Del Wilber, In The Shadow Of The Swords, The Baghdad Police Academy, Casemate, 2020

Wilber, Del, In The Shadow Of The Swords, The Baghdad Police Academy, Casemate, 2020

 

In The Shadow Of The Swords by D.W. Wilber might be one of the only 1^st hand accounts about the Americans’ attempt to rebuild the Iraqi police. Wilber was a former St. Louis police officer who volunteered to be a trainer. It’s a very interesting read even though less than half of it is about the actual police academy. It points out some of the major flaws with the strategy.

U.S. Army History Of Iraq War Vol 1 - Chapter 15 – Transformation In A Time Of War, January-April 2005

The start of 2005 was a transition period for both the United States and Iraqis. On the one hand the U.S. was trying and failing to implement its first strategy for Iraq. On the other Al Qaeda in Iraq was announced, other insurgent groups were breaking with Zarqawi, and Moqtada al-Sadr moved towards Iran.

U.S. Army History Of Iraq War Vol 1 – Chapter 13 The Changing Of The Guard, Again, Spring-Summer 2004

The spring 2004 uprising by Moqtada al-Sadr and the 1^st Battle of Fallujah killed any hope the U.S. might have of a short occupation and immediate withdrawal from Iraq. That led to a period of transition during the summer. There was a new U.S. commander General George Casey who created the first campaign plan for the war although the goal was the same, to get out. There was a new effort to rebuild the Iraqi security forces, the United Nations was finally able to broker a deal for the return of Iraqi sovereignty, while the Americans were hit with a new scandal.

U.S. Army History Of Iraq War Vol 1 – Chapter 11 The Gathering Storm

The eleventh chapter of the U.S. Army history of the Iraq War covers the events at the start of 2004. The American military thought the insurgency was waning and that it could withdraw as soon as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were rebuilt, while the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was forced to bring in the United Nations to settle its dispute with Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani over elections. The U.S. was operating in a vacuum as it missed the maturation of the insurgency and was ignoring Iran’s growing influence in Iraq.

US and Iraq Disagree Over Restarting Anti-IS Operations

US and Iraqi soldiers (US Army National Guard)

The New York Times reported that the U.S. military restarted working with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) against the Islamic State on January 15. This collaboration had been suspended for ten days after Washington killed Iranian Revolutionary Guards Quds Force commander General Qasim Suleimani and deputy head of Hashd Commission Abu Muhandis. The Times said it didn’t know whether the Iraqi government had approved such operations. Retired Prime Minister Abdul Mahdi’s military spokesman General Abdul Karim Khalaf was quick to point out that Baghdad had not okayed the ISF working with the U.S. led Coalition again. Premier Abdul Mahdi is attempting to stay in office based upon his demand that the American forces leave Iraq. The Iraqi political class is as divided as ever and usually take months to agree upon a new PM. Some factions have therefore decided that it is easier to skip this entire process and simply put Abdul Mahdi back in office. He therefore has to maintain his opposition to the Americans, which is why his spokesman said there is no authorization for the Coalition to resume its work in Iraq.

Development And Setbacks Of The Current Iraqi Military, Interview with CSU San Marco’s Prof Marashi

(AFP/Getty Images)

The Iraqi military has gone through several stages since the 2003 U.S. invasion. There was its disbandment by the Coalition Provisional Authority, the hasty attempt at rebuilding by the Americans, its collapse in the face of the Islamic State in 2014, and others. To help give some insights into the recent history of the force is California State University San Marcos’ Middle East Professor Ibrahim al-Marashi who has written about the Iraqi forces over the years including Iraq’s Armed Forces: An Analytical History. He can be followed on Twitter @ialmarashi.

US Finds Institutional Problems With The Iraqi Forces And Questions Their Counterinsurgency Abilities

(Buratha News)

A recent report by the Inspector Generals (IGs) of the Pentagon, State Department and United States Agency for International Development found that Iraq was facing institutional shortcomings with its security forces. They also criticized the Iraqi counterinsurgency operations. The warnings they made are remarkably similar to ones voiced in 2005-06. It raises questions about just how much the Iraqi forces (ISF) have progressed over the years, and more importantly if the Iraqis are capable of dealing with the insurgency on their own.

Mosul Campaign Day 115, Feb 8, 2017

The army chief of staff General Osman al-Ghani said that the attack on west Mosul would start soon. He encouraged people to return to the city and for the government to assist those still displaced. The government is continuing to push its propaganda line that the Islamic State is defeated and that taking west Mosul will be easier than east Mosul as a result.

Contradictions In Obama Administration’s Iraq Training Program

The Obama administration just announced that it was sending an additional 450 American soldiers to Iraq to train the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). That came after widespread criticism of America’s policy in the aftermath of the fall of Ramadi last month. Just beforehand the President mentioned that the U.S. had more training capacity in Iraq then Iraqi soldiers to be trained. The White House has also talked about the effectiveness of those Iraqis that have gone through the process, but then notes that none of them have been committed to battle yet. That might mean the administration’s new announcement was driven by the desire to do something in Iraq after the recent setback rather than being effective.

The United States just announced that it would be sending an additional 450 military trainers to Iraq. They would join the 3,080 trainers already in the country who are operating in camps in Irbil, Salahaddin, Anbar, and Baghdad. The new trainers are supposed to arrive later this summer and would go to the Taqadum base near Habaniya, which is in between Fallujah and Ramadi. The move was inspired by the fall of Ramadi in May, which led to a policy review within the White House. The training effort is one major part of America’s strategy in Iraq to rebuild the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) after their collapse during the summer of 2014. The U.S. also wants to organize and equip local Sunni tribal forces to oppose the Islamic State (IS).

The administration’s training program has two major problems, the first being that the forces that the U.S. has trained have not been used yet. On June 9, President Obama said that the ISF that were trained and equipped by the Americans were better than those who hadn’t gone through the process. None of those troops have been in combat yet however. That appears to be the Americans plan as U.S. officials said back in January that the new forces being put together should be used in defensive positions first rather than offensive ones because they would not be ready yet. This comes from previous experience in Iraq when the U.S. pushed Iraqi forces into combat as quickly as possible. Many of them were not ready and disintegrated in the face of insurgent attacks. This time around the Americans do not want to rush things. At the same time, the government forces are suffering from a manpower shortage and have not been able to hold many areas after they have been cleared. The American trained troops could be used in this capacity. Instead, it is unclear whether they are being used at all at this point.

The second issue involved shot comings with the Iraqi government. Obama recently mentioned that the U.S. had more training capacity in Iraq then soldiers to train. The Hill for example, mentioned in June that the Assad base in Anbar had not had any new recruits in six weeks. That followed other news that the government was not sending adequate troops for training. That’s probably why the U.S. has not been able to meet its goals. In December, it said it wanted to train 5,000 new recruits every six weeks. That would equal roughly 15,000 fighters by now. Instead, only 7,200 had finished the program with another 3,200 currently in training. Those soldiers and tribesmen that did arrive were not equipped by Baghdad either. At Camp Taji in Salahaddin, the Washington Post reported back in January that none of the trainees there had weapons or ammunition. Likewise, Al Mada noted that 200 tribal fighters at Assad in November had no guns either. The Iraqi government is notorious for its bureaucracy. The lack of soldiers showing up for American training and not being equipped are the negative effects of Baghdad’s red tape. The Defense Ministry always lacked capacity for basic needs such as logistics to supply its forces. More importantly this comes at a time when the government desperately needs to rebuild its army after it collapsed during the summer of 2014. Even during this crisis Baghdad can’t get the resources to where they are needed. This may be the reason why none of the U.S. trained forces have been used yet.

