Chilcot Inquiry Section 9.1 March to 22 May 2003

The British were caught off guard by the post-war situation in Iraq. That’s because the Blair government had made so few plans for what it was to do the day after the invasion ended. There were mixed ideas about who would run Iraq, the security situation and deBaathification.

Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.5 Planning And Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to March 2003

From January to March 2003 the Blair government was frantically trying to draw up its plans for post-war Iraq. One issue it pushed was getting the United Nations involved which was opposed by the United States. It was also worried that the Americans were not adequately strategizing for the day after the invasion. Third, Prime Minister Tony Blair was not providing the necessary leadership to make an organized effort to tackle the situation. The result was that the U.K. went to war without the resources and ideas for dealing with the post-Saddam situation in Iraq which endangered all its goals

Chilcot Inquiry Section 5 Advice On The Legal Basis For Military Action, November 2002 To March 2003

The Blair government needed a legal ruling to go to war with Iraq. That centered around whether a second U.N. resolution was needed to authorize force against Saddam. The man that determined that was Lord Goldsmith the U.K. Attorney General who gave a convoluted opinion on the matter.

Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.8 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 8 to 20 March 2003

In March 2003 the decision was officially made in London to go to war. The Blair government constantly asked for more time from the Bush administration to try to work out a deal with the United Nations but time had run out. Prime Minister Tony Blair did not tell his cabinet the full situation and the U.N. never had a vote to authorize the conflict. England joined the invasion because Blair had promised President Bush he would back him no matter what. This was another example of Blair not getting what he wanted on Iraq but going ahead anyway because of his relationship with Bush.

Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003

In the months immediately before the March 2003 invasion of the Iraq the number one priority of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s government was getting a second United Nations resolution to authorize the use of force against Saddam Hussein. This was despite the fact that the weapons inspectors had found nothing, and France, Russia and others on the U.N. Security Council opposed going to war. Despite that Blair was convinced that he could win the day. He would be proved wrong again and again.

Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003

At the end of 2002 into January 2003 the Blair administration went through a sea change in its Iraq policy. In the previous period Prime Minister Tony Blair had his one and only victory in the entire Iraq War when he convinced President George Bush to go to the United Nations for a new resolution on weapons inspections. After that however the discussion immediately shifted to invasion.

Chilcot Report Section 3.5 Development of UK Strategy and Options September to November 2002 – Negotiation of Resolution 1441

From September to November 2002 the main issue before the Blair government was how to approach the United Nations and deal with the United States’ opposition to that move. Prime Minister Tony Blair’s only victory so far with the Bush administration was to convince the president to go to the U.N. to get a new resolution on Iraq. Now there were disputes over whether one or two resolutions were needed to go to war. The Blair government was told that two would be necessary, and the problems that would cause with the Americans, but Blair went ahead anyway taking the risk that things would work out.

Review Invisible War, The United States And The Iraq Sanctions

Gordon, Joy, Invisible War, The United States And The Iraq Sanctions, Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 2010

 

If you want to learn about the United Nations sanctions on Iraq which lasted from 1990-2003 then Professor Joy Gordon’s Invisible War, The United States And The Iraq Sanctions should be on the top of your list. The U.S. wanted to use the sanctions to make sure Iraq could never rebuild its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and contain Saddam Hussein. Washington argued that it was Saddam’s fault that the sanctions lasted, that he abused the system, and that Iraq received all the basic necessities it needed all of which were false. In fact, U.S. policy devastated the people of Iraq and destroyed the economy.

U.S. Army History Of Iraq War Vol 1 – Chapter 13 The Changing Of The Guard, Again, Spring-Summer 2004

The spring 2004 uprising by Moqtada al-Sadr and the 1^st Battle of Fallujah killed any hope the U.S. might have of a short occupation and immediate withdrawal from Iraq. That led to a period of transition during the summer. There was a new U.S. commander General George Casey who created the first campaign plan for the war although the goal was the same, to get out. There was a new effort to rebuild the Iraqi security forces, the United Nations was finally able to broker a deal for the return of Iraqi sovereignty, while the Americans were hit with a new scandal.

How Paul Bremer Tried To Ignore Iraq’s Ayatollah Sistani

Paul Bremer, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) arrived in Iraq in May 2003. He was determined to put his stamp upon the country. He had a vision for how it would become a democracy, which would require up to two years of transition under his supervision. This was to be a top down process that had little room for what Iraqis wanted. This ran into immediate opposition from Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the most senior Shiite cleric in Iraq. He wanted Iraqis to have a voice in the process, and demanded that elections be held as soon as possible to draw up a new Iraqi constitution, and government. Bremer consistently rejected the cleric’s demands until Washington forced him to compromise. It was an ironic turn of events as Sistani consistently pushed for a faster turn towards democracy than the Americans did.

