US Sanctions Iraqi Businessman Khanjar For Bribery And Supporting Iran

US sanctioned businessman Khamis al-Khanjar for bribing politicians and supporting Iran (Reuters)

On December 6 the U.S. Treasury Department issued a new round of sanctions against Iraqis. That included millionaire businessman Khamis al-Khanjar. The Americans charged him with bribing Iraqi politicians to join his Axis List and supporting Iran. Khanjar has been a political chameleon in Iraq emerging as a major backer of Sunni politicians especially the Nujafis from Mosul before switching to supporting pro-Iran lists such as Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law in 2019.

Explaining The Political Factors Behind The Increasing Violence In Iraq, An Interview With Maria Fantappie, Iraq Researcher At The International Crisis Group

 

Violence in Iraq has escalated to the worse levels seen since 2008. The insurgency is making a comeback, while the central government is repeating many of the mistakes made by the United States after the 2003 invasion. The cause of this crisis is a breakdown in the country’s politics. Members of the Sunni community feel increasingly alienated from the government, because their national leadership has failed, their local politicians are ignored, Baghdad has focused the security forces upon their areas, and the protest movement has not achieved any tangible results. To help explain how this situation has led to the current security crisis is Maria Fantappie, a former visiting scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center and currently an Iraq researcher for the International Crisis Group. You can follow her on Twitter @Maria Fantappie and the International Crisis Group @CrisisGroup.

(Abdul Raheem Yasir)

1. In 2009, Sunnis went to the polls after largely boycotting the 2005 provincial vote, and helped put a slew of parties into power. In 2010, many of those same voters came out for Iyad Allawi and Iraqiya, the Iraqi National Movement (INM) which won a plurality of seats in the new parliament. How did Allawi and the other members of the INM turn out to be as national leaders, and how did their performance affect their followers’ opinion of participating in politics?

The key for political success in Iraq is to branch out power from Baghdad into the provinces. Iraqyia leaders focused all efforts on the assignment of government positions in Baghdad, neglecting local officials and constituents in the provinces. This was fatal to the future of the list. Starting from early 2011, while Iyad Allawi persisted in claiming the premiership for himself and the implementation of the Irbil agreement in Baghdad, Maliki ingrained power in the provinces: governors were replaced, police chiefs sacked and Sahwa tribal militias deprived of their salaries. Sunni constituents felt disappointed by their national leader and left under the grip of the government security agencies. Their disappointment evolved into distrust towards the political process altogether. In their eyes, Iraqyia leaders appeared not dissimilar from others of different political colors: locked within Baghdad Green Zone walls and far from people’s concerns.

2. In December 2012, Premier Maliki decided to go after then Finance Minister Rafi Issawi of the INM by issuing warrants for some of his guards. Exactly a year before, a similar situation unfolded with Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi who ended up being convicted in absentia for involvement in attacks. Previous to that, selected leaders of the local security forces known as the Sons of Iraq faced detentions as well. How did these events shape Sunni views of the security forces and Maliki’s rule?

These arrests created the premises for conflict, shaping Sunni self-perceptions and their perception of the government. Sunnis started viewing themselves as victims —targeted by the security forces, excluded from state-institutions, persecuted as terrorists or Baathists —and the government as the source of all this injustice. Al-Issawi events brought these feelings to the boil, exacerbating perceptions of the government’s anti-Sunni agenda, serving the Shiite interests within Iraq and the Iranian agenda in the Middle East. Nine-months of political crisis have turned perceptions into reality. Now more than ever, Sunnis are what they feared to be—excluded, discriminated and criminalized —and the government close to the way they had accused it to be: repressive, discriminatory and bound to Iran’s agenda.

3. How did the regional environment and Syria contribute to the escalation of Iraq’s domestic crisis into a conflict?

The regional environment polarized Iraq along sectarian lines, reducing the space for negotiation between the government and protesters. Earlier in 2013, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the prospect of a Sunni power governing Syria nurtured Iraqi Sunnis hopes for a political comeback boosted the Iraqi Islamic Party aspirations to leadership and mobilized Iraqi Sunnis in protests. This, in turn, directly fed Maliki fears’ of the rise of Sunni radicals in the region pushing the government to assume a defensive position, close to Iran and the Shiite crescent in the region.

4. What divisions have emerged within the demonstrators, and have they been able to achieve any meaningful results?

The conflict evolved over a series of missed opportunities for dialogue from both the government’s and the demonstrators’ side. But the demonstrations’ failure to bring about political leadership gave the government one more reason to shun dialogue and persist in its immovable positions. Sunni tribes, clerics, Iraqi Islamic Party members and insurgency militants gathered into demonstrations against the government, because of a shared feeling of injustice. But protest leaders were often concerned with gaining legitimacy as prominent politicians, clerics, tribal chiefs and thus pushed forward parochial agendas rather than lobbying for the protesters’ demands. Among others, the Iraqi Islamic Party project of establishing a Sunni federal region divided the demonstrations square between proponents and opponents of federalism, and challenged the formation of any negotiation committee.

The Sunni protest movement was a symbol of the dissatisfaction with politics, but also allowed militants to gain more supporters as shown in this photo with black Al Qaeda in Iraq flags flying (AP)

5. How has the failure of national parties, arrests of leaders, and the protest movements inability to bring about changes in government played into the hands of extremists and the insurgency?

Above all, the government’s violent response provided Sunni armed groups opportunities to increase their recruitment and safe-heavens. On 23 April, the government’s violent crackdown on Hawija’s protest sit-in empowered the most radical voices among protesters and silenced those calling for dialogue. The government sowed hostility among Sunni tribes as it armed a new Sahwa faction, depriving others of their salaries, as well as among Sunni citizens, policing their neighborhoods and limiting their mobility. Baghdad lost Sunni local support and with that, the human intelligence needed to counter the re-emergence of armed activities in their areas. Insurgency cells who fought against the U.S. troops found fresh recruits among the frustrated Sunni youth and reactivated their operations in the Kirkuk and Salahaddin provinces. For the first time in years al-Qaeda in Iraq, the Islamic State of Iraq, can count again on local support.  Iraq’s al-Qaeda is now operating with impunity in western Anbar, across the Iraq and Syria border as well as in Syria under the name of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, gaining the support in Sunni areas, helping Iraqis and Syrians in their struggle against their respective governments, Baghdad and Damascus and the resurgence of Sunnis in the region. 

6. A major problem faced by the Sunni community since 2003 is the lack of unity. They have been split between armed struggle and participation in the government, between local and national politicians, nationalist and regional agendas, and other issues. Why do you think there have been so many divisions, and how could they start working together more effectively?

Sunnis do not necessarily need their leaders to ally on the basis of their belonging to the Sunni sect. What Sunnis need is what Iraqyia failed to provide them with: representative leaders. I see the existence of different ideological trends (e.g. Sunni secular and Islamist trends) as rather beneficial to the formation of inter-sectarian and inter-ethnic alliances that will help overcome a rather communitarian political system. Whether together or separately, both Sunni secular and Islamist trends should focus their efforts in effectively representing their base, reach out to provincial officials, help to define the demands of their constituents in the provinces and represent them in Baghdad central institutions.

7. These splits have allowed Maliki to play divide and conquer. Could you provide one or two examples of how the premier has been able to use that tactic, and why do you think he could face long-term troubles if he continues down that path?

