Security Handover In Diyala Allows Islamic State To Rebuild

(New York Times)

The London School of Economics and Political Science’s Middle East Centre recently posted a story by Zmkan Ali Saleem, Mac Skelton and Christine van den Toorn on security in the disputed territories of northeast Diyala after federal forces took over in the wake of the 2017 Kurdish independence referendum. There are now various security forces working separately of each other, which is helping the Islamic State rebuild in the area.

Current Baghdad-Kurdistan Dispute A Replay Of 2008 Khanaqin Incident

Today, the Iraqi Army and the Kurdish peshmerga are facing off across the disputed areas of northern Iraq, while politicians in Baghdad and Irbil are in a heated war of words. The point of contention is the new Tigris Operations Command created by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The recent events are almost an exact replay of 2008 when the central government confronted the Kurdish parties in Diyala province. Both appeared aimed at shoring up the premier’s standing with the electorate before provincial elections. Regional President Massoud Barzani also benefited as he rallied the Kurdish parties behind him. On the outside these confrontations looked like they could escalate into open warfare, but they were more political theater than anything else.

(New York Times)

Diyala province in northeastern Iraq contains several disputed territories, including the Khanaqin district along the Iranian border. Kurdish forces occupied the area during the 2003 invasion, and they were later asked by the central government to help with security there. In 2008, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki selected that district as the place to confront the Kurds. First, he started setting up Tribal Support Councils across the province. They were supposed to help out with security, but were actually a way for the premier to create patronage networks throughout Iraq. Kurdish politicians interpreted the councils in Diyala as a way to undermine their hold on the disputed territories before the 2009 provincial elections. The Kurdish mayor of Khanaqin for example, said that the councils were a threat, and a way for Maliki to assert his power in the district. In April, the 34^th Peshmerga Brigade was told to vacate the district by the 5^th Army Division who said it would take over responsibility for security, but it was rebuffed. Again, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) saw this as a provocative move by the prime minister. Then in July, Baghdad launched Operation Omens of Prosperity in Diyala, which was to focus upon insurgents. As part of it, the 1st Army Division moved into Khanaqin at the beginning of August. The unit demanded that the 34^th Peshmerga Brigade vacate the area within 24 hours, but it refused. The soldiers then attempted to force out several Kurdish political parties and the peshmerga from their offices. This led to a tense standoff between the two sides with army forces standing on one side flying the Iraqi flag, and the peshmerga on the other flying the Kurdish flag. The next month, Iraqi police tried to arrest a Kurdish intelligence officer in the district, which led to an argument, and shots being fired, which killed a peshmerga. At the time, this growing escalation by Maliki against the Kurds in Diyala was seen as a dire threat to the status quo in the country. The Kurdish and Shiite ruling parties had long-standing alliances dating back to the Saddam times when they were both opposed to his dictatorship. Now the prime minister seemed to be threatening those ties by pushing the KRG over a small district. Many thought this could explode into open warfare between the central and regional government, and had far ranging affects throughout northern Iraq.

The incidents in Khanaqin spilled over into other provinces in the region. In Ninewa, the prime minister was accused of replacing Kurdish units with Arab ones, and attempting to transfer Kurdish officers out of an army division there. 200 Kurdish soldiers and a battalion commander in the province ended up deserting, and left for Irbil. A Kurdish army brigade in Diyala refused to take orders from Baghdad as well. Finally, the premier removed two leading Kurdish officials from the team that was negotiating a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the United States in August. Again, these were all seen as provocative moves by the Kurdish ruling parties. Many interpreted it as a mini-Arabization program by Maliki, which harkened back to the much more vicious and institutionalized Arabization campaign by Saddam when he forcibly uprooted Kurdish villagers from northern Iraq to be replaced by Arabs from other parts of the country.

This culminated in a war of words between Maliki and the KRG President Massoud Barzani. Kurdish officials began calling the prime minister the new Saddam. A Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) lawmaker in the Kurdish parliament told the press that Baathism was alive and well in Baghdad, and that it was trying to abrogate Article 140 of the Constitution that set out a process to determine the future of the disputed territories. (1) These verbal attacks went on for nearly a year after the Khanaqin incident at the beginning of August. It ended up having a lasting affect upon how Barzani’s KDP would see Maliki. From then on, it thought he could no longer be trusted. The feeling was that with the insurgency and militias receding in the country, the central government would repeat its long history of turning on the Kurds. This opinion played out all the way to the 2010 parliamentary elections when Barzani amongst other Iraqi politicians unsuccessfully tried to place limits upon Maliki’s power when putting together a new government.

The dispute in Diyala was eventually ended with help from the United States military, and direct talks between Irbil and Baghdad. President Barzani ended up travelling to Baghdad where he worked out a deal for Khanaqin to be placed under local police control instead of the Iraqi Army or peshmerga. The U.S. military commander in Iraq, General Raymond Odierno also helped create joint U.S.-Iraqi-Kurdish checkpoints throughout the disputed territories to get the two sides to work together on security. He also negotiated a ministerial committee to bring the top security officials from Baghdad and Irbil together. Those moves effectively diffused the tension, and the two sides went back to their normal business. It still raised fears that the situation could have gotten out of control, and some soldier or commander on the ground in Khanaqin could have made a bad decision that would have led to fighting between the army and peshmerga.

Kurdish tanks parked outside of Kirkuk, Dec. 2012 (Reuters)

Today, a very similar standoff is happening in the disputed areas. In July 2012, the Defense ministry announced the formation of the Tigris Operations Command. It would command both the army and police in Diyala, Tamim, and Salahaddin. By September, the Kurdish parties became increasingly critical of the new command, calling it illegal, provocative, and a threat to Article 140. In November, there was a shootout between the Iraqi army and police and a peshmerga unit in Tuz Kharmato in Salahaddin when there was an attempt to arrest a Kurdish businessman accused of smuggling oil. One person ended up dead, and ten were wounded. That led the central and regional governments to once again mobilize their forces and send them to the disputed territories. That same month, Barham Saleh of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) said that Maliki wanted to take the Kurds back to Saddam’s times. In a December 2 addition of Azzaman, President Barzani stated that the KRG would not allow Maliki to moves his forces into the disputed areas, and called him a dictator. The next day, the Peshmerga Ministry accused Maliki of arming Arab tribes in Ninewa, Diyala, and Tamim. Once again, the U.S. military was also brought in to help negotiate between the two sides. The events in 2012 are very similar to those in 2008. The prime minister made a provocative military move, which the Kurds saw as a threat to their claim to the disputed areas. Like 2008, they have sent their forces to stare down the central government’s. Like the dispute in Diyala, Kurdish officials have started making comparisons between Maliki and Saddam, and like then, the U.S. military has been asked to be an honest broker. The politics of the two are comparable too.

Both the present and past confrontations come before provincial elections in Iraq. On Maliki’s side, he is playing upon Arab nationalism, and trying to portray himself as standing up against Kurdish expansionism. This plays well with some Sunnis in northern Iraq who feel threatened by the Kurds. The Arab bloc in Tamim for example, welcomed the Tigris Operations Command, saying that it would reduce the power of the peshmerga. A parliamentarian from the Iraqi National Movement also stood up for the command. This was exactly the same stance that the prime minister took in 2008. Then, he was changing his image from the weak and compromise premier that took power in 2006, to the strong nationalist leader who took on Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army in Basra and Baghdad, and then the Kurds. Just like today, some Sunni parties came to Maliki’s side over the Khanaqin incident like when a lawmaker from the Iraqi Accordance Front demanded that the peshmerga withdraw from Diyala. The benefits of these standoffs have not been one sided. President Barzani has gained political points as well. In each case, he strengthened his image as the protector of Kurdish interests. Today, he has rallied the Kurdish press, opposition parties, and the PUK behind him. This was especially important, because the opposition and PUK had become increasingly critical of Barzani’s unilateral policies beforehand. In fact, despite the news reports of possible armed conflict, it seems like the true motivations behind both incidents is political gain before upcoming elections.

Khanaqin and the Tigris Operations Command are eerily similar. In 2008, Prime Minister Maliki decided to militarily challenge the Kurds in the disputed territories. This immediately led to the KRG to call out the peshmerga, and a tense situation ensued where armed forces stared at each other over open ground, and insults were tossed around in the press. This raised fears that the central and regional governments were on the verge of war. Almost the exact same series of events are now occurring over the Tigris Operations Command. The emphasis upon the threat of violence however, misses the more important political side. In both cases, Prime Minister Maliki and President Barzani have been trying to expand their constituencies by saying that they are standing up to the other. The hope is that this will result in votes in the next round of provincial balloting. The military side of things is just the show. Behind the scenes, these two leaders are playing the real game as they use the fears about each other to build up more support.