CPA head Paul Bremer wanted to run Iraq as a viceroy, and did not want to listen to prominent Iraqis like Ayatollah Sistani (AFP)

Paul Bremer envisioned a long process of building a new democratic Iraq. At first, many believed that he would quickly set up an interim government to turn over control to Iraqis, but he immediately squashed that idea. Instead, he created the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) with some help from the United Nations in July 2003. The council was tasked with coming up with a timetable for selecting a constitutional drafting body, and when the document would be written. Afterward there would be elections for a new Iraqi government. He speculated that process might take up to two years. Then on September 8, he wrote an op ed for the Washington Post where he clarified his plans. He ruled out early balloting, because there were no voter roles, no districts, or laws on elections or political parties. Instead he proposed a three-step process. The first was the creation of the Iraqi Governing Council. Then a constitutional committee would be formed by August. A constitution would be drafted, then a referendum held on it, followed by elections for a permanent government, finished off by sovereignty being returned. While Iraqis were minimally included in the process through the Governing Council, Bremer demanded that he be in charge, and have ultimate say. For example, no Iraqis were included in formulating his plan. Many were unhappy with this idea, including the ones that Bremer chose as partners, and his superiors back in Washington.

The Iraqi Governing Council and the Bush Administration had major problems with Bremer’s ideas. First, the Governing Council was a divisive group, and could not decide on any dates for when the constitutional committee would be put together or start its work. In October, the United Nations passed Resolution 1511, which required the IGC to submit a constitutional plan by the middle of December. That placed pressure upon the Council to make some decisions, but it still couldn’t agree. Bremer grew increasingly frustrated with the group, and blamed them for the delays even though he held all of the real power in his hands. At the same time, officials back in Washington were afraid that the chaos that was unleashed with the fall of Saddam’s regime, along with the failure to find weapons of mass destruction was costing it support for the war amongst the U.S. public. That led some to push for a faster timetable for turning over sovereignty to the Iraqis to try to show progress to the home front. Bremer was opposed to changing his plans, but after he was called back to the White House in November, he was forced to compromise. Instead of an open-ended two-year plan, Bremer now only had six months in office. By the end of February 2004, an interim constitution would be drafted and approved by the Governing Council. Then in May caucuses would be held in each province that would come up with a temporary parliament to form an interim government with the task of writing a permanent constitution. Sovereignty would then be handed over to the Iraqis in June, and the CPA would cease to exist. Elections for a constitutional convention would be held in March 2005, followed by national elections for a permanent government by the end of the year. Bremer was forced to give up on his long-term plan by domestic political concerns back in the U.S. At the same time, the Americans would remain in control until at least June 2004. The Governing Council for example, had zero say in the new plan. Rather it was delivered to them as a fait accompli when Bremer returned to Iraq after his meetings with Bush officials.

Ayatollah Sistani continuously demanded that Iraqis have a say in the new government being put together (Wikipedia)

Despite the sped up process that was announced in November 2004, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani always objected to Bremer’s plans. As early as June 2003, Massoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) went to Najaf to meet with Ayatollah Sistani. He called for an elected national assembly to draft a new constitution. The cleric followed that up with a fatwa at the end of the month saying that any body put together by Bremer to draft a constitution would be opposed, and repeated his demand for Iraqis to cast ballots to determine their future. U.N. special representative to Iraq Sergio Vieira de Mello met with Sistani, and then told Bremer that he had to listen to the Ayatollah. Bremer refused saying that Sistani was telling different people different things, and that Iraq was not ready for any voting anyway. The CPA head did try to meet with Sistani in Najaf in July to discuss the matter, but was turned down. The elder cleric wanted to keep his distance from the Americans. When Bremer published his September op ed for the Washington Post, the ayatollah responded that the Iraqi people be allowed to vote for a body to come up with a new constitution. That led de Mello and British representative to Iraq Sir Jeremy Greenstock to go to Bremer about their concerns surrounding Sistani’s objections, but the CPA chief would not listen. Others were taking note as well, most importantly officials in the Bush administration. They convinced National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice that Sistani needed to be listened to, which contributed to the November compromise. That didn’t stop the complaints however. Members of the IGC went to Sistani about the caucuses idea. Afterward, he issued another statement demanding an elected body instead, and then made comments about Iraqis not having enough say in the political transition. The CPA reacted stronger this time, believing that the Ayatollah was trying to dictate terms to it, and some asking whether they would have to run all their decisions through him for approval. The CPA had just been made to cut back on it plans, and now it was coming under attack by Sistani again. Finally, in February 2004, new U.N. representative Lakhdar Brahimi met with the ayatollah, and convinced him that elections could not happen until December at the earliest. At the same time, they talked about getting rid of the caucuses, and having elections for an interim parliament instead to write a constitution. It was always Sistani’s belief that Iraqis needed to have a direct role in the creation of a new government. CPA official Larry Diamond believed this came from his religious beliefs about social contracts. Bremer on the other hand, wanted complete control, and never consulted with Iraqis, but instead delivered his decisions to them after they were made. He also continuously rejected Sistani’s demands, because following an ayatollah did not fit his image of what the new democracy should be about. It was only when Washington pushed him that Bremer was willing to change showing that domestic American politics were more important than Iraqi ones. In the end, the U.S. did agree to hold elections in January 2005 for an interim parliament and government, which would then put together a constitutional commission, followed by a referendum on the document. These might be happening later than Sistani originally envisioned, but they did allow Iraqis to have their say.