So far, Maliki’s policy towards the Sunnis has been rather self-damaging.  Al-Issawi events unified Sunnis against the government, crashed the PM’s image as an Iraqi national leader and compelled him to seek even more U.S. and Iranian support to maintain power. The PM’s policy toward Sunni tribes is archetypal of the short-term benefits of a divide-and-conquer strategy. On February 2013, the government dismantled the Sahwa leadership and supported the formation of  new pro-governmental Sahwa corps— the New Sahwa —providing them with weaponry, salaries and privileges, leaving the former one with empty hands. Last May, al-Qaeda could expand its operations across the Iraq-Syrian frontier, mostly counting on co-operation, weaponry supplies and recruits of former Sahwa, now disenfranchised by governmental policies. In the absence of a radical change of approach, the government risks to further alienate Sunnis from the state, bolster Sunni solidarity with the Syrian armed oppositions, pushing them to cooperate with radical armed groups as a way to weaken the government legitimacy. If there is any way to insulate Iraq from the impact of the Syrian conflict and also for Maliki to secure his own power, this consists in an inclusive Iraqi state.

8. Rather than using greater force, what Iraq needs is some serious concessions and reconciliation to pull the Sunni community back to politics and away from the use of force. What kind of reforms should Baghdad consider?

In order to end violence, the government should win Sunnis back to its side. No security improvement will be reached without involving the Sunni population, security forces and tribes in fighting al-Qaeda and insurgency groups. A first step consists in dealing with outstanding issues that have generated the divide between the government and the Sunni population: deployment of security forces in Sunni populated areas, Sunni participation to the security forces, waves of arrests and exclusions upon alleged affiliation to terrorist groups and or Baathist regime. Also, Sahwa should return to be a united corps and ensured with monthly salaries. Any security plan should involve the co-operation with Sunni local officials, locally recruited police forces and Sahwa corps. Considering the number of missed opportunities to solve this conflict, it is legitimate to question whether or not the government ever made a serious effort to avoid reaching to the current level of violence.  

One of the major issues facing PM Maliki is whether he can put aside his immediate concerns and think long-term to hold onto power

9. Maliki would have to start thinking long-term to try to push for those changes. Right now he seems more focused upon looking strong in the face of the increasing violence, and preparing for next year’s parliamentary elections where he will face tough competition. Do you think he’s capable of putting aside those immediate concerns, and thinking big picture, which might assure him of a longer reign, and a more governorable country?

The lack of a legitimate Sunni leadership to ally with might turn into the prime minister’s biggest liability to a third term on power. The recent crisis delegitimized those Sunnis loyal to the prime minister and empowered a Shiite anti-Maliki bloc, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) in particular. Last June, the formation of local councils proved that a Shiite anti-Maliki bloc is a winning formula. ISCI and the Sadrists forged an alliance, and together with the Sunnis’ Mutahidun list garnered the majority needed to rule out Maliki’s coalition from Baghdad governorate. An isolated prime minister will hardly succeed for a third term. If, before or after the parliamentary elections, Shiite groups will stand together against the prime minister, only an alliance with a strong Sunni group could ensure Maliki a third term.

SOURCES

Carnegie Paper, “Contested Consolidation of Power in Iraq”, February 2013

International Crisis Group, “Make or Break: Iraq’s Sunnis and the State,” 8/14/13

Rumors Spread Of Militias At Work In Iraq

Iraq is facing a worsening security situation, but the country is not yet in a civil war. What could change that is if Shiites decide they can no longer rely upon the government to protect them, and begin taking matters into their own hands as they did during the civil war period from 2005-2008. Rumors play a large role in Iraq, and currently what is spreading amongst Sunnis are stories of fake checkpoints manned by militiamen who kidnap and murder people. Political parties and the protest movement are magnifying these rumors, and have now incorporated them into their weekly discourse. What’s more is that it is still not clear whether Shiite armed groups are operating again or not. If they are remobilizing it could be a sign that Iraqi society is breaking down once more.

Stories about Shiite militias reviving their activities started at the end of April 2013, and then became a part of the weekly statements made by various political parties and the protest movement. Speaker Osama Nujafi’s Mutahidun bloc made one of the earliest public remarks on April 24, which it said that there were militias operating with the consent of the government. It claimed that the security forces withdrew from two neighborhoods in Baghdad, causing residents to fear that militias would move in. By the next month, every week there were more such reports. On May 8, a lawmaker from the Iraqi National Movement (INM) told the press that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki needed to protect the public from militias. He stated that the government was turning a blind eye to the activities of Shiite militants, claimed they were being funded and armed by foreign intelligence agencies, a reference to Iran, and noted that the premier’s State of Law was aligned with the League of the Righteous and Hezbollah Brigades, two infamous Special Groups supported by Tehran. On May 14, the Anbar demonstration movement accused militias of working for the authorities, and said they killed an organizer in Diyala. Five days later, the People’s Committee in Anbar announced that Baghdad was massacring people with the help of militias. Then on May 23, Mutahidun held a press conference accusing the government of backing armed groups that were running fake checkpoints with the help of the security forces, and targeting mosques and Friday prayers. The list later called on Iraq’s political parties to stop the government and its militiaal lies. Finally, on May 26, Iyad Allawi got in on the act by saying that militias were being formed and increasing the violence in the country. Whether these groups actually have evidence of Shiite fighters being out on the streets again is not known, because they have not provided any evidence besides the one accusation that militias were behind the murder of a protest leader in Diyala. Otherwise, nothing specific has been revealed. It could be that they are repeating stories that they hear from their constituents. They could also just be exploiting the fears and growing tensions between the Sunni population and the Shiite led government. Talking about militias revives the bad memories of the sectarian war from 2005-2008 when Baghdad and surrounding areas became a battleground between armed Shiite groups and the insurgency, which resulted in the forced resettlement of thousands of people, mostly Sunnis who were cleansed from the capital. By invoking these images, the INM, Mutahidun, and the protest movement could be trying to rally the populace behind them by claiming Prime Minister Maliki is untrustworthy and treacherous, and that he not the insurgency is bringing the country to the brink of civil war.

The constant remarks about militias have led the Shiite parties and others to respond. On May 26, the League of the Righteous denied that it was running fake checkpoints in the capital, and that its opponents were spreading these rumors. A State of Law parliamentarian said that talk about militias was a political ploy by lawmakers. The Interior Ministry added that it did not know about any militia activities. The only exception was Moqtada al-Sadr who called on Baghdad to clear the League of the Righteous from the streets in a statement warning Maliki that he had to protect the public during the current security crisis. It was predictable that these Shiite groups would refute these stories. The Interior Ministry is under the acting control of the premier as well. It was also not surprising that Sadr would exploit these stories since he has an on going feud with the League, which he sees as a threat to his constituency, because it claims to be the legitimate legacy of Sadr’s father. Since Iraq is facing increasing polarization these statements cannot help the situation at all. There’s no reason for Sunnis to believe these parties, and Sadr’s comments were even welcomed by the protest movement.

The only serious attempt to study whether militias are operating or not was recently done by the Institute for the Study of War. At the end of May it issued a report, “Iraq’s sectarian crisis reignites as Shi’a militias execute civilians and remobilize.” It looked at a number of attacks and incidents in Baghdad and Diyala in April and May, which it firmly believed were the work of Shiite militants. Those included an attack upon a café in Amiriya, Baghdad on April 18 that left 27 dead. A shooting at a police checkpoint on May 14 in Baghdad, an assault upon a brothel and a liquor store on May 22, and another café hit in Diyala on May 29, amongst many others. The Institute was sure this was the work of militias for a number of reasons. One was that they did not fit the standard operating procedure of groups like Al Qaeda in Iraq, which usually relies upon explosive devices such as car and roadside bombs. Second the location of many of these attacks and their targets, mostly Sunni could also be considered retaliatory attacks against those communities for the insurgency. Bodies were also found in neighborhoods where militias use to drop them off during the civil war. Not all their evidence was convincing however. The attacks upon police checkpoints for example would not serve any purpose, but to undermine security unless Sunni officers manned them. Still, there were enough incidents to raise the question of who was responsible, and whether groups like the League of the Righteous or the Sadrists or some other groups might be behind them.

