Iraq’s Sadrists Back Off Attacks Upon Prime Minister Maliki For Now

In the last two months, Moqtada al-Sadr emerged as one of the strongest critics of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. He called the premier a dictator, and demanded a no confidence vote against him. At the end of June into July however, Sadr seemingly backed off in his attacks, and now appears to be working with Maliki. That could have been the result of Iranian pressure, which came down hard upon Sadr to reconcile with the prime minister. Even without that outside influence, the Sadrists have been playing a political game coming out against the premier rhetorically, while taking no substantive actions against him. This is all part of a strategy to position the Sadr Trend for the 2013 provincial and 2014 parliamentary elections where it hopes to either unseat Maliki or gain greater concessions from him in return for their support for a new ruling coalition.

Sadr has been playing at being both critic and supporter of PM Maliki in recent months (NINA)

In recent weeks Moqtada al-Sadr has backed down from his attacks upon Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. On July 1, 2012, Sadr answered a question from one of his followers by saying that questioning Maliki or carrying out a no confidence vote against him could harm Iraq’s developing political system. The week before, the head of the Sadr bloc in parliament said that it would not participate in any questioning of the premier before lawmakers. That would be the first step in a no confidence move by the legislature, and is being pushed by the Kurdish Coalition and the Iraqi National Movement. Previously, the Sadrists had joined them on three committees to come up with questions for Maliki. At the same time, the movement said that any interrogation of the prime minister should only be aimed at reforming the government. Sadrists have also talked about a national conference to resolve the country’s political disputes, the same thing Maliki has been calling for. Finally, Sadr lawmakers joined a reform committee created by the National Alliance that includes members of the premier’s State of Law that is also supposed to resolve the current crisis. All of these statements were the latest reversals by the Sadr movement. Beforehand, Sadr held a press conference where he criticized Maliki for not providing services, and said he was determined to unseat him. Before that, he said that withdrawing confidence from the prime minister would be carrying out God’s will, compared Maliki’s statements to those of Saddam Hussein, and warned that he could be becoming a dictator. These followed a series of other critical words by Sadr and his followers. Now suddenly the movement is willing to work with Maliki, and condemning moves that Moqtada previously supported. This has been a trend that Sadr has been following for months now. Sometimes he is Maliki’s greatest critic, while at others he stands by the prime minister. The fact of the matter is that Sadr was never seriously for removing Maliki at this time as a member of the Kurdish Coalition recently pointed out. 

Iranian pressure has often been pointed to as a possible cause for Sadr’s change in position, but that overlooks important facts. Iraq’s ambassador to Iraq has been pushing Sadr and other Iraqi parties to end their arguments. The head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force General Qasim Suleimani and Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei were said to be in talks with Sadr. Sadr’s former teacher, and spiritual leader of the movement, Ayatollah Kadhem al-Hussein al-Haeri who is based in Iran sent a message to Sadr saying that he shouldn’t split the Shiite parties by going after Maliki. Haeri then issued a fatwa meant to pressure Sadr to back off his no confidence drive. Sadr was then called to Tehran at the beginning of June, where Iranian officials pushed him to give Maliki a two-month reprieve to work out his differences with his opponents. Iran is concerned about the political crisis in Iraq, because it does not want instability on its doorstep. That’s especially true now, because it is dealing with the chaos in Syria, which threatens one of its closest allies in the region. It has therefore been pressing parties like the Sadrists to come to some sort of resolution to their differences. Tehran’s influence is limited in this matter however. Despite Iran’s efforts, Sadr has maintained his back and forth stance towards Maliki, and will likely continue with it into the foreseeable future. That’s because Sadr is thinking about his political future, and that outweighs the concerns of Tehran.

