The Undermining Of The Integrity Commission, Part II Of Washington And Baghdad’s Failed Attempt To Fight Corruption

Iraq is a country where corruption plays a role in everyday life. Politicians hire not only their followers, but also family members into the government. Bribes are the most common way to receive services from the authorities. Public procurement is notoriously manipulated by officials to skim money, and funnel it to their supporters. Theft and graft not only undermines the country’s democracy, but its economy as well as huge amounts of money are siphoned off, usually to foreign bank accounts, instead of used to rebuild the nation. After the 2003 invasion, the United States was hoping to prevent all that from happening in Iraq when it created two new anti-corruption agencies. The lead in this fight was going to be the Integrity Commission. The Americans however, failed to come up with an adequate structure for the agency, didn’t support it, and it was eventually undermined by politicians who did not want a check on their ability to make off with Iraq’s wealth.

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) came up with the idea of new offices to counter the threat of corruption in Iraq. In January 2004, it created the Integrity Commission with CPA Order 55. It was supposed to be the lead anti-graft agency in the new Iraq. The Commission was to investigate cases, and then turn them over to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq, which would decide whether to prosecute or not. The Americans thought this was a great idea, but didn’t fully back it. The CPA for instance, did not appointed a head of the Commission, Judge Radhi Hamza Radhi, until it was about to end its work in Iraq in June. The Coalition didn’t really fund the office either, which led it to struggle. Eventually, the State Department ended up providing $11 million to train both the Commission staff and the new Inspector Generals. Perhaps because the CPA was busy dealing with other matters such as appointing an interim Iraqi government or writing the Transitional Administration Law, which was to rule Iraq until a new constitution was drafted, it didn’t give the time and money to the Integrity Commission, which it needed in its inception. Then again, because the Coalition was such a chaotic institution the neglect of the Commission could be just another example of how the U.S. acted in an ad hoc manner in the 2003-2004 period.

Either way, the Americans left the Integrity Commission with an unnecessarily bureaucratic set of rules to follow. The Commission had to rely upon the Inspector Generals, which operated within each ministry to gain information about what was going wrong with the government. That was because the Commission had no power to demand files from the authorities. The Inspectors are largely under the control of their ministers and the prime minister, which means they don’t pass along much substantive data. When it does receive something, the Commission has to review it, and then request more information if it thinks it is important. It then turns over its findings to the Criminal Court that has final say on whether something will be done or not. Then the Interior Ministry would have to issue arrest warrants for the suspects. (1) A 2007 U.S. Embassy report noted that the Ministry often refused to do so when it involved corruption cases. Sometimes Interior officials would even check with the people they were supposed to arrest or take bribes to do nothing. Rather than being at the forefront of investigations, this web of red tape largely made the Integrity Commission a reviewer of material, dependent upon others to actually procure information and arrest and prosecute people. That greatly limited its ability to keep its work secret, and follow through with anything important it might find.

There were legal barriers the Integrity Commission faced as well. A major one was Article 136(b) of the Iraqi Penal Code. It allowed ministers to stop any cases from going to court. In June 2004, the CPA suspended the Law, only for interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi to bring it back later that year. From 2005-2008 136(b) was used 210 times. It wasn’t until April 2011 that parliament finally eliminated the article. Then there was the February 2008 Amnesty Law, which was aimed at reconciliation, but included a provision that covered public employees involved in corruption. By November, the Commission complained that 1,721 cases had to be closed as a result of the new legislation. The environment in which the Integrity Commission was working in was not conducive to its work. Both the executive and legislative branches used their power to inhibit the Commission for carrying out any meaningful investigations. That limited it to only low-level cases, where no one in power would be threatened.

Of greater consequence to the staff was the insecurity that reigned in Iraq from 2004-2008. The Integrity Commission became a victim of this violence. From 2004-2007, 31 workers were killed, as well as 12 family members. The first Commission head Judge Radhi became a target as well. Some of this came from elements of the government. The Interior Ministry for example, was considered a rogue element that had death squads running out of it, so it was off limits. The Sadrists controlled the Health Ministry and was using it to carry out extra judicial killings as well. It openly feuded with the Commission over charges of bribery and stealing drugs and equipment. Agency personnel couldn’t go to the Ministry building or the hospitals it controlled out of fear of the Mahdi Army. The Oil Ministry too was considered out of bounds, because the parties that controlled it would also threaten or attack Integrity officials if they pocked around. The intimidation level became so high that the Commission could barely do any of its work during this period, especially with some of the most powerful ministries out of bounds.

The disadvantage this put the Integrity Commission at was apparent early on. In the first eighteen months of its existence it sent 541 cases to the Criminal Court of Iraq, including 42 against ministers, deputy ministers, and director generals. The judiciary however hardly acted on any of these either because they were unwilling or unable. The result was that from 2004-2007, only 241 guilty verdicts were given, a pitiful 8% of those sent for prosecution. The number of convictions has greatly increased since then, but that hides the lack of effectiveness of such cases. In 2008 for example, there were 97 guilty verdicts, followed by 296 in 2009, and 481 in 2010. Hardly any of these involved any official of standing however. As a U.S. official noted to the International Crisis Group, the number of cases successfully going to court has had no impact upon corruption. In turn, the U.S. Embassy claimed that the Commission was a largely passive entity, because it was too dangerous for it to anything substantive. Given the opposition that the agency faced, going after the lower hanging fruit was probably all that it could hope for.

When violence died down, and Iraq became more stable things did not get any better. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Vice President Adel Abdul al-Mahdi both actively went after the independence of the Integrity Commission. In 2007, the premier told U.S. officials that he opposed independent agencies investigating corruption. That led to a spring executive order being issued that no action against a minister could take place without his permission. Judge Radhi claimed that blocked $80 million in cases that were being investigated. Even worse, for a short period of time in 2007, the prime minister had the official link to the Commission on the government’s webpage go to a porn site. Ironically, the next year the premier declared Baghdad was going to focus upon fighting corruption. He showed his commitment to that cause by pardoning 1,023 people who were under investigation at the end of the year. Behind the scenes, Maliki issued secret orders to stop the Commission from sending cases to the Central Criminal Court that involved high-ranking officials. The next year, the premier tried to limit the agency even more by saying that it could not start any investigations on its own, and attempted to get rid of specific Commission personnel. Vice President Mahdi tried similar tactics. He demanded the right to vet all corruption cases. When the Commission refused, it got a call from the head of the Iraqi Supreme Court, Judge Medhat Mahmoud telling it to give into Mahdi’s request. It was nearly impossible for the Integrity Commission to escape such pressure from the prime minister and vice president of the country. This put another huge damper on its ability to do its work properly, again reducing it to something akin to a beat cop who could arrest a common criminal, but never the big fish who committed the real crimes.