The news and rumors about Shiite militias operating again in Iraq are only growing in number. That is making the already tense situation in the country worse. The number of deaths just hit a four-year high as insurgents are going on the offensive. Now there are increasing statements by politicians and the protest movement along with some troubling articles that Shiite militias may be operating again in the country. Since the civil war ended groups like the Sadrists have not responded to the constant provocations by Al Qaeda in Iraq and others to rekindle the civil war. Instead they have let the government deal with it. With violence mounting however, these groups could mobilize again to protect their communities and carry out retaliatory attacks if they feel Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is not up to the task. That would be a surefire sign that Iraq is heading towards civil war again. As of yet, it’s not clear what is happening on the ground, but it is definitely a worrisome situation.

SOURCES

Dar Addustour, “Clashes with hands and sticks in the yard of Fallujah because banners demanding a region – protests enter day 154 .. and preachers six provinces are demanding dialogue,” 5/24/13

AIN, “Allawi: Forming militias to consolidate tensions,” 5/26/13

Lewis, Jessica, Ali, Ahmed, and Kagan, Kimberly, “Iraq’s sectarian crisis reignites as Shi’a militias execute civilians and remobilize,” Institute for the Study of War, 5/31/13

National Iraqi News Agency, “Ahl Al-Haq denies links to fake checkpoints, demanding the Govt to take firm and strict action,” 5/26/13

- “Anbar’s sitters accuse the “militia” of murdering one of the leaders of the demonstrations in Diyala,” 5/14/13

- “The IS coalition Carry-Maliki Iraqi civilian life and safty responsibility and to protect them from armed criminal militias,” 5/8/13

- “Motahedoon accuses the government of supporting the militias,” 5/23/13

- “Motahedoon criticizes “Suspicious government silence about the growing militia activity,”” 5/25/13

-“Mothedoon criticizes “Suspicious government silence about the growing militia activity,” 5/25/13

- “Mottahidoon /United/ bloc : targeting mosques and worshipers confirms that government giving the green light to the militia,” 4/24/13

- “MP: Fake checkpoints is lie to some politicians,” 5/28/13

Parker, Ned, “Ten years after Iraq war began, Iran reaps the gains,” Los Angeles Times, 3/28/13

Sadah, Ali Abel, “Sadr Gives Maliki ‘Final Warning,’” Al-Monitor, 5/29/13

Al-Shaher, Omar, “Fears of Civil War Cripple Baghdad Commerce,” Al-Monitor, 5/30/13

Sotaliraq, “Khatib Mosul: the region is the best choice and save religion takes precedence over home,” 5/24/13

Ministerial Boycott Of Iraq’s Cabinet Over Protests Breaking Down

In the wake of arrest warrants being issued for former Finance Minister Rafi Issawi’s bodyguards in December 2012, protests and an eventual boycott of the cabinet by several ministers began. The Agricultural Minister Izz al-Din al-Dawla left in March 2013 after demonstrators were killed and wounded by security forces in Mosul. Industry Minister Ahmad Nasser al-Dalli Karbuli, Technology Minister Abdul al-Karim al-Samarraie, and Education Minister Mohammed Tamim followed suit after the Hawija incident in April. Tamim is now returning to the council of ministers, while Dawla has also reportedly attended at least one cabinet session. All four ministers come from the now defunct Iraqi National Movement (INM), which was one of the prime minister’s main opponents. The four however, all had friendly relations with Maliki, and broke with their list several times beforehand. It is no wonder than that they should eventually return to their jobs, and resume their work.

Education Minister Tamim recently announced that he was returning to office after a short boycott over the Hawija incident in April 2013 (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty)

On May 22, 2013, Industry Minister Ahmad Nasser al-Dalli Karbuli announced that Education Minister Mohammed Tamim was returning to his position. Tamim resigned in April after the security forces attacked protesters in the town of Hawija. Karbuli, and Technology Minister Abdul al-Karim al-Samarraie joined him. The month before, Agricultural Minister Izz al-Din al-Dawla gave up his office after demonstrators were killed and wounded in his hometown of Mosul. Its recently been reported that he has attended at least one cabinet session recently as well. Tamim is from Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Iraqi National Dialogue Front, Karbuli is from the Solution Movement, Samarraie is a member of the Renewal Party, while Dawla belongs to Speaker Nujafi’s old Iraqiyoon party that is now part of Mutahidun, the Uniters List. All of them gained office through the Iraqi National Movement (INM) after the 2010 parliamentary vote. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki immediately rejected Tamim’s resignation. That was likely due to their close relationship beforehand. In fact, all four have consistently broken with their list to work to stay part of the government.  

In December 2011 and March 2013, the INM announced that it was withdrawing its ministers from the cabinet to protest Maliki’s government, but neither worked. At the beginning of March, the National Movement stopped going to the council of ministers to support the protesters. In less than a month, Education Minister Tamim, Industry Minister Karbuli, and Deputy Premier Mutlaq were all back at meetings, which helped lead to the end of the INM as a coherent list. Before that, at the end of 2011, the INM held another unsuccessful boycott against the prime minister. Karbuli, Tamim, and several other National Movement ministers never followed their party. Samarraie, Tamim, and Dawla all eventually met with the premier letting him know that they wanted to return to their offices, which effectively put an end to the boycott. In turn, Maliki gave them concessions, such as releasing 43 prisoners directly to Tamim’s protection in February 2012. The conventional wisdom on Iraq is that the government and country is wracked by sectarianism, and the divide between Sunnis and Shiites is becoming worse by the day. That’s how the increasing violence is also explained. This overlooks the fact that several Sunni ministers such as Karbuli, Tamim, Samarraie, and Dawla have actually had quite friendly relations with Maliki, and have been more than willing to work within his government, even when that directly contradicted their list’s strategy.

Given the protest movements and occasional violence the government has used against them it was predictable that these ministers would again step away from the government. At the same time, it was foreseeable that they would eventually come back to the cabinet as well. They did that the last two times they were supposed to be boycotting, and all of them will likely do so again on this occasion. Not only do they not have as many issues with Premier Maliki as some of their brethren, but they also lose out on the patronage and power that holding a ministry bestows upon them. That is another driving force for them to go back to work. If nothing else, the power, money, and corruption that accompanies holding office is one of the great unifiers that exists in the country.

SOURCES

AIN, “Urgent….Karbouli: Timim to resume his work as Minister of Education,” 5/22/13

- “Urgent….Maliki rejects Education minister’s resignation,” 4/23/13

Ibrahim, Haidar, “Iraqiya’s controversial remarks over ministers’ boycott termination,” AK News, 1/13/12

- “Maliki to tackle absent minister issue soon, advisor says,” AK News, 12/29/11

- “Protest-related violence kills 53 in Iraq,” Agence France Presse, 4/24/13

National Iraqi News Agency, “Iraqiya calls on Mutlaq to review his position and not be a false witness,” 3/27/13

- “Iraqiya: Statement ascribed to Al-Ani allowing some ministers attend cabinet session not accurate,” 1/12/12

- “Jubouri: three IS ministers return to ministries evidence of patriotic awareness,” 2/1/12

- “MP demands Iraqiya to hold a meeting to overcome differences,” 3/31/13

- “Nijaifi calls on Iraqiya ministers to resign,” 3/8/13

Sadah, Ali Abel, “Iraqiya List Frays As Constituents Splinter,” Al-Monitor, 3/28/13

Schreck, Adam and Salaheddin, Sinan, “Iraq fears rise as clashes spread to northern city,” Associated Press, 4/25/13

Sowell, Kirk, “Inside Iraqi Politics No. 31,” 1/25/12

- “Inside Iraqi Politics No. 32,” 2/9/12

- “Inside Iraqi Politics No. 33,” 2/29/12

Visser, Reidar, “How Iraq can pull back from the brink,” The National, 5/22/13

Yacoub, Sameer, “Iraqi minister resigns after protesters shot,” Associated Press, 3/8/13

The Final Dissolution Of The Iraqi National Movement?