For months now, the Sadr Trend has been following a two-track policy towards Prime Minister Maliki. On the one hand, it has issued a number of increasingly critical statements condemning the premier’s actions, and talked about removing him from office. At the same time, it has not done anything substantive against him, and made a number of supportive comments as well. The real goal behind this strategy is establishing its independence from Maliki in preparation for the 2013 provincial elections and the 2014 parliamentary vote. Representatives of the Sadr movement relayed this plan to Joost Hiltermann of the International Crisis Group during a recent trip to Baghdad. The movement has publicly stated that it does not want Maliki to return for a third term. If he were out of the way, that would open the door to the Sadrists perhaps emerging as the preeminent Shiite party. If not, they could use their critique to gain more concessions from the premier when a new government is put together. Already, in 2005 and 2010 the Sadr list was critical in Maliki coming to power. After the latest election, they were able to turn their position as kingmaker into gaining the most ministries in the new cabinet, and the release of their followers from prison. That could easily happen again in 2014. This is the reason why Sadr and his followers have seemingly acted so schizophrenically in recent months. They do not want to see Maliki out now, but they want to weaken him before the next round of balloting in an attempt to surpass him. That will mean more rhetorical attacks and then backtracking by the movement, but it’s all according to their plan.

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim and Murphy, Brian, “Iran rallies to aid Iraq’s embattled leader,” Associated Press, 6/19/12

AIN, “Iran pressurizes to prevent withdrawing confidence from Maliki, says Naji,” 6/6/12

- “Kinani denies reaching agreement between Sadr Trend, SLC in Iran,” 6/6/12

- “MP announces completing signatures required to withdraw confidence from Maliki,” 6/16/12

- “Musawi expects holding meeting involves all blocs leaders,” 6/16/12

- “Musawi: Sadr Trend, SLC about to reach agreement to settle crisis,” 6/6/12

- “Sadr insinuates his Trend recantation concerning withdrawing confidence from Maliki,” 7/1/12

- “Sadr: To have Shiite dictator means “Real danger faces Shiite,” 6/16/12

- “Sadrist MP: Investigating side for Maliki must be adherent to reformation demands,” 6/15/12

- “SLC MP : Maliki, Sadr talks tackled settling political crisis,” 6/16/12

Associated Press, “Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri Maliki fights off attempt to push him out of office,” 6/11/12

Aswat al-Iraq, “Al-Sadr in Najaf to take strong stance on unseating al-Maliki – source,” 6/14/12

Baghdadi, Salam, “Kurdish MP: Sadrists still demand replacing Maliki,” AK News, 6/26/12

Brosk, Raman “We’re awaiting request to parliament to hold emergency no confidence meeting, says Ahrar bloc,” AK News, 6/9/12

Habib, Mustafa, “sadrist political leader: ‘most important thing is to remove al-maliki,’” Niqash, 6/21/12

Hiltermann, Joost, conversation, June 2012

Independent Press Agency, “Lebanese newspaper: Khamenei intervened to pressure on the chest to dissuade him from withdrawing confidence from the Maliki,” 6/13/12

Jakes, Lara, “Firebrand cleric says Iraqi premier should resign,” Associated Press, 6/24/12

Mohammed, Fryad, “Kurdish official: Withdrawing confidence from Maliki “impossible,”” AK News, 7/3/12

Mustapha, Hamza, “Al-Maliki and al-Sadr’s war of words escalates,” Asharq al-Awsat, 6/21/12

National Iraqi News Agency, “Bahaa Al-Araji: Ahrar Bloc will not participate in questioning Al-Maliki,” 6/26/12

- “Sadr comment on al-Maliki’s statement to sweep the election results : “Saddam also claimed that his vote score 100%,” 6/22/12

- “Sadr refuses Malik’s nomination for a third term,” 6/17/12

- “Sadr : withdraw of confidence from al- Maliki pleases Mighty God,” 6/23/12

- “Sadr: Withdrawing confidence from Maliki is a divine Iraqi project,” 6/16/12

- “Sadrist MP: Maliki’s nomination for a third term is dictatorship,” 6/20/12

- “Shabandar gives the choice to Sadrists to abide the decision of the National Alliance or to leave to another Alliance,” 6/13/12

Al-Rafidayn, “Political body of the Iraqi National Alliance called the members of the political reforms,” 6/27/12

Shafaq News, “Moqtada al-Sadr indicates the existence of “harm” in interrogation of al-Maliki,” 7/1/12

Wicken, Stephen, “Sadr’s Balancing Act on Maliki,” Institute for the Study of War,” 6/18/12

Why The Talk Of A No Confidence Vote Against Iraq’s Premier Maliki Remains Just Talk

News from Iraq has been filled with headlines about a possible no confidence vote against Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. His main rival, the Iraqi National Movement (INM) has been talking about such a move for quite some time, but Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani and Moqtada al-Sadr have recently joined it. That gave the impression that Maliki’s opponents might have finally turned the corner, but it was fool’s gold. The National Movement has not been able to stick together, the Kurdish Coalition is also divided, and the Sadrists have been more talk than action. Iran has also tried to reconcile some of the parties. This all shows that Premier Maliki still has the upper hand.

