Postwar Situation In West Mosul - Many Unresolved Issues

Old City West Mosul (Al Jazeera)

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is the main group working with Iraq’s displaced population (IDPs). In June 2019 it released the results of survey work it did in West Mosul, the most war damaged area in Iraq. It talked with people that stayed in the city during the Islamic State occupation, those the fled and have now returned, and those that are still displaced. The IOM found that there are still major unresolved issues for the district including a lack of rebuilding, services, schools and jobs, along with distrust and resentment.

Iraqis Accused Of Being Affiliated With IS Treated As Outcasts

Iraqis believed to be affiliated with the Islamic State continue to face collective punishment. The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) was the latest to note that approximately 400,000 people do not have their government documents which means they cannot receive services, can’t freely move about the country, and suffer on going discrimination.

Is Reconciliation Possible In Iraq?

Reconciliation is often discussed in Iraq, but rarely ever accomplished. The Prime Minister has talked about it, there have been joint Sunni-Shiite prayers and tribal meetings, but nothing ever comes of them. The National Democratic Institute recently released a report “Iraq’s Road to Reconciliation” about this topic based upon interviews with religious, tribal, community and protest leaders. One of the major difficulties was that people often don’t agree upon what reconciliation means and who should be included. The biggest problem however was that the country’s political elite who are expected to lead Iraq in this process, have no desire to do so because they live off of division to stay in power.

All of those included in the National Democratic Institute survey agreed that Iraq’s politicians were barriers to reconciliation. That was because the country’s leaders advocated sectarianism and division to maintain their positions. At the same time, the elite were believed to be the only ones capable of pushing the process forward. Reconciliation between the political class was also important because their differences were a major reason why the country remained deadlocked on so many important issues. That history and the political benefits garnered from sectarianism were why none were willing to seriously deal with rapprochement. The people in the survey thought that it was up to the public therefore to pressure the government towards change. The problem with that approach is that the ruling parties are not beholden to the public, but instead the people are reliant upon them. For example, there have been years of protests in Iraq, and there are ones going on right now, but all they have garnered is lip service from politicians. That’s because Iraq’s oil based economy means that the government does not need taxes from the public for funds, but rather uses its natural wealth to become the largest employer and provider in the country. This is a common practice in petroleum dependent countries. Without that connection it’s unlikely that any demonstrations can make Iraq’s rulers move towards reconciliation unless they themselves want to, which does not look like it will happen any time soon.

Even if that process were to begin there are major barriers to it being successful in Iraq. First, no one seemed to agree on the terms and players that should be involved. Each group looked at the issue different. For example should it be Shiites and Sunnis, Arabs and Kurds, Baathists and everyone else, Iraq and foreign countries, should insurgents be involved, etc. There was also the issue of whether it should just focus upon present wrongs or historical ones. The National Democratic Institute brought up amnesty as a perfect example of this dilemma. Many said they supported the idea as a concept, but when they got into the specifics there was no agreement. For example, not many thought that people that had killed should be included. Given all the differences in Iraq there was probably no consensus on what even that meant. Would that just be members of the former regime, insurgents, militias, etc. That led few to believe that amnesty could be implemented in practice. Another issue was that few had any trust in the judiciary, which would be intimately involved in any amnesty program. The courts were considered corrupt and under political control, and thus easily manipulated. Finally, many Kurds had lost trust in Baghdad, and did not want to work on many of these issues because they had decided on independence instead. What everyone could agree upon was that any rapprochement had to be based upon Iraqi identity instead of sect or ethnicity. Again, all of these differences pointed to how far away Iraq was from even opening the door to reconciliation because so few could agree on even basic terms.

The third factor brought up was that sectarianism within society needed to be addressed, not just with the political parties. In polls, Iraqis say that they do not think in ethnosectarian terms, but when they were questioned on specific issue they often did. This was especially true today as the Islamic State has played upon the divisions within the country and increased tensions between communities. The violence of the insurgents has also created a deep seated desire for revenge amongst many groups that will take years to overcome.

The National Democratic Institute finished with six steps Iraq should take to move forward with reconciliation. The first was judicial reform. The courts play a crucial role in this process. They would oversee the release of prisoners, enforcement of due process, impartial prosecutions, etc. Making judges independent, and not beholden to political parties would be an important move to ensure that Iraq would start moving towards those goals. Second was a more equitable distribution of resources. Many of those interviewed thought that politicians and their cronies got all the benefits from the country. This was an especially important issue for the Kurds who believe Baghdad has cut them off. There was also a push for great transparency over the budget and decentralization of power to the provinces. The third was disarming groups. The Hashd, tribes, and others need to be demobilized after the war with the Islamic State. This would be easier said then done as many foreign powers back armed groups and would not agree to having them give up their weapons. Four was ending the quota system in government that determines the top positions in government. Many believe that the quotas are at the heart of the ethnosectarian political system that rules the country, and therefore ending it would be a blow to it. Five was holding reconciliation conferences, which was self-explanatory. Last was countering foreign influence in Iraq. Outside powers were seen as supporting the political divisions within the country to maintain their influence. Pushing Iraqi nationalism over ethnosectarianism was seen as a possible way to lesson this interference. These were all good suggestions, but the likelihood of them happening was little to none. As the study already noted Iraq’s politicians have no stomach for any real reform, especially if it threatens their hold on power. All of these proposals would do that. Prime Minister Abadi for example, brought up judicial reform at the end of 2015. When it came to it however, he left it up to the judges to change themselves, which never happened. That in a nutshell is the problem with reconciliation in Iraq. The public wants it, and even some politicians, but as long as the majority of elite do not, nothing will happen. The country’s leadership simply has too much to lose in such a process, and therefore will continue to stand in the way.