The Iraqi National Movement (INM) was formed before the 2010 parliamentary elections with Iyad Allawi as its leader to challenge Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his State of Law. The INM, otherwise known as Iraqiya, was always a divided list, because it was made up of so many different parties and individuals with divergent views. As soon as negotiations started for a new government, Iraqiya began to fracture. In the latest episode, Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq, and several ministers decided to return to the cabinet, breaking a boycott by the INM. Mutlaq and the others claimed they were returning to win concessions for the protesters in Anbar, Ninewa, and other provinces, but the real reason is because they have compromised with the prime minister, and are attempting to position themselves before April’s provincial vote. The rest of Iraqiya immediately condemned their actions. This could mark the end of the list, which has had such a troubled history since its birth.

Deputy Premier Mutlaq’s decision to break his list’s boycott of the cabinet might have led to the final break up of the Iraqi National Movement (Reuters)

The latest crisis within the Iraqi National Movement started when Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq and two other ministers from the list attended a cabinet session despite a boycott. On March 26, 2013, Mutlaq, Education Minister Mohammed Tamim and Industry Minister Ahmad Nasser al-Dalli Karbuli returned to the cabinet. They discussed the demands of the protesters from Anbar, Ninewa, and other provinces, and were included in a special committee dealing with the matter. Afterward, Mutlaq announced that the government had agreed to meet all the major demands of the demonstrators including passing an amnesty law, releasing prisoners, amending arrest procedures, ending the use of secret informers, and changing the Accountability and Justice Law. This broke a three-month old boycott by Iraqiya that started in December 2012 to protest the arrest of former Finance Minister Rafi Issawi’s bodyguards. Mutlaq was convinced to return after he was invited to dinner by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The deputy premier’s relationship with Maliki has gone back and forth from confrontation to reconciliation. In December 2011, Mutlaq gave an interview to CNN where he called the prime minister a dictator, and he responded by calling for a no confidence vote to remove his deputy from office.  The two then cut a political deal, and Mutlaq returned to his work in May 2012. Then in December 2012, the deputy prime minister came out for the protests in Anbar, and said he was resigning to support them in January 2013. That argument only lasted two months as the two have reconciled once again. Mutlaq has no real power within the government, so Maliki could simply wait out his protests. His deputy had more to lose out of office, because he would lose out on the patronage networks and money that every politician in the government gets access to. It was no surprise then that Mutlaq would come back into the fold after each flare up. The reaction it caused was also predictable.

Mutlaq’s latest actions might have caused a fatal blow to the National Movement. Iraqi National Movement lawmaker Ahmed Alwani accused Mutlaq of betraying his party, and the protests in Anbar. Haidar al-Mullah, the spokesman for the deputy premier’s Iraqi National Dialogue Front responded that Iraqiya was dead. He claimed that former Finance Minister Rafi Issawi and Speaker of Parliament Osama Nujafi had taken over the list, and were taking it towards an Islamist program instead of a nationalist one. He added that the constant absence of Iraqiya leader Iyad Allawi was another major factor. Lawmaker Mishan al-Saadi of the Dialogue Front also told the press that the National Movement was no longer. When Mutlaq cut a deal with Maliki back in May 2012 to return to his job his decision was not met with this type of open criticism. His recent move on the other hand, has brought up the depth of the divisions within Iraqiya. As April 2013’s provincial elections near, the competition between the parts of the Iraqi National Movement are increasing, because the major factions are running separately. Their stance towards the protest movement has become a central issue. Mutlaq tried to frame his return to the cabinet as a triumph for the demonstrators as he claimed that it agreed to all of their major demands. The rest of Iraqiya saw Mutlaq as a turncoat who broke their boycott in favor of a compromise with Maliki. Their differences being aired to the press is part of this campaign to differentiate each other before the vote. It also shows that the INM are no longer working together as whole.

The problems within Iraqiya were already apparent over the boycott. Electricity Minister Abdul Karim Aftan returned to the cabinet in February, saying that he was a technocrat who had to do his job. Minister of State for Provincial Affairs Turhan Mathhar Abdullah Hassan also broke the boycott, while a few lawmakers from the list criticized the decision to pull out the ministers as well. Talal al-Zoba’I and Talal Hussein for example, both said that the boycott was made by the list’s leadership who never consulted with the rank and file. There were also arguments over whether the Iraqiya ministers should resign to support the demonstrators, after Agriculture Minister Izz al-Din al-Dawla stepped down to condemned the shooting of protesters in Mosul. The same thing happened during the last boycott that was started in December 2011. That time the National Movement pulled out of both the cabinet and parliament. Speaker Nujafi, Electricity Minister Aftan, and Industry Minister Karbuli never complied, and the boycott only lasted until the end of January, because the list was going to break up over it. The boycott achieved nothing as the government continued its work, because the National Movement didn’t have the numbers in either the cabinet or parliament to stop anything. The same thing is true for the current boycott, except this time it appears Iraqiya has finally broken up.

While the Iraqi National Movement still exists, it is in name only. There are several different factions, which are going to compete against each other in the April elections. Jamal Karbuli of the Solution List, Saad al-Janabi of the Iraqi Republican Grouping, and Deputy Premier Mutlaq of the Iraqi National Dialogue Front are running together as the Arabic Iraqiya. Speaker Nujafi of the National Assembly and former Finance Minister Issawi of the National Future Gathering have formed another list, while Iyad Allawi has registered under Iraqiya. There are a large number of National Movement members who have not decided who will they will join. Still, in Shiite provinces, many of these parties are going to run together to try to pull votes. The break-up of Iraqiya was a long time coming. From the beginning it was made up of too many parties with too many divergent views. From the moment it entered into negotiations to form a new government after the 2010 elections its differences became apparent. During the 2011 boycott, several parliamentarians quit or were expelled, because they disagreed with pulling out of the government. Now the major leaders have all split marking the final end of the list.

Politicians will continue to talk about the Iraqi National Movement, but for all intents and purposes it is over. Mutlaq, and the two minister’s choice to cut a deal with Maliki to break the on-going boycott brought out all of the differences within the list into the public eye. Iraqiya has now broken up into different factions, which will compete against each other in many of the provinces in the April elections. The ultimate winner is Prime Minister Maliki. The INM was his main opponent. His strategy was to always wait them out, because he knew that they were riven with rivalries, and did not have the numbers to pose a real threat to his rule. That has now come to fruition, and the premier is in a stronger position. The different parts of Iraqiya are likely to work and fight with each other over the coming years, but are unlikely to come together in such a large gathering as they did for the 2010 elections.