Iraqi Pres. Talabani (left), Moqtada al-Sadr (center), and Kurdish Pres. Barzani (right) at Irbil meeting, Apr. 2012, which discussed what to do about Premier Maliki (KRP.org)

The call to unseat Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki seemed to gain momentum in April 2012 as more parties were joining the chorus for him to step down. Maliki’s main rival the Iraqi National Movement (INM) had been talking about a no confidence vote against him more and more recently. On April 27, its leader, Iyad Allawi joined Moqtada al-Sadr, Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, and Speaker Osama Nujafi, who is also from the INM, in a meeting in Irbil to discuss strategy. Sadr’s attendance seemed like a game changer, because he had been one of the prime minister’s main supporters. The group came up with a 15-day ultimatum for Maliki to follow the Irbil Agreement, which put together the current government, but which the prime minister has only partially followed. Speaker Nujafi said that this was a last chance for Maliki to share power or suffer the consequences. Those demands were put together in a letter sent to the National Alliance head Ibrahim al-Jaafari. The National Alliance is made up of the Sadrists, the Supreme Council, the Fadhila Party, the Badr Organization, and other smaller parties, and joined with Maliki’s State of Law to assure him a second term in office after the 2010 parliamentary elections. On May 19, there was another meeting, this time in Najaf, which included Sadr, Speaker Nujafi, Ahmed Chalabi of the National Alliance, former prime minister of Kurdistan Barhem Saleh, Deputy Premier Rowsch Nouri Shaways of Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and others. On paper, the National Movement, Kurdish Coalition, and Sadrists had more than half of the seats in parliament, which could call for a no confidence vote against Maliki. That as what led to all the press reports. The INM has been feuding with Maliki since before the 2010 elections even took place. President Barzani has joined the fray in the new year. Sadr has occasionally criticized Maliki as well, but his attendance at the Irbil and Najaf meetings seemed like he really meant it this time. It appeared that the prime minister was really in trouble, but all the press coverage obscured just how fractious a group this was.

The major problem for Maliki’s opponents has been that they are not united. Before the Irbil meeting for instance, a Sadrist spokesman said that they would not support a no confidence vote against the premier. During the meeting they remarked that they were not looking to replace him, and then repeated that after the Najaf affair. At the same time, they were discussing possible replacements for him. These seemingly schizophrenic statements have been typical of the Sadr Trend for months now. The Kurdish Coalition was also divided, with President Barzani saying that he was done with Maliki, while President Talabani has called him a partner. Officials from their two parties have also been snipping at each other behind the scenes. The National Movement has barely stuck together since the March 2010 election. There were reports that 20 to 30 parliamentarians from the list were ready to leave, because they were disillusioned with their leadership. Many lawmakers from northern provinces like Ninewa, Tamim, and Diyala that have disputed territories were upset that Allawi and others might be making deals with the Kurds, who they ran against, in order to facilitate their opposition to Maliki. Some members of parliament from the INM even issued a statement on May 20 that they stood by Maliki for his stance towards the Kurds. One legislator claimed that only around 20 from the list, which is less than a third of its total, would support a no confidence vote. Altogether that meant while the prime minister’s opponents might have more than half of the seats in parliament, in reality they had far less. The futility of the situation was apparent to some. Deputy Speaker of Parliament Aref Tayfour from the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) for instance was quoted in the press saying that the parties would probably decide to keep Maliki in office until the next elections in 2014. Another member of the Kurdish Coalition remarked that his list hadn’t even decided to support a no confidence vote or not, and said that the Supreme Council, the Fadhila Party, the Badr Organization, parts of the Iraqi National Movement from the north, President Talabani and his Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Free Iraqiya, and the White bloc all supported the premier. That meant Maliki was facing no real threat despite all the talk and news stories. His opposition has been big in rhetoric, but has never been able to present a united front. They make grand announcements, make plenty of demands, hold meeting after meeting, but they do not have any power to apply real pressure on the prime minister to make him change.