The influence Prime Minister Maliki was able to garner over the Integrity Commission allowed him to manipulate their investigations. In May 2011 for instance, the government accused the director of the Trade Bank of Iraq Hussein al-Azri of corruption. The charges however, dated back to 2007. A senior Iraqi official questioned why it took four years for any action to be taken on them, leading him and others to believe that the premier was just using them to gain control of the bank.

The constant outside interference, and lack of any meaningful accomplishments led to a high turnover rate with the heads of the Integrity Commission. Judge Radhi resigned in September 2007. He claimed that there was $4 billion worth of corruption going on at the Defense Ministry, and $2 billion worth in the Interior Ministry. Afterward, there was an attack on his house, which he blamed the Iraqi security forces for. In addition, he said that the government was stopping him from doing his job, and that Maliki was against investigating corruption. That same year, factions in parliament attempted to impeach him. That all led to him stepping down. Radhi’s deputy Mossa Farj was then appointed his replacement. He discovered massive corruption at the Oil Ministry, which he went public with. He was dismissed before he could do anything about it. Then in January 2008, Judge Rahim al-Ogaili was named the new head. He was never confirmed by parliament however, which meant he could be dismissed at any time. The prime minister used that fact to constantly pressure him. Ogaili ended up leaving in September 2011. He, along with the Inspector Generals and Board of Supreme Audit were looking into hundreds of shell companies set up by officials and political parties, which were involved in a massive scam to skim off money from government contracts. Any time a major development deal was signed by Baghdad, it included some of these front companies, so that relatives and followers of politicians could siphon off funds. When the Integrity Commission turned over its findings to the Criminal Court, it refused to act. Ogaili quit as a result. The political differences within parliament then kept it from naming a new Commission head. That allowed the premier to place Izzat Tawfiq in on an interim basis, and in effect, finally gain control of the agency. Since 2007, the prime minister has demanded that the Integrity Commission bend to his will. In 2011, he achieved his goal when he was able to place one of his people at the top of the organization. Now he can intervene on any cases that involve his supporters, and use the Commission against his rivals and enemies.

To top it all off, the Commission has not been immune from the problems it was created to solve. The organization has hired people who were not qualified, were corrupt, and members of political parties. Starting in 2008, as violence receded, the Commission did try to address some of these issues. Judge Ogaili for one, started some internal reforms, and fired some personnel. Still, in 2011, some of the leadership in the commission was accused of embezzling money and taking funds. An inquiry turned up nothing, but then it was revealed that bribes had been given to look the other way. That made the Commission much like the rest of the government. It’s just ironic in this case, since the agency is supposed to be fighting against these illegal activities, but ended up falling victim to them.

The Americans created the Integrity Commission to be at the forefront in the fight against corruption in the new Iraq. The U.S.’s lack of support, and bad planning however, undermined the new institution. When the CPA closed shop in 2004, the Integrity Commission faced an unfriendly legal, political, and security reality. It came out on the short end, and although it continues to do its work, and reports more arrests and convictions each year, it has hardly made an impact upon corruption, which has been institutionalized within the country. Like the other anti-graft agencies today it finds itself emasculated, and under the control of the prime minister.

FOOTNOTES

1. U.S. Embassy, “Review of Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq Working Draft,” 2007

SOURCES

Brinkley, Joel, “Iraq quietly tackles rampant corruption,” San Francisco Chronicle, 1/24/09

Corn, David, “Secret Report: Corruption is ‘Norm’ Within Iraqi Government,” The Nation, 8/30/07

Ibrahim, Haidar, “Lack of Political Consensus Hinders Assigning New Integrity Head,” AK News, 12/16/11

International Crisis Group, “Failing Oversight: Iraq’s Unchecked Government,” 9/26/11

Ramzi, Kholoud, “the integrity commission is accused of corruption,” Niqash, 3/23/11

Reuters, “Iraq Says 300 Officials Charged With Corruption,” 11/18/08

Rubin, Alissa, “Blaming Politics, Iraqi Antigraft Official Vows to Quit,” New York Times, 9/7/07

Schoof, Renee, “Iraqi judge: Corruption undermines Iraq’s future,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/4/07

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons, 1/22/09

- “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/12

- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/08

- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09

U.S. Embassy, “Review of Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq Working Draft,” 2007

Visser, Reidar, “Anti-Corruption Measure Sparks Constitutional Confusion in Iraq,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 5/10/11

Investigating Corruption Still Limited In Iraq

The Commission on Public Integrity, the main anti-corruption agency in the Iraqi government, released a report on its work for the first half of 2010. While the number of investigations, arrest warrants, and convictions continues to go up, the body still faces opposition from high officials, legal difficulties, and focuses upon low level incidents.

The Integrity Commission is dealing with more and more cases each year. In the first six months of 2010 the Commission received 3,901 allegations of corruption. They were also working on 4,004 claims and 3,921 other allegations. These investigations led to 2,360 arrest warrants, 52 of which were for director generals or above. One was also for the former Trade Minister Abdul al-Falah al-Sudani. Of those warrants, only 588 were actually carried out however, resulting in 762 people being detained, five of which were director generals or above. If that pace continued into the second half of the year the Commission would likely surpass its 2009 totals. In that year 3,710 arrest warrants were issued, leading to 1,719 people arrested. 

For the half, the Commission ended up sending 1,226 cases to court, leading to 982 convictions worth approximately $284 million. 1 person got life in prison, 78 got more than 5 years in prison, 18 got 3-5 years, 89 got less than 3 years, and 16 had to pay fines. The most common crimes involved were embezzlement, 40 convictions, forged documents, 31 convictions, stealing public money, 27 convictions, and misusing public money, 20 convictions. That compares to all of 2009 when only 889 cases were sent to court, with 257 convictions involving 296 people.

Arrest Warrants Issued/Number Detained By Integrity Commission 2008-2010
2008: 630 warrants/714 detained 
2009: 3,710 warrants/1,719 detained
1st Half 2010: 2,360 warrants/762 detained

Total Number of Cases Sent To Court By Integrity Commission 2004-2010
2004-2005: 26
2006: 296
2007: 140
2008: 382
2009: 889
1st Half 2010: 1,226

Total Number Of Convictions By Integrity Commission 2008-2010
2008: 97 
2009: 257
1st Half 2010: 982

High officials  and the Amnesty Law continued to interfere in the Commission’s work. Article 136(b) of the penal code allows ministers and other top official to stop investigations. That was used 95 times in the first six months of 2010 involving cases worth around $967,000. That was an increase from the previous year when it was only used in 28 cases involving 54 individuals. In 2008 136(b) was invoked 70 times, and 132 times in 2007. Of greater impact was the 2008 Amnesty Law, which was originally meant to help with reconciliation, but also absolves certain individuals from corruption. In 2008 1,552 cases had to be dropped because of the law, and 340 in 2009.

The Integrity Commission has also failed to bring any top administrator to justice since its creation in 2004. In 2010 the Commission lost its high profile case against the ex-Trade Minister Sudani, who had half of his charges dropped against him, which was subsequently upheld by a higher court in September. It’s believed that $4-$8 billion went missing while he was in office. There is still a second case pending against him, but it’s likely to end in a similar fashion.