Given these issues it’s a wonder why the Obama administration would want to increase its training force in Iraq. None of the troops it has trained have been deployed yet, and it’s not getting the support from Baghdad necessary to make them effective. There are other actions the White House could have taken that would have an immediate impact upon the battlefield such as increasing the number of air strikes, easing the process to get them approved, committing forward observers to sport targets, etc. Instead it chose to increase its training program that already has a lot of excess capacity. It raises more questions than answers about America’s commitment to the fight against the Islamic State. It could be that the administration wanted to take a step that fit in with its current program rather than escalate things, and that could also blunt some of the criticism that it is facing.

SOURCES

Arango, Tim, “U.S. Troops, Back in Iraq, Train a Force to Fight ISIS,” New York times, 12/31/14

Barnes, Julian, “U.S., Iraq Prepare Offensive to Retake Mosul From Islamic State,” Wall Street Journal, 1/22/15

BBC, “Islamic state crisis; US troops sent into Iraq’s Anbar,” 11/11/14

- “US strategy on Iraq ‘not yet complete’ – Obama,” 6/8/15

Davis, Julie Hirschfeld, “U.S. Will Step up Training of Iraqi Forces Fighting ISIS, Obama Says,” New York Times, 6/8/15

Donnelly, Kristin, Jennings, and Abdullah, Halimah, “U.S. Sending 450 Military Personnel to Iraq for Ramadi Battle, NBC News, 6/10/15

Gordon, Michael, “U.S. Embracing a New Approach on Battling ISIS in Iraq,” New York Times, 6/10/15

Harper, Jon, “Hundreds of US troops now deployed in Iraq’s Anbar province,” Stars and Stripes, 12/18/14

Independent Press Agency, “200 American advisers to Speicher military base,” 10/16/14

Al Mada, “Americans are training “special missions” brigade in Anbar for the Liberation of cities,” 10/18/14

- “The United in “continuous” training of the Iraqi army at the Assad base graduated 200 volunteers from tribal members,” 1/21/15

Malas, Nour and Adnan, Ghassan, “Iraq Struggles to Revive Military for Coming Battles With Islamic State,” Wall Street Journal, 6/7/15

Morris, Loveday, “The U.S. military is back training troops in Iraq, but it’s a little different this time,” Washington Post, 1/8/15

National Iraqi News Agency, “Anbar provincial council: /100/ American military personnel arrived to the province to train the security forces and the sons of the tribes,” 10/15/14

Nissenbaum, Dion and Lubold, Gordon, “U.S. Prepares Plan to Send Hundreds More Trainers to Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, 6/9/15

Roberts, Kristin, “Iraq’s Problem Is So Much Bigger Than Just Training Its Military,” National Journal, 6/9/15

Al-Salhy, Suadad, “US advisers spread out through Iraq,” Al Jazeera, 11/20/14

Wong, Kristina, “US training base in Iraq hasn’t seen a new recruit in weeks,” The Hill, 6/8/15

Washington Announces Mosul Campaign Plan To Placate Iraq Politicians

This year Iraq’s politicians are hoping for a major turn around in the security situation in the country. A big focus is upon retaking Mosul the nation’s second largest city and the center of the Islamic State’s (IS) caliphate in Iraq. Premier Haider Abadi recently said that the city would be freed soon. Given this pressure the United States decided to announce a plan to attack Mosul this spring. This garnered a huge amount of press coverage, but largely missed the fact that the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) would not be ready for such a large undertaking in just a few months. Rather than revealing the timetable for pushing IS out of Mosul the United States’ real target was the Iraqi political class, which has been deeply critical of America’s effort and to show them that Washington has a plan to defeat the insurgency.

On February 19, the first day of a conference on countering terrorism held by the White House a member of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) briefed reporters on an impending Mosul campaign. The official said that a force of 20,000-25,000 soldiers and peshmerga would retake the city in April or May. This would involve five army brigades, three peshmerga brigades, three reserve army brigades, a counterterrorism brigade, and a unit made up of Mosul locals who would hold the city after it was cleared of insurgents. The eight ISF brigades would all undergo training by the United States. They would face a force of 1,000-2,000 Islamic State fighters in the city. The American announcement came just three days after Prime Minister Haider Abadi gave an interview with the BBC in which he said Mosul would be freed in just a few months with minimal casualties. He went on to criticize the U.S. led coalition for taking so long to get involved in the fight against IS. Other Iraqi leaders have made similar negative comments about the Americans. When the insurgents launched their summer offensive in June the White House made it clear that it would only intervene after Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was removed from office. That took several weeks, which proved to be the most critical period during the militant surge, as many believed that Baghdad would be besieged after Mosul and Tikrit fell. That delay made many Iraqis question how much Washington was committed to Iraq. Some even believe that the U.S. backs IS. Those types of comments were the main motivation for going public with the Mosul plan. The White House wanted to let Baghdad know that it was concerned about reversing the insurgency, and had a strategy in place to do it.

The fact that this was a political move and not a real timetable was made apparent quickly after the CENTCOM briefing. First the official said that if the Iraqis needed more time to prepare for the offensive it could be delayed. That was an out because the ISF will not be ready in two to three months. The U.S. is supposed to train roughly 16,000 Iraqi soldiers by April. As of February it had only put 3,400 soldiers through a basic 6-8 week course. Some of this training has been without weapons because Iraq’s notorious red tape has delayed their delivery. An officer in the Iraqi Defense Ministry told Bloomberg that the 8 brigades would not be ready until August. Second, this process will take even longer as 20,000-25,000 soldiers and peshmerga are not enough to assault a city the size of Mosul that has roughly 1-2 million people. In 2004 the U.S. used 10,500 troops to take Fallujah that had a population of approximately 350,000. Some 3,000-4,000 insurgents opposed them. Rather than the 1,000-2,000 IS fighters the CENTCOM briefer claimed are in Mosul Iraqi and Kurdish officials put the figure at more like 10,000. Given the size of the city and the number of insurgents the Americans will need to train roughly 40,000 Iraqis or more to have a credible chance at success. Third, Mosul is supposed to be held by former soldiers and police from the city along with local tribes. In December 2014 members of the Ninewa council said Premier Abadi had given permission to set up three camps to train this Mosul Brigade, which was supposed to reach 8,000 volunteers. In early January it was claimed that 4,000 men had shown up at two camps, but then in February a peshmerga commander was quoted in the Daily Beast saying that there were only 800 Sunnis undergoing training to hold Mosul. That is obviously nowhere near the number necessary for the job ahead. Finally, at a minimum Salahaddin province would have to be cleared before the assault on Mosul to secure supply lines and communication for the ISF that would be coming up from the south. Currently the ISF and militias in the province are stretched and have not been able to hold some of their recent victories. Securing that governorate will take a long time putting another hold on Mosul. American officials have previously noted many of these issues so they are aware of the challenges ahead. That was even more evidence that an imminent offensive against the city was more talk than anything else, and was motivated by other issues like politics other than the military situation on the ground.