The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) that was written as a temporary constitution also brought out Sistani’s opposition. In early 2004, a small coterie of American and Iraqi representatives wrote the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), that would be in affect until a permanent constitution was passed the next year. Ayatollah Sistani came out against that document as well, arguing that the Iraqi people, not the U.S. created Governing Council, should ratify the TAL. He also said that it would serve as a barrier to a permanent constitution being formed, because the Americans would again be setting the groundwork for what should be an Iraqi affair. His office ended up passing out leaflets condemning the Transitional Law, claiming that it would divide the country, and that the U.S. was trying to impose it upon Iraq. For a while, he wouldn’t even meet with anyone from the U.N. unless the Security Council acted to limit the TAL. This again reflected Sistani’s view that the U.S. could not make all the decisions to determine Iraq’s future. That should be up to the Iraqis. He was convinced by Brahimi that the country wasn’t ready for immediate elections like he wanted, but he thought nothing should be done until they were ready. This brought him continuously into conflict with Bremer who wanted to dictate all the terms of Iraq’s transition towards democracy.

Bremer came into Iraq wanting to run it like a viceroy, and never realized the importance of Ayatollah Sistani until the end of his time in office. The CPA director never included Iraqis in his decisions even though he was supposed to be empowering them through democracy. Instead he wanted to impose his vision upon Iraq in a long, drawn out process that would maintain American control until its conclusion. Washington ended up making him curtail his plan, because it was worried about losing support for the war. Some were also concerned about Sistani’s continuous attacks upon Bremer’s ideas. Still, the overriding concern of the Bush administration was American domestic politics, which showed that it too was only marginally concerned with what the Iraqis wanted. Sistani’s argument for early elections to write a new constitution, and then form a permanent government might have been unrealistic at first, because there was no system in place to carry them out. Still, he finally won out, and the U.S. agreed to three rounds of balloting in 2005 in part to satisfy the Ayatollah. It turned out that the Iraqi cleric was pushing for a democratic process, while the Americans wanted to run everything. The Bush White House and Bremer never really understood Iraqi society, and tended to look at it as a blank slate, which they could shape into whatever they wanted. The country ended up fighting back, which caused all kinds of problems for the American project. One sign of that was Ayatollah Sistani’s constant calls for Iraqis to have their say in whatever new government was going to be created.

SOURCES

Chandrasekaran, Rajiv, “Iraq’s top Shiite assails U.S. plan to cede power,” San Francisco Chronicle, 11/27/03

Collier, Robert, “Shiite support for U.S. occupation of Iraq appears tenuous,” San Francisco Chronicle, 7/16/03

Diamond, Larry, Squandered Victory, The American Occupation And The Bungled Effort To Bring Democracy To Iraq, New York: Times Books, 2005

Gordon, Michael and Trainor, General Bernard, The Endgame, The Inside Story Of The Struggle For Iraq, From George W. Bush To Barak Obama, New York, Pantheon, 2012

Packer, George, The Assassins’ Gate, America In Iraq, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005