Instead most of the Commission’s work is focused upon low level cases. In its 2009 end of the year review for example, it highlights some of its convictions. Those included an official at the Civil Bank of Iraq in Baghdad who was taking bribes, a forgery ring that involved officials at the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Higher Education, which was helping students into universities and government jobs who had not finished preparatory school, a woman at the University of Technology who was transferring students from foreign schools to Iraqi ones for bribes, an official at the Ministry of Culture who was demanding money to complete paperwork, and a ring that was forging papers to buy and sell cars illegally in Baghdad. In the 2009 and 2010 reports cases involving forged documents accounted for the second and first most convictions respectively. In the first half of 2010 the Commission issued 284 warrants for fake documents leading to 31 convictions. In 2009 there were 90 convictions involving forgeries. While these incidents document the day to day corruption that the average Iraqi has to face, none of them could be considered going to the core of the problem.

The Integrity Commission faces a daunting task carrying out its work in Iraq. The country has a deep culture of corruption that began under Saddam and has continued into the present day. Every sector of the economy and government appear to be involved. The fact that the leaders of the nation show no real support for the Commission’s effort, and instead actively interfere with their work, shows that it is fighting an uphill battle. Until that changes the Commission is likely to continue to work at the margins of corruption, while those with real power will be able to steal and abuse the system with impunity.

SOURCES

Commission of Integrity, “Annual report for 2008,” December 2009
- “CoI Key achievements and indicators from January 1, 2010 To June 30, 2010,” 7/28/10

Office of Investigations, “Commission of Integrity Annual Report for 2009,” Commission of Integrity, 2010

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/10

Iraqi Anti-Corruption Report For 2008

The Integrity Commission is one of Iraq’s three main anti-corruption bodies. In December 2009 they released their report for 2008. It showed that while the number of cases it has dealt with has gone up each year, very few actually lead to convictions.

The Integrity Commission was created by the United States in 2004. Since then it has presented 12,976 cases to court. Of those, only 937 went to trial, resulting in a paltry 396 convictions in four years. In 2008 the Commission got 5,031 reports of corruption, presented 3,027 of those to an investigative judge, issued 630 arrest warrants, and detained 417. Of those, only 97 were convicted.

Besides a lack of evidence, interference by ministers and the 2008 Amnesty Law are two other factors leading to the paucity of convictions. The Amnesty Law was meant to foster reconciliation, but also had an exemption for corruption. As a result, 1,552 cases have been dropped, mostly from the Interior Ministry. Article 136B of the Constitution also allows top officials at each ministry to stop investigations. In 2008 this happened 70 times. That was actually a decrease from 2007 when the ministries involved the article132 times. Since 2005 Article 136B has been used 211 times.

The Interior, Municipalities and Public Works, Health, and Justice ministries got the most complaints and cases of corruption in 2008. There were 788 reports against the Interior Ministry, 659 against the Municipalities Ministry, and 269 against the Health Ministry. The Interior Ministry also had the most criminal cases against it with 736, followed by 400 against the Municipalities Ministry, and 249 against the Justice Ministry. Most of these dealt with public servants exceeding their duties in some capacity, forgery, and bribes. From 2004-2008 Interior has also had the most convictions with 103. The Finance Ministry was second with 58, and the Defense Ministry was third with 54.

All of Iraq’s top officials are also supposed to provide financial disclosures to the Commission each year, but this has hardly ever happened. From 2005-2008 Iraq’s prime minister, deputy prime minister, president, two vice presidents, speaker of parliament, and deputy speaker combined have only provided their financial reports once, and that was the deputy speaker of parliament in 2006. Only 29 of Iraq’s 49 ministers or heads of government offices have consistently turned in their financial disclosures since 2004, and no members of parliament did so last year. In 2009 the Commission reported that only 37% of Iraq’s 275 parliamentarians turned over their records.

The Commission remains hard at work despite the many difficulties they face. In mid-December 2009 the former deputy minister of transportation was found guilty, and sentenced to eight years in prison for taking a bribe. A few days later three senior officials from the Trade Ministry were also given jail terms for embezzling millions of dollars from the food ration system. The problem is that these are only a handful of the thousands of examples of corruption that the government faces. Most of those found guilty are also low levels officials, rather than these types of high profile cases. Those at the top are simply not interested in this fight, so the Commission faces an uphill battle. The result is that Iraq remains one of the most corrupt countries in the world.

SOURCES

Commission of Integrity, “Annual report for 2008,” December 2009

Inside Iraq, “Financial Disclosure,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/4/09

Reuters, “Iraq chases many for corruption, catches few,” 12/23/09
- “Iraqi trade officials jailed for corruption,” 12/24/09

Will Iraq Ever Have Reconciliation?

As Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki visited the United States in July 2009 President Obama repeated the common refrain that he hoped that there would eventually be reconciliation in Iraq. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy issued a report on this very topic on July 17 entitled, “How This Ends: Iraq’s Uncertain Path toward National Reconciliation.” In it, authors Michael Eisenstadt and Ahmed Ali document the steps that the American and Iraqi governments have followed to try to achieve this goal, and find their efforts lacking, and the prospects of making amends unlikely.

Reconciliation is important in countries that have recently gone through armed conflict. It provides greater stability and lessons the chances of a return to chaos. Successful reconciliation processes in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, Mozambique, South Africa, and Uruguay all shared the following steps:

1. Some form of truth telling
2. Recognition that all groups in the country are fellow citizens
3. Compensation programs and trials for some
4. Public peace events

Iraq has had some of these, but also gone against others. A major problem is that the United States and various Iraqi groups do not have a shared vision of what reconciliation means.

America’s policies have changed over time, and been a mixed bag. At first, U.S. efforts were focused upon making up for their own early mistakes. This included integrating Sunnis into the security forces and politics after the Coalition Provisional Authority disbanded the Iraqi Army and initiated deBaathification, and paying compensation to families that were harmed by the military. The U.S. has also stressed ethnosectarian power sharing through the passage of laws, and mediation between Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds. Norwegian Iraq expert Reidar Visser has argued that this is a misreading of Iraqi politics and maintains differences in the country rather than helps heal them. Not only that, but the results of these early strategies were very poor. Few laws pushed by the U.S. have been passed for example, and the ones that were have not been implemented as planned. During the Surge, the American forces began working with insurgents and militiamen that were willing to give up fighting in a bottom-up approach. This was much more successful, and directly led to the decrease in violence. At the same time, the U.S. has not been able to link many of the groups they worked with to the Iraqi government such as the Sons of Iraq.