SOURCES

National Democratic Institute, “Iraq’s Road to Reconciliation,” 1/14/16

Autumn 2015 Iraq Public Opinion Poll: PM Abadi Widely Popular Not So Much Rest Of Government

In December 2015 Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research released a new public opinion poll on Iraq. The company has done several such surveys over the last couple years, and the data is some of the most comprehensive available on how Iraqis are feeling about their country. The survey was done from August 12 to September 3 and included 2,000 people from all major regions of the country. The results showed that Prime Minister Haidar Abadi was still widely popular in Iraq, far above any other national leader. On the other hand, the public had a low opinion of the ruling parties and government in general, and had different thoughts on what needed to be fixed in the country apart from what politicians talk about.

Prime Minister Haidar Abadi was by far the most popular politician in the poll. He had an approval rating of 65%, and 58% of respondents said they wanted to continue in the direction he was leading the country. The only region that disagreed was Kurdistan with only 14% agreeing with the premier. In comparison, in Baghdad and the south 76% wanted to follow Abadi, and 42% in western Iraq. When compared to other national leaders the prime minister also had the highest rating with 54% versus 30% for Muqtada al-Sadr, 17% for Ammar Hakim head of the Supreme Council, 16% for ex-Vice President Nouri al-Maliki, 15% for Kurdish President Massoud Barzani, 11% for Speaker of Parliament Salim Jabouri, 10% for former VP Iyad Allawi, 9% for Iraq’s President Fuad Masum, and 5% for dismissed VP Osama Nujafi. When broken down by sect 75% of Shiites approved of the prime minister and 39% for Sunnis versus 34% unfavorable. Only Kurdish respondents had a bad view of him at 82% unfavorable. Abadi came in with a very positive approval rating when he was first elected in December 2014 at 75%. Even though it dipped after that he was still far above any other politician. August when the survey was done was also when the premier announced his reform program in response to national protests, and that could have maintained his support. The low rating amongst Kurds was likely due to Baghdad’s on going dispute with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) over the budget and oil exports.

Do you approve/disapprove of the job PM Abadi is doing?

65% Approve

29% Disapprove

I want to continue in the direction PM Abadi is taking Iraq versus I want to go in a different direction than the PM

Overall 58% Follow PM, 21% Different Direction

Baghdad 76% Follow PM, 8% Different Direction

South 76% Follow PM, 11% Different Direction

West 42% Follow PM, 17% Different Direction

Kurdistan 14% Follow PM, 77% Different Direction

How do you feel about Iraq’s political leaders?

Abadi 54% Favorable, 31% Unfavorable

Sadr 30% Favorable, 45% Unfavorable

Hakim 17% Favorable, 57% Unfavorable

Maliki 16% Favorable, 73% Unfavorable

M. Barzani 15% Favorable, 68% Unfavorable

Jabouri 11% Favorable, 63% Unfavorable

Allawi 10% Favorable, 75% Unfavorable

Masum 9% Favorable, 68% Unfavorable

O. Nujafi 5% Favorable, 79% Unfavorable

Opinion of PM Abadi by sect

Shiites 75% Favorable, 15% Unfavorable

Sunnis 39% Favorable, 34% Unfavorable

Kurds 5% Favorable, 82% Unfavorable

The survey showed the majority of Iraqis had a very low opinion of the country’s ruling parties. The Badr organization had the most favorable responses at 36% with 43% not liking the party. After that Sadr’s Ahrar bloc had 20% favorable 49% unfavorable, Abadi’s Dawa came in with 18% favorable 57% unfavorable, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan had 15% favorable 56% unfavorable, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) 14% favorable 57% unfavorable, the Kurdistan Democratic Party 14% favorable 59% unfavorable, Gorran came in with 11% favorable 62% unfavorable, Nujafi’s Mutahidun had 10% favorable 66% unfavorable, and Allawi’s Iraqi Nationalists finished with 6% favorable 71% unfavorable. After the fall of Mosul in June 2014 the Badr Organization was quick to respond with its militia, which became part of the Hashd al-Shaabi/Popular Mobilization units, while its leader Hadi Ameri took a commanding role in security operations. That probably accounts for why his party had the best rating out of the ruling parties. Still they were all held in low regard.