The U.S. is a big player in Iraq, but does not have the same position it once held. Coming late to the fight against the Islamic State has led to deep questioning of the Baghdad-Washington relationship by Iraqi elites. Feeling this heat the Americans made a public relations move by announcing a plan for Mosul in response to increasing statements by Premier Abadi and others that the city should be taken sooner rather than later. This is meant to buy time, as the real attack upon the city is a long ways away. The Iraqi army needs to be rebuilt, crucial territory needs to be cleared to even reach Mosul, and a real force has to be recruited to hold the area. That all points to the winter of 2015 being a more realistic date for this operation than the spring. That has to be sold to the political leadership by not only the Americans but the Iraqi Defense Ministry as well, because Baghdad doesn’t seem to be taking into account the current situation as it talks more and more about expelling the insurgency from major urban areas.

SOURCES

Abdullah, Dalshad, “Baghdad preparing to liberate Mosul from ISIS: sources,” Asharq Al-Awsat, 12/10/14

Baldor, Lolita, “Official: Mission to retake Mosul to begin in April, May,” Associated Press, 2/19/15

Baldor, Lolita and Yacoub, Sameer, “Iraqis worry they won’t be ready for Mosul operation,” Associated Press, 2/21/15

Barnes, Julian, “U.S., Iraq Prepare Offensive to Retake Mosul From Islamic State,” Wall Street Journal, 1/22/15

BBC, “Iraq preparing to retake Mosul form Islamic State – PM,” 2/16/15

Gordon, Michael, “Iraqi Assault to Retake Mosul From Islamic State Is Planned for Spring,” New York Times, 2/19/15

Gordon, Michael and Schmitt, Eric, “Iraqis Prepare ISIS Offensive, With U.S. Help,” New York Times, 11/2/14

Knights, Michael, “The liberation of Mosul will have to wit,” Al Jazeera, 1/28/15

Al Mada, “Nineveh volunteers continue training despite reluctance to give them salaries or arm them..and the Peshmerga awaiting coordination with Baghdad,” 1/10/15

McLeary, Paul, “CENTCOM Outlines Battle for Mosul, Doubles Estimate for IS Dead,” Defense News, 2/19/15

Natali, Denise, “Iraqis bicker over liberating Mosul,” Al Monitor, 12/29/14

Ollivant, Douglas, “Iraq After The Islamic State: Politics Rule,” War On The Rocks, 2/18/15

Rosenfeld, Jesse, “Witness to the Bloodthirsty Siege of Mosul: Kurdish Troops Taking Selfies With ISIS Corpses,” Daily Beast, 2/15/15

Rudaw, “Iraq to build new army bases, train volunteers for Mosul operation,” 12/26/14

Schmitt, Eric, “Despite U.S. Warnings, Iraqis Push for Winter Offensive in Mosul,” New York Times, 12/8/14

Sherlock, Ruth, “US admits it won’t be able to train enough troops in time for Mosul offensive,” Telegraph, 2/20/15

Walcott, John, Sabah, Zaid and Lerman, David, “US rhetoric collides with Iraqi reality in fight against Islamic State,” Bloomberg, 2/20/15

Can Iraq’s Militias Be Successfully Integrated Into The Security Forces?

 

Today the Iraqi government has become dependent upon militias to defend the country against the insurgency. These armed groups might be up to half of Baghdad’s forces. The question is what will happen to these militias after the insurgency is defeated? Can they be integrated into the security forces and whom will their loyalties lie with? Some are connected to political parties and many were created by Iran to either fight the Americans or defend the Assad government against the Syrian rebels. Iraq faced a similar dilemma in 2005 when the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq’s Badr Brigade was recruited into the police commandos who later became the National and then Federal Police. These units singled out Sunnis for mass arrests, ran death squads, and maintained secret prisons. It was only through external pressure and training by the U.S. and its allies, an independent Interior Minister, and a strong Iraqi general that the Federal Police was reformed. Today the situation is the reverse with Iran pushing militias to the fore, and an Interior Minister connected to the armed groups as well making the transformation of these organizations into a national security force all the harder.

Interior Minister Naqib created the 1st police commando units (AP)

The Iraqi police were in chaos after 2003 and the Americans did little to remedy the situation. After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein the police were largely ignored by the United States. It didn’t give the time or resources to rebuild the force even though they were crucial to restoring law and order in the country. Attacks by both insurgents and militias devastated many police units leading to collapses in several cities in 2004. That led to a push to a militarized police to help fight the anti-government elements. Interior Minister Falah Hassan al-Naqib and his uncle General Adnan Thabit went on to create the special police commandos to fulfill that role. The new units were mostly former Sunni soldiers, but included some Shiites and minorities. The commandos, the police, and the Interior Ministry in general were a mess and besieged from all sides. That led the Interior Minister to take matters into his own hands and create ad hoc units like the commandos, which were welcomed by the Americans at the time, because they too needed all the help they could get to restore security to Iraq.

Members of the Wolf Brigade in Baghdad 2007 (IraqSlogger)

 This chaos continued into 2005 and into this void stepped the Shiite militias. In May 2005 a new government took office and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq’s (ISCI) Bayan Jabr was named Interior Minister. He brought in his party’s Badr Brigade into commando units like the Volcano and Wolf Brigades. These units were accused of mass arrests, running death squads and secret prisons. Twice in 2005 the Wolf Brigade entered Diyala and arrested over 1,000 people all of which were Sunnis. By the summer, the first stories emerged of secret detention facilities being run within the Interior Ministry. (1) In July the 759^th U.S. Military Police Battalion found 170 prisoners at one such prison at the Ministry in Baghdad. The next month the Volcano Brigade took away 36 Sunnis from their homes in Baghdad, tortured, killed them, and dumped their bodies near the Iranian border. A warrant was issued for the commander of the brigade, but it was never followed through with. In November, the U.S. discovered another secret prison in the basement of the Interior Ministry’s operations center in Jadriya, Baghdad. Former Interior Minister Naqib told the New York Times that the Special Interrogations Unit ran the facility and that it was under the direct command of Minister Jabr. There were 8-10 other such secret facilities in Baghdad, which were run by the Deputy Director of the Interior Ministry’s intelligence directorate Bashir Nasir al-Wandi who was a Badr member. In Jadriya there were 173 prisoners, many of which had been tortured. A U.S. army adviser to the Wolf Brigade stated that the unit acted fine when the Americans were around, but when they weren’t it would kidnap and kill Sunnis and burn their homes. In fact, the Brigade once led U.S. advisers into an ambush. In September 2006 an inspection of the Site 4 prison in eastern Baghdad found that the Wolf Brigade was torturing many of the 1,400 prisoners there. The commanding General Mahid al-Gharawi was charged with abuse afterward, but the case against him fell apart when witnesses recanted their testimony. Two months later a National Police unit raided the Higher Education Ministry and took away 159 people. The incident was considered a sectarian attack, as the commandos had become the National Police and the Iraqi Accordance Front, the main Sunni party in the government, ran the ministry. Finally, in March 2007 the National Police blocked off an area of eastern Baghdad and kidnapped five British security guards. Both Premiers Ibrahim al-Jaafari and Nouri al-Maliki denied that the commandos or the National Police were involved in sectarian attacks. They claimed that people wearing fake police uniforms were responsible. The actions of the commandos, National Police and the protection they received from the prime ministers were all a reflection of the cooperation between the government and militias to carry out a sectarian war in response to the insurgency. By 2005 the civil war was just taking off, and the ruling Shiite parties decided to fight fire with fire giving the militias free reign both on their own and through the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