Many of Baghdad’s policies on the other hand, have been interpreted as retribution or done for political gain. Examples of the former were deBaathification and the trial and execution of Saddam Hussein, and cases of the latter were the moves by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. In June 2006 Maliki announced a 24-point plan that included amnesty, conferences, changes in deBaathification and the constitution, compensation, punishment for war criminals and terrorists, and the creation of a national dialogue council. Baghdad did compensate victims of the former regime, and passed an Amnesty Law and Accountability and Justice Act, which replaced the old deBaathification process created by the Americans. The Amnesty Law has only freed a few thousand prisoners, and has mostly been used for public relations purposes, while the Accountability Act has never been implemented. Baghdad created the Supreme Committee for Dialogue and National Reconciliation, which works with tribes, civil groups, political parties and religious leaders, but it has no staff, and parliament cancelled its funding. There is also the much more important Follow-Up Committee for National Reconciliation that vets former officials and soldiers to be re-integrated, and works with the Sons of Iraq, Tribal Support Councils, and the displaced. Both are headed by Maliki confidants, and have been accused of supporting the Prime Minister’s personal agenda. Sunnis in parliament also set up the National Reconciliation Committee to follow their vision. It mostly works to free Sunni prisoners. The government has integrated several thousand former soldiers and officers into the security forces or pays them pensions. There have also been examples of local reconciliation. The rest of Baghdad’s goals have been largely unmet, and led to accusations about the government’s intentions rather than helped heal wounds.

Eisenstadt and Ali finish by saying that reconciliation in Iraq will take years, and may never occur in a meaningful fashion. The problems are large and many. First, the major Iraqi political parties are based upon ethnosectarian politics, and could lose power if they give that up. Second, there is still fighting in Iraq, and a World Bank study on conflicts found that almost 50% of countries coming out of civil wars fall back into them within five years. Third, there is little consensus in Baghdad on major issues such as oil, and politics are fragmented, which makes it hard to conduct negotiations or find partners. Fourth, there is a lack of accountability as many militants are involved in politics and security with no regret for their past deeds. Fifth, many conflicts and fighting took place within communities, not just between them, which has never been resolved. Sixth, many groups still talk about revenge, and see things in zero-sum terms. Seventh Iraq has been in the throes of elections since 2008, which makes compromising more difficult. Last, Iraq’s neighbors have all interfered in its internal affairs, and continue to do so to this day such as Iran. These problems may never be overcome, which is why the authors are so pessimistic about the country’s future. Iraq’s government will continue, but without resolving some of these large and pressing concerns, it’s unlikely that major changes or legislation will be implemented, which are a necessity to pull the country out of its current predicament.

SOURCES

Biddle, Stephen, “Reversal in Iraq,” Center for Preventative Action Council on Foreign Relations, May 2009

DeYoung, Karen, “Obama Calls on Iraq to Foster National Unity,” Washington Post, 7/23/09

Eisenstadt, Michael and Ali, Ahmed, “’How This Ends’: Iraq’s Uncertain Path toward National Reconciliation,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 7/17/09

Visser, Reidar, “Biden, US Policy in Iraq and the Concept of Muhasasa,” Historiae.org, 7/6/09

Baghdad Responds To Renewed Violence Pt. II: Baghdad Re-Arresting Prisoners Released By Americans

The recent spate of bombings and violence in Iraq has led the authorities to blame prisoners released by the Americans as one major cause. Under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) the U.S. is to either release all detainees or turn them over to the government. In December 2008 American forces held over 15,000 Iraqis. Even before the SOFA was signed the U.S. had been stepping up its process of releasing them, letting 16,000 out in the first ten months of 2008. In 2007 the commander of U.S. detention facilities set up an extensive program to rehabilitate the Iraqis held by giving them religious, educational, and vocational classes. Now about 50 Iraqis are being released a day. By the summer of 2009 the American military plans to close down their main prisons, and release all but 2,500-5,000 that are considered the worst prisoners by the end of the year.

When the U.S. began releasing prisoners in 2007 it raised concerns of American commanders, and it now has become an issue with Iraq’s politicians. In February 2008, U.S. officers told the Christian Science Monitor that they were worried that the ex-detainees might jeopardize security. In October, the police chief in Ramadi said that he was keeping a close eye on former prisoners, and paying some of them to be spies. As more were released, an Iraqi police colonel in a town in Anbar said he was being overwhelmed by ex-prisoners, and had arrested 70 of them. The deputy police commander in Fallujah said they were looking for 10% of the detainees, while an intelligence officer at the Interior Ministry was worried about Shiite militants regrouping as Special Groups in Basra and Baghdad. He claimed 60% of the prisoners were returning to militancy. These were all local officials expressing their concerns.

When a spate of mass casualty bombings occurred in Baghdad however, the issue became a national one. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki gave an interview with the BBC at the end of April 2009 where he blamed the attacks on the Americans’ release program. It was then announced in May that the government was beginning a program to re-capture many of the people let go by the Americans. Later in the month the Prime Minister said that he wanted to amend the Amnesty Law passed in February 2008, claiming that it released too many prisoners. While Baghdad has announced that 132,838 people had been amnestied as of May 18, 2009 only around 6,300 were actual prisoners that were released. The rest were people on bail, parole or had warrants on them.

Freeing prisoners held by the U.S. was a major concern of the Iraqis during the negotiations over the SOFA. 85% were said to be Sunnis, and the main Sunni party the Iraqi Accordance Front and its leader Vice President Tariq Hashemi had been pushing for their release for years. The handover of prisoners by the Americans was also a sign of Iraq’s sovereignty. That symbolic gesture may now be coming to an end. It’s likely that some of these former prisoners are returning to their insurgent and militia pasts now that they are free. At the same time, Baghdad is searching for scapegoats to divert attention away from the increase in attacks and deaths. Together they give a powerful incentive for the government to begin rounding people up, at least for the time being, to show that the security forces are doing something to counter the rash of violence.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraqi detainees refusing to go home: US general,” 3/23/08

Alsumaria, “US Army releases about 3000 Iraqi detainees,” 3/18/08

Associated Press, “US military says number of detainees falling,” 3/3/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “132,838 inmates released so far under Amnesty Law,” 5/18/09
- “Some inmates released by U.S. are wanted by Iraqi authorities – official,” 4/24/09

Boot, Max, “We Are Winning. We Haven’t Won,” Weekly Standard, 1/28/08

Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq’s Insurgency and Civil Violence,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/22/07

DPA, “US to transfer Iraqi prisoners to local authorities,” 12/11/08

Eisenstadt, Michael, “Populism, Authoritarianism, and National Security in al-Maliki’s Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Studies, 5/12/09

Haynes, Deborah, “US risks fanning violence as it opens gates of Iraqi detention camps,” Times of London, 4/20/09

IRIN, “IRAQ: Lawyers accuse government of concealing information about detainees’ UN Office For The Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 9/19/07

Kingsbury, Alex, “In Iraq, U.S. Marines Rely on Allies Like a Hatchet-Wielding Colonel to Keep the Peace,” U.S. News & World Report, 10/30/08