Favorable/Unfavorable View Of Iraq’s Political Parties

Badr 36% Favorable, 43% Unfavorable

Ahrar 20% Favorable, 49% Unfavorable

Dawa 18% Favorable, 57% Unfavorable

PUK 15% Favorable, 56% Unfavorable

ISCI 14% Favorable, 57% Unfavorable

KDP 14% Favorable, 59% Unfavorable

Gorran 11% Favorable, 62% Unfavorable

Mutahidun 10% Favorable, 66% unfavorable

Iraqi Nationalists 6% Favorable, 71% Unfavorable

Despite Abadi’s high rating the majority of people believed that the country was going in the wrong direction. 65% felt that way compared to 26% who thought Iraq was heading the right way. Since 2012 most Iraqis had a negative opinion of the way the nation was heading. The easiest way to explain the pessimistic responses in 2015 would be to blame the war against the Islamic State. Since the feelings were steady for several years however other issues were probably at play, which led to the next question.

Is Iraq going in the right or wrong direction?

Nov 2010: 45% Right, 44% Wrong

Aug 2011: 37% Right, 50% Wrong

Nov 2012: 40% Right, 54% Wrong

Sep 2013: 31% Right, 65% Wrong

Dec 2014: 34% Right, 55% Wrong

Sep 2015: 26% Right, 65% Wrong

When asked what were the most important topics the government needed to deal with security and corruption were at the top of the list. Security was at 48% followed by corruption at 43%. After that services, 37%, jobs, 30% were the next highest. The displaced, sectarianism, inflation, schools, and the Baghdad-Irbil dispute all received 15% or less showing they were not major concerns. Instead, the war, graft, and the lack of opportunities and services were what Iraqis believed were the most pressing issues. That’s been true for the last decade as the insurgency rose and fell and returned, while the government has never been able to resolve chronic shortages in things like electricity in part due to the widespread theft amongst government officials.

What two issues are the most important for the government to address?

Security 48%

Corruption 43%

Basic services 37%

Jobs/unemployment 30%

Internally displaced 15%

Sectarianism 12%

High prices 5%

Education 3%

Central government-KRG dispute 2%

Few believed that the authorities were dealing with these problems. When asked how had the government responded to people’s needs three out of four regions said worse with the south at 68%, the west 50%, and Kurdistan 85%. Only in Baghdad did 37% say better versus 35% worse. Those were all higher than when people were asked that same questions in December 2014 showing growing frustration. Likewise, provincial governments did no better with 59% saying worse in Baghdad, 72% worse in the south, 66% worse in the west, and 70% worse in Kurdistan. Again, those were all worse then December 2014 with the exception of Kurdistan that was up 6%. This ties in with the low opinion of Iraq’s leaders and parties. Iraqis didn’t believe that their needs were being met, and blamed their representatives.

Is the government responsive to the people’s needs?

Baghdad 35% Worse, 37% Better

South 68% Worse, 24% Better

West 50% Worse, 20% Better

Kurdistan 85% Worse, 9% Better

Is the local government responsive to the people’s needs?

Baghdad 59% Worse, 33% Better

South 72% Worse, 22% Better

West 66% Worse, 21% Better

Kurdistan 70% Worse, 23% Better

Two solutions that have been proposed to help resolve Iraq’s chronic violence and political discord are to pass laws aimed at reconciliation and decentralize power neither of which rated well with respondents. When asked which law was the most important to be passed for political accommodation none of the three major ones before parliament seemed important. The Amnesty Law that would deal with prisoners got the most positive results, but that only stood at 26%. Even amongst Sunnis it only got 36%. The Federal Court law that would reform the judiciary received 16% and the National Guard Law that would create new regional defense units got 12%. Premier Abadi has tried to push the latter as a means to include Sunni forces into the government, but just 10% of Sunni respondents in the poll believed it was necessary. When the topic of giving the provinces more power was brought up it didn’t fare any better. Only 18% thought that would be very effective in solving problems with 54% saying somewhat. When asked what would be the best way to accomplish political reconciliation decentralizing power to the governorates the numbers went down to 14% thinking it would be very effective and 43% somewhat. This has been something that Abadi has pushed as well and the provincial councils have been lobbying for years for.

Which of the following laws before parliament are the most important to achieve political accommodation?

Amnesty Law

Overall 26%

Shiites 27%

Sunnis 35%

Kurs 9%

Federal Court Law

Overall 16%

Shiites 21%

Sunnis 5%

Kurds 15%

National Guard Law

Total 12%

Shiites 13%

Sunnis 10%

Kurds 11%

What are the most important ways to achieve reconciliation in Iraq?

