacks on buildings. This was happening not only in Tikrit, but the surrounding towns as well. On April 6, Prime Minister Haidar Abadi said that 152 houses and shops had been destroyed in Tikrit, but didn’t say by who. Even by the end of April, there were still stories of buildings being damaged. A Tikrit municipal worker for example, was quoted in the Financial Times stating that 300 out of 600 structures in the north of the city were wiped out including two mosques. The Tikrit area was the site of the Camp Speicher massacre. IS and members of the Albu Ajeel tribe were blamed for rounding up 1,700 cadets from the base and executing them. When the Tikrit operation was launched many Hashd units said they wanted revenge for that bloodbath. That was why they carried out these acts.

Five months later Human Rights Watch released a report on the destruction of the Tikrit area. It found that Badr, the Ali Akbar Brigades, Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, Kataib Hezbollah, Saraya Khorasan, Jund al-Imam and Sunni volunteers destroyed at least 1,425 buildings in Tikrit, Dour, Albu Ajeel and Alam, 950 of which looked like they were blown up and 400 burned. 200 people were also arrested and 160 were never seen again. This all happened after the district was liberated, and supported the press reports made at the time. Many officials however denied that the Hashd were responsible instead blaming gangs and local tribes. Abu Mahdi Muhandis for example, the deputy commander of the Hashd acknowledged that there were violations going on in Tikrit, but blamed criminal gangs. Adnan Asadi a parliamentarian from State of Law said that elements of the press were carrying out a smear campaign against the Hashd, while a Hashd spokesman blamed Sunni tribes. The Hashd and its supporters obviously did not want to admit to any wrong doings, and neither did the government in the end. While everyone seemed to admit that there was a period of lawlessness after the Tikrit area was freed, the Hashd were never held responsible.

The next phase of the Tikrit story was the decision over who would be allowed to return. The major issue was over IS sympathizers. The Albu Ajeel and Albu Nasr tribes were blamed for not only joining IS, but the former was accused of taking part in the Speicher massacre. The Jabouri tribe, that sided with the government and fought IS, also wanted blood money for its members that were killed in the fighting. Because of their ties, the Jabouris were able to return, mostly to the town of Alam outside of Tikrit early on. By the middle of June, people who had been vetted started heading back to the district. In November the mayor of Tikrit claimed that 90% of the residents were home, and the United Nations reported that Salahaddin had the most returns overall in the country. Even some Albu Ajeel members were allowed to go back as long as they were not deemed pro-insurgent after a reconciliation meeting was held, and the Hashd signed off on it. Some 120,000 people have not been allowed back however. This has happened in other parts of the country as well. Tribes, the Hashd, the Peshmerga, etc. have all blocked people they believe to have joined the insurgents from going back to their homes. The government has tried to mediate some of these disputes, and even offered to pay blood money for dead relatives, but as in the case of Tikit, tens of thousands have still been excluded. They will remain displaced as a result, and have to re-settle in other parts of the country or perhaps try to move to Europe as others are currently attempting.

Tikrit is part success story, part tragedy. The Hashd and fighters from the Jabouri tribe destroyed sections of the city and surrounding towns out of revenge for the Speicher massacre and joining the insurgency. Over 100,000 people have also been kept from their homes because of those same accusations. On the other hand, the majority of the district is now returning to normality. People are back at work and school, and trying to start over. They are trying to think about the future, but the recent past is still in their memories as so much destruction was left in the wake of the Islamic State, and the retaliation that followed its expulsion from the district. The same pattern is being played out in other parts of the country as well, and will likely leave deep scars after the war is long over.

SOURCES

Abbas, Mushreq, “Displaced Iraqis still wait to return home,” Al Monitor, 6/24/15

Arango, Tim, “After Iraqis Wrest Tikrit From ISIS, Sectarian and Tribal Tensions Persist,” New York Times, 5/9/15

Bradley, Matt and Nissenbaum, Dion, “’Chaos,’ Charges of Abuses Follow Retaking of Tikrit,” Wall Street Journal, 4/3/15

- “Iraq, U.S. Are Divided on What’s Next in Battle Against Islamic State,” Wall St Journal, 4/5/15

Daragahi, Borzou, “Sacking of Tikrit district highlights Iraq tensions,” Financial Times, 4/30/15

Fordham, Alice, “After Retaking Iraqi City, Shiite Militias Accused Of Targeting Sunnis,” National Public radio, 4/7/15

- “The Fragile Peace Of An Iraqi City Once Run By ISIS,” NPR, 1/29/16

Habib, Mustafa, “Tikrit After The Extremists: A Ghost Town Ruled By Gunmen,” Niqash, 4/30/15

Human Rights Watch, “Iraq: Militia Abuses Mar Fight Against ISIS,” 9/20/15

International Organization for Migration, “Displacement in Iraq Exceeds 3.2 Million: IOM,” 10/16/15

Al-Jawoshy, Omar and Arango, Tim, “Iraqi Families Return to Fragile Stability in Tikrit After Liberation From ISIS,” New York Times, 6/22/15

Al-Jibouri, Ghazwan Hassan, “Family Feuds That Last, And Last: As Extremists Withdraw in Salahaddin, Iraq’s Tribes Demand Justice,” Niqash, 10/22/15

Al Mada, “75% of displaced returns in Salahuddin..but Saddam’s tribe abandons Awija willingly,” 11/3/15

- “Jubouri: Iraq needs figures like al-Sadr and what happened in Tikrit will not deter us from freeing Anbar and Mosul,” 4/5/15

- “Karim al-Jubouri leave Tikrit to protest against the “violations” within the city,” 4/3/15

- “Salahuddin announce the return of 8,500 displaced families to Tikrit and role,” 7/30/15