Lubold, Gordon, “A new U.S. push to release more detainees in Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor, 2/22/08
- “Do U.S. prisons in Iraq breed insurgency?” Christian Science Monitor, 12/20/07

Muir, John, “’No Delay’ in US withdrawal from Iraq,” BBC News, 4/27/09

Peter, Tom, “Iraqi courts to decide fate of America’s detainees,” Christian Science Monitor, 1/29/09

Pincus, Walter, “U.S. Working to Reshape Iraqi Detainees,” Washington Post, 9/19/07

Pincus, Walter and Greenwell, Megan, “U.S. Releases 260 Iraqi Detainees,” Washington Post, 9/23/07

Reilly, Corinne, “As clock ticks, U.S. letting thousands of Iraqi prisoners go,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/27/08

Reuters, “Iraq PM slams law pardoning mainly Sunni prisoners,” 5/23/09

San Francisco Chronicle, “U.S. military divided on troop withdrawal,” 8/25/07

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09

Stone, Andrea, “Some worried about detainee transfer to Iraq,” USA Today, 1/26/09

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Update Iraq February 2009,” 2/28/09

Zair, Kareem, “Iraq to re-detain released prisoners,” Azzaman, 5/16/09

Iraq’s Anti-Corruption Agencies

Iraq’s anti-corruption agencies continue to struggle with their job. The Minister of Planning Ali Baban told the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) that he thought corruption was worse now than under Saddam. He said that corruption was rampant throughout the government, and that Baghdad had failed to stop it. The investigative group Transparency International supports Baban’s claims. They look into corruption in governments across the world. In 2003 they ranked Iraq 113 out of 133 governments on its annual corruption index with one being the best and 133 the worst. By 2008 Iraq was tied as the second most corrupt government in the world out of 180 nations. According to SIGIR’s evaluation, of Iraq’s three anti-corruption agencies only one was doing its job.

Iraq has three offices that are tasked with stopping corruption. Those are the inspector generals, the Board of Supreme Audit, and the Commission on Public Integrity. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) created the inspector generals in 2004. They were fashioned after the investigative bodies that work in the United States government. There is one inspector general for each Iraqi ministry and agency. The Board of Supreme Audit is run by Dr. Abdul Basit, and looks into the government’s finances. It is similar to the American Government Accountability Office. The third agency is the Commission on Public Integrity led by Judge Raheem al-Ogaili. It was created by the CPA as well, and is an independent group that is tasked with investigating corruption throughout the government.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki declared 2008 the year of fighting corruption, but SIGIR found little evidence of that. SIGIR said that the Board of Audit was the only reliable anti-corruption agency, and provided the best information. The inspector generals are caught in the middle of a controversy. Since 2008 six have been fired, but only a few of those have been replaced, leaving those agencies and ministries with no real oversight. The government claims they were not doing their job, but critics claim Prime Minister Maliki removed them for political reasons. Judge Ogaili of the Public Integrity Commission was definitely a political appointee. He took over from Judge Radhi Hamza al-Radhi who actively pursued corruption cases, but was constantly foiled by ministers, Maliki, and sometimes by the United States. In 2007 Judge Radhi fled Iraq due to threats. His successor was Judge Ogaili. He has been in office for over a year but has never been confirmed by parliament. The judge has said that corruption gives Iraq a bad image. His response has been to keep all the work of the Commission secret. He said his agency would only discuss cases after people have been found guilty. That rarely happens in Iraq. In 2008 only 300 officials were charged with corruption, and out of those 87 were found guilty. All were low-level officers. No high-level officials have ever had to go to court. That’s largely because of Article 136, a hold over from the Saddam period that allows ministers to stop any case from going to trial. This has consistently been used to stop corruption investigations. The Amnesty Law passed in 2008 that was supposed to foster reconciliation between Shiites and Sunnis has also been used to stop hundreds of corruption cases. The Commission on Public Integrity said it had to drop half of its investigations as a result of the law. By the end of 2008 the Prime Minister pardoned 1,023 government workers. Those included a group of Interior Ministry officers that were collecting salaries of 50,000 fake policemen, and Defense Ministry officials that skimmed money off of arms sales to Iraq. Maliki’s position is that corruption is all the result of Saddam Hussein, and would like to have the issue quietly disappear.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has also criticized Iraq’s fight with graft and fraud. The IMF has an agreement with Iraq to reduce its debt that includes better accounting of its oil profits. In 2008 the IMF said that Baghdad had not moved forward on this, and did not have a plan on how to create greater transparency. In December the organization said that Iraq had not done enough to fight corruption in the petroleum sector as a result.

The U.S. has often said it is committed to fighting corruption in Iraq, and has several programs to do so, but that appears to be more rhetoric than reality. The U.S. embassy in Baghdad has an anti-corruption coordinator, but there have been ten of those since the office was created. On average they have only served six months in Iraq, with the latest one just arriving in the country. That provides no continuity in effort. In May 2008, two State Department officials who worked in Iraq on this task said that the U.S. was never committed to the fight. The Americans have also stopped some investigations because of political concerns. A U.S. official told Reuters in December 2008 that if the U.S. or Baghdad really went after corruption, it could bring down the government because of the high officials that would be implicated.

Corruption has taken a great toll on Iraq. The former head of the Public Integrity Commission said that $13 billion had been lost in the reconstruction effort. The agency found oil workers in Basra stealing up to 500,000 barrels of oil a day in early 2008. No one of standing has been held accountable for these crimes. Instead, Prime Minister Maliki has attempted to silence the investigations fearing the bad image it creates for his country. That hinders development in a country that has mass unemployment and poverty despite its oil wealth, and undermines the public’s belief in the government. This was seen in the recent January 2009 provincial elections where corruption was a major issue. With no leadership from either the United States or Baghdad, this problem will continue to fester.

SOURCES

Adhoob, Salam, “An Inside View of the ‘Second Insurgency’: How Corruption and Waste Are Undermining the U.S. Mission in Iraq,” Senate Democratic Policy Committee Hearing, 9/22/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq among countries with highest levels of corruption – report,” 9/23/08

Brinkley, Joel, “Iraq quietly tackles rampant corruption,” San Francisco Chronicle, 1/24/09

Flahert, Anne, “Ex-officials: Bush admin. ignored Iraq corruption,” Associated Press, 5/13/08

Glanz, James and Mohammed, Riyadh, “Premier of Iraq Is Quietly Firing Fraud Monitors,” New York Times, 11/18/08

Human Rights Watch, “The Quality of Justice, Failings of Iraq’s Central Criminal Court,” December 2008

O’Hanlon, Michael and Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 11/20/08

Ryan, Missy, “U.S. Says Iraq Fails to Tackle Corrupt High Officials,” Reuters, 12/19/08

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/08
- “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09

U.S. Embassy, “Review of Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq Working Draft,” 2007

Human Rights Watch Report On Lack Of Due Process In Iraqi Justice System

In December 2008 Human Rights Watch released its review of Iraq’s justice system entitled, “The Quality of Justice, Failings of Iraq’s Central Criminal Court.” The Americans largely created Iraq’s justice system from scratch after the U.S. invasion. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) said that it wanted to create a court system that would follow international and Western norms, and give the Iraqi public confidence in their new government. After having observed several court cases, and interviewed Iraqi and American officials, Human Rights Watch reported that Iraq and the U.S. had failed to achieve these goals. It found abuses of detainees were common, and that the country lacked due process and fair trials.