FOOTNOTES

1. Aswat al-Iraq, “Provincial elections, Khanaqin conspiracy against Kurds – official,” 9/9/08

SOURCES

Abouzeid, Rania, “Arabs-Kurd Tensions Could Threaten Iraq’s Peace,” Time, 3/24/09

Ahmed, Hevidar, “Kurdish Parties Seen United Against Dijla Forces’ Push into Kirkuk,” Rudaw, 11/20/12

Alsabawi, Jasim, “Politicians in Baghdad say Kurdish Fears of Dijla Forces Unfounded,” Rudaw, 11/17/12

Alsumaria, “Peshmerga accuses Iraq MP of ‘arming’ Arab tribes,” 12/3/12

Arraf, Jane, “Kurdish-Iraqi government talks collapse amid fear of civil war,” Christian Science Monitor, 11/30/12

Aswat al-Iraq, “Military units should be under central govt. control,” 8/19/08

- “Provincial elections, Khanaqin conspiracy against Kurds – official,” 9/9/08

- “Withdrawal of Kurdish forces from Khanqeen asserts security in Diala – MP,” 8/13/08

Azzaman, “Kurdish leader lashes out at Iraqi premier, says he will not ‘surrender,’” 12/2/12

Bartu, Peter, “Wrestling with the integrity of a nation: the disputed internal boundaries in Iraq,” International Affairs, November 2010

Dagher, Sam, “Fractures in Iraq City as Kurds and Baghdad Vie,” New York Times, 10/28/08

Eisenstadt, Michael, “Populism, Authoritarianism, and National Security in al-Maliki’s Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Studies, 5/12/09

Garicia-Navarro, Lourdes, “Standoff In Iraqi City,” Morning Edition, NPR, 9/22/08

Gause, Gregory, “Gause: Maliki’s bid to be the strong man,” Abu Aardvark, 9/3/08

Gordon, Michael and Lehren, Andrew, “Tensions High Along Kurdish-Arab Line,” New York Times, 10/23/10

Hiltermann, Joost, “Everyone wants a piece of Kirkuk, the golden prize,” The National, 2/26/09

 

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09

Krauss, Joseph, “Tribal power stokes fears in fractured Iraqi province,” Agence France Presse, 12/10/08

Kurdish Globe, “Peshmarga not withdrawing from Diala,” 8/15/08

Kurdistan Tribune, “’Maliki wants to take Kurdistan back to pre-1991’ – Barham Salih,” 11/19/12

Lawrence, Quil, “A precarious peace in Northern Iraq,” The Middle East Research and Information Project, 10/1/09

Mahmood, Nawzad, “Tension Easing after Standoff between Peshmerga and Iraqi Troops in Dibis,” Rudaw, 11/27/12

National Iraqi News Agency, “Kurdistan Parliament: the formation of Dijlah Operations Command, unconstitutional,” 11/8/12

- “Maliki warns Peshmerga from approaching to the armed forces,” 11/19/12

Parker, Sam, “Maliki the strongman?” Abu Muqawama, 9/5/08

Rubin, Alissa, “Rejection of Oil Law and Move to Create Tribal Councils Add to Tensions With Kurds,” New York Times, 10/28/08

Russo, Claire, “The Maliki Government Confronts Diyala,” Institute for the Study of War,” 9/23/08

Shafaq News, “PUK: Dijla operations recruit 3,000 Arab soldiers and urge them to move to Kirkuk,” 11/4/12

Sky, Emma, “Preventing Arab-Kurd Conflict in Iraq after the Withdrawal of U.S. Forces,” United States Institute of Peace, 3/22/11

Sowell, Kirk, “Inside Iraqi Politics No. 43,” 8/2/12

- “Inside Iraqi Politics No. 50,” 11/21/12

Stansfield, Gareth Anderson, Liam, “Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” Middle East Policy, Spring 2009

Zagros, Roman, “the iraq – kurdish military stand off: and the winner is…,” Niqash, 11/29/12

Problem For Refugee/Displaced Return Program In Diyala

Refugees International recently released a report in mid-March 2010 on Iraq’s refugees and displaced that highlighted a return program currently being conducted in Diyala province in northeastern Iraq. Refugees International held up the program as a successful example of the Iraqi government, the United Nations, and international organizations working together to help Iraq’s displaced return and be re-integrated into their home province. The plan seeks to have 27,500 displaced and refugee families return to Diyala, and rebuilding 400 villages destroyed during the war. So far 3,000 homes have been rebuilt, and the Ministry of Displacement and Migration said that 12,900 families, around 77,000 people, had come back to the province from late 2008 to the end of 2009. The government has also provided 12,500 of those families with a grant of $850, with 400 more on the waiting list. The Displacement Ministry is also helping the returnees with jobs. There are also plans to build 6,000 more houses this year.

This has run into a problem however. The government wants to build 3,000 housing units in the Khanaqin district, which is a disputed territory between Arabs and Kurds. After the 2003 invasion, thousands of Kurds returned to the area, claiming that they had been displaced by Saddam Hussein’s Arabization policy. In turn, thousands of Arabs left the district. The central authorities now want these families to return, which the Kurds might object to. Khanaqin was the site of a stand off between government security forces and the Kurdish peshmerga in 2008, when Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sent troops there as part of a security operation in the province. The two sides would not recognize each others’ authority, and the U.S. military had to step in to defuse the situation, which could have led to a shoot out. So far the Kurdish Regional Government has said nothing officially about the housing and return plan.

During the sectarian war of 2006-2007 Diyala saw one of the largest humanitarian disasters in Iraq. According to the International Organization for Migration, Diyala had the second most displaced after Baghdad during the fighting. Conversely, since that phase of the Iraq war ended, the U.N. has found that Diyala has received the second most returns, approximately 55,660 people. 

The Diyala plan is to return the displaced to their former homes and rebuild their villages if they were destroyed. Most of this devastation occurred during the sectarian war, but in Khanaqin, displacement mostly occurred as a result of Kurdish refugees returning in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion that pushed out Arab families. Since the district has been a flashpoint between the Kurdistan government and Baghdad in the past, it’s likely that the Kurds will object to Arabs coming back and houses being built for them. In this case, two of Iraq’s major problems, the Arab-Kurd divide and refugees have intersected, with one trouncing an attempt to solve the other. The authorities will likely have to place the Arab families in another part of Diyala, thus maintaining the new population pattern created by the overthrow of Saddam, but at least more families will be able to go back to their province and find permanent shelter.

SOURCES

International Organization for Migration, “IOM Emergency Needs Assessments Post February 2006 Displacement In Iraq 1 June 2009 Monthly Report,” 6/1/09

IRIN, “IRAQ: Controversy over Diyala Province housing project,” 3/18/10
- “IRAQ: IDPs returning to Diyala Province in increasing numbers,” 3/9/10

Refugees International, “Iraq: Humanitarian Needs Persist,” 3/17/10

UNHCR Iraq Operation, “Monthly Statistical Update on Return – December 2009,” 1/27/10

Critique Of Mayor’s Warning of Politicization Of Iraq’s Security Forces

In July 2009 the former mayor of Tel Afar in Ninewa Najim Abed al-Jabouri authored a paper for the National Defense University warning of sectarianism and political influence in the Iraqi Security Forces. The report, “An Iraqi ISF Assessment after U.S. Troop Withdrawal” warned that the U.S. must protect the security forces from Iraq’s political parties before it withdraws in 2011 or face a possible civil war. While touching on an important issue, there are some major problems with Jabouri’s argument.

Jabouri starts off by saying that many American officials have warned about politicization of the security forces. He notes General James Jones’ report on Iraq’s forces, General Ray Odierno, the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, and the Defense Department’s quarterly reports to Congress, have all mentioned political meddling in Iraq’s army, police, and Interior and Defense Ministries. This is the first issue with the paper. General Jones’ report from September 2007 mentioned that the Iraqi police were open to political influence because they were locally recruited and thus under local political leaders’ sway. It also talked about the sectarian nature of the Interior Ministry and the lack of top leadership. At the same time it found that the Defense Minister was independent of politics. Later in the paper Jabouri actually seems to admit this by saying that the Iraqi Army is less influenced by politics as the police because the U.S. has spent much more time training and mentoring the armed forces. Newer reports like one by the United States Institute of Peace from August 2009 has found that Interior Minister Jawad Bolani has successfully instituted a series of reforms of the ministry, and cleaned up a lot of the previous problems. A further issue is that the two quotes used, one by General Odierno and one by the Defense Department, mentioned politics and sectarianism were still problems in Iraq in general, but never mentioned the security forces. That’s not to say that Jabouri’s thoughts are off, but the examples he gives don’t quite support his point.