The weakness of the opposition was shown in the response, or lack thereof of Maliki’s supporters. The Irbil letter was addressed to the National Alliance (NA). The Sadrists said that since the NA nominated Maliki back in 2010, it was up to it to replace him. The Alliance, with the exception of Sadr’s followers, however, has stood by Maliki. When the 15-day deadline set in the Irbil meeting expired, the NA didn’t reply. On May 23, it held a conference, but no decision was made about the premier. Those were all signs that Maliki’s opponents were not being successful in their strategy. The National Alliance was obviously feeling no pressure, which was why they let the ultimatum pass. With the opposition lacking the votes to move against Maliki there was no reason for the list to make a decision on him.

Iran has also come to the aid of the prime minister. Several Iranian officials have visited Baghdad and Irbil recently. Allegedly, they asked the Kurds to give Maliki another chance, and told the premier to compromise with them. Maliki also travelled to Iran and met with Sadr there. The two signed a letter of understanding, which was supposed to reconcile the two. Neither initiative worked, but it shows that Iraq’s longstanding political crisis is bringing in its neighbors into the fray. Iran’s strategy in Iraq is for it to be like a big brother, which Iraq turns to when it runs into problems. Before the 2010 elections for example, it helped push the Sadrists and Supreme Council together into the National Alliance, but failed to get Maliki to join it in a grand Shiite coalition. It was also thought to have played a hand in the deBaathification controversy that led to the banning of hundreds of Sunni politicians, which occurred prior to the voting. After the vote, it worked to block INM head Iyad Allawi becoming premier, by pushing Maliki’s State of Law and the National Alliance to join together as the National Coalition to keep the prime minister in office. Tehran has continued to play this role in Iraqi politics throughout the current crisis by consulting with Iraqi politicians, and trying to mediate some of the disputes.

The news out of Iraq continues to be dominated by reports about the differences between the country’s political parties. While there is much talk about unseating Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the reality is that he is comfortably holding onto power. Despite more leaders joining the chorus criticizing his rule, his opponents remain deeply divided, and lack the seats in parliament to do anything about him. These disputes are far from over however, and will drag on until the 2014 parliamentary elections. That will mean that the government will be deadlocked, with little to no major legislation being passed for the foreseeable future as neither side will be willing to compromise with the other. This is a perfect example of the zero sum game that debilitates Iraqi politics. As long as Iraq’s lists are caught up in this battle over the prime minister they will not be doing much else in terms of governing the country, which means the public is the one really paying the price.

SOURCES

Abdul Raman, Muahmad, “Talabani wants Maliki to stay, say sources,” AK News, 5/13/12

Abdulla, Mufid, “Cracks appear in the PUK-KDP strategic relationship,” Kurdistan Tribune, 4/28/12

Ahmed, Hevidar, “Kurdish Leaders Struggle to Remain United in Dealing with Baghdad,” Rudaw, 5/18/12

- “Maliki Given Ultimatum at Leaders Meeting in Erbil,” Rudaw, 4/29/12

AIN, “Araji: Attendants of Najaf meeting not to discuss withdrawing confidence from Maliki,” 5/19/12

Ali, Omar, “Kurdistan Blocs Coalition yet to demand withdrawing confidence from PM,” AK News, 5/27/12

Alsabawi, Jasim, “Sadr Movement Claims No Ulterior Motive to Leader’s Erbil Visit,” Rudaw, 5/9/12

Aswat al-Iraq, “Barzani convinced impossible to deal with Maliki, Kurdish government official,” 5/16/12

- “Iran’s presence in Iraq relies on NC’s existence – Shiite source,” 7/17/10

- “National Alliance supports Maliki’s govt. and NC, MP,” 5/15/12

- “No support for Nujaifi’s demotion – MP,” 5/25/12

- “Six Sadrist nominees if Maliki’s trust withdrawn, Sadrist Trend,” 5/6/12

Brosk, Raman, “Maliki’s avoidance of Erbil agreements will force blocs to withdraw confidence, says Iraqiya,” AK News, 4/25/12