- “Salahuddin clans agree to the return of the people of Albu-Ajeel, excluding only 300 people,” 9/28/15

- “Salahuddin Council rejects the return of families involved with Daash,” 5/7/15

- “Tikrit after liberation: “Daash” executions aggravate disputes .. tribal and local government restricted movement,” 4/24/15

Morris, Loveday, “Iraq chased Islamic State out of Tikrit. Getting residents back is still a battle,” Washington Post, 6/19/15

Al Rafidayn, “Popular crowd acknowledges the existence of some lurking in their ranks and prepared to bring them to justice,” 4/5/15

Reuters, “After Iraqi forces take Tikrit, a wave of looting and lynching,” 4/3/15

- “First families return to Tikrit since city retaken from IS,” 6/15/15

Al-Salhy, Suadad, “What really happened in Tikrit after ISIL fled,” Al Jazeera, 4/7/15

Shafaq News, “Najafi: looting and burning of property in Tikrit revenge and overturning victory,” 4/3/15

- “Senate Salahuddin: We want intervention of Sistani to stop burning Tikrit .. government is incapable,” 4/3/15

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Iraq: Humanitarian Bulletin 1-15 October 2015,” 10/20/15

Xinhua, “Iraqi forces halt looting, arson in Tikrit,” 4/4/15

Zeed, Adnan Abu, “Controversy surrounds alleged violations by Shiite forces in Tikrit,” Al Monitor, 4/23/15

Saddam’s Faith Campaign & Iraq’s Tribes Two Pillars Of The Insurgency, Interview With Iraq Historian Prof. Amatzia Baram

Iraq’s insurgency has drawn from many different groups in Iraq, but two major ones were the tribes and Salafis. Many sheikhs turned against the United States in 2003 due to the actions of the military and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). In the 1990s Saddam Hussein started his Faith Campaign, which led to the growth of Salafism in the country. That ideology fueled many to join Islamist insurgent groups later on. To help explain these two phenomena is Dr. Amatzia Baram Professor Emeritus at the Department of History of the Middle East and Director of the Centre for Iraq Studies at the University of Haifa. He has authored several books on Iraq, his most recent being Saddam Husayn and Islam, 1968-2003: Ba’thi Iraq from Secularism to Faith.

Albu Ajeel Points To Tribal Disputes In Post-IS Iraq

Once the Islamic State is driven from a part of Iraq that doesn’t mean everything is resolved. The current war has increased tensions between communities and created new ones within them. That’s show in the case of Albu Ajeel just outside of Tikrit. The tribe there was accused not only of collaborating with the insurgents, but taking part in the now infamous Camp Speicher massacre, which took place last summer. After the town was cleared in March it was destroyed by both Shiite Hashd units and local Sunni tribesmen. Afterward Albu Ajeel was a ghost town with no locals being allowed to return. That has recently changed after a political deal, but the situation there points to the deep divisions that will remain in the country after the Islamic State is eventually defeated.

At the end of September 2015, a political deal was made to allow locals to return to Albu Ajeel. The provincial council held a reconciliation conference, and as a result an agreement was made for families to go back to their home in the town. That did not include 300 people who were suspected of being IS sympathizers. The local Hashd commander agreed to the arrangement as well showing their continued influence over the area. Beforehand the Jabour tribe was said to have been stopping people from returning to that area.

The reason no one was allowed back into the town was the deep suspicion people have of the tribe. After Tikrit fell to to the Islamic State in June 2014, the Albu Ajeel were accused of helping the organization commit the Camp Speicher massacre where 1,500 recruits were executed. To make matters worse, a mass grave was found in the town after its liberation with 300-400 bodies in it. Some believed these were Speicher victims. Families of the victims of that mass murder were demanding blood money from the Albu Ajeel for their dead relatives, and members of the Jabour and Abed tribes were said to be seeking revenge.

The result of this mistrust and suspicion was that after Albu Ajeel was liberated on March 7, most of the town was destroyed. Satellite photo analysis done by Human Rights Watch showed most of the town had been flattened shortly after its capture. On March 9, a video was posted with a suspected Asaib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH) member yelling “Burn them!” as he droves through town. A local who joined the Hashd said that shortly after the town was liberated AAH started burning down homes. A lawmaker from the area also blamed the Jabour tribe for taking part in the acts as well. In the end, a reported 200 homes were destroyed and 300 burned. This was done in revenge for the Speicher massacre and occurred in several other towns in the area as well.

The example of Albu Ajeel shows how scarred Iraq is from the Islamic State. The Hashd have been blamed for most of the abuses by the government, but there are also a plethora of tribal disputes that have emerged from the war that have barely been reported on. Many families are demanding not only blood money for their lost relatives, but revenge as well. After the Islamic State is driven back these issues are likely to remain causing more lasting problems for the nation.

SOURCES

Al-Ali, Zaid, “Tikrit: Iraq’s Abandoned City,” New York Review of Books, 5/4/15

Barnard, Anne, “Iraqi Army Cements Hold on Tikrit, but Islamic State Sends a Message,” New York Times, 3/11/15

Cunningham, Erin, “Unusual alliance provides hope in fight against Islamic State in Iraq,” Washington Post, 3/10/15

Human Rights Watch, “Iraq: Militia Abuses Mar Fight Against ISIS,” 9/20/15

Al-Jibouri, Ghazwan Hassan, “Family Feuds That Last, And Last: As Extremists Withdraw in Salahaddin, Iraq’s Tribes Demand Justice,” Niqash, 10/22/15

Al Mada, “Salahuddin clans agree to the return of the people of Albu-Ajeel, excluding only 300 people,” 9/28/15

Al-Salhy, Suadad, “What really happened in Tikrit after ISIL fled,” Al Jazeera, 4/7/15