Next Jabouri goes over Iraqi concerns about their forces. According to him Iraq assessments see problems with political meddling, lack of professionalism and training, and logistics and organization as the major issues facing the army and police. He gives examples of political influence over the army by saying the 8th Division is under the influence of the Dawa party, the 4th Division under the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the 7th Division under the Anbar Awakening, and the 5th Division under the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC). Here Jabouri does a much better job. In Anbar for example, almost all of the soldiers and police were recruited from the Awakening tribes. During the standoff between the Iraqi forces and the Kurdish peshmerga in the Khanaqin district of Diyala in August 2008, a Kurdish led Brigade in the province refused to take orders from Baghdad, while another commander and 200 of his soldiers in Ninewa quit and marched back to Irbil. Maliki has also tried to centralize control of the Army divisions by placing his supporters in command positions. There is definitely political influence in the security forces; the question is to what extent.

Jabouri is afraid with U.S. forces withdrawing, the different sectarian parties will launch attacks to try to undermine the security situation and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s standing, which could have wide ranging affects upon the country. If the security forces are not able to deal with the violence, then Iraqis might look to other groups like militias or insurgents for protection. He’s also afraid that this could escalate into civil war, where the security forces will loose its national character and become solely beholden to each one of the ruling parties. Jabouri writes that the attacks will seek to test the security forces’ strengths and weaknesses. Yet if they are already under the control of the political parties as he argues, wouldn’t they already know the capabilities of the security forces? A second problem is why would the political parties escalate these attacks into an open armed conflict with each other? What event could be the cause of this breakdown? All of the parties are planning for the 2010 parliamentary elections, and are trying to figure out whether to oppose or support Maliki. While Iraqis are increasingly blaming political actors for the increase in bombings lately, there have been no retaliations for the attacks, and people are demanding more from their security forces instead. Things could obviously change after the balloting or some event could spiral out of control, but for now the status quo is based upon political, not armed struggle.

Jabouri writes that there are six steps to reform the security forces. First is to have a renewed push for reconciliation and to support free elections. The Obama administration and U.S. military have been talking about both. Jabouri also says that former soldiers that are not getting any government support should be paid their pensions. This could help with reconciliation because many of the former soldiers are Sunnis, but this doesn’t seem like a way to keep the political parties’ hands off the security forces. Second, corrupt officers should be removed and time limits should be set on officers, because many get their positions through political connections. Third, there are already laws on the books prohibiting political meddling. The judicial system and media could play a role here as well enforcing the laws and exposing backroom deals. The Prime Minister is one of the main actors trying to strengthen his control over the security forces however, and it may be hard to determine which of his actions are legitimate and which are not. Fourth, Army battalions should be moved around the country to break the hold the local ruling party has over them. He cites the example of Maliki’s deployment of army units to northern Iraq, and his attempt to lesson the Kurdish influence in those forces. The problem is that this was a political move by the Prime Minister, just the type of action that Jabouri is seemingly writing against. Fifth, conscription should be brought back so that the armed forces are truly national in character. On the other hand, Jabouri’s last suggestion is to reduce the Interior Ministry’s forces because they are too large, and the most open to political influence.

Finally the paper has four steps for the U.S. to take to achieve these goals. First the U.S. needs to be forceful with Iraqi leaders to make sure that they get the message that America wants to fix these problems before it leaves. Second, Iraq’s neighbors need to be brought into the process. All of the countries that Jabouri mentions however are Sunni ones. Why would the Shiite or Kurdish parties listen to them? They have little influence in Iraq right now. Third, the U.S. needs to use its media assets to increase transparency within the security forces and ministries. Last, the Iraqi Army needs to turn to national security, which will them a goal that is less political than internal defense

Jabouri writes about an important issue. There are undoubtedly political influences in the Iraqi forces, especially the local police. The U.S. is also loosing influence every month as they plan for their withdrawal. At the same time, Jabouri brings up many issues that are not relevant to his point like using quotes by American officials that don’t mention the security forces, arguing that Sunni Arab countries could influence Iraq’s political parties, and saying that Maliki’s use of the armed forces to pressure the Kurds is an example of lessoning political influence. More importantly, he warns over and over of a civil war, yet Iraq’s problems are being largely dealt with on the political field today. There is a real possibility of an armed clash between the Iraqi army and the Kurdish peshmerga that everyone is talking about. Other than that though, all of the major disputes are over Maliki’s growing power, not sectarian divisions. In fact, opposition to Maliki unites a wide swath of Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish parties. That being said, many of the paper’s suggestions for solving the problem of politicization are good such as moving Iraqi units around, which is already done to some extent. That should be mixed with a rotation of officers rather than term limits, something the armed forces are unlikely to adopt. The real problem could be stopping the Prime Minister from naming commanders, as that would be extremely hard to prove as a political move rather than just an exercise of his executive power. Overall, Jabouri could’ve done a lot better with a more focused argument and better analysis to prove his point.

SOURCES

Abouzeid, Rania, “Arabs-Kurd Tensions Could Threaten Iraq’s Peace,” Time, 3/24/09

Amos, Deborah, “Ethnic, Sectarian Discord Threaten Iraq Security Gains,” All Things Considered, NPR, 8/13/09

Ashton, Adam and Issa, Sahar, “Iraqis remaining cool despite attacks on mosques, minorities,” McClatchy Newspapers, 8/14/09

Cordesman, Anthony Mausner, Adam, “Withdrawal from Iraq, Assessing the Readiness of Iraqi Security Forces,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2009

Al-Jabouri, Najim Abed, “An Iraqi ISF Assessment after U.S. Troop Withdrawal,” Strategic Forum, July 2009

Jones, General James, “The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq,” Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, 9/6/07

Paley, Amit, “Uncertainty After Anbar Handover,” Washington Post, 9/2/08

Perito, Robert and Kristoff, Madeline, “Iraq’s Interior Ministry,” United States Institute of Peace, August 2009

Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009

International Crisis Group Report On Baghdad-Kurdish Divide

In early July 2009 the International Crisis Group issued its latest report on Iraq covering the simmering Baghdad-Kurdish dispute entitled “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line.” This has been one of the biggest problems in Iraq over the last two years, and has replaced the sectarian war as the major dividing line in the country. The U.S. is especially worried that it might blow up and lead to new violence as the administration is trying to draw down forces. Vice President Joe Biden, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Christopher Hill, have all talked recently about this issue needing to be resolved. There may not be enough of a commitment on the part of Washington, Baghdad, and Kurdistan however to fix this problem anytime soon.

The split between the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) began in the summer of 2008. Previous to that Baghdad was relatively weak, especially in the years immediately following the U.S. invasion. That allowed the Kurds to win a number of large concessions to protect their autonomy, while their peshmerga forces swept south into areas they claimed to be historically Kurdish. By 2008 however, Maliki and the central government were stronger, and the Prime Minister began trying to assert federal authority and limit the Kurds to Kurdistan. This led to a number of confrontations, some of which are still playing out today. In August 2008 Maliki confronted the Kurds in the disputed district of Khanaqin in Diyala province. That same month the Prime Minister began talking about the need for a strong central government, that the constitution should be changed, that ethnosectarian quotas should be done away with, that there was no need to find consensus on every law between the different groups in the country, and that majority rule should replace it. In September 2008 Maliki followed that up by moving the 12th Iraqi Army Division into Tamim, home of Kirkuk. These were all steps meant to improve Maliki’s image as a nationalist leader before the 2009 provincial elections. He could very use the same tactics in the run-up to the 2010 parliamentary vote.

As would be expected, Maliki’s actions set off alarm bells in Kurdistan. The Kurdish leadership began condemning the Prime Minister, and claiming he was acting like the new dictator of Iraq. The Kurds were also becoming increasingly frustrated that nothing was being done about Kirkuk, and began holding up major legislation in parliament as a result. The Kurds even flirted with having a no confidence vote against Maliki in December 2008, but a lack of a successor ended the idea. By 2009 then, the two sides had hardened their positions, and neither seemed willing to back down.