Fair judicial process 49% Very Effective, 78% Somewhat Effective

Improving economy 38% Very Effective, 73% Somewhat Effective

Equitable sharing of resources amongst sects 37% Very Effective, 76% Somewhat

Effective

Equitable sharing of political power among sects 34% Very Effective, 80% Somewhat

            Effective

Giving provinces more power 18% Very Effective, 54% Somewhat Effective

Decentralizing power to provincial governments 14% Very Effective, 43% Somewhat

            Effective

What are the most important ways to achieve reconciliation in Iraq by sect

Fair judicial process Shiites 51%, Sunnis 59%, Kurds 27%

Improving economy Shiites 37%, Sunnis 40%, Kurds 37%

Equitable sharing of resources amongst sects Shiites 33%, Sunnis 52%, 19% Kurds

Equitable sharing of political power among sects Shiites 36%, Sunnis 40%, Kurds 19%

Giving provinces more power Shiites 20%, Sunnis 14%, Kurds 20%

Decentralizing power to provincial governments Shiites 11%, Sunnis 16%, Kurds 26%

For Sunnis the two most important issues were a fair judiciary, 59%, and equitable sharing of resources amongst the country’s sects, 52%. Mass arrests and prisoners being held indefinitely without warrants or after release orders have been issued have been long time complaints by the community as they feel like they are facing group punishment by the government. That would be partly dealt with by the Amnesty Law, which was why it received the highest importance from Sunni respondents amongst the three bills asked about. The sharing of resources and political power, which was at 40% amongst Sunnis ties in with the sects’ belief that they have gotten the short end of the stick by the Shiite parties since 2003. Even though government offices are all doled out by quotas and Sunni parties have been given a mix of meaningful, speaker of parliament, and symbolic positions, vice president, and a larger percentage of posts within each administration then their percentage in the population that has not changed the widespread belief that they have been marginalized. That applies to sharing the country’s oil wealth and development as well. How or even if these feelings can be overcome is one of the questions Iraq has struggled with for over a decade now and may not be resolvable since some Sunnis will not be happy until they rule the country once more.

For Shiites the two biggest issues were a fair judiciary as well, 51%, and improving the economy, 37%. Many see Iraqi courts as being corrupt and pliant to the ruling parties, and they also turn a blind eye to the institutionalized abuse that takes place for anyone that is arrested in order to obtain a confession. The judiciary for example, was a major point for protests that started across Iraq during the summer. The fact that the Federal Court law was not seen as an effective way to deal with this problem by both Sunnis and Shiites may reflect the fact that they don’t believe it will address the root problems with the judicial system. The economy is also stagnating due to the drop in oil prices. Since Iraq is a petroleum dependent country it has little leverage to pull itself out of this problem as it is dealing with forces outside of its control.

Finally, for Kurds the two top priorities were improving the economy, 37%, and equitable sharing of political power, 36%. Kurdistan’s economy has been hit even harder than the rest of the country because former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stopped sending the region its share of the budget due to the dispute over who should control oil resources in 2014. While budget payments were temporarily revived under Abadi when a new agreement was made, that fell apart as well. In turn, that has meant the regional government has not been able to pay its workers for months nor the oil companies that it depends on to develop its energy sector that is paying the bills. Like the rest of Iraq the KRG is an oil dependent and public sector heavy economy meaning that any changes in the petroleum industry trickles down to all segments of the population. The Kurds also feel that they are not getting their fair share of power in Baghdad due to the Shiite parties. This hit a low point with the Maliki administration who directly challenge the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) over a number of issues, and those negative feelings have carried over to Abadi. Like the Sunnis these perceptions are hard to change.

What these results show is that what has been bandied about both within and without Baghdad as some steps to resolve the country’s problems are not seen as important by the public. It also highlights that there are some issues upon which both Sunnis and Shiites agree upon like fixing the judiciary that the ruling parties could work on that would find widespread support. Then again there are more intractable disputes such as power sharing that are likely to go nowhere as both Sunnis and Kurds believe they are not getting enough positions as they are due, while Shiites think they have enough or even too much. The fact that so many Iraqis have a very low opinion of their government and the people elected to run it means they have little faith that these problems will be properly addressed anytime soon. Overall, Iraqis seemed to be very dissatisfied about their nation with few exceptions. That explains why there have been protests almost every year in the country that only gain token responses from the country’s leaders. Sadly the ruling parties are more concerned with preserving their own power and thinking of politics as a zero sum game where no concessions can be given to their rivals that blocks almost all serious work from being done other than what is necessary such as passing a budget so that things can keep running as they are. Until that changes many Iraqis will continue to feel frustrated.

SOURCES

Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, “Lack of Responsiveness Impacts Mood, August-September 2015 Survey Findings,” 11/23/15

Precarious Situation of Iraq’s PM Abadi, Interview With Iraqi Institute for Economic Reform’s Sajad Jiyad

Iraq’s Prime Minister Haider Abadi took office in September 2014 under the worst of circumstances. His predecessor Nouri al-Maliki felt like he should receive a third term, but after the insurgency’s summer offensive and U.S. pressure he was forced to stand aside for Abadi. The Islamic State (IS) held two of Iraq’s largest cities Mosul and Tikrit and large swaths of the northern and western part of the country. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) had disintegrated in the face of IS’s onslaught, and it took a fatwa from Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani to rally volunteers into the new Hashd al-Shaabi forces to stabilize the battlefront. Iraq’s two major foreign patrons the United States and Iran were competing for influence within the country, and had different views of how to fight the insurgency. The central government was still in a long standing dispute with Kurdistan over the budget and oil exports. Finally, Iraq was heading into a financial crisis as the price of oil collapsed at the end of the year. To help explain the prime minister’s position is Sajad Jiyad of the Iraqi Institute for Economic Reform. He can be followed on Twitter @SajadJiyad.

