DeBaathification is one of the lasting legacies of the
American occupation of Iraq. Passed in May 2003 by the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) the effort to rid the country of the Baath Party quickly took
on a life of its own that continues with the current Iraqi government.
DeBaathification was not a vetting process meant to weed out the good and the
bad. Rather it set out to ban the top ranks of the party, but then quickly
expanded to any Baathist in a politicized, open ended effort that lacked due
process, and coherent guidelines. While it had many supporters in both the U.S.
and Iraq, there were just as many detractors. It ended up dividing the country,
and hindered the development of a new Iraqi government and democracy.
The Baath was one of the most successful authoritarian parties
in modern history. By the end of 2002,
it had just under 4 million members. From 1986 to 2002 it increased 140% as Saddam Hussein attempted to maintain
control of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, and then the sanctions period following
the Gulf War by reaching out to young people and women. Out of an estimated 25
million people in 2002, Baathists were 16.5% of the population. That was much
higher than the Communist Party in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. Party
members who had actual power were only about 4% of Iraq, while the party elite
was around 2.4% of the populace. Towards the top of the party
were Secretary Generals, amin sir, who set policies and had power over the military. Branch members, udhu fir, led party sections, could order arrests, use weapons,
and had some authority over the security forces. A section member, udhu shu’ba,
led cells, and supervised and could work with local security forces. A division
member, uhdu firqa, implemented orders, and could oversee the security forces
and local administrators. Below that were the lower level party members
consisting of active members, udhu amil, apprenticed members, udhu mutadarib,
candidates, murashih, advanced supporters, nasir mutaqadin, supporters, nasir,
and sympathizers, muayid, all of which belonged to party cells. By 2002 there
were 69 party branches across the country, 612 sections, 3,787 divisions,
32,852 cells run by 76 Secretary Generals, 1,027 branch members, 6,128 section
members, 45,537 division members, 223,662 active members, 254,081 apprenticed
members, 27,242 candidates, 1,113,211 supporters, and 2,328,080 sympathizers. DeBaathification
was originally supposed to only affect the top four party levels, approximately
52,700 people, that it was assumed had participated in crimes. It was later
applied to far more than that with many exceptions. DeBaathification was not a
vetting process to see which Baathists could remain in office, and which could
not, but was rather more like a purge of anyone the authorities felt needed to
be removed or retired.
The Bush administration liked to compare Saddam’s Iraq to
Nazi Germany, but was divided on what to do with the Baath Party. The State
Department and the Central Intelligence Agency wanted to get rid of Saddam and
a couple of other leaders only, while the Pentagon and Vice President Dick
Cheney called for a broad purge of Baathists. National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice
was in the middle. Early in 2003 the Defense Department
and Cheney won the debate. Ahmad Chalabi had the ear of both of them, and
pushed the idea that Saddam was like Hitler and needed a deNazification
process. That comparison didn’t quite hold up. DeNazification did not hold all
senior Nazis accountable or stop them from returning to office. It was more of
a vetting process meant to keep the German government running after World War
II. More importantly, it didn’t seem that the administration even studied how
deNazification worked to help plan the deBaathification it would soon order.
How to deal with the Baath Party on the ground in Iraq also
created divisions. After the fall of Baghdad in April 2003, General Tommy
Frank’s Freedom Message to Iraqis bared the Baath Party. Afterward, the Office
of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) under Jay Garner followed a
mild deBaathification approach. It only disqualified the 55 top party members
on the deck of cards wanted list, and anyone implicated in crimes. Otherwise,
it allowed hundreds of Baathists to return to work. That quickly changed when
Paul Bremer arrived in Iraq in May and the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) was announced. Bremer received a draft deBaathification law from
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith who wanted it implemented
immediately. Four days after Bremer landed in Baghdad he issued CPA Order 1
banning the Baath Party. The top four party ranks, Secretary General, branch
member, section member, and division members were barred from working in the
government. That was quickly expanded to the three highest levels of
administration in each office, and criminals. That meant that any Baathist
could be included no matter what the rank. That immediately created opposition
from people like Garner, and the CIA station chief in Baghdad Charlie Sidell.