The Crisis Group points to five on-going issues that are contributing to the conflict between Baghdad and the KRG. First is Kirkuk, which remains in political limbo as none of the parties can agree upon how to resolves its future or hold elections there. Second is the Green Line, the former border between Iraq and Kurdistan established in 1991. That line disappeared after 2003 when the peshmerga moved south into the disputed areas. Even though the constitution says they should not be there, the Kurds claim that part of the constitution should be revised. Third is the United Nations’ attempt to mediate the disputed areas. In April 2009 the U.N. presented its findings on the territories, and in mid-June the first meeting was held to work out the details, but shortly afterwards the Kurds passed a draft of a regional constitution, which laid claim to Kirkuk and other the other areas the Kurds consider theirs. Fourth, is the increasing confrontation between the peshmerga and Iraqi security forces. This began in Khanaqin in August 2008, spread to Tamim, and then Ninewa. The U.S. has increased its presence in the north to try to mediate, and set up a joint committee of Kurdish and Iraqi forces in Kirkuk, but has been unsuccessful in creating similar groups in the rest of the conflicted areas. The Kurds and Baghdad are both apprehensive about what will happen after the U.S. withdrawal, and are thinking in terms of worst-case scenarios of a possible armed confrontation. Last is the control of Iraq’s oil and natural gas. This involves the constitution and who has the authority to issue contracts, Baghdad or Kurdistan. The two sides have held up work on fields in disputed areas, and even when there is an apparent break through like the recent okay for the Kurds to export some of their oil, there are major hindrances as well. The Kurds are looking for major oil companies to move into the region, and create stronger ties with Turkey and the European Union to pressure Baghdad into allowing the KRG to follow its own, autonomous resource development plan.

The International Crisis Group, the United Nations, and the U.S. all say that this is the major divide in Iraq today. The problem is that the dispute involves so many different issues, federalism, the constitution, the security forces, the disputed territories, and natural resources, that any negotiations will be long and difficult. The Crisis Group calls for a grand bargain between the two sides that would include all of these issues. In October 2008 they proposed just such a deal for Kirkuk, but there were so many steps that it seemed impossible to implement. There is also the added issue that this is an election year for Iraq with parliamentary elections due in January 2010, which leads politicians to harden their stances rather than seek compromise. U.S. influence is also weakening as Maliki is limiting their freedom of operation under the Status of Forces Agreement, and U.S. troops are set to withdraw in the coming months. All of these factors do not point to a breakthrough in this dispute. Unless the Americans make a major push to put all of these sides in a room together to talk out their differences, it seems like the Baghdad-KRG dispute could last for years. Despite recent trips and comments by leading administration officials, there does not appear to be this level of commitment by the White House. Instead they seem to be working at the local level to try to stop the peshmerga and Iraqi Army from shooting at each other, while standing behind the United Nations’ talk at the national level, rather than being in the forefront and being the initiator. Perhaps only Maliki being replaced as Prime Minister could change things in the short-term, and this will definitely be a goal of the Kurds after the 2010 elections.

SOURCES

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
- “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08

Khalil, Lydia, “Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Mirage?” Brookings Institution, June 2009

Kurdistan Regional Government, “Full Text of the KRG Response to Iraqi Prime Minister’s Accusations,” 12/1/08

Mahmoud, Amer, “controversy over Kurdish constitution,” Niqash, 7/6/09

Malazada, Hemin, “kurds dismiss talk of centralization,” Niqash, 11/24/08

Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Deaths of Iraqis in July Lower Than in May, June,” Washington Post, 8/2/08

Reuters, “Shi’ite Maliki calls for majority rule in Iraq,” 5/15/09

Baghdad-Kurdistan Divide Could Lead To Break Up Of Iraq Argues Journal Piece

In the Spring 2009 edition of the journal Middle East Policy, Professors Gareth Stansfield and Liam Anderson in their article “Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” argue that the growing conflict between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) could bring down the government, and possibly lead to the break-up of Iraq. Many commentators have pointed out the seriousness of this issue, but still think that the sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shiites is more important. Stansfield and Anderson believe that no other problem is as central to the future of Iraq. The oil law, the constitution, Kirkuk and other disputed territories, and federalism are all tied to the differences between the central government and Kurdistan. The relations between the two sides has only grown worse since 2008 as both have become distrustful of the others’ intentions. That leaves little room for compromise, and increases the chance for violence.

Many western views of Iraq are based upon past experiences, which makes analysis of newer ones sometimes difficult. For example, many believe that reconciliation between Sunnis and Shiites is the most important issue due to the sectarian war of 2006-2007. If that’s not resolved many believe that Iraq will fall back into civil war. Iraqi nationalism is also making a comeback, which some hope will unify the country and balance outside influences like Iran’s. Commentators do note the conflict between Baghdad and Kurdistan, but think its secondary to sectarianism. They also think that because Turkey and Iran are opposed to Kurdish independence, that it will never happen. Stansfield and Anderson counter that no other issue as important as this one.

After the 2005 provincial and parliamentary elections the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the two main Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) emerged as the dominant forces in Iraqi politics. The two had been allies since the Iran-Iraq War when both joined with Iran to fight against Saddam Hussein. The U.S. also played a role, supporting the Kurds after the Gulf War, and selecting the SIIC as their main Shiite partner after the 2003 invasion. Together the SIIC and Kurdish parties became the backbone of the Ibrahim al-Jaafari premiership. They were also the main authors of the 2005 constitution, which included federalism, an issue dear to both, and Article 140 that created a process to annex Kirkuk. Later they helped put Nouri al-Maliki in power.

Maliki was considered weak and ineffectual at first, but after the Surge took care of his main rivals, Al Qaeda in Iraq, the Sunni insurgency, and Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia, the state was strengthened, and the Prime Minister began flexing his muscle in 2008. In the process he began moving away from the SIIC, KDP and PUK to assert his independence. He has now fashioned himself as an Iraqi nationalist that wants to stop the Kurds from annexing the disputed territories, including Kirkuk, and amend the constitution to strengthen the central government. Sunni Arabs, Turkmen, and independent Shiites have supported Maliki’s efforts. This has led to increasing tensions with the Kurds, who feel threatened by Maliki’s actions.

The first real confrontation between Baghdad and Kurdistan occurred in the summer of 2008. In July Maliki launched Operation Promise of Good in Diyala. It was supposed to target insurgents and Al Qaeda in Iraq, but quickly turned into a political move by the Prime Minister. In August 2008 he sent the Iraqi Army into the Khanaqin district in northern Diyala. That area had been under Kurdish control since March 2003, and was home to about 4,000 peshmerga. Kurdistan considered it a disputed territory, which they wished to annex. On August 10, the Iraqi Army told the peshmerga they had 24 hours to leave the area, and a week later began forcing out Kurdish parties from government owned buildings. Finally, on September 27 Iraqi police and peshmerga got into a shoot out in the town of Jalawlaa. Things seemed headed for a military confrontation until KRG President Massoud Barzani flew to Baghdad to hold talks with Maliki. With the assistance of the Americans they came up with a deal where the peshmerga and Iraqi security forces would withdraw from the town of Khanaqin, turning over duties there to the local police, while the Iraqi Army would take up patrolling the Arab areas to the south, and the peshmerga the Kurdish areas of the north.

This was the opening shot in changing the dynamic between Baghdad and Kurdistan. After Khanaqin, Maliki went on to confront the Kurds across the disputed territories that stretch from Diyala to Ninewa, to Tamim to Salahaddin. In Mosul, Maliki ordered the Interior Ministry to take over responsibility for security from the peshmerga in November 2008, and began reaching out to the Arab population by offering them reconstruction money. He also set up tribal support councils across all four provinces, and began transferring predominately Kurdish units and Kurdish officers out, and replacing them with Arab ones. This was not only a way to push the Kurds, but for Maliki to build up his own independent power base and armed supporters independent of both the government and the SIIC and Kurds.

The major disputed territory of course is Tamim province, home of Kirkuk. The Kurds claim that Kirkuk is historically theirs, and was Turkified under the Ottomans. When Iraq gained independence the Arab governments, and especially Saddam went on to Arabize the area. Since 2003 the Kurdish leadership has promised their constituency that they would annex the area. During the U.S. invasion they occupied Kirkuk, and then handed it over to the Americans when local Arabs and Turkmen complained about their presence. In 2004 they set up a process of normalization, a census, and then a referendum on the future of Kirkuk in Article 58 of the Transitional Administration Law created by the Coalition Provisional Authority. Then the Kurds had the same measures included in the 2005 constitution in Article 140. The Kurds claim this was a huge sacrifice for them because they could have just kept Kirkuk after 2003. Instead they have tried to work within Iraq’s new political system to legally annex it. The referendum on Kirkuk was supposed to happen by December 31, 2007, but didn’t. It was then extended until June 2008 but with nothing done again. Now the United Nations is supposed to handle Tamim’s future.