AL JAZEERA VIDEO: Iraqi Forces To Maintain Security As US Pulls Out

Protests Continue In Iraq

Protests continue to occur in Iraq. The general perception that the government has not improved on basic services in the eight years since the fall of Saddam Hussein, nor cares about the average citizen has led to hundreds of people to take to the streets since February 2011. Friday has become a national day of protest for many, especially in Baghdad where there have been repeated demonstrations at Tahrir Square, which is located in the central part of the city near the Green Zone. The capital has not been the only scene for marches, as nearly every province of the country has witnessed one in the last month and a half. The last few days was no exception.

Woman in Tahrir Square holding up pictures of relatives detained by the authorities March 25, 2011

On March 25, Alsumaria reported that the security forces had blocked all the roads and bridges to Tahrir Square. This has been a tactic adopted by the police in many parts of Iraq to limit access and reduce the number of people able to attend any given protest. Those barriers must have been removed because later in the day there were two demonstrations in the square. First, a group came out against coming to terms with former Baathists. On March 23, the National Reconciliation Ministry announced that it had come to an agreement with five insurgent groups for them to lay down their arms and join the political process. The Sadrists have condemned the move as accommodating with former regime members. Later in the day, another crowd gathered to complain about corruption, unemployment, the lack of services, and the treatment of prisoners. Several women were in the group with pictures of family members they wanted the government to release. That demonstration was organized by the Civil Society Organization and Facebook Youth. The internet has proven to be a useful tool for some protest leaders in the capital.

Workers from the Iraqi Election Commission demanding full time jobs, Tahrir Square, March 26 (Associated Press)

Baghdad and Friday have not been the only place and day for assemblies in Iraq. March 25 also saw people gather in Najaf, Diwaniya in Qadisiyah province, Kut in Wasit, and Hillah in Babil governorate to voice their complaints about the government. The next day the Democratic Movement protested in Diwaniya again, against services, unemployment, and corruption. There was also a march west of Ramadi in Anbar. Temporary workers at the Iraqi Election Commission were also seen in Baghdad demanding full time work that day. These events show that demonstrations have not ended in Iraq, and that they are widespread throughout the country, not just in the capital.

Despite the authorities concerted effort, there are still weekly protests in Iraq. Their demands vary, but in general they have emphasized the lack of governance in the country. Services like electricity are still spotty, corruption is rampant, unemployment is highest amongst the young, not all the government positions have been filled one year after national elections, politicians are unresponsive to the demands of the public, etc. While the demonstrations do not threaten to overturn the system of government like in other parts of the region, they do pose a challenge to those in power. Already several governors have been forced to step down, and Maliki has felt the heat as well. As a result, the prime minister has given his ministers 100 days to improve or else. At the same time, he has actively attempted to suppress the demonstrations, and coverage of them as well. Little is likely to change after that deadline, so people will still attempt to hit the streets. That could lead to a battle of wills between those angry at the condition of the country and who demand change, and the prime minister who would rather solidify his power over the nation and be done with the public outbursts.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Baghdad Secretary resigns on account of protests,” 3/3/11
- “Iraq protests against bad services ongoing,” 3/26/11

Alsumaria, “In Iraq, Security Forces Block Streets Leading To Baghdad’s Al-Tahrir Square,” MEMRI Blog, 3/25/11

Associated Press, “Temporary workers at Independent High Electoral,” 3/26/11

Aswat al-Iraq, “Baghdad demo protests “reconciliation” with Baathists,” 3/26/11

Ibrahim, Waleed, “Analysis: Iraq’s Maliki wields protests to consolidate power,” Reuters, 3/15/11

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Parties Differ On Insurgent Groups Joining Politics,” 3/25/11

Tawfeeq, Mohammed, “Iraqi protesters rally in the rain,” CNN, 3/25/11

Is The U.S. Negotiating With Baathists?

In early January 2010 the Paris based Intelligence Online site said that the CIA was meeting with Baathists in Yemen and Syria to try to work out a cease-fire with them to re-integrate them into the new Iraq. After the overthrow of Saddam many Baathists fled to Syria where they set up offices, and helped fund the insurgency. The President of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh also recruited many former Iraqi army and intelligence officers that had lost their job when the U.S. invaded 2003 into his own forces. Intelligence Online claimed that these talks began in the summer of 2009 with the help of Jordanian intelligence. The strategy is to try to reach out to these former regime elements, and get them involved with Iraqi politics before the U.S. withdraws. For their part, the Baathists and army officers want jobs in the government and military, and an end to the constitutional ban on the Baath party. This was just the latest evidence that the U.S. has been negotiating with insurgents and former regime elements to try to bring about reconciliation in Iraq, but ironically, none of these efforts have included the Iraqi government.