Powell, Bill and Ghosh, Aparism, “Paul Bremer’s Rough Ride,” Time, 6/28/04

Ricks, Thomas, Fiasco, New York: Penguin Press, 2006

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09

Tyler, Patrick, “Big step toward a new Iraq,” San Francisco Chronicle, 7/8/03

Whitelaw, Kevin, “Deal Maker, Deal Breaker,” U.S. News & World Report, 1/26/05

United Nations’ Dec. 08 Human Rights Report On Iraq

In the beginning of December 2008 the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) released its human rights report covering the first six months of the year. The paper documented the continuing violence and casualties in Iraq, as well as the situation of women, minorities, the press, the internally displaced, and detainees. The U.N found that there are still mass casualty attacks in Iraq, although not at previous levels. Women are also targeted, especially in Kurdistan in honor killings, minorities continue to be threatened, the press, especially in Kurdistan continues to be limited, and the situation of the country’s internally displaced is deteriorating. Iraq’s prisons are also overcrowded with reports of torture and abuse, as the legal system is overloaded. Overall, while security is improving in Iraq, the U.N. agency noted that there are still widespread abuses and human rights concerns.

Violence

Violence is down, but not over in Iraq. On January 23, 2008, for example, there was a bombing in Mosul that killed 15 and wounded 132. There continue to be attacks on civilians, security forces, government officials, politicians, educators, professionals, members of the judicial system, and the press. The U.N. no longer reports on total casualties for the country however. In its January 2007 Human Rights report, the U.N. recorded almost three times as many deaths as the Iraqi government. Baghdad then stopped issuing official death counts claiming that it couldn’t accurately keep track of deaths, but also to conceal the increasing killings due to the sectarian war that was taking off at that time.

Instead of total deaths, the report covered mass casualty attacks. The U.N. found that these declined from January to June 2008. There were eight such attacks in January compared to only 4 in June, while the number of killed and wounded went down from 330 to 206 for those same months. From March to June however, the total number of casualties actually increased going from 161 to 206.

Large Scale Attacks
January – 8 attacks resulting in 330 casualties
February – 6 attacks resulting in 253 casualties
March – 5 attacks resulting in 161 casualties
April – 6 attacks resulting in 177 casualties
May – 3 attacks resulting in 205 casualties
June – 4 attacks resulting in 206 casualties

Government employees, religious figures, activists, judges, lawyers, professionals, and academics all continue to be targeted. Attacks on security forces not only resulted in they being wounded and killed, but civilians as well. There were 11 such incidents resulting in 274 civilian casualties from January to June 2008. There were 22 attacks on government officials, politicians and civil servants. In June for example, two members of the Sadr City Council were killed and ten wounded in a bombing of the council building. Kidnappings are also common, especially in Diyala province. Large numbers of unidentified bodies were found in Diyala, Ninewa, Anbar, Qadisiyah, but mainly in Baghdad. Mass graves have also been found, particularly after insurgents have been cleared from an area.

Deaths due to foreigners were also a concern. There were two high-profile cases of Iraqis being wounded and killed by security contractors in the first six months of 2008. In January 5 a car fleeing an attack hit five students, aged 6-10. In February Blackwater contractors trying to clear traffic killed one civilian. There were also six Coalition air strikes that resulted in civilian casualties.

Women

The U.N. received many complaints about the rights of women being limited by conservatives in their neighborhoods, in the government, and in schools. The Major concern was in Kurdistan where there were reports of honor killings. A women’s group in Irbil found 145 cases of violence against women in just the first two months of 2008. In May, the Kurdistan Regional Government Prime Minister held a meeting on violence against women promising action on this issue. England’s Guardian also just reported on honor killings in Basra where authorities were turning a blind eye.

Minorities

Iraq’s minorities, consisting of Shabaks, Yezidis, Christians, and Turkomen in Ninewa and Tamim continue to worry the U.N. There were 17 reported kidnappings of Christians in those two provinces, along with nine attacks on Shabaks, mostly in Mosul, 2 Turkomen leaders were killed in that city in June, and Sabean Mandeans were threatened.

Press

Journalists continue to be attacked in Iraq. The Kurds were singled out in the report for their restrictions on the press as well. Many reporters and editors have been arrested in Kurdistan, with the Committee to Protect Journalists issuing a report in May calling for the end of their persecution. The KRG claims that they are only going after those that are guilty of libel and lack professionalism, but UNAMI doubts these claims. The results have been that many papers are intimidated by the regional government, and practice self-censorship.