The Kurds say the solution to Kirkuk is for Article 140 to be implemented, but other groups in the province would not be happy with that. If there were a referendum, Kirkuk would assuredly be annexed. The problem is that Arabs and Turkmen there would object. They favor equal power sharing amongst the three main groups in the provincial council, and making Tamim an autonomous region. They have become increasingly angered by the Kurds’ expansionist ideas, and treatment by the Kurdish peshmerga and security service the asayesh. Rather than gaining friends to support their aims, the Kurds have created enemies with their policies in the province.

Maliki has inserted himself into this process as well. He has come to the side of the Arabs and Turkmen to frustrate the Kurds’ aspirations for Kirkuk. Like the other disputed areas, the Prime Minister began setting up tribal support councils and Sons of Iraq units in Tamim. This especially angered the Kurds because the councils included many Arab tribes that had fought alongside Saddam’s troops during the Anfal campaign in the 1980s where the government tried to ethnically cleanse the Kurds from northern regions. To drive the point home even more, Maliki helped orchestrate a demonstration of Arabs in two of Tamim’s districts in November 2008 where they chanted an old Baathist slogan replacing Saddam’s name with Kirkuk, “With our souls, with our blood, we sacrifice for you, Kirkuk.” The result of Maliki’s actions has been to ignore Article 140.

This has increasingly frustrated the Kurdish leadership. The KRG has run an extensive public relations campaign in Kurdistan assuring their constituency that Kirkuk would be annexed, and to a lesser extent the other disputed areas. Beginning with Khanaqin, then the other disputed territories, and finally Kirkuk, the Kurds came to distrust Maliki. They openly compared him to Saddam, and said the Prime Minister could no longer be trusted since he wasn’t following the constitution and Article 140. At one meeting, President Barzani even told Maliki, “You smell like a dictator.” As a form of protest, the Kurds held up major legislation in parliament like the provincial election law, the oil law, and amending the constitution. The Kurds were eventually successful in making Maliki back off, but the relationship between Baghdad and Kurdistan, especially between the Prime Minister and President Barzani were ruined in the process. By December 2008, ties between the two sides were at an all time low.

The other major conflict is over politics. Beginning in 2008 Maliki began calling for revisions to the constitution that would strengthen the central government vis a vis the provinces and the KRG. He claims that the constitution reflects the sectarian divide and instability of 2003-2005, and should therefore be amended to reflect the new status quo in Iraq. Maliki would especially like to curtail the Kurds’ oil policy, where they have passed their own law and signed over 20 independent contracts. For the Kurds’ part, they and their allies the Supreme Council were able to dominate the drafting process, and include provisions in it to ensure federalism and Article 140. They claim that this was a major sacrifice because they agreed to a legal framework to annex Kirkuk, rather than take it by force, and shows that they wish to remain part of Iraq in a federal system.

It seems unlikely that Maliki and the Kurds will be able to reconcile on any of these issues. The Prime Minister has pushed and shoved the Kurds over the disputed territories, and allied himself with many of the anti-Kurdish forces in the north, including ones that evoke a dark memory for the Kurds. This has allowed Maliki to create an independent base as well that he used well in the provincial elections. He is also challenging the Kurds’ autonomy by calling for amending the constitution. It’s believed that the 2010 parliamentary elections will only strengthen the Prime Minister more. The question then is what will happen next?

Many believe that Maliki has time on his side. Eventually the central government will have the power to force the Kurds out of the disputed areas for example. Stansfield and Anderson write that ironically, in fashioning himself as the nationalist leader of Iraq, calling for the unity and strength of his country, Maliki may actually lead to its break-up. The Kurds have repeatedly said that they want to stay part of Iraq, but if they are losing on every front, then what motivation will they have to remain part of the country? They will only take losing out on their aspirations and power for so long. Add to this the fact that the conflict could lead to violence. Iraqi forces and the peshmerga have faced off several times since Khanaqin. So far, nothing has come of it, but each time the two sides practice brinkmanship it increases the likelihood of something going wrong.

This is an obvious situation where the United States could play a mediating role. The U.S. has tried to calm nerves in military situations, but on the political side there’s little evidence of much pressure to resolve this growing dispute. On Kirkuk for example, the Americans are now deferring to the United Nations, but they have no hope of bringing the various sides together without the U.S. The policy seems to consist of keeping a lid on possible flashpoints, while letting the Iraqis try to solve their own problems. If something is not done, this feud will only grow in intensity until it reaches the breaking point, and that could either lead to the fall of the Maliki government, or worse, the secession of Kurdistan from Iraq.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Kurdish official condemns Iraqi army raid on Peshmerga HQ,” 8/24/08
- “Military units should be under central govt. control,” 8/19/08

International Crisis Group, “Iraq After The Surge II: The Need for a New Political Strategy,” 4/30/08
- “Shiite Politics In Iraq: The Role Of The Supreme Council,” 11/15/07

Jakes, Lara, “Key UN report to suggest power-sharing plan in Iraq’s divided Kirkuk,” Associated Press, 3/29/09

Paley, Amit, “Strip of Iraq ‘on the Verge of Exploding,’” Washington Post, 9/13/08

Parker, Sam, “Guest Post: Behind the Curtain in Diyala,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 8/20/08

Peterson, Scott, “US referees Iraq’s troubled Kurdish-Arab fault line,” Christian Science Monitor, 10/21/08

Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009

Stansfield, Gareth Anderson, Liam, “Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” Middle East Policy, Spring 2009

U.N. Suspends Work On Disputed Territories Until Provincial Elections Are Over

The disputed territories in Iraq came to the fore this summer. In August 2008 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sent the Iraqi army into the Khanaqin district in northern Diyala province. The area had been occupied by the Kurds since the U.S. invasion, and been under official Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) administration since February 2008. Tensions were so high that violence seemed inevitable but for the intervention and mediation of the United States. Khanaqin is one of a dozen districts in Iraq that the Kurds hope to annex. Currently the KRG occupies 300 miles of territory outside of Kurdistan. The United Nations had been working on these disputed areas since late 2007, but in November 2008 the U.N.’s envoy to Iraq Staffan de Mistura said that the organization would be suspending its effort on the issue until after the provincial elections scheduled for January 2009.

Map of Kurdish occupied areas outside of Kurdistan

The Iraqi constitution’s Article 140 is supposed to deal with Kirkuk and other disputed territories, but it has never been implemented. By December 31, 2007 the government was supposed to have completed a census of Kirkuk and held a plebiscite on whether the population wanted to join Kurdistan or not. As the end of 2007 approached and nothing substantial had happened, the Kurds agreed to a six-month delay. That too has passed with no action either. In early 2007 when it was apparent that the article was not going to work any time soon, the U.N. began looking into alternatives.

On August 10, 2007 the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1770 that said the U.N. envoy to Iraq would work on the disputed territories. The first thing Staffan de Mistura did under this new resolution was to get Baghdad and the Kurds to agree to delay Article 140. This was supported by the United States who began pushing for a negotiated settlement instead of 140. This was a great disappointment to the Kurds who had hoped that the constitution would ensure a legal take over of the areas. They feared that any negotiations would cost them territory, especially Kirkuk, which is the most revered by the Kurds.

5 – Akre, 17 – Hamdaniya, 77 – Khanaqin, 79 – Kirkuk, 81 - Makhmur, 92 – Shekhan, 93 – Sinjar, 98 – Tal Afar, 100 – Tilkaif are some of the areas to be mediated by the United Nations under Resolution 1770

The U.N. and the U.S. have been moving towards power sharing and a division of disputed areas since the end of 2007. In December of that year, the U.S. pressured the KRG into accepting a division of power with the Arabs in Kirkuk’s Tamim province. At the same time, the U.N. began working on a 3-phase report on what to do with the other territories. In June 2008 they released their initial report that dealt with four areas. The U.N. suggested that two, Makhmur in Tamim and Akre in Ninewa would go to Kurdistan, while Hamdaniya would go to Ninewa and Mandali to Diyala. The U.N. specifically chose these four to go first because they had Arab and Kurdish majorities and would evenly be split. That didn’t seem to help as no side was happy with the report. Both the Kurds and Baghdad however seemed to accept the process. The second report is to address Tal Afar, Tilkaif, Shekhan and Sinjar in Ninewa, and Khanaqin in Diyala. The final one would deal with the thorniest issue, Kirkuk. De Mistura was supposed to have finished this work by September or October 2008, but that didn’t happen. Now the U.N. envoy has said that he is going to postpone his work until after the provincial elections in January 2009. De Mistura said that he didn’t want the process to be caught up in politics and electioneering. The Kurds condemned the delay.