SOURCES

Abbas, Mushreq, “Maliki Takes Steps to Ease Political, Social Divisions in Iraq,” Al-Monitor, 3/27/13

AIN, “Breaking News….Deputy PM Mutleg resigns,” 1/28/13

- “IS MP describes his Slate as “inharmonious mixture,” 2/28/13

AK News, “Iraqiya to discuss political crisis today,” 5/14/12

Al-Ali, Daoud, “means justify ends: a sunni MP for defence minister?” Niqash, 3/28/13

Aswat al-Iraq, “Laws connected with demonstrators agreed upon,” 3/25/13

Gutman, Roy, “As US troops exit Iraq, Maliki moves against Sunni rivals,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/19/11

Habib, Mustafa, “election coalitions indicate depth of Iraq’s sectarian divide,” Niqash, 3/14/13

Mardini, Ramzy, “Iraq’s First Post-Withdrawal Crisis,” Institute for the Study of War, 12/19/11

National Iraqi News Agency, “Abdul Karim al-Samarrai heads a political entity to participate in provincial elections,” 11/15/12

- “Abu Risha call on Iraqiya ministers to resign,” 3/3/13

- “Ahmed al-Alwani: Salah al-Mutlaq reneged of Iraqiya Slate and playing a suspicious role,” 3/29/13

- “BREAKING NEWS. A new political coalition headed by Nujaifi,” 11/29/12

- “Iraqiya calls on Mutlaq to review his position and not be a false witness,” 3/27/13

- “Iraqiya coalition suspends its attending in the Parliament,” 12/23/12

- “Iraqiya MP: al-Nujaifi and Issawi are to form a new bloc,” 11/12/12

- “Iraqiya MP: Political forces and figures negotiate to form a new alliance,” 11/14/12

- “Iraqiya’s Ministers joint their resignations with Nujaifi’s resignation,” 3/10/13

- “Majeed: Maliki asked Parliament to withdraw confidence from Saleh al-Mutlaq,” 12/17/11

- “A new coalition, headed by al-Mutlaq, formed,” 12/3/12

- “Nijaifi calls on Iraqiya ministers to resign,” 3/8/13

- “Sajri withdraws from the alliance of Mutlaq, Karbouli,” 12/28/12

Sadah, Ali Abel, “Iraqiya List Frays As Constituents Splinter,” Al-Monitor, 3/28/13

Shafaq News, “Council of ministers delay its sessions after al-Iraqiya ministers boycott it,” 12/25/12

- “Council of Ministers holds its session in absence of Kurds and al- Iraqiya,” 3/12/13

- “Al-Iraqiya attacks Aftan for his return to the Council of Ministers meetings,” 2/27/13

Visser, Reidar, “Endgame for the Prime Minister?” Sada, 5/29/12

- “IHEC Publishes the List of Entities for the April 2013 Local Elections in Iraq,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 11/29/12

Wicken, Stephen, “2013 Iraq Update #9: Issawi resignation presents opportunities to Maliki,” Institute for the Study of War, 3/1/13

Yacoub, Sameer, “Iraqi minister resigns after protesters shot,” Associated Press, 3/8/13

Once Again Iraq’s Premier Maliki Goes After Former Finance Minister Issawi

Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has increasingly used arrest warrants to intimidate and get rid of his political enemies. The latest example occurred in March 2013 when a court ordered former Finance Minister Rafi Issawi to be detained on terrorism charges. Issawi is from the Iraqi National Movement, which is one of the main rivals to the prime minister’s State of Law, and he has often criticized the prime minister’s rule. In December 2012, some of his bodyguards were arrested, and allegedly confessed to carrying out attacks. That led to the current protests in western, eastern, and northern Iraq along with Issawi eventually resigning. Now the ante has been upped as Maliki is going after the former minister himself. Rather than actually trying to arrest Issawi it appears the warrant was a scare tactic.

On March 12, 2013, security forces stopped the former Finance Minister. Issawi was going to a funeral of a local council head in the Rutba district of Anbar province when he ran into group of vehicles backed by helicopters. The ex-Minister was not arrested however. Afterward, there were some reports that Issawi was attempting to flee to Jordan, and that he was turned away because there was an arrest warrant for him on terrorism charges. That story was later proven false. The entire incident appeared to be for show. If the government wanted to detain Issawi this was a perfect opportunity as he was isolated, while driving through the countryside. The fake claim that he was trying to get out of Iraq appeared to be a justification for the raid. Overall, it was obviously meant to intimidate Issawi, to let him know that the government knew about his movements, and could pick him up when they wanted to. This was just the latest episode in a drawn out drama between Issawi and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

Former Finance Minister Issawi at the podium before protesters in Anbar (Al-Mada)

The current dispute between the two has its origins in the arrest of several of Issawi’s bodyguards. In December 2012, some of the Finance Minister’s security detail was picked up in Baghdad on terrorism charges. A spokesman for the Supreme Judicial Council told the media that the head of Issawi’s bodyguards had confessed to involvement in attacks, while a member of the premier’s State of Law list said that twenty families in Anbar had filed lawsuits against members of the minister’s security unit. Later, state-run Iraqiya TV aired a confession of one of Issawi’s guards claiming that he received orders from the minister’s son-in-law to carry out assassinations. Immediately afterward, protests sprang up in Anbar, Baghdad, and other provinces in support of Issawi, which continue to this day. Issawi then started boycotting session of the cabinet, which led to Maliki replacing him temporarily with Planning Minister Ali Yousef Abdul-Nabi of the Sadr Trend in February. The next month, Issawi announced his resignation in front of a huge crowd of demonstrators in Ramadi, Anbar. Iraqiya TV reported that the prime minister did not accept his resignation, because he was being investigated for corruption. This mirrored the arrest of Vice President Tariq Hashemi’s guards in December 2011, which led to a warrant for him, and his eventual self-imposed exile in Turkey. Perhaps Maliki was hoping for that series of events to be repeated with Issawi.

In fact, during the Hashemi affair, Issawi was temporarily targeted as well. On December 15, 2011, security forces surrounded both Hashemi and Issawi’s residences in Baghdad’s Green Zone. Then the pair was forced off a plane at Baghdad airport for a planned meeting with Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani. This all resulted from the arrest of several of the vice president’s guards who confessed on television to carrying out attacks and murders in Anbar. One connected their operations through a number of officials to Issawi. The government then said that it would investigate the Finance Minister, which led to some of his bodyguards to be arrested as well. Hashemi eventually left the country, but nothing came of the charges against Issawi. Perhaps going after the vice president was enough for Maliki at that time. Either way, it set the stage for the current situation where Issawi has again been charged with involvement in terrorism, and members of his security unit being detained.

Even previous to the Hashemi incident, Maliki had brought up accusations against Issawi. In the middle of 2010 for example, the prime minister told the U.S. military he was worried about Issawi’s connections to militants. Then commander of U.S. forces in Iraq General Ray Odierno sent a letter to the premier telling him that American intelligence had looked into the matter and found nothing. Then in September, there was a report that while Maliki was attempting to put together a new ruling coalition after parliamentary elections, he threatened to charge Issawi with terrorism if he didn’t join the new government. All of the stories revolving around Issawi stem from the fact that he is from Fallujah, and worked there while it was a base for Al Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgent groups. Almost every party in Iraq has been involved with violence, so it is no surprise that there are accusations against Issawi. The problem is that in the current political environment nothing ever happens about these reports, because all of the country’s leaders could be implicated, especially if any were ever to go to court. What Maliki has done is to selectively use these accusations against his opponents. Hashemi was a perfect and public example. The current crisis with Issawi is another.

It seems unlikely that Prime Minister Maliki really wants to arrest Issawi and put him on trial. That could lead to a series of unexpected consequences. Rather it appears that the arrest of his guards, and the warrant out for him are just a way to keep him off the national scene, and perhaps force him into exile like Vice President Hashemi. The problem for the premier is that Issawi has not completely followed this script. While he has resigned, Issawi has remained in the public eye through involvement with the protest movement in Anbar that sprung up to support him. He is also trying to campaign for his party in that province before this year’s provincial elections. That could lead to further acts of intimidation. Then again, Maliki might be happy with just gaining influence over the Finance Ministry. This is a very important post, because all government spending has to go through it and the Planning Ministry, which are now controlled by the same person, Sadrist Ali Yousef Abdul-Nabi who is allied with the premier. This is the prime minister’s ultimate goal to trim down the government to just those that support him instead of the unwieldy national unity coalitions. Rather than taking democratic means to achieve that however, Maliki has too often used the security forces, which has all kinds of negative consequences for the future of Iraqi politics.