At first, the U.S. leadership was largely unwilling to deal with the militias in the security forces saying it was an Iraqi affair, but by 2006 it started pushing for reforms. In January it started a re-training program for the police to try to stop some of the abuses. It also got the Interior Ministry to mix the commandos created by General Thabit with the Badr ones into the National Police. These moves had no real effect as the leadership within the ministry and National Police was still in tact to give orders to the units to continue on with their operations. In October, the U.S. took stronger action when it disbanded the 8^th Brigade of the 2^nd National Police Division and arrested its officers for abuses. It was blamed for a raid on a Baghdad factory where it kidnapped 26 Sunni workers and killed seven of them. Later in the year the Americans began another process with the National Police that involved taking each brigade off line to go through three week of training and vetting that included human rights, policing, patrolling, and other skills. It took over a year to finish this reform effort, and this time it was more far reaching. By the end of the year 27,000 National Police had been fired, 17 of 27 battalion commanders and 8 of 9 brigade commanders had been removed. In September 2007 a congressionally mandated commission issued its findings about the ISF known as the Jones report, which advocated disbanding the National Police because of its sectarian nature. The U.S. military rejected this suggestion claiming that the National Police were necessary to help secure the country. At the same time, it acknowledged that the National Police were still carrying out attacks upon Sunnis and needed more work. It therefore launched its third re-training program, this time by the Italian Carabinieri. The training lasted two months and went from December 2007 to 2009. The Americans also created 41 National Police Transition Teams to monitor the Iraqi units. Although it took several years to get it right this outside pressure to deal with the militias in the police was crucial in changing the force. The Shiite parties that led the government were not interested in the matter because it was their fighters who were in the units and they were committed to fighting a sectarian war. The U.S. was one of the only groups within Iraq capable of pushing for re-training the National Police and getting rid of its commanders who were Badr members. The Americans could not do this alone, and needed to find Iraqi partners to accomplish this and they eventually did.

Interior Minister Bolani was essential for clearing out the Badr elements within the National Police (Getty Images)

In May 2006 a new Interior Minister Jawad Bolani was named, which opened the door to changing the National Police. Under the new Maliki administration Jabr was switched to Finance and Bolani became Interior Minister. Bolani was considered an independent giving him some leeway to operate outside of the other Shiite parties who had militias in the ministry. After the 2007 Jones Report came out he ordered an evaluation of the National Police, which found that it was still plagued with problems. That led to a major reform effort that worked congruently to the American one. He investigated 5,000 National Police and fired 2,300 of them by the end of the year. He appointed a new National Police Commander General Hussein al-Awadi who was also committed to change. Awadi got assurances that he could fire anyone without political interference or repercussions. He then recruited new young officers that could carry out his reforms within the National Police, while at the same time forcing out most of the old leadership from command positions. The National Police Brigades also went through their own Iraqi re-training program. They were then partnered with a U.S. unit afterward that provided oversight and more mentoring. The Interior Ministry also recruited more Sunnis into the National Police to try to balance out the force. One result was that the head of the Wolf Brigade was fired, half of the unit was broken up, and Sunnis were brought in. The Americans applied the outside pressure, but if it wasn’t for Bolani at the top of the Interior Ministry and General Awadi commanding the National Police the U.S. could have been ignored. Instead, it found Iraqis who were just as committed as it to cleaning up the militias’ influence within the police. Together the two removed the leadership of the National Police and made it loyal to the government and country rather than ISCI. By breaking that link the National Police really became a national force.

The reforming of the National Police provides important lessons for Iraq today as it is again dealing with a massive militia mobilization and integration within the security forces. The two situations could not be more different however. This time the main outside power is Iran not the Americans, and Tehran has pushed the militias, many of which it helped create, funds and arms, to the front in the fight against the insurgency after the ISF collapsed in Mosul this summer. Even before that when fighting broke out in Anbar in January the militias were active there and many were included within ISF units. That has only increased since then. The Iraqi government has talked about including all of the various independent armed groups in Iraq within a National Guard to try to bring them under the umbrella of the government. The Americans support this idea. That would not break the militia ties to their leadership however just as when Badr joined the Interior Ministry in 2005. In fact, Iran wants to maintain its power and influence within the Iraqi government and ISF through its militia allies and would oppose any effort at trying to carry out any serious reform of government forces. Not only that but the new Interior Minister Mohammed Ghaban is from the Badr organization the leading militia in the country. It was tasked by Iran with heading the Iraqi militias fighting in Syria, and it appears to be doing the same in Iraq. Premier Haider Abadi has welcomed the help of the militias to defend the country now, but there is talk that he is worried about the day after. Unless he finds strong allies that will help him it’s unlikely that he will be able to end the militias’ influence, and their ties to Iran.

FOOTNOTES

1. San Francisco Chronicle, “Iraq concedes detainees likely were tortured,” 11/16/05

SOURCES

Allbritton, Christopher, “Why Iraq’s Police Are a Menace,” Time, 5/20/06

CNN, “Death Squads,” 3/25/07

Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraqi Force Development: A Progress Report,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/23/07

Diamond, Larry, “What Went Wrong in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2004

Gangs of Iraq, “Interview Brig. Gen. Karl Horst,” Frontline, 4/17/07

Jones, General James, “The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq,” Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, 9/6/07

Moore, Solomon, “Killings Linked to Shiite Squads in Iraqi Police Force,” Los Angeles Times, 11/29/05

Oppel, Richard, “Iraqi Police Cited in Abuses May Lose Aid,” New York Times, 9/30/06

PBS Frontline, “Interview Robert Perito,” Truth, War and Consequences, 10/9/03

Perito, Robert, “The Iraq Federal Police U.S. Police Building under Fire,” United States Institute of Peace, October 2011

Rathmell, Andrew, "Fixing Iraq's Internal Security Forces: Why is Reform of the Ministry Interior so hard?" Center for Strategic and International Studies, 11/13/07

Rayburn, Joel, Iraq After America, Strongmen, Sectarians, Resistance, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2014

San Francisco Chronicle, “Iraq concedes detainees likely were tortured,” 11/16/05

Sherman, Matt and Carstens, Roger, “Cooling the Streets: Institutional Reforms in Iraq’s Ministry of Interior,” Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations at The College of William and Mary, 11/14/08

Silverstein, Ken, “The minister of civil war: Bayan Jabr, Paul Bremer, and the rise of the Iraqi death squads,” Harper’s Magazine, August 2006

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Government,” 7/30/07

Tharp, Mike, “More Sunnis joining Iraq’s National Police,” McClatchy Newspapers, 5/29/08

Tyson, Ann Scott, “U.S. Commanders Say Iraqi Police Can Be Reformed,” Washington Post, 12/11/07

Wong, Edward and Burns, John, “Iraqi Rift Grows After Discovery of Prison,” New York Times, 11/17/05

Zavis, Alexandra, “Iraq works to clean up national police,” Los Angeles Times, 2/6/08

Controversy Over Supporting Iraq’s Tribes In Anbar

Anbar was where fighting first broke out in Iraq at the very end of December 2013. The conflict split many of the province’s tribes with some supporting the government, some revolting against the authorities but opposing the Islamic State (IS), and some throwing in their lot with the Islamists. Since then some of those tribes have re-aligned again as many had bad relations with IS previously, and when it became the main fighting force in Anbar they decided to fight them as well and went to Baghdad for support. New Prime Minister Haider Abadi has come out for recruiting and training tribes in the governorate and incorporating them into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The U.S. has been pushing this idea as well. Not all in Abadi’s coalition agree however, and the implementation of the strategy has gone anything but smoothly.