- “National Alliance doesn’t need to implement all Erbil meeting demands within 15 days, says Ahrar leader,” AK News, 5/14/12

- “National Alliance won’t accept replacing Maliki, says MP,” AK News, 5/22/12

- “PM Maliki given two weeks to implement Erbil agreement,” AK News, 5/5/12

- “Political crisis might be resolved at today’s meeting, says Islamic Supreme Council,” AK News, 5/26/12

- “SLC MP: Four NA components support Maliki,” AK News, 5/25/12

Hussein, Adnan, “Will Barzani “Checkmate” Maliki?” Rudaw, 4/29/12

Ibrahim, Haidar, “President Barzani’s talks with leaders to last 10 more days,” AK News, 4/28/12

Jakes, Lara, “Iraq leaders call for solution to political crisis,” Associated Press, 4/28/12

Katulis, Brian, “An Iraqi View On Iraq’s Recent Elections,” Wonk Room, 4/19/10

Khallat, Khudar, “National Alliance didn’t discuss searching for Maliki replacement, says State of Law Coalition,” AK News, 5/23/12

Al-Mada, “Out more than 20 deputies of the Iraqi and the mass of “al-Mutlaq,” may join the dissidents,” 5/8/12

MEMRI Blog, “Iraq Votes – Part XI,” 3/29/10

Mohammed, Fryad, “Official: Three major blocs to discuss retaining Maliki tomorrow,” AK News, 5/22/12

Myers, Steven Lee, “Unity Is Rallying Cry Ahead of Iraq Elections,” New York Times, 10/1/09

National Iraqi News Agency, “Sadr’s visit to Arbil will not discuss the withdrawal of confidence from Maliki,” 4/26/12

- “SLC absent from leaders of blocs at Sadr’s house in Najaf,” 5/19/12

Qanon, “Iraq published a list of retreating .. Fragmentation and rupture splits the Iraqi List,” 5/9/12

Shadid, Anthony, “In Sign of Times, Alliances Shift Ahead of Iraqi Elections,” Washington Post, 9/30/09

Tohme, Abdul Wahid, “Expect new splits in the Allawi bloc,” Dar Al Hayat, 5/19/12

Visser, Reidar, “Iraqiya, the Kurds & Disputed Territories in Iraq: The Grassroots Reaction,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 5/21/12

Zahra, Hassan Abdul, “Sadr ‘against’ fall of current Iraqi government,” Agence France Presse, 4/27/12

National Conference To Resolve Iraq’s Political Disputes Dies A Slow Death

In December 2011, the Kurds came up with the idea of a national conference to be attended by all of Iraq’s ruling parties to resolve the country’s political problems. These disputes have been going on since the March 2010 elections, and have only gotten worse since then with various provinces calling for autonomy, a wave of detentions of alleged Baathists, an arrest warrant for Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, and an attempt to unseat Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq, amongst other events. Within days however, the idea of actually pulling off a meaningful meeting seemed dim, and has only gotten worse with the passage of time. With Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki continually outplaying his rivals the Iraqi National Movement there is no reason for him to compromise, meaning there is little chance for a substantive meeting to happen.

In April 2012, the realization that a meaningful national conference could be pulled off was apparent to all the major parties in Iraq. On April 23, the Iraqi National Movement (INM) announced that it would not attend the preparatory meetings for the conference on the grounds that it would be a waste of time. The lists could not agree upon an agenda, so the meetings were going nowhere. The Kurds held the same view with Parliamentarian Mahmoud Othman telling the press that it wasn’t a good time to hold the conference due to the lack of consensus, and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Massoud Barzani questioning whether the conference could achieve anything even if it was ever held. Barzani blamed Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki for the impasse. He was correct. Since the March 2010 parliamentary elections, the premier has been able to consistently out maneuver his rivals in the INM. He got a second term in office, while his competitor for prime minister Iyad Allawi was shut out of government. He was able to split the National Movement during its boycott of the cabinet that started in December 2011, and has been able to put off almost all of the Kurdish demands like resolution of the disputed territories and a new oil law. Being in such a strong position means that there is no reason for the premier to compromise with any of the other parties, let alone hold the national conference.