They went to Bremer warning him that such a broad deBaathification effort would
create tens of thousands of opponents to the CPA. They pushed for only the top
two tiers of the party to be excluded. Bremer replied that he was under orders
from Washington. He also believed in getting rid of the Baathists, and
thought it would be a strong statement about the dramatic transformation the U.S. was
hoping to bring to the country. The CPA head went on to promote
deBaathification as being just like deNazification to help justify it. (1) After
the order came out others came out against it as well. That included General
David Petraeus who was then the commander of the 82
nd Airborne
Division in Mosul, and General Ricardo Sanchez, the commanding general of
Coalition forces in Iraq. The former was afraid that getting rid of Baathists
would cause people to turn against the Americans and deprive the government of
needed officials, while the latter thought that the CPA never paid attention to
how to implement the order or its effects. By the end of his time in Iraq, Bremer
also understood that deBaathification had backfired, cutting into the
bureaucracy much deeper than he thought, and banning far more than he had
envisioned. The executive director of the deBaathification Commission Ali
al-Lami later told the Washington Post that
150,000 people were banned from May to September 2003. The Pentagon and Bremer wanted to make their mark on
Iraq. They considered the Baath a totalitarian party that needed to be rooted
out of Iraqi society. The various officials who came out against it were not
able to change the policy, but eventually Bremer saw the error of his ways. The
problem was that by then, the process was out of his control.
Ahmad Chalabi quickly took over deBaathification, and ran
with it. In July 2003, the CPA created the Iraqi Governing Council. The next
month, when Chalabi was the rotating president of the Council it created the
deBaathification Commission. Then in September, Chalabi became its chairman,
and appointed Mithal al-Alusi as its director. Alusi
was a former Baathists
himself who went into exile in the 1970s. The staff that was hired mostly
came from the Shiite religious parties, while Chalabi centralized control over
the commission. He immediately expanded its scope by adding more party levels, including
people who had been kicked out of the party before 2003, banned those belonging
to “oppressive institutions” or involved in stealing or corruption, and created
deBaathification offices in each ministry. He then cancelled all previous
reinstatements, and took over the appeals process, even though there were no
rules for how that would work. In early 2004 the Commission issued regulations
about its powers. It said it would oversee all information about the Baath, all
personnel in the ministries, control all exemptions, said that only certain
party members had the right to appeal, and if they did, they would lose their
pension if they were rejected. This new approach led to a dispute with the CPA,
but by then the Americans had no real influence over the matter. In April 2004,
Bremer attempted to add due process procedures, and later rescinded the order
authorizing the Commission, but they had little actual effect. At the same
time, the Dawa Party, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the Kurdistan
Democratic Party, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan supported deBaathification,
which was more than enough to keep the process moving forward. At the same
time, the Shiite religious parties saved some Shiite Baathists, and re-employed
them making them dependent upon those same organizations. This was part of a
larger process where a little over 100,000 former Baathists
were brought back
into the government to help with administration. Under Chalabi
deBaathification became an open ended and politicized process. Any Baathist was
open to investigation even if they had left the party before the 2003 invasion.
The ruling parties could pick out people they wanted, and exempt from the
process. This was when Bremer saw the errors of the policy, but it was too
late. The Iraqis were now in control, and they were not going to let go.
In June 2005 when Iyad Allawi was made interim prime
minister, he immediately came into conflict with Chalabi and the
deBaathification Commission. The new premier wanted to limit deBaathification
to only a small group of party leaders, as he was a former Baathist himself,
and did not see the party in the same light. Chalabi refused to change his
policy. This feud was not just about politics, but became a personal one
between Allawi and Chalabi. The Commission went to the Shura Council, a part of
the Justice Ministry, and got a favorable ruling to continue with its work. At
the same time, the Council said that there could be new limits placed on
deBaathification. Afterward, the cabinet said that all contacts with the
Commission had to go through it. Shortly after that, Mithal al-Alusi faced
criminal charges, and was removed from his position. The government then got
rid of three more members of the Commission, cut its funding, and attempted to
evict it from its offices in Baghdad. It also drafted a new law to replace the
Commission. Unfortunately for Allawi he was not in office long enough to carry
through with his plans. Allawi’s Iraqi National List was based upon former
Baathists like himself and ex-military men. He therefore had the exact opposite
opinion of Chalabi and the deBaathification Commission, which was to go after
any former regime member they wanted to. He could not win this war however as
he made way for a new government in 2005.
The parties that wanted to rid the country of the Baath
Party were the ones that took power in the 2005 elections. After the January
2005 vote, the United Alliance led by the Shiite religious parties won the most
seats in parliament, and eventually got Ibrahim al-Jaafari of the Dawa Party
elected prime minister. Chalabi was named his deputy. Shortly afterward, the
new government was ordered to cooperate with the deBaathification Commission.