In 2009 there were scattered stories about the U.S. talking with militants. In February 2009, a Saudi newspaper said that an American delegation met with former army officers in Jordan, hoping to convince them to return to Iraq. In April, Newsweek reported that the U.S. had tried to talk with Baathists, and was pushing Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to offer them a fig leaf. On August 29, The National paper from Abu Dhabi ran a story that said that the U.S. had met with insurgents in Turkey at the beginning of 2009, and that a U.S. military delegation to Syria in August had also talked with Baathists there. Finally, on January 5, 2010 Azzaman claimed that Baathists and insurgents inside Iraq were having discussions with the U.S.

These American overtures have led to a mix response by Baghdad. In April 2009, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said that he would welcome back Baathists if they accepted the new political order in the country. However, later in the year he rejected any U.S. brokered talks with them. In August 2009 after the bombing of government buildings in Baghdad, Maliki began a concerted campaign to blame Syrian Baathists to defer blame away from himself for the security failure. In December, the Prime Minister noted that if Washington were to meet with Baathists in the future, that would be a violation of the Status of Forces Agreement between the two countries. With Maliki focusing the public on the threat of Baathist terrorist acts and the recent banning of candidates in the March 2010 elections due to their alleged Baathist sympathies, the negative reaction by Maliki to the U.S. talking with former regime members could be expected.

In the middle of all the Baathist baiting going on in Iraq, it was ironic to read on January 21 a report by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that members of the Iraqi government were carrying out their own secret negotiations with Baathists. A spokesman for the cabinet’s reconciliation committee was quoted as saying that the Ministry of National Dialogue held talks with insurgents in Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and Syria recently. He went on to say that the reconciliation committee’s chairman had met with Baathists in Syria who were willing to renounce violence and try politics.

Reconciliation in Iraq has gone in spurts and spats, and the U.S. has led much of this effort with mixed results. The Anbar Awakening that was made up of former tribes and militants who had cooperated with Al Qaeda in Iraq was largely accepted by Baghdad because of their indigenous origins, and residence in a Sunni dominated province. The Sons of Iraq, which was a successful attempt by the Americans to divide and conquer the insurgency on the other hand, has met plenty of opposition by Iraqi officials since it was a U.S. creation. Their integration into the government has been dragged along as a result. U.S. attempts at working out deals with Baathists and insurgents would probably create a similar reaction as the Iraqi government is not involved in the policy at all. The willingness of Iraqi officials to accept militants back into Iraq is also divided. The boogey man of a Baathist return is still quite useful amongst Shiite political parties for example, as is currently playing out in the 2010 elections. Reconciliation would deprive them of this tool. When Iraqi politicians will be mature and secure enough in their positions to accept the return of Baathists exiles that are really no threat to the new Iraq is unknown, but probably won’t happen anytime soon. That means the U.S. has plenty of time to talk with them, or their work may be futile.

SOURCES

Azzaman, “US talking to former Baathists in Iraq,” 1/5/10

Dawlat Al-Qanon Network, “Al-Maliki Answers Reporters’ Questions Online,” MEMRI Blog, 12/8/09

Kaplow, Larry, “The Return of the Baathists,” Newsweek, 4/6/09

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Officials Confirm Talks Held Abroad With Ba’athists, Insurgents,” 1/21/10

Roads To Iraq Blog, “American delegation met with former Iraqi army officers,” 2/20/09

Sands, Phil, “A safe haven in Damascus,” The National, 8/29/09

UPI, “CIA ‘seeks truce with Iraqi Baathists,’” 1/11/10

Will Iraq Ever Have Reconciliation?

As Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki visited the United States in July 2009 President Obama repeated the common refrain that he hoped that there would eventually be reconciliation in Iraq. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy issued a report on this very topic on July 17 entitled, “How This Ends: Iraq’s Uncertain Path toward National Reconciliation.” In it, authors Michael Eisenstadt and Ahmed Ali document the steps that the American and Iraqi governments have followed to try to achieve this goal, and find their efforts lacking, and the prospects of making amends unlikely.

Reconciliation is important in countries that have recently gone through armed conflict. It provides greater stability and lessons the chances of a return to chaos. Successful reconciliation processes in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, Mozambique, South Africa, and Uruguay all shared the following steps:

1. Some form of truth telling
2. Recognition that all groups in the country are fellow citizens
3. Compensation programs and trials for some
4. Public peace events

Iraq has had some of these, but also gone against others. A major problem is that the United States and various Iraqi groups do not have a shared vision of what reconciliation means.

America’s policies have changed over time, and been a mixed bag. At first, U.S. efforts were focused upon making up for their own early mistakes. This included integrating Sunnis into the security forces and politics after the Coalition Provisional Authority disbanded the Iraqi Army and initiated deBaathification, and paying compensation to families that were harmed by the military. The U.S. has also stressed ethnosectarian power sharing through the passage of laws, and mediation between Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds. Norwegian Iraq expert Reidar Visser has argued that this is a misreading of Iraqi politics and maintains differences in the country rather than helps heal them. Not only that, but the results of these early strategies were very poor. Few laws pushed by the U.S. have been passed for example, and the ones that were have not been implemented as planned. During the Surge, the American forces began working with insurgents and militiamen that were willing to give up fighting in a bottom-up approach. This was much more successful, and directly led to the decrease in violence. At the same time, the U.S. has not been able to link many of the groups they worked with to the Iraqi government such as the Sons of Iraq.