Internally Displaced

The U.N. counts 2.8 million internally displaced Iraqis. 1.2 million were forced out of their homes before 2006, and 1.6 million afterwards. Displacement has slowed in 2008, and over 100,000 Iraqis have returned to their homes since 2007. There were new displacements in the Dora, Jamia, Sulaik, Adhamiya and Karkh districts of Baghdad however. The U.N. is also concerned about the fact that eleven of Iraq’s eighteen provinces have restricted the movement of refugees into their areas. Overall, the internally displaced suffer from a lack of services and jobs, resulting in deteriorating living conditions.

Prisons

The plight of Iraqi detainees was a major concern. At the end of June 2008 there were a total of 50,595 prisoners. The highest number was in March when there were 56,320.

Detainees - 2008
January: 23,800 held by Coalition, 26,676 held by Iraq, TOTAL: 50,476
February: 23,862 held by Coalition, 26,854 held by Iraq, TOTAL: 50,791
March: 23,862 held by Coalition, 32,458 held by Iraq, TOTAL: 56,320
April: 23,862 held by Coalition, 28,283 held by Iraq, TOTAL: 52,145
May: 23,229 held by Coalition, 28,028 held by Iraq, TOTAL: 51,257
June: 23,229 held by Coalition, 27,366 held by Iraq, TOTAL: 50,595

The jump in numbers in March coincided with the security operation in Basra

These numbers revealed two things. First, the February 2008 Amnesty Law has had no real affect on prisoners. Most of those affected by the act were actually people on wanted lists or on bail with only 2,000 detainees and convicts let go. Second, the U.S. setup a new program in its prison facilities during the Surge, aimed at increasing the number of those released. They claimed that they were discharging more prisoners than taking in new ones, but for the first six months of 2008 there as no real change in Iraqis held by the Americans. A May 19, 2008 report by the USA Today quoted U.S. military officials who said that the number of detainees they were holding dropped from 26,000 in 2007 to around 22,000 in May. UNAMI’s numbers show only a slight decline from 23,800 in January 2008 to 23,229 in May, only a 571 decrease. This brings into question the U.S. claims of successful rehabilitation and increased releases of Iraqis.

The major problem with the U.S. and Iraqi systems has been overcrowding and a lack of capacity by Iraq’s courts. Most prisoners are held for months, sometimes years, before they are ever charged, receive legal aid, or go before a judge. The courts simply cannot handle the number of prisoners. The detainees are therefore overcrowded with horrible conditions. Reports of abuse and torture are also common. Kurdistan is no better than the rest of Iraq. There are reports of secret detention facilities there, and the Kurdish Regional Government often moves prisoners when U.N. officials come to inspect sites.

Recommendations

The United Nations Mission had several recommendations for the Iraqi government. First, the Health Ministry needs to release official numbers of casualties in Iraq. Reports today are based upon leaks from various ministries and officials or the U.S. military. The government also has to protect vulnerable groups like minorities and the displaced, and investigate attacks on women. The legal system needs to deal with the large number of detainees, who are usually held without ever being processed, and address torture. That would begin to alleviate some of the problems in the overcrowded detention facilities. The U.N. also wants Iraq’s parliament to pass a human rights law to give legal standing to protecting against some of these abuses.

SOURCES

Babylon & Beyond Blog, “IRAQ: U.N.’s Iraq report still missing casualty count,” Los Angeles Times, 12/3/08

Michaels, Jim, “Military retools detainee releases,” USA Today, 5/19/08

Reilly, Corinne, “As clock ticks, U.S. letting thousands of Iraqi prisoners go,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/27/08

UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, “Human Rights Report 1 January – 30 June 2008,” United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq

U.N. Suspends Work On Disputed Territories Until Provincial Elections Are Over

The disputed territories in Iraq came to the fore this summer. In August 2008 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sent the Iraqi army into the Khanaqin district in northern Diyala province. The area had been occupied by the Kurds since the U.S. invasion, and been under official Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) administration since February 2008. Tensions were so high that violence seemed inevitable but for the intervention and mediation of the United States. Khanaqin is one of a dozen districts in Iraq that the Kurds hope to annex. Currently the KRG occupies 300 miles of territory outside of Kurdistan. The United Nations had been working on these disputed areas since late 2007, but in November 2008 the U.N.’s envoy to Iraq Staffan de Mistura said that the organization would be suspending its effort on the issue until after the provincial elections scheduled for January 2009.

Map of Kurdish occupied areas outside of Kurdistan

The Iraqi constitution’s Article 140 is supposed to deal with Kirkuk and other disputed territories, but it has never been implemented. By December 31, 2007 the government was supposed to have completed a census of Kirkuk and held a plebiscite on whether the population wanted to join Kurdistan or not. As the end of 2007 approached and nothing substantial had happened, the Kurds agreed to a six-month delay. That too has passed with no action either. In early 2007 when it was apparent that the article was not going to work any time soon, the U.N. began looking into alternatives.