The idea for a national conference originated with the Kurds in December 2011. President Jalal Talabani and KRG President Barzani originally made the suggestion during the latest blow up between the INM and Maliki’s State of Law. At the time, Maliki was attempting to remove Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq from office, and an arrest warrant had been issued for Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi on terrorism charges, and he had fled to Kurdistan as a result. The two Kurdish leaders had been trying to mediate the crisis, and came up with the idea of a gathering of all of Iraq’s parties as a way to solve the latest problem. The INM was the first to support the idea, saying that all of the national leaders should attend as well such as President Barzani, Moqtada al-Sadr, and Ammar al-Hakim from the Supreme Council. It also demanded a set of principals be developed beforehand. The conference was originally supposed to happen in January 2012, but it never did. That’s because the negotiations over the meeting have been just as contested as everything else in Iraqi politics. The various parties have made demand after demand of each other, traded accusations, which has led to deadlock, a problem the conference was supposed to solve.

There are various examples of why the conference has not happened so far. The INM for one, has flip flopped on some issues, and made impossible demands at other times. One lawmaker from the list said in January that the Hashemi case would not be included, only to have another member demand that it should be in February. The list then called for an end to random arrests, the cessation of tensions in Diyala where the provincial council was under siege for attempting to declare itself an autonomous region, and the removal of security forces from outside the homes of the party’s leaders. The conference was supposed to be a place where these issues would be brought up and discussed, but the INM was trying to get parts of its agenda fulfilled before it even occurred when there was absolutely no reason for the prime minister to do so. Then President Barzani began calling for the meeting to occur in Kurdistan, nominally so that Vice President Hashemi could attend since he was residing there and wanted in the rest of the country. Allawi threw his support behind the change in location, but again, Maliki would not agree and there was nothing the INM nor Kurdish Coalition could do about it since the meeting would be meaningless without the prime minister. Around the same time, Moqtada al-Sadr said he would not attend, because he was not a politician, again putting a damper on things. The only positive event to come out of the new year was Maliki and Speaker Osama Nujafi who is from the National Movement agreeing upon creating a joint committee of all the leading parties that would go over the issues before the national conference occurred, and try to set the agenda. These initial moves were signs that the meeting would never come off, and if it did, nothing substantive would come of it. The INM has a bad tendency to overplay or mishandle its strategies. Hence its indecision over whether to include Hashemi or not, and making numerous demands be met before the conference was to even happen although they had absolutely no leverage to gain any of them. The Kurds proved little better, because while they were attempting to be honest brokers they too could not convince Maliki to come to the negotiating table in good faith, and trying to get the venue changed from Baghdad to Kurdistan perhaps in the hopes that it would be a neutral location never got off the ground. Maliki was in a position of power being the prime minister, and had no reason to compromise on any of these issues.

With January having come and gone, the conference was then pushed back to after the Arab Summit held in Iraq in March, but that didn’t mean there was any more likelihood that it would be pulled off. There were some demands that the meeting happen before the Arab League came to Baghdad, but again the prime minister was not willing to talk to the other parties when he was more concerned about showcasing the new Iraq to regional leaders and diplomats as they travelled to the country. President Talabani then suggested April 5 as a new date. By the time April had rolled around, there had been several planning committee meetings, but nothing had been achieved. Allawi and Barzani said they would not attend as a result, and eventually the INM stated it would no longer go to the planning sessions, because the conference would not mean anything. Again, Maliki played his hand well, while the others did not. He could sit back and remain prime minister, while the various parties argued about the details of the national conference. A three-month delay from its original date of January was sign enough that he could wait them out even more.

The national conference seemed a pipedream from the get go. Prime Minister Maliki was able to get the Kurds’ backing for his second term, and the National Movement to join his coalition while leaving out Allawi. From that moment on he has been in the drivers’ seat, and shows no sign of relinquishing it to the other lists. They can call for a meeting of all the parties, make various demands about what will be included, but there’s no reason for Maliki to comply. He can send his State of Law members to every meeting, and hear every complaint and argument, and drag out the process for months. All the while, he will remain in power. As long as the Sadrist, Supreme Council, and Badr Organization led National Alliance stands behind the premier there are not enough seats in parliament to threaten Maliki with a no confidence vote. If that coalition of Shiite parties stands together, and the Sadrists and Badr have been some of the prime minister’s strongest supporters, he can stave off any attempts by the Kurdish Coalition or the Iraqi National Movement to negotiate with them. In the meantime, talk of a national conference will likely drag on for several more months. One might even happen eventually. Maliki’s position will not change however, because he’s holding all the cards.