Many of Baghdad’s policies on the other hand, have been interpreted as retribution or done for political gain. Examples of the former were deBaathification and the trial and execution of Saddam Hussein, and cases of the latter were the moves by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. In June 2006 Maliki announced a 24-point plan that included amnesty, conferences, changes in deBaathification and the constitution, compensation, punishment for war criminals and terrorists, and the creation of a national dialogue council. Baghdad did compensate victims of the former regime, and passed an Amnesty Law and Accountability and Justice Act, which replaced the old deBaathification process created by the Americans. The Amnesty Law has only freed a few thousand prisoners, and has mostly been used for public relations purposes, while the Accountability Act has never been implemented. Baghdad created the Supreme Committee for Dialogue and National Reconciliation, which works with tribes, civil groups, political parties and religious leaders, but it has no staff, and parliament cancelled its funding. There is also the much more important Follow-Up Committee for National Reconciliation that vets former officials and soldiers to be re-integrated, and works with the Sons of Iraq, Tribal Support Councils, and the displaced. Both are headed by Maliki confidants, and have been accused of supporting the Prime Minister’s personal agenda. Sunnis in parliament also set up the National Reconciliation Committee to follow their vision. It mostly works to free Sunni prisoners. The government has integrated several thousand former soldiers and officers into the security forces or pays them pensions. There have also been examples of local reconciliation. The rest of Baghdad’s goals have been largely unmet, and led to accusations about the government’s intentions rather than helped heal wounds.

Eisenstadt and Ali finish by saying that reconciliation in Iraq will take years, and may never occur in a meaningful fashion. The problems are large and many. First, the major Iraqi political parties are based upon ethnosectarian politics, and could lose power if they give that up. Second, there is still fighting in Iraq, and a World Bank study on conflicts found that almost 50% of countries coming out of civil wars fall back into them within five years. Third, there is little consensus in Baghdad on major issues such as oil, and politics are fragmented, which makes it hard to conduct negotiations or find partners. Fourth, there is a lack of accountability as many militants are involved in politics and security with no regret for their past deeds. Fifth, many conflicts and fighting took place within communities, not just between them, which has never been resolved. Sixth, many groups still talk about revenge, and see things in zero-sum terms. Seventh Iraq has been in the throes of elections since 2008, which makes compromising more difficult. Last, Iraq’s neighbors have all interfered in its internal affairs, and continue to do so to this day such as Iran. These problems may never be overcome, which is why the authors are so pessimistic about the country’s future. Iraq’s government will continue, but without resolving some of these large and pressing concerns, it’s unlikely that major changes or legislation will be implemented, which are a necessity to pull the country out of its current predicament.

SOURCES

Biddle, Stephen, “Reversal in Iraq,” Center for Preventative Action Council on Foreign Relations, May 2009

DeYoung, Karen, “Obama Calls on Iraq to Foster National Unity,” Washington Post, 7/23/09

Eisenstadt, Michael and Ali, Ahmed, “’How This Ends’: Iraq’s Uncertain Path toward National Reconciliation,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 7/17/09

Visser, Reidar, “Biden, US Policy in Iraq and the Concept of Muhasasa,” Historiae.org, 7/6/09

Center for a New American Security – Maintain The Status Quo In Iraq

In June 2009 the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) released a position paper on what U.S. policy towards Iraq should be under the new administration entitled, “After the Fire: Shaping the Future U.S. Relationship with Iraq.” The two authors, John Nagl, a famous former Army officer, and Brian Burton argue that the U.S. should foster Iraq as a long-term ally in the Middle East. The problem is that the U.S. is pulling out, the American public has grown tired of the war, and there is a recession. The CNAS paper worries that short-term thinking will outweigh the long-term goal of the U.S. to have stability in the Middle East. Almost all of the paper’s recommendations however are already being implemented, so what it’s really about is asking for the status quo to be maintained in Iraq past the U.S. withdrawal.

The paper sees four major challenges for the U.S. in Iraq. First, is the increasing divide between Arabs and Kurds. As reported before, a recent journal piece in Middle East Policy argued that this dispute could lead to the fall of the government, become a new source of violence, and even break up the country. Second, is integration of the Sunnis, who still need to find their place in the new political order. Third, is whether Iraq will slide back to authoritarianism. As a paper by two United States Institute of Peace officials recently noted, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is now at the center of Iraqi politics. His opponents are worried that he may become an autocrat. Finally, Iraq’s future is threatened by its over reliance upon oil, which provides almost all of its revenue. The economic downturn has affected Baghdad’s hopes for development, jobs, services, and maintaining the security forces to name just a few.