The Central Criminal Court of Iraq is the highest in the country. The CPA created the Central Court after the U.S. invasion in July 2003. The Court is meant to deal with the most serious criminal cases. It has jurisdiction over the entire country, and priority over all other courts. It has two branches, one is the Karkh Branch in the Green Zone, and the other is the Rusafa Branch in the Rule of Law Complex, both in Baghdad. The Court and the rest of the justice system is based upon old Saddam era legislation, as well as international law and treaties Iraq signed in the past including agreements on human rights, due process, and bans on torture. The 2005 Iraqi Constitution also guarantees a number of rights such as protection from torture, innocence until proven guilty, a hearing within 24 hours of arrest, a fair trial, legal defense, etc. While Iraq has all the fixings of a Western style justice system, in practice, the courts do not follow the rule of law.

One example is the fact that detainees are held for months, sometimes years before they ever have a hearing. In Iraq, detainees have a hearing before a judge to decide whether their case should go to trial or not. Iraqi law says that people can only be held for 24 hours, with a one-day extension, after their arrest. During the Surge, the number of prisoners dramatically shot up. The amount of people held went from 17,000 at the end of March 2007 to 23,000 by the end of the year, not including Kurdistan. This overwhelmed the already fragile system. There are simply not enough judges to deal with the number of cases, which causes a huge delay in hearings. At the Karkh Branch for example, 10 trial judges, 25 investigative judges, and 15 investigators had to deal with 32,084 cases in 2007. The backlog of cases will take years to get through. Despite the huge reduction in violence, new arrests are still being added to the system as well.

In February 2008, Iraq’s parliament passed an Amnesty Law, partially aimed at relieving the crowded prisons. The law applies to anyone that has been held for six months without having seen a judge. The Iraqi Justice Ministry has routinely made claims that tens of thousands have been affected by this act. On December 14, 2008 for instance, the Iraqi Chief Justice Abdelsattar al-Berqadar said that 125,000 people had been given amnesty. Neither the United Nations nor Human Rights Watch however, has noted any real change in the number of detainees since the law was passed. Human Rights watch found that the vast majority of those affected have been suspects on wanted lists or those on bail, rather than people being held or incarcerated. In September 2008 Human Rights Watch noted that only 5,000-8,000 actual prisoners had been released. A member of the Iraqi Islamic Party said that 17,000 had been freed by December. Again, there are not enough judges to review the cases under the Amnesty Law. Iraqi officials have also asked for bribes from families to release prisoners. Like many of the country’s reconciliation acts, the government has simply not implemented the Amnesty Law the way it was supposed to.

Number Of Detainees Held By Iraq (Including Kurdistan) Before And After The Amnesty Law: January to June 2008

January: 26,676
February: 26,854 – Month Amnesty Law Was Passed
March: 32,458
April 28,283
May: 28,028
June 27,366

A second problem is the routine abuse of prisoners in Iraqi jails. Suspects are usually beaten to gain confessions. Iraqi criminal code and international obligations makes this illegal. Human Rights Watch did observe cases where judges dismissed cases because the defendant had been tortured, but it hasn’t stopped the practice.

An added difficulty is the fact that no one has ever been held responsible for this mistreatment. Under Article 136 if torture happens during the line of duty, the minister in charge of the official who committed the act has to permit the case to go to trial. This has never happened. Attempts to overturn Article 136, and create new legislation against torture have all failed.

Human Rights Watch also believes that prisoners don’t get a real defense at their hearings and trials. The Iraqi Constitution says that defendants have the right to legal representation. Most cases that Human Rights Watch observed did have a lawyer present. However this was usually the first and only time that they met their clients. There were also cases where there were no defense lawyers. Prisoners also often don’t get the same lawyer at their trial as they had at their hearing. At both of those proceedings there is also an utter lack of witnesses and evidence. Forensic evidence and investigation is almost unknown in Iraq. Many cases relied upon confessions, often gained from beatings, or secret informants. There are times when this testimony has been dismissed, but one court investigator estimated that 40% of all cases relied upon informants. A judge said that although this allowed abuses, it had to happen due to the security situation in the country. Human Rights Watch believes these two issues severely limits the rights of defendants because they are unable to challenge the claims against them.

Despite the U.S. creating the Iraqi legal system, it has refused to follow it itself. The U.S. has repeatedly said that it will not follow Iraqi laws or court rulings that deal with prisoners they hold. From 2003 to 2007 there were 367 cases in which the Criminal Court either dismissed the charges against a person held by the U.S. or found them innocent, but the Americans refused to let them go. The U.S. does claim that they review cases to see if they can be turned over to Iraqi courts, but that only happens 10% of the time. This undermines the Iraqi justice system as a foreign country holds Iraqis, yet refuses to follow Iraqi law. As reported earlier, this is due to change in February 2009 as the United States begins handing over the roughly 15,000 prisoners it holds to Iraqi authorities. While an important step for Iraqi sovereignty, it will also add thousands more cases to the Iraqi system that already can’t handle what they have.

In conclusion, the U.S. set up the Central Criminal Court and the Iraqi justice system to help create a new Iraqi society based upon the rule of law. While officially, the country has many of the same rights as western countries, it follows few of them. After being arrested, Iraqis wait months or years to have a hearing, at which time they usually see a lawyer for the first time, and can be presented with a confession they gave under duress, or are accused by a secret witness. Until Iraq has enough judges to deal with the high number of cases, this situation is unlikely to change anytime soon. Iraq’s politicians are also unwilling to act on torture or Article 136, because it protects their party members in the government. Implementing laws is also important for reconciliation, but as the Amnesty Act shows, that’s a long way off. Overall, Iraq’s legal system barley works. It lacks personnel, a commitment to the law, and is open to political interference, a series of problems any country would find hard to overcome.

For more on Iraq’s justice system see:

Concerns Over Transferfing Prisoners To Iraqi Control

United Nations’ Dec. 08 Human Rights Report On Iraq

Lack Of Commitment To Fight Corruption In Iraqi Government

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s Quarterly October Report

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “17,000 prisoners freed under amnesty law – MP,” 12/15/08

Human Rights Watch, “The Quality of Justice, Failings of Iraq’s Central Criminal Court,” December 2008

Leinwand, Donna, “Wheels of justice slowly returning to Iraqi court,” USA Today, 2/26/08

UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, “Human Rights Report 1 January – 30 June 2008,” December 2008

United Nations’ Dec. 08 Human Rights Report On Iraq

In the beginning of December 2008 the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) released its human rights report covering the first six months of the year. The paper documented the continuing violence and casualties in Iraq, as well as the situation of women, minorities, the press, the internally displaced, and detainees. The U.N found that there are still mass casualty attacks in Iraq, although not at previous levels. Women are also targeted, especially in Kurdistan in honor killings, minorities continue to be threatened, the press, especially in Kurdistan continues to be limited, and the situation of the country’s internally displaced is deteriorating. Iraq’s prisons are also overcrowded with reports of torture and abuse, as the legal system is overloaded. Overall, while security is improving in Iraq, the U.N. agency noted that there are still widespread abuses and human rights concerns.