Premier Abadi and the Americans have both been pushing the formation of tribal fighting forces in Anbar. In the middle of October the Interior Ministry okayed the creation of a new 3,000 member Special Task Force Brigade for the province. It would consist of three brigades of 1,000 fighters each drawn from local tribes. The idea for the brigade came after meetings between representatives from Abadi’s office and sheikhs in Jordan. The Americans facilitated these talks as they have been pushing Baghdad to reach out to tribes and others to create Sunni allies to fight the insurgency. Both before and after this announcement, sheikhs in Anbar had complained that the central government was not supporting them, and were not giving them weapons despite their fighting the insurgents and the worsening security situation in the province. The problem is the Shiite parties are split over this idea. Some do not trust the tribes, some of which were once with the insurgents. They worry that if any weapons are given to them they could later be used against the government. There are also those that oppose decentralization of the security forces out to the provinces believing that it could lead to the break up of the country. These are long time concerns and existed under the former government of Nouri al-Maliki when the Awakening emerged in Anbar and later the Americans formed the Sahwa.

Despite these worries, Abadi and the Americans are pushing forward with this plan, but it is being criticized. First, the U.S. sent in advisers to the Habaniya and Al-Assad bases in central Anbar. The provincial council claimed this occurred in the middle of October, but the Americans didn’t officially announce this move until the start of November. At the same time, tribesmen from Ramadi, Haditha, Ana, Rawa, and Qaim began arriving at Al-Assad. 200 were to be trained every two weeks. When all 3,000 have completed this process they are supposed to assist with a major military push in Anbar. Sheikh Gaood from the Albu Nimr tribe, which has recently experienced mass executions by the IS complained on November 18 that this new brigade was not getting the support it was supposed to. He claimed that the unit received no ammunition and only 100 guns. A local official told Al Mada that the tribesmen had no weapons at all. If these charges are true they could have been the result of several factors. As already stated, some ruling parties are against the formation of this unit, and may be holding up its completion. The ISF’s logistics are horrendous and they may not have been able to come up with the equipment for the new unit in such as short amount of time. Whatever the case the lack of adequate supplies for the new brigade perpetuates the belief amongst many sheikhs that Baghdad is unwilling to stand behind them.

The creation of Sunni allies is a must if Baghdad hopes to turn around the security situation. Clearing out cities alone will not stop the insurgency or turn people away from supporting it. Only with local allies within the Sunni community can things be reversed. The creation of the Special Task Force Brigade in Anbar is a step in the right direction, but all the issues it is facing points to the problems in making this policy a reality. Members of Abadi’s ruling coalition do not trust the tribes’ loyalty. The institutional deficiencies within the ISF may delay the equipping of the unit. The fighters are also only scheduled for two weeks of training, which cannot provide them with much besides basic weapons training. That may mean the Brigade is just for show and will remain an auxiliary force like the current tribal forces are doing now in the province. Whatever the case, until there is full political and military backing for this plan there is little hope that it will be successful.

SOURCES

BBC, “Islamic state crisis; US troops sent into Iraq’s Anbar,” 11/11/14

Al Mada, “Abadi in dialogue with the elders of Anbar: competition between the two groups over recruiting 30 thousand fighters .. stuck on political demands,” 10/30/14

- “Americans are training “special missions” brigade in Anbar for the Liberation of cities,” 10/18/14

- “Americans are training volunteers from the clans but Baghdad only gave 200 guns,” 11/18/14

National Iraqi News Agency, “Anbar provincial council: /100/ American military personnel arrived to the province to train the security forces and the sons of the tribes,” 10/15/14

- “MoI approves forming a special force in Anbar under the supervision of US,” 10/17/14

Radio Free Iraq, “05 November 2014,” Daily Updates from Anbar, 11/5/14

- “16 November 2014,” Daily Updates from Anbar, 11/16/14

Rasheed, Ahmed, “Iraq’s Abadi struggles to gain Sunni tribal support,” Reuters, 10/29/14

Al Rayy, “Anbar declares that the first batch of the Brigade of Martyr Ahmed Dulaimi will complete its training this week,” 11/4/14

Shafaq News, “Abadi agrees to form a force of 30 thousand fighters from Anbar,” 10/28/14

- “A leader in Albu-Nimr tribe: the government did not arms only 100 of our men without ammunition,” 11/18/14

U.S. Boots On The Ground In Iraq, Advisers Deployed To Anbar And Diyala

 

The Obama administration has pointed out that it needs local security forces in Iraq to turn around the security situation in the country, as air power alone cannot do it. The U.S. just took the first step in that direction. The 1^st Infantry Division headquarters is being sent to Iraq for an advisory mission, and three units have been deployed to bases in Anbar and Diyala.

On September 25, 2014 it was announced that the 1^st Infantry Division headquarters was being sent to Iraq to train the Iraqi forces. Earlier in the month 475 troops were deployed for advising the ISF. They are just now being sent out into the field. One unit arrived in Karkush base in central Diyala on October 15. That same day 100 U.S. advisers arrived in Al Taqadum base outside of Habaniya, which is situated between Ramadi and Fallujah, and to Al-Assad that is outside Baghdadi and to the south of Haditha. That last base is a dangerous one. The day before it was reported that the Islamic State had attacked Al-Assad. It was also assaulting neighboring Baghdadi from two directions. This is part of IS’s on going campaign to seize all of Anbar. That could mean that these new advisers will not only come under fire, but might have to return it as well. President Obama has said that he is not sending ground forces to Iraq, but these forward advisors might end up in combat.

Security in Anbar is dire with the Islamic State having seized much of the center of the province in the last few days. The local council and governor have desperately asked Baghdad for aid and assistance, and recently called for U.S. troops to be sent there to help reverse the situation. Part of their wishes has now been met. American advisers are in two bases in the center of the governorate, which is where the heaviest fighting is now taking place. This is the first substantive move by the Obama administration to build up local forces on the ground, which is what is necessary to really turn back the insurgency. On the other hand, training the ISF and tribes is a long-term process, and Anbar may not have that much time. A spate of towns and cities has just fallen, and IS is pushing hard on seizing other areas including Al-Assad base. That means American troops are in harms, and there could be casualties. Hundreds more advisers also need to be sent to Iraq if the U.S. has any real hope of turning around the Iraqi forces so this is only a baby step in that direction. Still, Anbar is one of the main battlefronts in Iraq and something has to be done there to save the province from falling. These advisers could be a step in that direction.