Its work was later included in the 2005 constitution, it banned candidates in
the 2005 elections, and influenced the trial of Saddam Hussein. Article 7 and
135 prohibited the Baath Party, and said that all government offices were
subject to deBaathification. Before the December 2005 balloting, the Commission
tried to bar 170 candidates even though both Chalabi and the new director Ali
al-Lami were candidates. The Election Commission objected, claiming that it was
given multiple lists of banned politicians with different names on them just
before the voting with little evidence against them. The Election Commission
only ended up banning 40 candidates. Finally, the deBaathification Commission
tried to insert itself into the trial of Saddam. First, it objected to many of
the judges and staff on the tribunal being former Baathists. Three times it
stopped personnel from participating for their ties to the former regime, and
eventually got 19 employees of the tribunal to quit including the
administrative director. The U.S. stepped in and stopped any of the judges from
being dismissed, but the Commission did succeed in getting the president Judge
Said al-Hammashi being transferred. Giving into this pressure, the tribunal
eventually created its own deBaathification committee in 2006, and agreed to
get rid of more of its staff. After Saddam was sentenced to death, the
Commission told four judges they could transfer or face deBaathification. Given
the make-up of the new government, and the support it gave to deBaathification
it was no surprise that the commission would expand its power and try to
influence the new political system. Although not always successful it did play
a role in the voting process and Saddam’s trial, and most importantly was given
constitutional legitimacy. The Commission therefore could continue its work as
long as it wanted. For the Shiite religious and Kurdish parties, they supported
the process, because they still feared the return of the Baath Party, and
believed that many party members deserved to be excluded and prosecuted for
their crimes.
When the civil war took off into high gear in 2006, the new
government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki came under increasing pressure from
Washington to reform the deBaathification process in an effort to appease
Sunnis. In June 2006, Maliki said he would revise the process in an attempt at
reconciliation, but nothing came of it. In
March and
August 2007 he
tried again, but was shot down by the Shiite and Kurdish parties. Chalabi even
offered to loosen the deBaathification rules, and claimed that 2,300 high-ranking
Baathists would get their jobs back or pensions in 2007. Eventually these
different ideas coalesced into the Accountability and Justice Law, which was
passed in January 2008 despite much opposition. It basically continued the same
process, but simplified it, and offered more opportunities for some Baathists
to receive pensions. The new Accountability and Justice Commission immediately
became a point of contention. First, Chalabi and Lami argued that the new law
allowed the old deBaathification members to maintain their positions in the new
commission. Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi believed that an entirely new
leadership should be appointed. Not only that, but Lami called for all former
Baathists in the government to apply for reinstatement or retirement under the
new law, and received 41,000 applications as a result. This started another
argument over the approval process in the cabinet and parliament. That
controversy finally ended when the Americans arrested Lami in September for
alleged connections to Iranian backed Special Groups. He was not released until
July 2009 as part of a political deal. Without Lami, the new commission
stalled, and the cabinet was successful in stopping some of its work. When Lami
returned to office, he went to the Supreme Court and Shura Council, and
successful got the old deBaathification Commission to become the new
Accountability and Justice Commission. Ironically, by the time the Accountability
and Justice Law was passed, the civil war was coming to an end, and there was
not as much pressure to appease the Sunnis so that they would give up fighting.
Instead, the new Accountability Commission caused a battle over who would
control it. Chalabi and Lami were eventually able to win that match, and stay
in power.
The Accountability Commission would soon make its mark in
the 2010 parliamentary elections. Like in 2005, Chalabi and Lami were once
again running for office, which would make their decisions all the more
controversial. In January 2010 the commission went after former Baathists,
intelligence and security officials, and those they claimed promoted the Baath
Party just before the vote. In total, it wanted to ban 511 candidates including
some sitting parliamentarians, 15 parties, and 376 military and police
officers. That included Salah al-Mutlaq the head of the Iraqi National Dialogue
Front, the director of military intelligence, the commander of the Federal
Police, and many members of secular and Sunni parties. After a long drawn out
battle more than 170 candidates appealed their cases, and 26 won. The Election
Commission also refused to disqualify 52 others. After the balloting, the
Accountability Commission went after some of the winners. When negotiations
started for putting together the new ruling coalition, the ban on the lawmakers
was dropped. That eventually allowed Mutlaq to become a deputy premier. At the
same time, Lami became the head of the commission as Chalabi was elected to the
legislature. In May 2011, Lami was assassinated, and the commission lost much
of its power without its dynamic leader. The next month, Maliki dismissed
Chalabi from the commission, and replaced him with Human Rights Minister
Mohammed Soudani from the Dawa Party. In September, the prime minister
dismissed two Chalabi allies from the commission and replaced them with his own
followers. This political struggle meant that the 7 commissioners were not
appointed until July 2012. Falah Shanshal of the Sadr trend
was elected its head with Omar al-Qadhi of the Kurdish Coalition his deputy. That didn’t
stop Maliki from
trying to replace Shanshal in February 2013. That same
month, Maliki issued orders through the cabinet to
cancel all the decisions of
the Accountability and Justice Commission while it was under Shanshal’s
leadership. It wasn’t until July that parliament
confirmed Shanshal in his
position in a deal between the Sadrists, Supreme Council, and Mutahidun. DeBaathification
was always open to political manipulation by Chalabi and the ruling parties.