Violence

Violence is down, but not over in Iraq. On January 23, 2008, for example, there was a bombing in Mosul that killed 15 and wounded 132. There continue to be attacks on civilians, security forces, government officials, politicians, educators, professionals, members of the judicial system, and the press. The U.N. no longer reports on total casualties for the country however. In its January 2007 Human Rights report, the U.N. recorded almost three times as many deaths as the Iraqi government. Baghdad then stopped issuing official death counts claiming that it couldn’t accurately keep track of deaths, but also to conceal the increasing killings due to the sectarian war that was taking off at that time.

Instead of total deaths, the report covered mass casualty attacks. The U.N. found that these declined from January to June 2008. There were eight such attacks in January compared to only 4 in June, while the number of killed and wounded went down from 330 to 206 for those same months. From March to June however, the total number of casualties actually increased going from 161 to 206.

Large Scale Attacks
January – 8 attacks resulting in 330 casualties
February – 6 attacks resulting in 253 casualties
March – 5 attacks resulting in 161 casualties
April – 6 attacks resulting in 177 casualties
May – 3 attacks resulting in 205 casualties
June – 4 attacks resulting in 206 casualties

Government employees, religious figures, activists, judges, lawyers, professionals, and academics all continue to be targeted. Attacks on security forces not only resulted in they being wounded and killed, but civilians as well. There were 11 such incidents resulting in 274 civilian casualties from January to June 2008. There were 22 attacks on government officials, politicians and civil servants. In June for example, two members of the Sadr City Council were killed and ten wounded in a bombing of the council building. Kidnappings are also common, especially in Diyala province. Large numbers of unidentified bodies were found in Diyala, Ninewa, Anbar, Qadisiyah, but mainly in Baghdad. Mass graves have also been found, particularly after insurgents have been cleared from an area.

Deaths due to foreigners were also a concern. There were two high-profile cases of Iraqis being wounded and killed by security contractors in the first six months of 2008. In January 5 a car fleeing an attack hit five students, aged 6-10. In February Blackwater contractors trying to clear traffic killed one civilian. There were also six Coalition air strikes that resulted in civilian casualties.

Women

The U.N. received many complaints about the rights of women being limited by conservatives in their neighborhoods, in the government, and in schools. The Major concern was in Kurdistan where there were reports of honor killings. A women’s group in Irbil found 145 cases of violence against women in just the first two months of 2008. In May, the Kurdistan Regional Government Prime Minister held a meeting on violence against women promising action on this issue. England’s Guardian also just reported on honor killings in Basra where authorities were turning a blind eye.

Minorities

Iraq’s minorities, consisting of Shabaks, Yezidis, Christians, and Turkomen in Ninewa and Tamim continue to worry the U.N. There were 17 reported kidnappings of Christians in those two provinces, along with nine attacks on Shabaks, mostly in Mosul, 2 Turkomen leaders were killed in that city in June, and Sabean Mandeans were threatened.

Press

Journalists continue to be attacked in Iraq. The Kurds were singled out in the report for their restrictions on the press as well. Many reporters and editors have been arrested in Kurdistan, with the Committee to Protect Journalists issuing a report in May calling for the end of their persecution. The KRG claims that they are only going after those that are guilty of libel and lack professionalism, but UNAMI doubts these claims. The results have been that many papers are intimidated by the regional government, and practice self-censorship.

Internally Displaced

The U.N. counts 2.8 million internally displaced Iraqis. 1.2 million were forced out of their homes before 2006, and 1.6 million afterwards. Displacement has slowed in 2008, and over 100,000 Iraqis have returned to their homes since 2007. There were new displacements in the Dora, Jamia, Sulaik, Adhamiya and Karkh districts of Baghdad however. The U.N. is also concerned about the fact that eleven of Iraq’s eighteen provinces have restricted the movement of refugees into their areas. Overall, the internally displaced suffer from a lack of services and jobs, resulting in deteriorating living conditions.

Prisons

The plight of Iraqi detainees was a major concern. At the end of June 2008 there were a total of 50,595 prisoners. The highest number was in March when there were 56,320.

Detainees - 2008
January: 23,800 held by Coalition, 26,676 held by Iraq, TOTAL: 50,476
February: 23,862 held by Coalition, 26,854 held by Iraq, TOTAL: 50,791
March: 23,862 held by Coalition, 32,458 held by Iraq, TOTAL: 56,320
April: 23,862 held by Coalition, 28,283 held by Iraq, TOTAL: 52,145
May: 23,229 held by Coalition, 28,028 held by Iraq, TOTAL: 51,257
June: 23,229 held by Coalition, 27,366 held by Iraq, TOTAL: 50,595

The jump in numbers in March coincided with the security operation in Basra

These numbers revealed two things. First, the February 2008 Amnesty Law has had no real affect on prisoners. Most of those affected by the act were actually people on wanted lists or on bail with only 2,000 detainees and convicts let go. Second, the U.S. setup a new program in its prison facilities during the Surge, aimed at increasing the number of those released. They claimed that they were discharging more prisoners than taking in new ones, but for the first six months of 2008 there as no real change in Iraqis held by the Americans. A May 19, 2008 report by the USA Today quoted U.S. military officials who said that the number of detainees they were holding dropped from 26,000 in 2007 to around 22,000 in May. UNAMI’s numbers show only a slight decline from 23,800 in January 2008 to 23,229 in May, only a 571 decrease. This brings into question the U.S. claims of successful rehabilitation and increased releases of Iraqis.

The major problem with the U.S. and Iraqi systems has been overcrowding and a lack of capacity by Iraq’s courts. Most prisoners are held for months, sometimes years, before they are ever charged, receive legal aid, or go before a judge. The courts simply cannot handle the number of prisoners. The detainees are therefore overcrowded with horrible conditions. Reports of abuse and torture are also common. Kurdistan is no better than the rest of Iraq. There are reports of secret detention facilities there, and the Kurdish Regional Government often moves prisoners when U.N. officials come to inspect sites.

Recommendations

The United Nations Mission had several recommendations for the Iraqi government. First, the Health Ministry needs to release official numbers of casualties in Iraq. Reports today are based upon leaks from various ministries and officials or the U.S. military. The government also has to protect vulnerable groups like minorities and the displaced, and investigate attacks on women. The legal system needs to deal with the large number of detainees, who are usually held without ever being processed, and address torture. That would begin to alleviate some of the problems in the overcrowded detention facilities. The U.N. also wants Iraq’s parliament to pass a human rights law to give legal standing to protecting against some of these abuses.