SOURCES

Arabic CNN, “Anbar police chief for CNN: Daash caught one of the largest air bases..and the Alliance performs 21 raids with the participation of Saudis on Kobani,” 10/14/14

Harper, Jon, “Army sending division HQ element to Iraq,” Stars and Stripes, 9/25/14

National Iraqi News Agency, “Anbar provincial council: /100/ American military personnel arrived to the province to train the security forces and the sons of the tribes,” 10/15/14

- “Breaking News….The Islamic State attacks Haditha district from two directions,” 10/14/14

Shafaq News, “Security official reveals the tasks of American advisers in Diyala,” 10/15/14

Advising The Iraqi Police In Anbar 2010-11 Interview With Morgan Smiley

 

Rebuilding the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) was considered one of the few success stories of the U.S. reconstruction effort in Iraq. When the Americans withdrew in 2011 there were questions about whether the ISF would be able to keep up the fight against the insurgency. Issues of training, equipment, logistics and leadership were all brought up. To help shed some light on this issue is Morgan Smiley who served as a police adviser in Ramadi from 2010-2011 with the U.S. Army’s 3^rd Infantry Division. He retired from the army in 2013 and served as an adviser to Afghan, Iraqi, and Saudi forces. He currently works as a civilian adviser to the Afghan forces.

1. Was there a national training program for the Iraqi police or were they just taught at their police stations and bases in Anbar?

Because I dealt more with the Federal Police (FP) than Iraqi Police (IP), I cannot say for certain how the IP were trained. I believe they were locally recruited and trained on-the-job, though the leadership often received some type of formalized training in the Baghdad area.  Some of the senior IP leadership were drawn from the Iraqi Army (IA) or had previous experience in the old IA and were in position as a result of that. I do recall that the Anbar IP had a training center near Habaniyah that our attached MP [Military Police] Company dealt with. Again, because I worked primarily with the Federal Police brigade, I am unsure of how many IP from Ramadi and Fallujah went through that center during our tenure in Anbar but I know some did.

2. The Iraqi Police are recruited local, but is the same true for the Federal Police or are they drawn from around the country?

The FP that I dealt with were, in many cases, drawn from the Anbar area but many were drawn from other parts of Iraq, often from around the Baghdad area, some from further north. The FP brigade I worked with was the Abu Risha Brigade, named for Sheik Abu Risha who was influential in creating the "Anbar Awakening" in the Ramadi area (the unit leadership took some pride in being associated with this individual).

3. What did you think of the skills and competence of the police units you advised?

Keeping in mind that I was an infantry officer with no real law enforcement experience (beyond previous duty as a police advisor in Afghanistan), I felt that the IP and FP leaders I dealt with were fairly competent and were able to execute basic level management functions within their respective organizations. The lower ranking personnel appeared, for the most part, to be effective, with the FP personnel geared more towards para-military style "policing" (like well-equipped riot control forces) and the IP focused on "community policing", with U.S. forces concentrating on developing their ability to secure a crime scene, collect and secure evidence, conduct investigations, follow the rule of law, etc, etc.  I felt that the FP were better prepared to execute their duties since their duties were similar to military functions. The IP needed more work in developing and understanding western methods of law enforcement....very difficult in that culture.

4. How about their equipment and logistics. Were the police you worked with fully equipped and could they maintain their supplies on their own or were they still relying upon the Americans at that time?

The logistics system with both the FP and IP were barely functional. With the FP, their equipment was generally in good shape but maintenance was a constant problem, particularly regarding vehicle parts. The same was true for the IP. In fact, at one IP station in Ramadi, several fairly new Ford F-350 IP trucks sat idle, covered in dust, stripped of parts, because they couldn't get parts through their supply system forcing them to cannibalize their vehicles. Yet they still reported these stripped vehicles as functional for fuel resupply purposes.

They were expecting the U.S. forces to provide logistics support as we had in the past but at this point in the war, we were directed to avoid such efforts in order to force the Iraqis to use their system, identify the shortfalls, correct them, and make it work while we were still there to provide some limited oversight.

5. There have been several reports that the leadership of the ISF is plagued by political appointees. Did you see any of that in Anbar?

The Fallujah IP police chief in 2010-2011 was Brigadier General (BG) Mahmud, who was part of the Issawi [clan within the Albu Issa tribe]. The story we got upon arrival was that Colonel Mahmud had been fired in early 2010 by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) for corrupt behavior and shortly before we got in-theater, was reinstalled as police chief at brigadier general rank because he had a relative working in MoI in Baghdad. BG Mahmud was known to be in regular contact with some of the insurgent groups working in and around Fallujah though I'm not certain what that involvement entailed. He routinely kept information from us regarding insurgent activity in the city (some of which was directed against us) and sometime seemed to know of events before they happened. 

6. Did you see anything similar to that with police in Ramadi and the Federal Police?

IP forces in Ramadi and Fallujah seemed to be familiar with insurgent groups in the area, having been there for quite some time. The FP didn't seem as knowledgeable but did indicate some familiarity with key insurgent leaders, likely through the informal communications network (usually involving cell phones) that exists among seemingly everyone in Iraq (and Afghanistan for that matter).

7. When the U.S. pulled out its forces in 2011 did you think the Iraqi police was capable of maintaining itself?

Did I think they could maintain themselves....no. Did I think the IP and FP could perform their primary functions....yes. But maintaining their equipment and sustaining the training and instruction they had received we knew was going to be difficult because of their constant logistics management problems and their general reluctance towards sustainment training....after all, once you've received training in something, why do you need to update, re-train, or go through refresher training, right?

8. The ISF has stopped doing counterinsurgency operations and have reverted to tactics used by the Americans before the Surge such as raiding and then leaving an area, conducting mass arrests, etc. Did you see that coming when you left Iraq in 2011?

I doubt many former U.S. advisors are surprised at how ISF are executing their missions. I think most of us felt that the Iraqi forces were generally uncomfortable with counterinsurgency (COIN) as practiced by U.S. and coalition forces and felt such efforts would be pushed aside after we left. The Iraqis seemed far more comfortable with raids, mass arrests, and the more heavy-handed style associated with Saddam-era security forces versus a population-centric method that relied more on "soft-power" skills.

9. Finally what was the state of the insurgency in Anbar when you left and were there any signs then that it was attempting to rebuild itself after its defeat during the Surge?

The insurgency in Anbar in 2010-2011 was still active but at a far lower ebb than in previous years. While still hitting U.S. targets on occasion, insurgent activity was generally focused against ISF (the Anbar Provincial Government Center in Ramadi was a frequent target).  There didn't appear to be a re-building of insurgent forces in the area though there was concern that the Sahwa or "Sons of Iraq" could return to insurgency and terrorism if they didn't get paid as promised by the Iraqi government.

HISTORY CHANNEL VIDEO: Iraq War Insurgency And Counterinsurgency

The Breakdown Of The Iraqi Army’s Logistics

Given the dire security situation that Iraq faced from 2003-2008 it was no surprise that the United States gave little attention to the Iraqi Army’s logistics. It wasn’t until several years after the U.S. invasion that the Americans finally began planning and contracting to develop Iraq’s support network, so that it could maintain its forces and equipment. This went through huge problems including the complete un-interest amongst the Iraqi military leadership for this task. By the time the U.S. withdrew its forces in 2011, several supply depots had been established and a computerized management system was in place. The problem was that the Americans oversaw this network, and when they left the Iraqis weren’t capable of keeping it up and running. The result is that most of the logistics for the Iraqi army has broken down since then.

