Analyzing the returns from Iraq’s May 2018 parliamentary elections shows some interesting trends. First, the most well organized parties did the best. Some lists were focused upon the wrong themes, and there was widespread charges of fraud.
The Sairoon alliance between Moqtada al-Sadr, the Iraqi
Communist Party, and some civil society groups benefited the most from the low
voter turnout. Sairoon’s political machine served it well. It was able to mobilize
its voters and get them to pick from across the list to get them a plurality of
the seats with 54. It was the only one that ran completely new candidates, and
its participation in the protests for services, ending corruption and political
reform showed that it did not want to maintain the status quo. That matched the
widespread disillusionment with the electorate this year. In 2014
Sadr’s Ahrar won 34 seats, while the Civil Democratic Alliance got 4. Half of
the later joined Sadr this year, so together they were able to gain roughly 18
seats. While the number of votes it received was little
changed from 2014, because fewer people came out Sairoon won a larger
percentage. Its base was solidly in the south coming in 1st in Dhi
Qar, Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, and Wasit, 2nd in Babil, Basra,
Karbala, and Qadisiyah, along with winning Baghdad, and fourth place in Diyala.
Fatah which was led by Badr’s Hadi Amiri and made up mostly
of pro-Iran Hashd groups also did well. In 2014, Badr was part of State of Law
and won 22 seats. Another
member of the list, Asaib Ahl Al-Haq won
1 seat that year as well. This year Fatah took 47 seats. Like Sairoon,
Fatah was able to get out the vote. It played upon the Hashd’s populist image
of common folk who fought the Islamic State. It included some Sunni candidates
leading to 2 seats in Salahaddin and 3 seats in Ninewa, along with winning
Babil, Basra, Karbala, Qadisiyah, and coming in 2nd in Baghdad, Dhi
Qar, Diyala, Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, and Wasit.
Abadi was hoping his victory over the Islamic State and his
dealing with the Kurdish independence referendum would lead to his victory in
May, but that didn’t happen. He used the office of the prime minister to
crisscross the country in the weeks before the vote talking about tackling
corruption, and being a nationalist rather than a sectarian list. His base
in the Shiite middle class also meant he didn’t play on Shiite identity
politics as much. As a member of the Communist Party and another from the Civil
Democratic Party pointed
out, the premier made promises to deal with graft and the ethnosectarian
political system, but never did anything substantive about them. With the mood
of the public swinging against the status quo, Abadi suffered by representing
the establishment. He came in a disappointing third with 42 seats. His running
of candidates across the country was the one highlight as he picked up 2 seats
in Anbar and Salahaddin each, and won in Ninewa netting 7 seats, all of which
are considered solidly Sunni governorates. In Baghdad, he largely flopped
however coming in tied for fourth with 8 seats.
Vice President Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law was fourth
with 26 seats. Despite being blamed for the loss of Mosul in 2014, failing to
get the Hashd to run with him, flip flopping from being an opponent of the
Kurds to trying to appeal to them over the independence referendum, which cost
him in the south, Maliki won the most
votes of any individual. He did the same in 2010 and 2014. State of Law was
also able to come in third ahead of Abadi’s Nasr in the capital. Maliki tried
to embrace the reform trend by calling for a majority government as the
solution to the problems in Baghdad, but otherwise made a sectarian appeal to
the Shiite community.
The Kurdish vote was highly contested, but the ruling
parties ended up coming out on top. The KDP won 25 seats and the PUK 18. That’s
roughly the same as 2014 when the KDP got 25 and the PUK 21. The opposition was
hoping for a much better showing with the failure of the Kurdish referendum,
the loss of Kirkuk, and the economic crisis in Kurdistan. They talked about
running together but the clash of personalities at the top meant they went it
alone and it cost them. Change that won 9 seats in 2014 only got 5 in 2018. New
Generation won 4 seats, and the Coalition for Democracy and Justice, the
Kurdistan Islamic Union, and the Kurdistan Islamic Group each got 2. The PUK
has been accused
of cheating in Kirkuk and Sulaymaniya, but it and the KDPs success is again
due to its voter mobilization. Its followers came out despite the problems and
voted across the lists to get the most candidates in office. They are now
hoping to play their victory in Kurdistan and Kirkuk into rejoining the federal
government, which they had moved away from in the last several years. The
opposition on the other hand are talking about lawsuits and withdrawing
from the political process because of their poor showing, which they have blamed
on the PUK’s fraud. That will mean the Kurdish parliamentarians will continue
to be split and divided over regional politics rather than focusing on national
ones.
Wataniya made up of Vice President Iyad Allawi, Speaker of
Parliament Salim al-Jabouri and Salah al-Mutlaq was another disappointed list.
It pulled 21 seats when in 2014 Allawi was able to pull that same amount on his
own. While it tied for the most seats in Diyala, and came in 2nd in
Anbar, it didn’t do as well in other areas picking up 3rd in Ninewa
and Salahaddin, tied for 4th in Baghdad, and won no seats in Babil,
although it did pick up one seat in Basra. Wataniya tried to play upon the
public’s disillusionment, but Allawi and Mutlaq had done little in the last
four years, while Jabouri was aligned with Abadi.
Ammar Hakim ran alone this year forming his own Hikma after
he split with his family’s Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. Like everyone else
he talked about reform, but was really helped by the financial backing he had. The
list finished with 19 seats. In 2014, his Mowatin, which included the Iraqi
National Congress was able to get 31 seats.
Vice President Osama Nujafi was another politician that had
to deal with faltering popularity. In 2014 his Mutahidun won 27 seats. That
went down to 13 seats in 2018. Even in Ninewa where Nujafi is from he came in a
distant 5th. Nujafi played about identity politics and his
opposition to Abadi, but neither paid off.
SOURCES
Bas News, “Gorran to
Boycott Iraqi Parliament, Political Process: MP,” 5/19/18
Buratha
News, “After news of its withdrawal from the state of law coalition….Badr
Organization declares its commitment to the decision of the National Alliance
for the prime minister post,” 7/28/14
Hawez, Abdulla, “So
candidates with the highest number of votes,” Twitter 5/19/18
Institute of
Regional and International Studies, “Iraq Votes 2018, Election Mobilization
Strategies,” The American University of Iraq, Sulaimani, 5/11/18
Institute
for the Study of War, “Final 2014 Iraqi National Elections Results by Major
Political Groups,” 5/19/14
Al Mada, “Dawa Party
is close to leaving the head of power after the results considered
disappointing,” 5/14/18
Al Masalah, “The
Kurdistan Islamic Group threatens to withdraw from the political process,”
5/20/18
- “New Generation
accuses the Barzani and Talabani parties of rigging 640 thousand votes,”
5/20/18
Rudaw, “Six Kurdish
parties consider withdrawing from Iraqi political process,” 5/18/18
Sowell, Kirk,
“Understanding Sadr’s Victory,” Sada, 5/17/18
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