To meet these challenges and ensure that Iraq is a long-term ally, the CNAS paper suggests five strategies Washington should follow. To deal with the Arab-Kurd divide, the U.S. should act as mediators, and support the United Nations effort to resolve the disputed territories, especially Kirkuk. The U.S. is already trying to help talks between the two sides across northern Iraq, and has stepped in to stop military confrontations. The U.S. also backs the U.N.’s plans for the disputed territories. With regards to the integration of the Sunnis, the writers believe supporting elections is the best course of action. The U.S. has been largely unsuccessful pushing Baghdad to reconcile with the Sunnis, so backing free and open voting where Sunni parties can gain power is the best alternative. This is something Washington has done since 2005. The U.S. also needs to help Iraq diversify its economy. CNAS suggests agriculture should be cultivated. The last few Defense Department quarterly reports to Congress have said the same thing. The problem is that Iraq’s farm sector faces so many institutional barriers such as a lack of tariffs and government support, inadequate irrigation, etc. that it could take over a decade for it to recover. To prevent the return of an autocratic leader in Iraq, the two writers suggest supporting institutions and professionalism. The U.S. already has advisers throughout the Iraqi military and ministries. Washington should also emphasize that it stands behind the Iraqi government, and not just Maliki, something that the Obama administration has already done as well. Finally, to encourage Iraq as a long-term ally the U.S. needs to re-integrate it into the region, and foster more ties between Washington and Baghdad. Getting Iraq’s neighbors to accept the Shiite led government in Baghdad has proven more difficult than expected. Countries like Saudi Arabia have given Iraq a cold shoulder since the invasion. Turkey on the other hand has changed its policy and become much closer recently. Other steps could be bringing more Iraqi military officers and students for training and education in the United States. The authors also believe that the U.S. needs to keep both civilian and military advisers in Iraq past the 2011 deadline for a U.S. withdrawal of combat troops.

Almost everything that the CNAS paper advocates is already being done by the U.S. administration. It is working with the Iraqi government and military, it is trying to mediate internal disputes, it is helping with the economy, it is trying to bring its allies in the region to open up to Baghdad, etc. The only question is whether President Obama will be open to keeping up this support for Iraq after 2011. That’s what “After the Fire” is really about, trying to ensure that all of these programs are maintained into 2012 and beyond.

SOURCES

Anatolia News Agency, “Turkish general says MoU between Turkey and Iraq to contribute to peace,” Today’s Zaman, 6/12/09

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2009
- “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” September 2008
- “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008

Al-Hayat, “US ambassador to Iraq offers to mediate between Kurds, Arabs in Mosul – paper,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/4/09

International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08

Kazimi, Nibras, “Iraq: Trouble for Maliki,” Hudson New York, 4/24/09

Nagl, John and Burton, Brian, “After the Fire: Shaping the Future U.S. Relationship with Iraq,” Center for a New American Security, June 2009

Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009

Stansfield, Gareth Anderson, Liam, “Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” Middle East Policy, Spring 2009

Williams, Timothy and al-Salhy, Saudad, “Allotting of Iraqi Oil Rights May Stoke Hostility,” New York Times, 5/29/09

Grassroots Reconciliation At The Samarra Shrine

In February 2006 the Shiite shrine at Samarra was bombed. In subsequent months Shiite militias responded with a wave of attacks that eventually led to Iraq descending into a sectarian civil war. Civilian deaths went from 2,165 in February according to the United Nations to eventually shooting up to 3,590 by July. Over 1.6 million were displaced as a result. On March 6, 2009 however a remarkable event happened. Over one million Shiite pilgrims returned to the Samarra shrine in an example of grassroots reconciliation.

Samarra, a Sunni city, is the burial place for two revered Shiite Imams. Those are the Imam Hasan Askari and his father Imam Ali Hadi. Both are descendents of the Prophet Mohammad. The death of the Imam Askari is usually celebrated with a pilgrimage to Samarra. On March 6 over one million Shiites from across the country made this trip, the first time since the 2006 bombing. Moqtada al-Sadr also called for his followers to join in the procession.

The city was heavily guarded by the Iraqi security forces, which erected blast walls along the path of the pilgrims. Even though some Shiites complained that they were not able to interact with the local Sunni population that much, there were still tents and food vendors set up to greet the visitors. 5,000 Sunnis and Shiites even went to a joint prayer service at a Sunni mosque, and then marched down the streets chanting anti-violence slogans.

While there are anecdotal reports of Iraqis being tired of the sectarian war, the events at Samarra are a specific example of that new status quo. The symbolism was strong as it took place at the starting place of the civil war. There are still many problems in Iraq, but it appears that at least for the people that made the pilgrimage to Samarra, and those that greeted them wanted to put part of Iraq’s bloody past behind them.

SOURCES

International Organization for Migration, “Three Years Of Post-Samarra Displacement In Iraq,” 2/22/09

O’Hanlon, Michael, Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 1/30/09

Rasheed, Hamid, “Sow of Sunni-Shiite unity in Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, 3/7/09

Schofield, Matthew, “Iraqi pilgrims visit Samarra’s bombed mosque once again,” McClatchy Newspapers, 3/6/09