Iraqis are finding it harder to maintain their equipment like this Humvee because their logistic network is falling apart (U.S. Department of Defense)

In early 2013 General Robert Caslen, the head of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq told the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) that Iraq’s logistic system had collapsed after the U.S. withdrawal. General Caslen told SIGIR that when the U.S. military pulled out of Iraq it took the structures with it that made sure the Iraqi military could supply and maintain itself. Around December 2012, General Caslen travelled to the spare parts warehouse at the Taji facility, which is the top maintenance base for the Iraqi army. There the general saw shelves packed with parts and the computers for the country’s automated inventory management system. The problem was that the parts were covered with dust, because they were never sent to any Iraqi units to repair anything. As a result, the Taji base had not ordered a single spare part during 2012. The computers Caslen found were not turned on, and had not worked for months. That was because the generators that ran the computers were out of commission. When the U.S. left the base had no contract or budget to provide fuel. That forced Iraqi soldiers to buy it themselves, which turned out to be of low quality, which eventually broke the generators. This was symbolic of the entire supply system for the Iraqi army. After the Americans departed, the Iraqis lacked the care, concern, know how, and interest to keep up the facility, and the entire network running. In turn, it fell apart leaving Iraqi units to fend for themselves. These problems were repeatedly brought up in audits and investigations in the lead-up to the withdrawal.

The Special Inspector General and the Inspector General of the Department of Defense from 2009-2010 issued several reports warning that the Iraqis were incapable of maintaining their supply system for the Iraqi forces. The problems actually started with the Americans. For the first several years after the invasion, the U.S. was only concerned with pumping out as many soldiers as possible. The Americans would do all the training, equipping, and supplying, so nothing was really done about the Iraqis doing that work themselves. Eventually, the U.S. decided to tackle the issue, and the Taji maintenance facility was to be at the forefront of that effort. The company that was contracted to develop the base was originally given a deal for $350 million, but that ballooned to $628.2 million by the time it was done. That was because the job was badly designed, and the orders for it were changed 161 times. The Iraqi Defense Ministry showed no interest in the facility, and the supply network overall, which meant the U.S. had to work on the base longer than expected adding more costs. When Taji was completed there were no Iraqi soldiers trained to use its equipment. The U.S. military stepped in, but the Iraqi army and Defense Ministry again showed little concern, and never sent enough soldiers to fully man the base or go for training. Not only that, but those that were detailed for the task were often pulled out. A July 2009 report by SIGIR for example, found that around 50% of students at Taji were absent at any given time. Of those permanently stationed at the base, 75% had finished their required courses, but they were ranked as marginally skilled. On top of that, only 33% of required troops were ever at the facility. Taji was only one example of how the entire system was flawed. Other issues included the fact that the Iraqi generals valued parts on the shelves over them being sent to units. That meant the leadership did not want bases like Taji to actually do their job, but simply store parts. Second, the system set up required Iraqi units to go to Taji to get parts rather than having them shipped to them. That would require huge trips, often ones that commanders would not allow. Requests for parts had to go all the way to the division’s general staff, and officers felt if they constantly asked for repairs they would lose standing, so most of them did not make the effort. There was also no guarantee that equipment sent to be fixed would be sent back to their units. Instead, Iraqi soldiers were forced to buy spare parts on the open market, sometimes of spotty quality or scavenge them from other vehicles to maintain their forces. Another factor was that Iraqi divisions were only given fuel for the number of vehicles they had on hand whether they worked or not. That created an incentive for officers to keep as many vehicles on hand as possible, even broke ones, so that they would get their fuel quota. At the top, because the Defense Ministry did not value logistics, and didn’t understand how it worked, it didn’t adequately budget, plan, or maintain it. The only thing that kept the system working was American oversight and advisers. Now that they are gone, the whole thing is collapsing. That has left each Iraqi division to take care of itself, while millions of dollars of parts sit idle in places like Taji.

Rebuilding the Iraqi security forces is considered the only success of the U.S. effort to reconstruct Iraq. A number of divisions were put together. After some huge setbacks, those units eventually took the lead in fighting militants, and performed admirably. Behind the scenes however, American and Iraqi neglect meant that the Iraqi army was only able to field a force, because of the U.S. military was there to ensure that adequate supplies and parts were made available. Once they withdrew the logistics system immediately began deteriorating. Taji Maintenance Depot is a perfect example with parts collecting dust that could be used to keep Humvees and other vehicles running. The Iraqi military leadership is making the situation worse, because they value how many resources are on hand rather than whether they are being used or operating properly. It has never understood the need for maintenance, and until it does the general staff will maintain incentives that will eventually lead to the breakdown of most of its heavy equipment.

SOURCES

Hoffman, Michael, “Logistics logjam is a challenge for Iraqi army,” Army Times, 3/13/11

Inspector General United States Department of Defense, “Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Iraq Security Forces,” Department of Defense, 11/17/10

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Developing A Depot Maintenance Capability At Taji Hampered By Numerous Problems,” 7/30/09

- “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/09

- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09

- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” April 2013

How The U.S. Reconstruction Effort Came Apart During Iraq’s Sectarian Civil War

The United States project to rebuild Iraq had been beset by problems the day it started in 2003. When the civil war started in 2005 it complicated matters more as security steadily declined. Things got worse after the bombing of the Shiite shrine in Samarra in February 2006. In the next four days approximately 1,300 people were killed. 25,000 were eventually displaced. The sectarian cleansing of Baghdad began as the Shiite militias went on the offensive. The Iraqi government and the United States were overwhelmed by the situation. Reconstruction of the country was thrown into disarray as a result just as American officials were trying to change directions.

The violence that was unleashed after the bombing at Samarra greatly impeded the U.S. rebuilding effort. First, the program was run out of Baghdad. Movement throughout the city and entering and leaving it became very difficult as militias, insurgents, and local neighborhoods created informal checkpoints to protect their areas from attack. Parts of the capital were declared no go zones for the U.S. Iraqi professionals and public workers also begin fleeing the capital in a massive brain drain. That further impaired the capacity of the government, which was already poor. The Iraqi authorities were now even less able to run the infrastructure that they were being left with. The ability of the Americans to monitor and manage projects became greatly impaired as well.

The outbreak of civil conflict came as the United States was attempting to change the emphasis of its rebuilding program. 2006 was the year that the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 2 (IRRF2) was coming to an end, which emphasized large infrastructure projects using major American corporations such as Bechtel. These were long-term efforts that would take years to impact the country. The U.S. was now trying to move towards small and medium sized projects that would have immediate effects, and include more Iraqi companies and local communities out in the provinces. The two tools that would be used to achieve these goals would be the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), which was distributed by local military units, and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). This was part of the new Clear, Hold and Build counterinsurgency strategy put together by Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and the White House. There were many problems in this transition. First, some U.S. officials didn’t see the necessity of the medium term projects, and refused to approve them. Second, there wasn’t enough funding, and there were delays in budgeting and acquisition. That meant that the nine cities that were supposed to be targeted by the new campaign in the summer of 2006 was reduced to four. The PRTs were not adequately staffed, lacked money, and there were disputes between agencies over who would have responsibility over them. Finally, there were disagreements within the administration over whether the new strategy should be initiated to begin with. These all undermined the effectiveness of the new counterinsurgency plan. Without a unified stance, there was no way the Americans were going to be able to carry out the new strategy. That on top of the increased violence meant restoring and securing the country suffered.