SOURCES

Ahmed, Hevidar, “National Convention to Be Boycotted By Major Players,” Rudaw, 4/3/12

AIN, “Breaking News….Allawi, Barzani agree to hold national meeting before Summit,” 3/13/12

- “IS adheres to forming Policies Council, says MP,” 2/4/12

AK News, “National Conference – route to solutions,” 12/19/11

Ali, Mandy Samira, “Signs of easing in the Iraqi political crisis,” Radio Free Iraq, 1/6/12

Ali, Omer, “President Talabani selects date for national conference,” AK News, 3/26/12

Alsumaria, “Sayyed Muqtada Al Sadr refuses to participate in Iraq National Conference,” 1/27/12

Aswat al-Iraq, “Article 140, oil and gas law are in our demands – Kurdish MP,” 2/11/12

- “Barzani will not participate if national conference held in Baghdad – Kurdish Presidency Divan,” 1/10/11

- “Al-Iraqiya to make new alliances – says MP,” 4/9/12

- “National Alliance threatens to boycott national conference,” 2/17/12

- “National conference expected mid of this month – MP,” 1/4/12

- “Nat’l Conference Agenda completed,” 2/20/12

Brusk, Raman, “Leaders won’t discuss Hashemi’s issue in meeting,” AK News, 1/1/12

Hussein, Adnan, “Iraqi Parties Submit Proposals for National Convention,” Rudaw, 2/16/12

Ibrahim, Haider, “SLC will accept Talabani’s invitation to hold national conference, says aide,” AK News, 4/15/12

Mohammed, Fryad, “NC-Iraqiya tensions render meeting unlikely,” AK News, 1/4/12

National Iraqi News Agency, “BREAKING NEWS Jumaily announces Preparatory Meeting failure in setting date for the National Meeting,” 4/4/12

- “Iraqiya calls for stopping random arrests, ending armed manifestations, create suitable environment to make National Conference successful,” 1/12/12

- “Iraqiya slate says it will not deal with the invitation to it on the Preparatory Committee’s meeting for the National Meeting,” 4/23/12

- “IS calls for a set of principles before holding the national conference,” 12/28/11

- “Mahmoud Othman conditions inconvenient to hold the National Meeting,” 4/25/12

- “Parliamentary source unveils reasons for IS approval of not including Hashimi’s, Mutlag’s cases in the national Conference,” 2/12/12

Rasheed, Ahmed and Chaudhry, Serena, “Boycott, walkout mar Iraq parliament session,” Reuters, 1/3/12

Rudaw, “Massoud Barzani: Dictatorship Threatens Iraq’s Territorial Integrity,” 4/23/12

Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Iraq’s Sunni-backed bloc to end parliament boycott,” Reuters, 1/29/12

Al-Shemmari, Yazn, “Sadrists reject holding the national conference outside Baghdad,” AK News, 1/11/12

- “VP Hashemi’s movement to boycott national conference,” AK News, 4/4/12

Yusif, Mortedha, “Government calls for crisis meeting,” AK News, 12/21/11

- “No talks without Barzani and Sadr, says Allawi,” AK News, 12/28/11

Iraq’s Prime Minister Fails To Unseat Election Commission

Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has had an adversarial relationship with the country’s Election Commission since he lost to his main rival Iyad Allawi in the 2010 parliamentary election. Maliki demanded a recount, but that did not change the outcome. The premier was still able to outmaneuver Allawi and stay in power thanks to a favorable ruling by the Federal Court. Months later, Maliki was not done. At the beginning of 2011, the Federal Court again decided in his favor by saying that the Election Commission was under the cabinet’s control, instead of parliament. Members of the prime minister’s State of Law then began a relentless attack upon the commission for corruption, and pushed a no confidence vote to get rid of its leadership. That effort failed in July, marking an important setback for Maliki’s autocratic tendencies.