Its bold attacks upon candidates in the 2010 elections showed that it could be
used as a powerful tool in shaping new governments. That led Maliki to attempt
to take over the Accountability Commission, which was eventually spoiled by his
rivals that did not want the premier to extend his influence into the
deBaathification process.
Today, there is renewed talk of reforming the anti-Baathist
legislation. In the spring of 2013, the cabinet
agreed to amend the Accountability and Justice Commission by allowing division members to no longer
face disqualification as part of a reconciliation deal between Maliki and
Mutlaq aimed at the protests, which started in Sunni provinces at the end of
2012. The Sadrists, Fadhila, and Badr parties
all expressed reservations
about changing the law. Even a member of Maliki’s own State of Law
came out against any amendments saying that the Baathists should be given no
concessions. The Iraqi National Movement (INM) initially
supported the changes, because it backed the protest movement, but now may not be willing to back
it, because Maliki could claim it as a victory. The Shiite parties have always
been the strongest supporters of deBaathification, and see no reason to appease
the demonstrations, especially because they have taken on a sectarian tone, and
some have joined the insurgency. They along with the INM and others are also
thinking about the 2014 parliamentary elections, and see Maliki as their main
rival. They do not want to give him any successes, which could help him out with
voters. That means this talk of amending the Accountability and Justice law
will likely go nowhere.
DeBaathification has had a profound impact upon Iraq.
Thousands of Baathists were banned from office, crippling much of the
bureaucracy. The process was not evenly felt across the government however.
Many former regime members were able to get jobs in the security forces for
example. The Foreign Affairs Ministry gave lots of exemptions as well, because
of its need for specialized skills in international relations. The Education
Ministry on the other hand lost over 18,000 of its staff, four more times than
any other ministry. In comparison, the Higher Education Ministry only lost
4,361, the Agriculture Ministry 999, the Health Ministry 236, and the Science
Ministry only 120. The politicization of the process allowed many public
servants to get their jobs back for ties to the ruling parties. Since 2006 deBaathification
has mostly been concerned with retirements and reinstatements. The basic
problem with banning the Baath Party was that it was based upon mass guilt for
the crimes of Saddam. That didn’t take into account the role of Baathists in
running the government, and how many were culpable of actual illegal activities.
People were initially dismissed with no chance to question their case
beforehand. The deBaathification Commission then took up appeals, but had no
rules for how that would work. There was no due process until 2010 when the
Accountability Commission set up a court that heard complaints. Even then,
parties were able to cut deals to get their followers exempted. Most
importantly, it caused grave mistrust amongst Sunnis who believed that they were
being singled out for sectarian reasons even though plenty of others were party
members as well. This was one factor leading to the growth of the insurgency.
The acts of the deBaathification and later Accountability Commissions in the
country’s elections have also discredited the process in the eyes of many.
After the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iraq could have benefited
from a reconciliation process. That could have attempted to bring the
population together by airing the crimes of the former regime, while at the
same time moving forward. The new ruling elite however did not want anything to
do with the Baath Party as a whole, and the White House wanted deep
institutional changes. That led to deBaathification, which was a politicized
purge. Its failure is seen in the fact that the Shiite religious parties still
fear the return of the Baathists to power, while the Accountability Commission has
become a prize to be controlled by the Iraq parties. It also did not help with
building the new government and democracy. Instead it led to resentment amongst
many Sunnis, and the insurgency. Since it is an open ended process, getting rid
of Baathists will continue for years, banning candidates in elections and
forcing members of the bureaucracy to retire.
FOOTNOTE
1. PBS Frontline, “Interview L. Paul Bremer,” Truth, War and
Consequences, 10/9/03
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