SOURCES

Dar Addustour, “Maliki calls for parliament to withdraw confidence from the al-Mutlaq – Government waited and proclamation of the results revealed the involvement of senior political terrorist operations,” 12/18/11

Adnan, Duraid and Arango, Tim, “Arrest of a Sunni Minister’s Bodyguards Prompts Protests in Iraq,” New York Times, 12/21/12

AIN, “Breaking News … Maliki orders to arrest security force responsible for arresting Esawi’s guards,” 12/21/12

- “Defense Committee: number of Esawi’s guards, released,” 12/21/12

- “Esawi not involved in criminal actions according to primary investigations, says MP,” 12/22/12

- “IS suspends its ministers from CoM’s meetings,” 12/22/12

- “MP: Foreign guarantees behind return of Iraqiya Slate to parliament,” 1/31/12

- “Mutleg calls IS to suspend from current government,” 12/21/12

- “SLC MP demands Esawi to resign,” 12/26/12

Aliraqnews, “Sadr’s office: Planning Minister receives the functions of the Ministry of Finance Acting,” 2/5/13

Alsumaria, “An informed source disclosed agreement to resolve the issue individuals protect Issawi conveyed investigation committee headed by Atta,” 12/22/12

- “Maliki appoints acting ministers replacing Iraqiya ministers,” 1/5/12

Associated Press, “Iraq finance minister says staff members kidnapped,” 12/20/12

Aswat al-Iraq, “Kurdish Alliance denounces intruding Issawi’s offices,” 12/22/12

Dodge, Toby, “Iraq: Maliki power grab risks fresh civil war,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, 4/20/12

- “The resistible rise of Nuri al-Maliki,” Open Democracy, 3/22/12

Fordham, Alice, “Iraq’s finance minister quits amid huge protest,” The National, 3/2/13

Gordon, Michael, “Tensions Rise in Baghdad With Raid on Official,” New York Times, 12/20/12

Gutman, Roy, “As US troops exit Iraq, Maliki moves against Sunni rivals,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/19/11

Healy, Jack and Gordon, Michael, “A Moderate Official at Risk in a Fracturing Iraq,” New York Times, 12/30/11

Institute for the Study of War, “Warrant for Iraq VP Hashemi’s Arrest and Coerced Confessions,” 12/19/11

Al-Jawari, Fulaih, “Cracks in Iraqiya begin to open,” AK News, 1/8/12

Knights, Michael, “Iraq’s Political Crisis: Challenges for U.S. Policy,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 12/21/11

Al-Mada, “Power of the Prime Minister’s Office arrested facilities Rafie al-Issawi,” 12/20/12

Mardini, Ramzy, “Iraq’s First Post-Withdrawal Crisis,” Institute for the Study of War, 12/19/11

National Iraqi News Agency, “Anbar Cleric Council demanding to declare civil disobedience,” 12/22/12

- “Anbar Provincial Council: Hashemi scenario repeated with Issawi,” 12/21/12

- “BREAKING NEWS Obama makes a call to Essawi in response to the arrest of Essawi’s head of his guards,” 12/20/12

- “Iraqiya coalition suspends its attending in the Parliament,” 12/23/12

Radio Nawa, “Bayraktar: an arrest warrant for official protection Issawi was issued some time ago but he was on the run,” 12/22/12

Al Rafidayn, “Alfalh: 20 families of Anbar filed lawsuits against al-Issawi and protection elements Hashemi,” 12/22/12

Salaheddin, Sinan and Schreck, Adam, “Iraq confirms arrest of minister’s bodyguards,” Associated Press, 12/21/12

Schreck, Adam and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq: New Protests Break out in Sunni Stronghold,” Associated Press, 12/26/12

Shafaq News, “Salahuddin calls its masses to demonstrate peacefully to express their demands,” 12/31/12

Sotaliraq, “Government circulated judicial arrest warrant Rafie al-Issawi on all security institutions and internal checkpoints and border,” 3/14/13

Sowell, Kirk, “Inside Iraqi Politics No. 30,” 1/3/12

- “Inside Iraqi Politics No. 40,” 6/20/12

Sullivan, Marisa Cochrane, “Iraq’s Post-Withdrawal Crisis, Update 2,” Institute for the Study of War, 12/23/11

Tawfeeq, Mohammed, “Report: Bodyguards for Iraqi finance minister arrested,” CNN, 12/21/12

Al-Tayyeb, Mouhammed, “Government to investigate Issawi’s alleged support for terrorism,” AK News, 12/22/11

Van Wilgenburg, Wladimir, “Iraqi Government Will Possible Arrest More Sunni Leaders,” Transnational Middle-East Observer, 12/22/11

Wicken, Stephen, “2013 Iraq Update #9: Issawi resignation presents opportunities to Maliki,” Institute for the Study of War, 3/1/13

- “2013 Iraq Update #10a: Maliki Pursues Issawi – Again,” Institute for the Study of War, 3/13/13

Iraq Finally Passes 2013 Budget But With Protests

At the beginning of March 2013, Iraq’s parliament finally passed the annual budget. Voting on it had been delayed for months, mainly because of disputes between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the central government over the former’s oil policy. The argument was not resolved by the time the vote took place, which led to complaints by the Kurdish Coalition. In terms of the actual budget, it is the largest in Iraqi history. It also has the biggest outlay for investment, but many of the country’s ministries have proven incapable of spending all their money. The budget is usually one of the few pieces of legislation that all parties can agree upon, because they all use it to enrich themselves and maintain their patronage networks. This year’s budget proved just as divisive as all the other major laws, showing the increasing dysfunction in Baghdad.

(Universal Dinar)

On March 7, 2013, Iraq’s parliament voted on the annual budget. 168 out of 325 legislators were present, providing the quorum necessary to pass it. Half of the Iraqi National Movement (INM) did not attend, while the Kurdish Coalition boycotted. The budget had been before parliament for months, having been approved by the cabinet back in October 2012. The cause of the delay was the argument over Kurdistan’s oil policy. The KRG demanded $3.5 billion in compensation for the costs of the oil companies operating in the region over the last few years. Baghdad claimed that the Kurds were not turning over all their profits to the central government, were smuggling oil, were not forthcoming with all of their records, and not meeting their export quotas. There were several high level-meetings between the two sides in Irbil, and Baghdad in February, but there were no breakthroughs, because the Kurds said that the budget would only penalize them if they didn’t perform with no consequences for central government if it did not meet its obligations. In the end, only $650 million was included for the energy businesses in Kurdistan, which was the reason why the Kurdish Coalition did not vote on the budget. Afterward, members of the Kurdish list objected to its passage, the Kurdish Natural Resource Ministry stated that it would not meet its 250,000 barrel a day export quota, and there was even talk of withdrawing from the government, but that did not happen. The budget showed the increasing dissension between the regional and central governments, and the major lists. The INM has been split since almost the day after the 2010 elections, because too many parties involved with different agendas. That accounts for why half of the National Movement did not show up for the vote. Baghdad and Irbil have been at odds over energy policy for years now. The KRG demands the right to sign oil contracts independently, which the Oil Ministry calls illegal. The Kurds have also been smuggling oil to Turkey and Iran since the 1990s, and now have an agreement with Ankara to truck in small amounts of refined products, which has angered the central government even more. To strike back, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has only occasionally paid the energy companies working in Kurdistan, which has led to constant breakdowns in export deals between the two sides. For years, the KRG has promised the oil businesses there that a national hydrocarbons law would be passed, their contracts would be recognized by Baghdad, and they would be able to export, and get paid. The budget is just the latest episode in this argument, with the Kurds having lost this round.

