From January to March 2003 the Blair government was frantically trying to draw up its plans for post-war Iraq. One issue it pushed was getting the United Nations involved which was opposed by the United States. It was also worried that the Americans were not adequately strategizing for the day after the invasion. Third, Prime Minister Tony Blair was not providing the necessary leadership to make an organized effort to tackle the situation. The result was that the U.K. went to war without the resources and ideas for dealing with the post-Saddam situation in Iraq which endangered all its goals
London thought the United Nations should play a crucial role in post-war Iraq. It knew that the U.S. was opposed to this idea but believed it could convince President Bush to go along. On January 22 Coalition members the U.S., the U.K. and Australia met over Iraq but little came of it. White House officials said that the differences over the U.N. had to be worked out between Bush and Blair. That never happened and the U.N. was never given a role by the occupying powers.
The U.K.’s plans for Iraq in January 2003 were still largely a work in progress. There was a meeting where it was stressed that security and services were the top priority but there were questions about who would pay for them, how much the Coalition should push political and economic reform in Iraq, and there was no idea what kind of civilian administration would be created to run the country. There were also fears that the British would not be welcomed if it stayed in Iraq. Most importantly officials were told again and again that the U.S. was committing little resources to post-war Iraq, that it based everything upon best case scenarios and Washington was sharing little with London. The Blair government never overcame these problems. It went to war with outlines of ideas but nothing settled on how to run Iraq, and the Americans were not serious about the occupation either. Downing Street and others always said they could influence U.S. policy but they consistently failed to get their voices heard.
Prime Minister Blair like Bush didn’t seem concerned over the lack of plans. On January 24 Blair sent a note to Bush suggesting that the invasion should be delayed for a month to make better postwar plans, but then when the two leaders met Blair said nothing about the matter. It wasn’t until March 5 that the PM brought up the matter with the president and by then it was too late as the war was just about to start. It was apparent that Blair like Bush didn’t really care about the occupation of Iraq and neglected it with huge consequences.
In February there were increasing warnings about what might happen in Iraq the day after the war. On February 10 the Joint Intelligence Committee warned that the invasion might spark terrorist attacks. The next day the Treasury warned that the U.K. might be asked to make a much larger contribution to Iraq than it could provide. On February 19 the Treasury Office said that administering a section of Iraq as was proposed by the U.S. could drain resources. Treasury wrote that running Iraq would be a long term commitment, longer than the British military was planning for, and that rebuilding the country could cost a huge amount of money, especially without a U.N. mandate. All these offices proved right. The Iraq war did spark a new wave of terrorism in the West and provided the jihadist movement with a new cause. The Blair government was also not ready for the time and money it ended up having to spend on Iraq.
The Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) was the first civilian organization created by the U.S. to run Iraq. On February 21 it met to do a run through with its plans. U.K. officials that attended tried to warn Washington that the ORHA was inadequate and that a large Coalition and the United Nations were needed. That had no effect and the ORHA proved not be up to the huge task it was given.
That was apparent when the ORHA left for Kuwait in March. When they arrived the U.S. military told them they had no housing for them and the staff was spread across 5 facilities in Kuwait and Qatar. General Tim Cross the British representative to Iraq warned PM Blair that the U.K. was not ready for running Iraq as there was no clarity on who was going to do what and who would pay for it. He suggested delaying the war as a result. That didn’t happen and British officials entered the war believing that if anything happened the U.S. would deal with it.
A number of witnesses told the Chilcot Inquiry that it wasn’t possible to predict how Iraq would play out after the invasion but admitted that what the government did plan for didn’t happen. Some top officials like Foreign Affairs Minister Jack Straw tried to blame everything on the U.S. The Chilcot inquiry did not accept these excuses. It found that London never adequately analyzed the risks involved in Iraq and it didn’t make sure the U.K. could meet its obligations. The result was that PM Blair endangered achieving his strategic goals in Iraq. Added to that it could be said that the prime minister’s own neglect and lack of leadership was the main issue. He always talked about how he had Bush’s ear but didn’t use it when it came to post-war Iraq. He never got his government to provide a detailed and united strategy for the occupation either. The result was the British had no idea what to do the day after the invasion, just like the Americans.
SOURCES
The Iraq Inquiry, “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry,” 7/6/16
PREVIOUS CHILCOT REPORTS
Review The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary
Chilcot Inquiry Sec 1.1 UK Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000
Chilcot Inquiry Section 1.2 UK Iraq strategy September 2000 To September 2001
Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.3 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, April to July 2002
Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003
Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003
Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.8 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 8 to 20 March 2003
Chilcot Inquiry Section 4.1 Iraq WMD Assessments, Pre-July 2002
Chilcot Inquiry Section 4.2 Iraq WMD Assessments, July to September 2002
Chilcot Inquiry Section 4.3 Iraq WMD Assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
Chilcot Inquiry Section 4.4 The Search For WMD
Chilcot Inquiry Section 5 Advice On The Legal Basis For Military Action, November 2002 To March 2003
Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.1 Development of the Military Options for an Invasion of Iraq
Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.2 Military Planning For The Invasion, January to March 2003
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