Tensions between Kurdistan and Baghdad have only grown since the first U.N. report. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki feels that his security operations have strengthened his hand, and he is working to limit the Kurds in a number of disputed areas including Mosul, Kirkuk, and Khanaqin. The KRG in turn have condemned his moves, claiming that Maliki is attempting a power grab, and is undermining the constitution. Only through strong pressure by the United States and the United Nations can these contested territories be resolved. Even then they might not be able to resolve this thorny issue, which pits the regional aspirations of the Kurds against the determination of Maliki to assert national power, along with the demands of minorities. The U.N.’s initial recommendations were not welcomed, but all sides seemed to agree to the organization’s work, which is a positive sign that they might accept its arbitration to fix this mounting problem.

For more on Khanaqin and the Kurd-Maliki dispute see:

Cold War Between Baghdad and Kurds Turns Hot

Could Maliki Be Deposed?

Deal Struck To Defuse Khanaqin Issue

Khanaqin Deal Off?

Kurdish-Baghdad Tensions Over Diyala

The Kurds Come Out Swinging

Maliki Still Pushing The Kurds On Khanaqin District

Maliki Ups the Ante in Khanaqin District of Diyala

Mosul: The New Battleground Between Maliki And The Kurds

Two Reports On Trying to Solve The Kirkuk Issue

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraqi Kurds Accuse UN Of Delaying Report On Disputed Areas,” 11/30/08

Alsumaria, “Arabs in Kirkuk refuse UN recommendations,” 6/9/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “95 lawmakers criticize the U.N. recommendations over disputed districts,” 6/7/08
- “KRG: PM Should Create, Not Undermine, National Unity,” 12/2/08
- “Military units should be under central govt. control,” 8/19/08

Dagher, Sam, “Can the U.N. avert a Kirkuk border war?” Christian Science Monitor, 4/25/08

International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08

Janabi, Nazar, “Kirkuk’s Article 140: Expired or Not?,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/30/08

Londono, Ernesto, “Kurds in N. Iraq Receive Arms From Bulgaria,” Washington Post, 11/23/08

Paley, Amit, “Strip of Iraq ‘on the Verge of Exploding,’” Washington Post, 9/13/08

Russo, Claire, “The Maliki Government Confronts Diyala,” Institute for the Study of War,” 9/23/08

Could Maliki Be Deposed?

Since March 2008 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has been forming Tribal Support Councils. Originally, these were created to help the security forces crackdown on the Mahdi Army militia of Moqtada al-Sadr. Beginning in the summer however, Maliki has been creating councils across the south and north to establish his control over the country, and increasingly to challenge the rule of his main coalition partners, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the Kurdish parties, in the provinces. This is coming to a boiling point as both groups are increasingly criticizing Maliki’s rule, and rumors are beginning that they might even make a move to unseat him from power.

There have been several reports that the SIIC and Kurds might be looking to replace Maliki as prime minister of Iraq. First, Nibras Kazimi, former Iraqi National Congress member, New York based writer, member of the Hudson Institute, and operator of the Talisman Gate blog, wrote that he had heard that the Kurds and Supreme Council were considering replacing Maliki with either current Vice President Adel Abdel-Mahdi of the SIIC, former prime minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari who broke away from the Dawa Party and formed his own National Reform Party this summer, or Ali al-Adeeb of the Dawa Party. Al-Quds al-Rubi reported that while Iraq’s President Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan was meeting with members of parliament he said that Maliki’s government needed to be reformed, while Iraq-Ina wrote that Talabani was trying to depose the Prime Minister.

That followed a public dispute between Maliki and the Presidential Council, which consists of President Talabani, Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi of the Iraqi Islamic Party, and Vice President Abdel-Mahdi. On November 18, they sent a letter to Maliki suggesting that the government should stop wasting money forming Tribal Support Councils, and instead use the funds on the existing security forces. They also said that the Prime Minister should stop forming the councils until there is a formal framework to integrate them into the government. Two days later, Maliki gave a televised speech in which he said that Talabani was picking on the Support Councils, while the Kurds were breaking the constitution by deploying their Peshmerga militia outside of Kurdistan, and signing oil contracts without government approval. Maliki also said that the constitution needed to be amended so that the central government could have more power, implying that the Kurdish Regional Government needed its authority to be curtailed. That was an empty threat since the changes to the constitution have been held up for over a year, but upped the war of words between the two sides. The Presidential Council was not pleased by Maliki’s comments, and told him on November 21 that he shouldn’t have made their differences public.



Tribal Support Councils have been formed in 4. Wasit, 5. Maysan, 6. Basra, 7. Dhi Qar, 8. Muthanna, 9. Qadisiyah, 10. Babil, 11. Karbala, 12. Najaf, 17. Tamim, and others to support Prime Minster Maliki

All of this began back in March 2008 when the government moved against the Sadrists. During the crackdowns in the south, Maliki reached out to various tribes to help deal with the Mahdi Army. This first happened in Basra when Maliki gave 10,000 tribesman jobs in the provincial police in return for fighting the militias. Tribal Support Councils were also formed in Babil, Karbala, Maysan, and Dhi Qar as the fighting spread across the south. After that initial wave, the Prime Minister moved ahead creating councils in Qadisiyah Wasit, Najaf, Kirkuk, Muthanna, and other areas. Each was paid $21,000 by the government, and then $10,000 a month afterwards. They reported to the Committee for National Reconciliation in Baghdad, although there is talk of forming a National Tribal Support Council. Tribal sheikhs have been eager to join these councils because it gives them power and new standing, as well as jobs for their followers. As reported earlier, many of the country’s tribes were weak after the invasion because they had become dependent upon Saddam and his patronage to maintain their positions. Working for Maliki then, is an all too familiar relationship for many of these sheikhs. Many of these tribes are also national in character, which means that the Prime Minister is building up support not only in the individual provinces where the councils are, but across the country.

The Supreme Council was the first to object to this policy. As they rule most of the south, they saw the Support Councils as a brazen attempt by Maliki to build up his support and challenge their authority in the upcoming provincial elections, scheduled for the end of January 2009. SIIC officials in Babil, Wasit, Karbala, Dhi-Qar, Basra, Muthanna, and Qadisiyah have all protested the tribal groups. Governors and provincial councils have all complained that Maliki never consulted with them when forming the Support Councils, and that they are not part of the local governments, answering to Baghdad rather to them.

The Kurds became concerned later in the year when Maliki began focusing upon the north. As mentioned several times before, in August 2008 government forces moved into the disputed Khanaqin district in Diyala province, which the Kurds have occupied since the 2003 invasion. That caused a confrontation between Baghdad and the Kurdish Regional Government that could have led to violence. By September, Kurdish President Massoud Barzani gave an interview where he accused Maliki of acting like an autocrat, never following through with their promises to the Kurds, and questioning whether Kurds should stand behind the Prime Minister’s government. Maliki then set up Support Councils in Kirkuk and Mosul, and attempted to form one in Khanaqin, while also trying to move Kurdish forces out of Mosul.

As a result, the Kurds have stepped up their attacks upon Maliki. Beginning in November, they have said that Maliki is acting like a totalitarian, and that the Support Councils are illegal and unconstitutional. The Patriot Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party issued a joint statement that compared the tribal groups to Kurds that fought for Saddam in the 1980s and 90s. Kurdish President Barzani followed that up with a TV interview with al-Jazeera in which he said that the the councils were mercenaries and would be treated as enemies by the Kurds. Maliki responded by organizing two days of protests by his new tribal allies. On November 15, tribes came out on the streets to support Maliki and the Support Councils and protest against the Kurds in Tikrit in Salahaddin, Hawijah in Tamim, Karbala, Najaf, Nasiriyah in Dhi Qar, Samawah in Muthanna, and Hilla in Babil. Demonstrators said that Kirkuk, Mosul, and Diyala were parts of Iraq, responding to the Kurd desire to annex districts in those areas.

The Kurds and SIIC have been close allies since before the 2003 U.S. invasion. They were the main reason why Maliki was able to stay in power in 2007 when various factions were trying to unseat him. The Prime Minister has been emboldened after his successful crackdowns on the Sadrists earlier this year however, and now feels as if he can take on his allies in the provinces that they control. He is building up support across the country before the provincial elections, but it could come at a cost. If the Kurds and SIIC want, they can depose him in parliament with a no confidence vote. Worse, his moves could lead to violence between the Tribal Support Councils and local police and Peshmerga controlled by the SIIC and Kurds. So far these disputes have stayed verbal, but the rhetoric is increasing, and shows the deep divisions that remain in Iraq.

For more on the Tribal Support Councils, Inter-Shiite Power Struggles, and the Kurdish-Baghdad Dispute see:

Cold War Between Baghdad and Kurds Turns Hot

Deal Struck To Defuse Kahanqin Issue

Disputes Over Tribal Support Councils

Khanaqin Deal Off?