The $118.6 billion budget is the largest ever. It is 18% more than the previous one. 93% of the money comes from oil. 38% of the total, $45.5 billion is for investment. That is the highest percentage ever. The remainder goes towards the operational budget, most of which is for salaries and pensions for the public sector, one of the largest relative to the population in the world. Energy, 21%, security, 14%, and services, 13%, get the largest amounts. It has a predicted $15.5 billion deficit, which the government is prepared to cover with unspent funds, and loans from international institutions. Baghdad and the provinces have never been able to spend all of their money however, which means that there will likely be a surplus like the previous years. In 2011 for example, less than 50% of the funds set aside for investment in services, security, and culture were spent, while energy and industry were the only two fields that executed more than 90% of theirs. This year’s budget repeats three re-occurring problems. One is that the huge operational budgets don’t contribute to the development of the economy. It actually impedes it by maintaining the large state sector. Second, the record capital budget for investment likely means that even less will be spent, because it will overwhelm many of the ministries who lack the capabilities to manage their funds. Third, critical fields such as education, health, and water are not getting the money they deserve to meet the country’s needs.

Execution Rates For 2011 Capital Budgets

Services 43%, 500 mil dinars

Culture 49%, 1.5 tril dinars

Water 52%, 2.5 tril dinars

Central and local governments 56%, 8.1 tril dinars

Education 57%, 1.5 tril dinars

Health 58%, 1.1 tril dinars

Housing 70%, 1 tril dinars

Agriculture 71%, 2.3 tril dinars

Transportation 81%, 1.1 tril dinars

Energy 93%, 12.3 tril dinars

Industry 94%, 1.3 tril dinars

In the past, the budget has been a unifying document in Iraq. This year it signified the deep divisions occurring in the country. The argument over oil between Baghdad and Irbil played out with Prime Minister Maliki once again taking a swipe at the Kurds by not meeting Kurdish demand for greater compensation for oil companies operating there. The huge increase in spending will also be a mixed bag. Baghdad has proven very capable of paying its public workers, but that stymies developing the country by taking away money that should be spent on diversifying the economy away from oil. A large part of the funds that are set aside for investment are also probably not going to be spent, because the bureaucracy does badly managing, and executing projects. The 2013 budget was supposed to mark a step towards meeting the country’s national development plan that calls for a moving away from dependence upon petroleum, reducing poverty, and rebuilding the nation’s infrastructure. It now looks like it will be more of the same however, as it highlights the political disputes and lack of capacity within the government.

SOURCES

AIN, “Ratification of Federal Budget without Kurds’ approval “negative step”, says MP,” 3/7/13

Joint Analysis Policy Unit, “Iraq Budget 2013, Background Paper,” Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, January 2013

Kurdish Globe, “Baghdad refuses to pay Peshmerga budget for seven years,” 2/25/13

Lando, Ben, “Iraq in dispute over 2013 draft budget as KRG oil sector demands higher allocation,” Platts, 2/13/13

Natali, Denise, “Who Will Pay IOCs in Iraqi Kurdistan?” Al-Monitor, 2/20/13

National Iraqi News Agency, “Vote on some items of the budget, in the absence of Kurdish component, “incorrect procedure.” 3/7/13

Ninanews, “Kurdistan rules out withdrawal from Iraqi govt, disagreement between KDP and PUK,” 3/11/13

- “Kurdistan to cut oil output by 250 thousand barrels per day unless Baghdad bears companies’ costs,” 3/10/13

Reuters, “Iraq budget stalemate deepens over Kurd oil payments,” 2/27/13

Saberi, Roxana, “No End in Sight for Iraq Oil Dispute,” Al-Monitor, 2/27/13

Salaheddin, Sinan, “Parliament approves national budget for Iraq,” Associated Press, 3/7/13

Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Iraq budget battle opens new front in Kurdish feud,” Reuters, 2/15/13

Al-Shaher, Omar, “Baghdad Bickers With Regions Over Iraqi Budget,” Al-Monitor, 2/15/13

Wicken, Stephen, “2013 Iraq Update #9: Issawi resignation presents opportunities to Maliki,” Institute for the Study of War, 3/1/13

Wicken, Stephen and Sullivan, Marisa, “2013 Iraq Update #7: De-Baathification Body Ousts Iraq’s Chief Justice as Protests Continue,” Institute for the Study of War, 2/15/13

Protests Return To Iraq In December 2012

In the middle of December 2012, security forces arrested ten guards of Finance Minister Rafi Issawi of the Iraqi National Movement (INM). That same day spontaneous protests started in Anbar, Salahaddin, and Baghdad provinces. They demanded the release of the Minister’s guards, and an end to what they saw as government discrimination against Sunnis in government and through arbitrary detentions. Since then there have been demonstrations in Ninewa as well. Like previous protests in 2010 and 2011, the government is listening to their demands, while warning them about the limits of its patience. If those previous years are any indicator, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki will only allow public outbursts like these to last so long before he breaks them up.

The arrest of members of the Finance Minister’s security detail was what started the new round of protests. On December 21, 2012, ten members of Issawi’s security detail were arrested in Baghdad on terrorism charges. Spontaneously, protests started in Tikrit in Salahaddin, Qaim, Rutba and Fallujah in Anbar, as well as the Adhamiya neighborhood in Baghdad. Fallujah had the largest outpouring with a reported 2,000 people showing up, and shutting down the highway that goes towards Jordan and Syria. The Anbar provincial council also voiced their concerns about the detentions. Salahaddin, Anbar, and Adhamiya were all strong supporters of Issawi’s Iraqi National Movement (INM), and the Minister is originally from Fallujah. The events also took place on the one year anniversary of Vice President Tariq Hashemi having his guards picked up for running deaths squads, which forced him into exile. During that time, Issawi was also placed under temporary house arrest, and had some of his bodyguards were held as well. That was seen as a political attack by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki upon his rival the INM. The new arrests of Issawi’s guards made some believe that the premier was at it again, leading them to take to the streets.

Protesters in Ramadi, Dec. 26, 2012 (Reuters)

Anbar quickly became the center of the new protest movement. On December 22, the Sunni Endowment, political parties, local officials, and tribes in the province met, and decided to call for civil disobedience to voice their anger at the government’s actions. The next day there was a march in Fallujah, which shut down the highway again. On the 24, similar events occurred in Ramadi, which have continued on to the present time. They were soon joined by others from across Iraq, including Maysan, Diyala, Baghdad, Salahaddin, and Basra who made the trip to western Iraq. On December 26, Minister Issawi himself showed up, and addressed the crowd. December 28 might have seen the largest turn out of all. Reuters reported up to 60,000 attended that day in Ramadi. The protest raised concern as well, because some were flying the Saddam era Iraqi flag and that of the Syrian Free Army. An Iranian flag was also set afire as the crowd called the prime minister a puppet of Tehran. There were also marches in Fallujah, a town just to the north of Ramadi, Mosul in Ninewa, and Tikrit and Samarra in Salahaddin. The old Iraqi flag became such an issue that several days later a prominent sheikh gave a speech to the protesters that their actions had to be non-sectarian, and nationalist in character, so that all citizens could be included. Anbar is considered part of the Sunni heartland of Iraq. Ramadi and Fallujah have a large population of former soldiers, intelligence officers, and Baath Party members. It was no surprise then that some flags from the Saddam era would show up there. It could hurt their appeal to other Iraqis who do not have such fond memories of the former regime. Many Shiites have also voiced concerns about Syria becoming a haven for Islamists that could later attack Iraq if the government there were to fall to the rebels. At the same time, there have been tribal groups from southern Iraq who have showed up in Anbar to show their support showing that they do have some following across the country.