SOURCES

Babylon & Beyond Blog, “IRAQ: U.N.’s Iraq report still missing casualty count,” Los Angeles Times, 12/3/08

Michaels, Jim, “Military retools detainee releases,” USA Today, 5/19/08

Reilly, Corinne, “As clock ticks, U.S. letting thousands of Iraqi prisoners go,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/27/08

UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, “Human Rights Report 1 January – 30 June 2008,” United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq

Lack Of Commitment To Fight Corruption In Iraqi Government

As reported earlier, corruption within the Iraqi government is endemic. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has never been committed to fighting it because investigations make his government look bad. The U.S. has also been lackluster in pushing for oversight as well. Recent reports show that the situation has not gotten any better.

The New York Times for example, recently reported that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is secretly getting rid of anti-corruption officials. The article said that up to seventeen officials might have been pushed out or replaced recently. Seven to nine of them were inspector generals in ministries such as Water Resources, Culture, Trade, Youth and Sport, and perhaps Foreign Affairs, along with the Central Bank of Iraq, the Sunni Endowment, and the Christian Endowment. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) confirmed at least six removals. Maliki supporters claim there is nothing behind the Prime Minister’s actions, while others are afraid that he will replace the officials with Dawa members or worse, it is a move to slowly end oversight within the government.

Anti-corruption investigations were already hobbled before Maliki’s recent actions. The main oversight agency, the Commission on Public Integrity recently announced that it had sent 337 cases to court in 2008. At the same time, only 86 people had been actually convicted, and most of those were very low-level officials who were mostly selling fake papers to Iraqis who wanted to flee the country. The Commission also noted that the Amnesty Law, which was supposed to promote reconciliation by releasing Sunnis from Iraqi jails, has also stopped investigations of 1,721 officials. That was more than half of its cases. The commission also doesn’t operate outside of Baghdad, severely limiting what it can and cannot do. Its previous head, Judge Rati al-Rathi constantly clashed with Maliki and ministers over investigations. Maliki demanded that all cases be okayed by him, and he often wanted them stopped. Rathi fled Iraq in 2007 due to threats, and was replaced by Judge Rahim al-Ogaili who supports getting rid of inspector generals. Rathi later told the U.S. House of Representatives in October 2007 that corruption cost Iraq $18 billion from 2004-2007.

Under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) the United States set up Iraq’s oversight apparatus. Inspector Generals were created and appointed by the Americans in each Iraqi ministry and sub-ministries, along with the Board of Supreme Audit that was to oversee the budget, and the Commission on Public Integrity that was to investigate the entire government. The U.S. however was never committed to fighting corruption in the first place, and when sovereignty was turned over to the Iraqis, the situation became worse as none of the preceding governments were interested either.

For more on corruption in Iraq see:

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s Quarterly October Report

Corruption and Reporting In Kurdistan

Iraqi Corruption Remains Endemic

Iraqi Corruption

SOURCES

Glanz, James and Mohammed, Riyadh, “Premier of Iraq Is Quietly Firing Fraud Monitors,” New York Times, 11/18/08

Kadhim, Abbas, “A Plan for Post-Surge Iraq,” Strategic Insights, November 2007

Reuters, “Iraq Says 300 Officials Charged With Corruption,” 11/18/08

Schoof, Renee, “Iraqi judge: Corruption undermines Iraq’s future,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/4/07

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/08

Iraq’s Amnesty Law

In February 2008 Iraq’s parliament passed an Amnesty Law, which was part of the reconciliation process. On March 27, the Presidential Council ratified it, making it official. The Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front and the Sadrists were the main supporters of the act because up to 80% of those detained are Sunnis, and the Sadrists have faced a wave of arrests by government forces. At the time, most reports said that Iraq held 26,000 prisoners. In fact, the true number was two to three times that. It turns out the government was holding thousands of Iraqis that were never officially arrested or were just waiting for a court date, while others had been found guilty but never given a sentence.

On July 22 Baghdad announced that 109,087 people had been pardoned under the Amnesty Law. There was no breakdown given, but some specifics were publicized in June and May. On June 29, the Voices of Iraq reported that the courts had released 13,199 people that had been found guilty but not sentenced, and 46,371 had been given bail. An additional 33,273 had been pardoned that were wanted, but had never been captured. In May, Iraq had pardoned a total of 55,053 people. 5,636 were convicted criminals, 24,472 were given bail, 11,476 were being held awaiting trial, and13,469 were wanted persons that had not been arrested. The government said they wanted to provide job training for those released to keep them out of trouble.

The huge number of those released, far past the official number of 26,000, shows the dysfunctional nature of the Iraqi justice system. While the U.S. has worked to improve the top court in the country, the rest of the legal system barely works. The United Nations has said that many times Iraqi forces arbitrarily arrest anyone suspicious in an area after an incident. Suspects are then suppose to be assured of due process, where the government can only hold suspects for 48 hours, and then they need to be brought before an investigative judge. The system is so overwhelmed by the number of cases however, that rarely happens. Police often hold people even after their cases have been dropped. Even those that actually go to court and are found guilty rarely get sentenced as the numbers above point out. A U.S. adviser on a Provincial Reconstruction Team told the New York Times that Iraqi courts lack basic necessities and the government doesn’t care about them. Baghdad now has the money to pay for basic services because of the oil boom, but the legal system is not one of its priorities. It will probably take years for this to be fixed, and until then the Amnesty Law will continue to release tens of thousands that should have never been held in the first place, and some that are probably guilty, but the system simply can’t process.

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraqi Lawmakers Pass 3 Key New Laws,” Associated Press, 2/13/08

Alsumaria, “Iraq Amnesty Law forging ahead,” 2/19/08

BBC News, “Iraq government backs amnesty law,” 12/26/07

Colvin, Ross, “Iraqi police raid Mehdi Army strongholds,” Reuters, 3/12/08

Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraqi Force Development,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2008

Gluck, Jason, “From Gridlock to Compromise: How Three Laws Could Begin to Transform Iraqi Politics,” United States Institute of Peace, March 2008

Moore, Solomon, “Thousands of New Prisoners Overwhelm Iraqi System,” New York Times, 2/14/08

Stone, Andrea, “Iraq frees, pardons detainees,” USA Today, 4/22/08

Voices of Iraq, “3245 prisoners released under pardon law – source,” 3/17/08
- “8229 detainees released – judicial source,” 3/20/08
- “55,000 wanted encompassed by amnesty law – Supreme Judicial Council,” 5/6/08
- “More than 100,000 detainees released under pardon law,” 7/22/08
- “MP unleashes details of agreement to pass key laws,” 2/13/08
- “Two opposition parliamentary blocs slam implementation of Amnesty Law,” 6/29/08