Kurdish-Baghdad Tensions Over Diyala

The Kurds Come Out Swinging

Maliki Responds To His Critics On Tribal Support Councils

Maliki Still Pushing The Kurds On Khanaqin District

Maliki Ups the Ante in Khanaqin District of Diyala

Maliki’s Tribal Support Councils Appear To Be Paying Off

Shiite Rivalries Increasing As Provincial Elections Near

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraqi Sunni And Shiites Demonstrate In Favour Of US Pact,” 11/19/08

Alsumaria, “Al Maliki defends tribal awakening councils,” 10/9/08
- “Maliki meets Kirkuk’s tribes’ leaders,” 11/5/08
- “Rows growing between two major Iraqi parties,” 9/18/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “Barazani criticizes al-Maliki on al-Jazeera,” 11/16/08
- “Diwaniya sahwa council meets in defiance of protests,” 11/10/08
- “Gov’t seeks national support council,” 11/6/08
- “Karbala governor says no-confidence vote proposal is political pressure tool,” 10/1/08
- “Meeting to Discuss Disagreement over Forming Support Councils,” 11/12/08
- “MP’s decision to cancel partisan support councils welcomed,” 10/9/08
- “PM Accuses Kurdish Leadership of ‘violating’ the Constitution,” 11/20/08
- “Premier to cancel partisan support councils,” 10/9/08
- “Pro-sahwa protests in Thi-Qar,” 11/15/08
- “Sahwa councils could stir sedition, says key legislator,” 11/12/08
- “Thi-Qar governor slams govt’s plan of installing support councils,” 10/3/08
- “Tribal chieftain announces opening 20 Supports Councils offices in Thi-Qar,” 10/1/08
- “Wassit province refuses to establish support councils,” 9/24/08

Farrell, Stephen and Glanz, James, “More Than 1,000 in Iraq’s Forces Quit Basra Fight,” New York Times, 4/4/08

Garcia-Navarro, Lourdes, “Competition Between Iraqi Shiites Gains Strength,” All Things Considered, NPR, 10/22/08

IraqSlogger.com, “Najaf Forms Tribal ‘Support Council,’” 10/27/08
- “New Tribal Groups Buck Wishes of Wasit Council,” 10/23/08

Kazimi, Nibras, “Ousting Maliki, Maybe,” Talisman Gate Blog, 11/21/08

Krauss, Joseph, “Iraqi PM feuds with Kurds over militias,” Agence France Presse, 11/12/08

KurdishMedia, “Massoud Barzani on Kurdistan Region’s conflict with Baghdad,” 9/5/08

Levinson, Charles and Nabhan, Ali, “Iraqi tribes caught between rival Shiite parties,” USA Today, 10/20/08

Missing Links Blog, “What’s up with Maliki’s latest tribal-council proposal,” 7/1/08

Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Mon: Australian Troops to Depart,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/1/08

Muhammed, Ako, “Kirkuk Tribal Militias Trouble for Kurds,” Kurdish Globe, 11/13/08

Niqash, “southern tribes: security or politics?” 11/6/08

al-Obeidi, Hassan, “Thousands of Iraqi Arabs attend anti-Kurdish protests,” Agence France Presse, 11/15/08

Parker, Sam, “ISCI/Da’wa alliance showing strain,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 9/17/08

Roads To Iraq Blog, “Talabani’s attempt to oust Maliki, demonstrators hanged a statue of George Bush,” 11/21/08

Rubin, Alissa, “Rejection of Oil Law and Move to Create Tribal Councils Add to Tensions With Kurds,” New York Times, 10/28/08

Russo, Claire, “The Maliki Government Confronts Diyala,” Institute for the Study of War, 9/23/08

Ryan, Missy, “Kurd-Arab tension may threaten Iraq calm,” Reuters, 11/12/08

Weiner, Scott, “Maliki Makes a Play for the Southern Tribes,” Institute for the Study of War, 11/6/08

Maliki Still Pushing The Kurds On Khanaqin District

The tension between Kurds and the central government in the Khanaqin district of Diyala province have calmed down, but Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is still pushing. In early August 2008, Iraqi forces reached the Khanaqin district as part of a security operation in Diyala. The move was intentionally meant to assert the government’s control over a disputed area, which the Kurds wish to annex. After a series of escalating and then de-escalating moves by the two sides, things reached a climax on September 27 when Iraqi police got into a shoot out with Kurdish forces in the town of Jalawlaa. Iraqi troops later forced out a Kurdish political party from government owned buildings in that town in early October. The United States then moved in to mediate the conflict. U.S. officers brought together the Shiite governor of Diyala and the Kurdish mayor of Khanaqin village for example, to reduce tensions. Since then nothing much has been heard from the area.

The New York Times however, reported on October 28 that Maliki is still intent on gaining control of the area. The Times reported that Baghdad tried to set up a Tribal Support Council in the Khanaqin district, and another in Kirkuk. As reported earlier, the Prime Minister has been setting up these groups across southern Iraq to gain support in light of the upcoming provincial elections. These are the first attempts to create such councils north of Baghdad.

Since March when the government launched an offensive in Basra, Maliki has been trying to become the sole power in the country. First, he took on his former allies, the Sadrists in Basra, Sadr City, and Maysan. These were aimed at breaking up the largest Shiite militia in the country, and Maliki’s biggest opponent in provincial elections. Troops were then sent to Mosul and Diyala to deal with the Sunni insurgency. Since this summer, the Prime Minister has taken on his coalition member the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) by forming Tribal Support Councils in provinces they rule. These are meant to sway tribes to Maliki’s Dawa party. At the same time, he also confronted the Kurds in Khanaqin. What was most important about these moves was that the Prime Minister fashioned a new image for himself. Whether they worked out as happened in Basra, or didn’t like in Mosul, Maliki was still taking action. Out of complete self-interest no doubt, but action nonetheless. That has given him a new standing in the country like he’s never had before. As the Iraq Center for Research & Strategic Studies’ survey reported on earlier pointed out, Maliki is now the most popular politician in Iraq. On the other hand, as military analyst Anthony Cordesman wrote about in September, these operations have been almost completely military in nature, as Baghdad has not proven that it can actually govern. That will be the major question Maliki needs to answer. Is he just interested in amassing as much power as he can, or is he committed to actually improving the living conditions in his country, rebuilding its infrastructure, and delivering services.

For more on the Kurdish-Maliki dispute see:

Cold War Between Baghdad and Kurds Turns Hot

Deal Struck To Defuse Khanaqin Issue

Khanaqin Deal Off?

Kurdish-Baghdad Tensions Over Diyala

The Kurds Come Out Swinging

Maliki Ups the Ante in Khanaqin District of Diyala

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “2 killed in clashes between policemen, Kurdish party supporters in Jalawlaa,” 9/27/08
- “Iraqi army takes over Kurdish party headquarters,” 10/4/08

Peterson, Scott, “US referees Iraq’s troubled Kurdish-Arab fault line,” Christian Science Monitor, 10/21/08

Rubin, Alissa, “Rejection of Oil Law and Move to Create Tribal Councils Add to Tensions With Kurds,” New York Times, 10/28/08

Russo, Claire, “The Maliki Government Confronts Diyala,” Institute for the Study of War,” 9/23/08

Cold War Between Baghdad and Kurds Turns Hot

Yesterday, September 27, Iraqi police and Kurdish forces got into a shoot out in the town of Jalawlaa in the Khanaqin district of Diyala province. There are two versions of what happened. According to Iraqi forces, a unit of the Emergency Police raided the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) headquarters in Jalawlaa and arrested two members. According to UPI, the target was the Kurdish intelligence agency the Asayesh. (2) Kurdish officials then went to the Emergency Police Unit’s offices to demand the release of the two Kurds, but that resulted in a shootout that left a policeman and a member of the KDP dead, and two officers wounded. The other version comes from the Peshmerga (3) who claim that two Arab policemen stopped three members of the Asayesh in a market. When they refused to show their identity cards they were arrested and taken to a police station. A member of the KDP went there to demand their release. He was successful, but as they were exiting, police began shooting at them, killing one of the Asayesh officers. A police official said the police who opened fire were being investigated.