Things toured sour in Ramadi on December 30. That day, Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq of the INM attempted to give a speech to the demonstrators. The crowd didn’t want to listen however, and started throwing bottles and rocks at him, and calling him a liar. In the hail of projectiles being hurled at them, the deputy premier’s delegation made a hasty retreat, not before they fired shots at the crowd, wounding five, one of which later died. Afterward, Mutlaq made an attempt at face saving by claiming that he was generally greeted well in Ramadi, but that a bad element there tried to assassinate him. This showed that the masses there were not trying to be co-opted by politicians, and instead were trying to maintain a level of independence.

Deputy Premier Mutlaq and his party being chased out of Ramadi, Dec. 30, 2012

Local governments have bolstered the protesters as well. On December 29, Ninewa’s governorate council said it would not work for three days until the government responded to the demands of the protesters. Likewise, on December 31 the Salahaddin council called for peaceful protests there. Anbar’s officials had come out for the demonstrations from the beginning. With such large numbers of people out on the streets there was no way the provincial authorities could ignore them. The governorates have been neglected by the central government as well, not giving them the funds they want or holding up development projects, so they had reason enough to complain about Baghdad as well.

The central government has responded with both carrots and the threat of sticks. On December 29, a party led by acting Defense Minister Sadoun Dulaimi arrived in Anbar, and received a set of five demands from the protest organization. Those included a release of innocent prisoners, the integration of Sunnis within the government, and the end of arbitrary arrests. On December 31, Maliki released a number of women prisoners who were arrested without warrants on terrorism charges. On the other hand, there have been increasingly critical comments coming from Baghdad. A spokesman for the premier called the demonstrations sectarian, while another called on Minister Issawi to resign saying that he couldn’t be part of the government, and use the street against it at the same time. Similarly, a member of the prime minister’s State of Law blamed the Finance Minister for the demonstrations, claiming that he was trying to use them for his own benefit. On December 30, Maliki gave a TV interview where he questioned why pictures of Turkish Premier Erdogan were seen and the Free Syrian Army flag was flown at the Ramadi protests. The next day, the cabinet sectary said that freedom of expression was guaranteed in Iraq, but that people could not break the law. He stated that any assembly needed the permission of the authorities, and the people in Anbar had not gotten that, so their actions were illegal. He went on to say that any provincial council that called for work stoppages or other acts of defiance were violating the constitution, and would be held accountable for their actions. Finally, there have been several reports that the security forces have not allowed people from outside Anbar to join the marches and arrested people. In 2010 and 2011 there were similar popular outbursts in Iraq over the lack of services, corruption, and poor governance. The prime minister reacted in a similar way. He promised reforms, and sacked the Electricity Minister in 2010. At the same time, he had the Interior Ministry set up restrictive rules to bar any further marches in 2010, and eventually had the security forces harass the media so that they could not cover the demonstrations, while they were broken up by force in 2011. A similar set of circumstances could happen this time. The premier has shown that he will give lip service to the street, but if things drag on to long, he will put an end to them using the army and police.

The Iraqi public has a lot of pent up anger at the lack of good governance, and what they see as the abuse of power. The arrest of Finance Minister Issawi’s guards was simply the catalyst for the release of those feelings. Spontaneously people took to the streets in four provinces, with those in Anbar and Ninewa continue to this day. People from other governorates have also gone to Anbar to show their support. The question is what can they accomplish with these protests. Will they be able to get some concessions from Baghdad or will their enthusiasm eventually wane or worse could the government crack down on them? In the previous two years when there were mass demonstrations they accomplished next to nothing, because they never developed a means to push their demands beyond the street. This time, their local governments are behind them, which could act as their representatives to press their case with the central government. Maliki’s growing criticism of events and his past actions however may not bode well for the future. The people in Ramadi, Fallujah, and Mosul and could very well end up disappointed again, because the government has proven very unresponsive to the public, and broken up demonstrations before.  

SOURCES

Adnan, Duraid and Arango, Tim, “Arrest of a Sunni Minister’s Bodyguards Prompts Protests in Iraq,” New York Times, 12/21/12

AIN, “SLC MP demands Esawi to resign,” 12/26/12

- “SLC MP: Esawi has to adhere to judiciary, not to provoke Iraqis over arresting his guards,” 12/27/12

Al Arabiya with Reuters, “Iraqi PM orders release of female prisoners to appease protesters,” 12/31/12

Associated Press, “Sunni demonstrators challenge Iraq’s Shiite-led government, denounce bodyguards’ arrest,” 12/23/12

- “Thousands of Sunnis protest across Iraq,” 12/28/12

Aswat al-Iraq, “Tribal delegation arrives from Missan to take part in Anbar protest,” 12/25/12

Al Jazeera, “Iraqi PM questions role of Turkey in unrest,” 12/31/12

Naama, Kamal, “Sunni protesters attack Iraq official’s convoy, guards wound two,” Reuters, 12/30/12

National Iraqi News Agency, “Abdul Malik al-Saadi: Beware to attribute your sit-in to a particular component or person,” 12/30/12

- “Anbar Cleric Council demanding to declare civil disobedience,” 12/22/12

- “Anbar Provincial Council: Hashemi scenario repeated with Issawi,” 12/21/12

- “Anbar tribal council: the government incapable to meet the demands of Iraqi people,” 12/27/12

- “Arrival of / 15 / convoys from Diyala province to Ramadi,” 12/26/12

- “The arrival of demonstrators convoys from Baghdad to participate in demonstrations in Fallujah,” 12/28/12

- “Arrival of supporters from Baghdad, Tarmiyah, Dujail and Samarra to sit-in in Ramadi,” 12/26/12

- “Continues to sit for the second day in Anbar province and cut off part of the international road,” 12/24/12

- “Delegation from Basra tribes joins protests in Ramadi,” 12/27/12

- “Demonstrations in Salah al-Din condemns “arbitrary measures” against Issawi protection members,” 12/21/12

- “Demonstrations pro-Issawi in the cities of Alqaim and Rotba of Anbar province,” 12/21/12

- “Flow of hundreds of protesters from iraqi provinces continues heading to sit-in Ramadi,” 12/31/12

- “Military force prevent demonstrators from entry to Anbar province,” 12/28/12

- “Protesters from Fallujah cut off the international highway and heading to Baghdad,” 12/21/12

- “One of the injured dies due to wounds he got from Mutlaq’s bodyguards shooting,” 12/30/12

- “Samarra demonstrators urging in “Friday of pride and dignity,” the government to stop oppressive and sectarian practices,” 12/28/12

- “Source: the government forces prevent other delegations to join the Anbar sit-in,” 12/30/12

Radio Nawa, “Nineveh provincial council suspended work for three days until the implementation of the demands of the demonstrators,” 12/29/12

- “Representative of Nuri al-Maliki received the demands of the demonstrators in Anbar,” 12/29/12

Reuters, “Tens of thousands of Iraqi Sunnis protest against Al Maliki government,” 12/28/12

Schreck, Adam and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq: New Protests Break out in Sunni Stronghold,” Associated Press, 12/26/12

Shafaq News, “Council of ministers threatens government departments and those responsible for the civil disobedience of legal accountability,” 12/31/12

- “Salahuddin calls its masses to demonstrate peacefully to express their demands,” 12/31/12