Review Faust, Aaron, The Ba’thification of Iraq, Saddam Hussein’sTotalitarianism, Austin: University of Texas Press, 2015
The Ba’thification of
Iraq, Saddam Hussein’s Totalitarianism starts off with a dramatic story of
a bicycle repairman in Wasit province who shot his son for deserting the army
during the Iran-Iraq War. The man wrote to the Baath office for deserters
asking to be pardoned for his crime. The secretary of the office passed his
request all the way to Saddam Hussein who not only amnestied him, but gave him
a commendation and entered his account into the official records of the war.
The point of Aaron Faust’s book is to explain why people like this lowly
laborer would kill his own child for a dictatorship like the one in Iraq. Was
it because people loved Saddam as thousands of letters and speeches proclaimed
each year, were they loyal to the regime, or was it because they were terrified
into submission as writers such as Kanan Makiya wrote about? What Faust argues
is that the Baath Party and Saddam created an all encompassing system, which
offered rewards and punishments and attempted to control every facet of Iraqi
life from marriage to where people lived to their education to their jobs and
future. Under such a system the vast majority had to comply to ensure their
livelihood and that of their families.
The Ba’thification of
Iraq is one of a series of books based upon the extensive Baathist records
that were seized after the 2003 invasion of Iraq and taken to the United States
for safe keeping. The documents cover the period from 1979-2003 and are housed
at the Iraq Memory Foundation at Stanford University in California. There is
another collection at the National Defense University in Washington D.C. These
papers document the day to day activities of the Baath Party to control the
Iraqi populace. Faust found that Baathist Iraq operated much like other
totalitarian regimes such as Stalinist Russia, Hitler’s Germany and Maoist
China.
What sets a totalitarian government apart from an
authoritarian one is that doesn’t just rely upon violence, but it also offers
plenty of rewards and wants the public to love and support the authorities. It
claims it serves the masses, while attempting to co-opt and destroy any element
that might oppose it. It wants to politicize every element of society so there
is nothing left but the state, and in Iraq’s case that was personified in
Saddam Hussein. Those that did not conform could lose their jobs and their
lives. This violence could be indiscriminate since there were no checks upon
the government, but force alone could not explain the Iraqi regime or any of
the other totalitarian ones. Instead, Iraq created a system meant to
indoctrinate every Iraqi from the day they were born until they died. They were
taught that the Baath Party stood for a strong Iraq, that it encompassed Islam
because it stood for faith and belief, that the public should sacrifice
themselves to the state, and if they did they could gain benefits like
stipends, pensions, access to college, public jobs, etc. Rather than an all
repressive system, Iraq used a carrot and stick approach to make sure the
public conformed. This was not absolute as there was always dissent and
opposition, but the vast majority went along with the system because that’s
what they knew and had to live under. Other books that have gone through the
Baath files such as Joseph Sassoon’s Saddam
Hussein’s Ba’th Party, Inside an Authoritarian Regime have come to the
same conclusion. The difference is that Faust argues that this led to a
totalitarian system rather than an authoritarian one.
On some specific issues, Faust provides interesting insight,
especially how adaptable the party was. For instance, Michel Aflaq was the
founding father of Baathism. Saddam took Afaq’s ideas and theories and centered
them around himself. Iraq said that it stood by Aflaq’s ideas but they needed
to be built upon and changed to fit the Iraqi experience. During that process,
Saddam was put at the center of Baath ideology, and he rather than Aflaq became
the new authority for what the party meant. In another instance, after the 1991
uprising that followed the Gulf War, Saddam turned to sheikhs and tribes to
provide security in parts of the country. This contradicted earlier Baath
policy that saw tribes as part of the past which the party was trying to
eliminate to create a new modern advanced country. However, Saddam always saw
that tribalism was an important part of Iraqi society and should be controlled
and mobilized to support the government. The party therefore attempted to
recruit sheikhs to join the Baath, drafted tribesmen into the army and security
forces, and gave them control of specific areas raising the status of certain
tribes. The authorities also monitored them by making sheikhs register. A
similar stance was taken with religion. In 1993 Saddam started the Faith
Campaign, which some have argued was another dramatic change since the Baath was
secular. Just like the tribes however, the government attempted to co-opt religion.
Baghdad promoted a nonsectarian form of Islam that was meant to appeal to all
Iraqis, and again rally them behind the state through mosques that were built
by the government, and via imams and clerics that were picked by the
authorities as well. At the same time, the government attempted to stamp out
Islamist elements that were seen as being opponents of the regime. These and
other examples show that the party had two main goals, which were to hold onto
power and reshape the society in its image. When it ran into problems like the
growth of religiosity in the 1990s it would attempt to control it and destroy
the elements it couldn’t. That is the main benefit of the book as it documents
the system of control that lasted for 35 years and how it was able to deal with
changing situations over that long period.
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