The Khanaqin district has been the scene of growing conflict between Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s central government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). On August 11, 2008 Iraqi forces reached the outskirts of Khanaqin as part of Operation Omens of Prosperity. (4) They entered the towns of Qara Taba, Saidyah, and Khanaqin and demanded that the Kurdish Peshmerga militia withdraw within 24 hours and that all government buildings be evacuated. The Kurds refused at first, but after high level negotiations, agreed to pull their forces out of Qara Taba and Jalawlaa, but not Khanaqin. The security forces immediately broke that deal by moving into Khanaqin on August 24. The Kurdish parties organized demonstrations against the Iraqi forces and refused to leave. By the end of the month, another round of negotiations led to both the army and Peshmerga to withdraw leaving the Kurds still in political control of the area. By September 9 however, a Baghdad spokesman denied that any deal had been signed. (5) On September 18, the Iraqi army again announced that the Peshmerga had to pull out of Jalawaaa. (6) Three days later it appeared the Kurds had agreed when they announced that they would evacuate government owned buildings. (7) All that has gone up in smoke with yesterday’s shootout.

Although the Kurds represent one of the foundations of Prime Minister Maliki’s ruling coalition, the two sides have been disagreeing more and more. The most prominent was when the Kurds vetoed the provincial election law in July 2008. The Kurds also occupy 300 square miles of territory outside of Kurdistan, which they wish to annex. (8) The Khanaqin district is one of those. There was no security situation to speak of there when the Iraqi forces moved into the area in August. Maliki’s action was an attempt to pressure the Kurds and assert the central government’s control over all sections of the country. The Prime Minister must have been pleased to have so many high level Kurds come to his office, including Kurdish President Massoud Barzani, to work out a deal over Khanaqin. The arguments between the two sides were heated, but stayed verbal. Yesterday’s incident was the first time they turned violent, and obviously threatens all the talks over the future of the area and Maliki’s power play. Already Kurdish President Barzani (9) and the speaker of the Kurdish Assembly (10) have begun talking about conspiracies against the Kurds and the return of Baathism to Baghdad. This shootout will only lead to the growing paranoia of Kurdish leaders, and will probably make working with them even harder.

For more on the Khanaqin dispute see:

Deal Struck To Defuse Khanaqin Issue

Khanaqin Deal Off

Kurdish-Baghdad Tensions Over Diyala Grow

The Kurds Come Out Swinging

Maliki Ups the Ante in Khanaqin District of Diyala

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Man dies as Iraqi forces raid Kurdish peshmerga post,” 9/27/08

Gera, Vanessa, “Iraq: Kurdish politician killed in disputed region,” Associated Press, 9/27/08

Al-Ily, Naseer and Aziz, Hewa, “The Baghdad-Arbil Crisis Escalates,” Asharq Alawsat, 9/12/08

Middle East Online, “Iraqi forces raid Kurdish peshmerga post,” 9/27/08

Muhammed, Ako, “Kurds and their Iraqi allies see differences,” Kurdish Globe, 9/11/08

Paley, Amit, “Strip of Iraq ‘on the Verge of Exploding,’” Washington Post, 9/13/08

Press TV, “Iraq army sets deadline for Kurds,” 9/18/08

Russo, Claire, “The Maliki Government Confronts Diyala,” Institute for the Study of War,” 9/23/08

Voices of Iraq, “2 killed in clashes between policemen, Kurdish party supporters in Jalawlaa,” 9/27/08
- “Consensus solution about Khanaqin achieved – lawmaker,” 9/16/08
- “Kurdish parties to flee offices in Diala,” 9/21/08
- “No deal struck between central gov’t, Kurds over Khanaqin-spokesman,” 9/5/08

The Kurds Come Out Swinging

Iraq’s parliament reconvened at the beginning of September 2008 after its summer recess. They were greeted by a barrage of statements by Kurds about how angry they were with the central government. Their complaints centered around two events. One was the passage of a provincial election law in July that said they had to share power in Kirkuk, and the other was the Iraqi security forces moving into the Khanaqin district of Diyala province. Both are disputed areas that the Kurds have de facto control over. To them, the actions of Baghdad threatened their hopes of creating a Greater Kurdistan.

The dispute between the central government and Kurdistan started in July of this year. In the middle of that month parliament passed a provincial election law that had two provisions about Kirkuk’s Tamim province. The first said the Kurds had to share power in the provincial council with the Arabs and Turkomen, the two other groups that lay claim to area. Currently the Kurds control the council, the head of the council, and the governorship. Another article said that that the province’s security forces needed to be under Baghdad’s control, when currently the Kurdish Peshmerga militia patrol the area. The next day President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, vetoed the law in the Presidential Council. Since the parliament has reconvened they still have not come up with a new election law that the Kurds agree to.

The second point of contention was the Iraqi army moving into the Khanaqin district of Diyala province. On July 29, Maliki launched Operation Omens of Prosperity to clear the area of insurgents. By August, the Iraqi army entered two villages in the Khanaqin district, Jalwalaa and Quara Taba, and demanded that the Peshmerga there withdraw. This led to a standoff, and then protests by the Kurds, which eventually had both the Peshmerga and the Iraqi forces pulling out of the area. The two sides now appear close to a deal, but none has been signed yet.

Both of these conflicts led to some choice words by Kurdish officials and some provocative moves. First, on August 1, the Kurds in Tamim province demanded that the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) annex the province as a symbolic protest against the election law. On August 6, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) moved two Peshmerga brigades outside of Kirkuk cutting off Arab and Turkomen areas. The situation was so tense Baghdad sent the Defense Minister to check on the situation. The move was obviously meant to show that the Kurds would not give up on their plan to annex the city. As the Khanaqin incident was going on in late August, the Peshmerga minister said that his units were better than the Iraqi army and could take them on.

Since parliament reconvened in early September, the Kurds have become even more brazen. On September 5 an interview with KRG President Massoud Barzani was published where he said the Kurds were not treated fairly in the government, they were being cut out of key decisions, deals that were made with Baghdad were never followed through with, and accused Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki of being an autocrat. Barzani finished by saying that the Arabs were out to get the Kurds, and wondered aloud whether they should even support the coalition government behind Maliki anymore. On September 8, the speaker of the Kurdish Assembly gave its opening speech were he said that the U.S. and other countries that sold heavy weapons to Iraq needed to promise that they would not be used against the Kurds. This came just as the government announced that it was buying $10 billion in weapons from the United States. The Assembly speaker went on to say that Baathism was making a come back within the government, and that they had no right to enter the Khanaqin district. Those statements were probably aimed at rallying the Kurdish public behind the KRG’s increasingly volatile war of wards with Baghdad. On the 12th, an allegedly secret Kurdish document was leaked to the United Arab Emirates’ Gulf News. The documents claimed that the United States was becoming so disillusioned with Maliki that it might even consider assassinating him. This was the most outrageous news to emerge from the Kurds, obviously meant to sow dissension between the Americans and Baghdad. It could’ve also been a means to tell Maliki he should rely on the Kurds because the U.S. was unreliable.

Map of Kurdish occupied areas outside of Kurdistan

The underlying cause of all this talk, is the growing fear amongst Kurds that their dream of a Greater Kurdistan will be squashed by the government’s attempt to assert its control over all parts of the country. Currently the Kurds occupy up to 300 miles of territory outside of Kurdistan. This stretches from Sinjar and Mosul in Ninewa province, to the already discussed city of Kirkuk in Tamim and the Khanaqin district of Diyala. In many of these areas the Kurdish flag flies, and security is handled by a combination of the Peshmerga, Kurdish police, and the Kurdish intelligence service the Asayesh. Many are also under official Kurdish administration control such as Khanaqin. Article 140 of the constitution is suppose to deal with these disputed territories through a census, and then a vote on whether they want to be annexed by the KRG. Two deadlines have been set for this, but both have expired. Currently the United Nations is working on negotiated settlements for these regions, because many believe that 140 could lead to more conflict, and possibly even violence. As the veto of the provincial election law, and the recent remarks show however, there’s little evidence that the Kurds are willing to give up de facto control of any of these areas. This is another sign of the momentous political battles that lay ahead for the future of Iraq. It also points to a weak and divided government, despite the improvement in security.

For more on the Kurds and the election law see:

Kurds Walk Out Over Provincial Election Law Debate

Special Sunday Session of Parliament For Election Law

Election Law Update

Conspiracy Theories Abound On Election Law Veto

Kurdish Frustrations Over Provincial Elections Boil Over After Suicide Bombing

For more on Khanaqin see:

Kurdish-Baghdad Tensions Over Diyala

Maliki Ups the Ante in Khanaqin District of Diyala

Deal Struck To Defuse Khanaqin Issue

Khanaqin Deal Off?

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraqi politicians squabble over election law,” Associated Press, 5/26/08

Adas, Basil, “Crackdown in Diyala worries Kurdish leaders,” Gulf News, 8/27/08
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