On August 10, 2007 the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1770 that said the U.N. envoy to Iraq would work on the disputed territories. The first thing Staffan de Mistura did under this new resolution was to get Baghdad and the Kurds to agree to delay Article 140. This was supported by the United States who began pushing for a negotiated settlement instead of 140. This was a great disappointment to the Kurds who had hoped that the constitution would ensure a legal take over of the areas. They feared that any negotiations would cost them territory, especially Kirkuk, which is the most revered by the Kurds.

5 – Akre, 17 – Hamdaniya, 77 – Khanaqin, 79 – Kirkuk, 81 - Makhmur, 92 – Shekhan, 93 – Sinjar, 98 – Tal Afar, 100 – Tilkaif are some of the areas to be mediated by the United Nations under Resolution 1770

The U.N. and the U.S. have been moving towards power sharing and a division of disputed areas since the end of 2007. In December of that year, the U.S. pressured the KRG into accepting a division of power with the Arabs in Kirkuk’s Tamim province. At the same time, the U.N. began working on a 3-phase report on what to do with the other territories. In June 2008 they released their initial report that dealt with four areas. The U.N. suggested that two, Makhmur in Tamim and Akre in Ninewa would go to Kurdistan, while Hamdaniya would go to Ninewa and Mandali to Diyala. The U.N. specifically chose these four to go first because they had Arab and Kurdish majorities and would evenly be split. That didn’t seem to help as no side was happy with the report. Both the Kurds and Baghdad however seemed to accept the process. The second report is to address Tal Afar, Tilkaif, Shekhan and Sinjar in Ninewa, and Khanaqin in Diyala. The final one would deal with the thorniest issue, Kirkuk. De Mistura was supposed to have finished this work by September or October 2008, but that didn’t happen. Now the U.N. envoy has said that he is going to postpone his work until after the provincial elections in January 2009. De Mistura said that he didn’t want the process to be caught up in politics and electioneering. The Kurds condemned the delay.

Tensions between Kurdistan and Baghdad have only grown since the first U.N. report. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki feels that his security operations have strengthened his hand, and he is working to limit the Kurds in a number of disputed areas including Mosul, Kirkuk, and Khanaqin. The KRG in turn have condemned his moves, claiming that Maliki is attempting a power grab, and is undermining the constitution. Only through strong pressure by the United States and the United Nations can these contested territories be resolved. Even then they might not be able to resolve this thorny issue, which pits the regional aspirations of the Kurds against the determination of Maliki to assert national power, along with the demands of minorities. The U.N.’s initial recommendations were not welcomed, but all sides seemed to agree to the organization’s work, which is a positive sign that they might accept its arbitration to fix this mounting problem.

For more on Khanaqin and the Kurd-Maliki dispute see:

Cold War Between Baghdad and Kurds Turns Hot

Could Maliki Be Deposed?

Deal Struck To Defuse Khanaqin Issue

Khanaqin Deal Off?

Kurdish-Baghdad Tensions Over Diyala

The Kurds Come Out Swinging

Maliki Still Pushing The Kurds On Khanaqin District

Maliki Ups the Ante in Khanaqin District of Diyala

Mosul: The New Battleground Between Maliki And The Kurds

Two Reports On Trying to Solve The Kirkuk Issue

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraqi Kurds Accuse UN Of Delaying Report On Disputed Areas,” 11/30/08

Alsumaria, “Arabs in Kirkuk refuse UN recommendations,” 6/9/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “95 lawmakers criticize the U.N. recommendations over disputed districts,” 6/7/08
- “KRG: PM Should Create, Not Undermine, National Unity,” 12/2/08
- “Military units should be under central govt. control,” 8/19/08

Dagher, Sam, “Can the U.N. avert a Kirkuk border war?” Christian Science Monitor, 4/25/08

International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08

Janabi, Nazar, “Kirkuk’s Article 140: Expired or Not?,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/30/08

Londono, Ernesto, “Kurds in N. Iraq Receive Arms From Bulgaria,” Washington Post, 11/23/08

Paley, Amit, “Strip of Iraq ‘on the Verge of Exploding,’” Washington Post, 9/13/08

Russo, Claire, “The Maliki Government Confronts Diyala,” Institute for the Study of War,” 9/23/08