Still, the U.S. pressed ahead with a new focus upon agriculture. Farming was the second largest industry after oil in Iraq, and employed 25-30% of the workforce, so it had great potential to effect a large part of the population. It faced major problems. It was behind in techniques and technology, because it had been cut off from innovations due to sanctions imposed in 1990. Production had largely collapsed as a result, and there were problems with irrigation, water supply, and salinity. This started a large exodus of people from the countryside to the cities in search of jobs. Farming had been largely overlooked in the first three years of the reconstruction program. IRRF2 didn’t fund any agriculture projects for example, but the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) did get the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to work with the Agriculture Ministry. The new U.S. effort focused upon reforming the Agriculture Ministry into becoming more of a regulatory body rather than a manager, and helping to modernize the industry. While the Americans repaired a large amount of farm equipment, and started long-term planning for land and water use, it wasn’t able to change the overall situation. Iraqis were still using mostly 1980s techniques, output was below pre-war levels, there were few market-based mechanisms, and the lack of services like a steady supply of electricity hurt production. The Agriculture Ministry was still controlling important inputs like fertilizer and seeds, as it does to this day. All the U.S. was able to accomplish was put a bandage upon a declining industry.

Another major focus of the Americans was the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). In June 2005, President Bush announced that the United States wanted the Iraqis to take responsibility for security. This was stated in a number of speeches by the president where he said, “As Iraqis stand up, we will stand down.” What was left unstated was that this was just the latest version of the withdrawal plan, because as more Iraqi units were stood up that would eventually allow the American forces to pull out. The ISF had already become the largest expenditure in U.S. reconstruction funds. The problem was the Americans were pushing for immediate results in a process that would take years to come to fruition. First, too many Iraqi units were put out into the field before they were ready, and performed poorly or disintegrated as a result. That caused continuous changes in the training program. Second, Iraqi institutions were not ready to manage the forces. Budgeting, acquisition, and maintenance were all weak within the Defense Ministry. Corruption also siphoned off huge amounts of money. The U.S. tried to help with this process by skipping the Iraqi procurement system, and used the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program instead. The amount of equipment the Iraqis needed however, overwhelmed the FMS, leading to huge delays. Of the $1.7 billion in orders placed in 2006, only $300 million had arrived by 2007. The U.S. also setup a modern financial and accounting system within the Defense Ministry, but this was based upon American norms, which were completely foreign to the Iraqis, and proved to be a failure. By the end of 2006, more and more Iraqi units were finally considered ready to take the lead in operations, and two provinces were transferred to local control. There was still a lot of work ahead, and any hopes of withdrawing would have to be put on hold as a result.

A far more difficult task was handling the Iraqi police. Training for the force had always been haphazard and uncoordinated. 2006 was coined the “Year of the Police” as the program was reformed with more trainers being sent. The major problem was the divided control of the police. The Interior Ministry was split between rival political factions, while the local police came under the influence of tribes, religious groups, families, and parties as well. In April 2005 for instance, Bayan Jabr of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq became Interior Minister. He immediately began recruiting members of his Badr Brigade militia into the force, especially the National Police. They were accused of running death squads, and kidnapping and torturing Sunnis. Jawad Bolani replaced Jabr in 2006, and attempted to reform the National Police. He replaced seven out of nine brigade commanders, 17 out of 26 battalion chiefs, and made all of the units go for retraining. That didn’t stop abuses by the unit. A U.S. review later recommended that the National Police be completely disbanded, because they were too corruption and sectarian. That never happened as the U.S. military still felt that the force could be reformed, and was needed to counter the insurgency. Another issue was the location of the Interior Ministry headquarters in Baghdad by Sadr City. For several years it was too dangerous for many employees to go to work with dozens of workers being killed. Like the Defense Ministry, corruption was also widespread. Attempts at vetting the police proved ineffective, because it only worked when commanders were willing and able to overcome all the local and national pressures they faced from those who wanted control over the security forces. Last, American civilian officials were worried about the militarization of the police. The U.S. military took control of all training of the ISF, and many times regular units, not the Military Police were responsible for much of this. That meant routine police work like investigating cases and arrest procedures were ignored for paramilitary training on weapons use and raids to be used against militants. That was a job no police force was built for, but the Americans wanted to employ them in the counterinsurgency strategy nonetheless. The problem as ever was the lack of civilian trainers, which had been a recurring issue since the 2003 invasion. The effects of all these would be that the Iraqi police would lag far behind the armed forces in terms of readiness and professionalism. In fact, to this day many of these problems still afflict the force.

A final area the Americans attempted to focus upon was the Iraqi court system. There were a large number of U.S. agencies working on rule of law. That caused problems with coordination and a unified effort. In 2005, Ambassador Khalilzad created the Rule of Law Task Force. It didn’t have a manager until 2006, and wasn’t given real authority until 2007. The U.S. also tried to bring together the various Iraqi ministries and officials involved in the matter. One success story was the support given to the Central Criminal Court, which mostly dealt with terrorism cases. It was given protection within the Green Zone and new facilities. The rest of the system was suffering. The number of detainees was overwhelming the bureaucracy. There weren’t enough judges, workers to handle the files, and prisons and jails. The attempt to deal with those issues proved unsuccessful, and the regular Iraqi courts were neglected. One U.S. legal adviser said that the Americans only cared about the Central Criminal Court, because it suited their goals of fighting the insurgency, and did little for the rest of the justice system. Regular courts also came under attack by militants with lawyers and judges being killed. Corruption and political influence played a huge role with the judiciary as well, making an impartial ruling a rarity. Iraq had so many problems with the various parts of the government that the Americans could never deal with all of them at the same time. The pressing need for security meant that the ISF would get the most attention, while other parts of the government were going to be overlooked even though they were important parts in dealing with militants. The justice system was an example of the latter.  

2006 was a year of transition for both the Americans and Iraqis. The civil war went into overdrive after the Samarra bombing, and the number of deaths skyrocketed. Large parts of the country were torn apart by the fighting with Baghdad at the center of it all. That made governing the country even more difficult than it already was as public workers were killed or couldn’t go to work, because it was too dangerous. At the same time, the U.S. was attempting to move towards a more targeted reconstruction effort that would support its new counterinsurgency program. Work with the Iraqi military proved the most effective, while the other parts were mixed like with the police to complete failures like the attempt to reform agriculture. In the end, the new Clear, Hold, and Build strategy proved incapable of stemming the violence or improving services and the economy. The events of 2006 simply proved too much for the U.S. to handle. That led to outside reviews like the Iraq Study Group, internal studies within the administration, and the firing of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The result would be another change in direction in 2007 with the Surge.

SOURCES

CNN, “Death Squads,” 3/25/07

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09

Tijara Provincial Economic Growth Program, “Assessment of Current and Anticipated Economic Priority In Iraq,” United States Agency for International Development, 10/4/12

Wing, Joel, “From Bad To Worse, How Militias Moved Into the Iraqi Police Force, And The United States Failed At Nation Building. Part Two Of An Interview With Jerry Burke, Former Advisor To The Baghdad Police And Interior Ministry,” Musings On Iraq, 2/13/12