In January 2011, Iraq’s Federal Court ruled that all independent commissions in the country were under the control of the cabinet, and not parliament. The case was at the behest of Prime Minister Maliki who wanted to clarify the jurisdiction of the commissions. An advisor to the premier said that the decision was a good move because the Election Commission had no oversight before, and blamed any criticism of the court on politics. A legal aide to Maliki denied that the ruling was illegal, claiming that the constitution was unclear about what body the commissions came under. In fact, the constitution is quite unequivocal as Article 103 and 104 expressly state that all the independent commissions are under the parliament.

Why the Federal Court would make such a decision was widely debated within Iraq. It came after a number of other questionable rulings that favored Maliki. After the March 2010 parliamentary elections, the court said that the largest bloc that could form a new government meant one that was made either before or after the vote when previously it had been considered to mean one made before. That allowed the prime minister to make alliances after the vote to stay in office. The court followed that with a ruling that laws had to come from the cabinet, not parliament, which would have severely limited the power of the legislature. Some analysts believed that since the judges were from Saddam Hussein’s time, they were following their history of ruling in favor of the country’s leader.

The Election Commission was very worried about the court’s decision. It said that Maliki could interfere in elections, and undermine public confidence in them in the future. The head of the commission, Faraj al-Haydari stated that the United Nations was also worried. Right after the court ruling, the prime minister did intervene by ordering it to halt the appointment of 38 low-level election officials. The commission refused to follow that order. By doing so, the commission  was defying not only the prime minister, but the court as well, which again angered Maliki.

The prime minister’s problems with the Election Commission started right after the March 2010 balloting. Maliki’s State of Law lost by just a few seats to Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement. That led the premier to demand a recount over fraud charges. The commission eventually agreed, but only in Baghdad, and it did not change the results. The prime minister was still able to stay in office, but was obviously upset that the commission had not made him the winner.

In May 2011, State of Law began questioning the integrity of the Election Commission. State of Law members accused it of financial and administrative corruption. That led to hearings with the commission’s leadership who were questioned about their salaries, special allowances, trips, and overtime pay. Maliki’s list accused them of having excessive security costs, and taking their family members on official visits. These charges became the basis of a no confidence vote in the leadership of the commission.

In the summer, Maliki stepped up his attacks upon the commission. First, he ordered that it cease all of its work in June. Second, State of Law distributed a report accusing the commission of corruption in July. Members of the prime minister’s list also began collecting signatures for a no confidence vote in the commission’s leadership. The commission responded by refusing to follow Maliki’s order, while its chairman, Faraj Haydari, accused State of Law of conducting a witch-hunt against the commission. If the no confidence vote went through, Haydari, and the rest of the commission’s leadership would have to step down. New commissioners could then be appointed by the cabinet, following the earlier court decision, giving Maliki the control he sought.

The problem for the premier, was that he found few supporters for his plan. The Kurdish Coalition did not support the no confidence vote claiming that it was just a plot by Maliki because he was upset with the 2010 election results. It also didn’t help that Haydari was from their list. The Change List, a breakaway Kurdish opposition group, was also opposed to the move, along with Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement and the National Alliance. Allawi’s list claimed that Maliki was trying to remain in power and stop any early elections from being called, while the National Alliance, which was in a coalition with State of Law, questioned the prime minister’s motives as well. The premier could expect no victories with so little support. It also showed that the majority of parliament believed that the attacks upon the Election Commission were just a raw power grab by Maliki.

The vote on the Election Commission finally happened on July 28, with the State of Law going down in defeat. Only 94 out of 245 parliamentarians in attendance voted in favor of the no confidence motion when a majority was needed. State of Law only has 89 seats out of 325 total, meaning that it got few supporters for its initiative. It appeared that the White Iraqi National Movement was the only party willing to stand with it. State of Law proved poor losers, as they marched out of parliament afterward, as some members said they would not follow the commission’s decision in the future. One State of Law parliamentarian went for hyperbole, claiming that the legislature could never talk about corruption again because they had stood by and allowed the corrupt commission leaders to stay in office. In contrast, the Iraqi National Movement praised the defeat as a positive sign for Iraq’s parliament, while the Sadrists, who are part of the National Alliance, said that State of Law’s accusations against the commission were false. Maliki had seemingly made a big deal out of nothing. He had his followers in parliament relentlessly attack the parliament, bring it up for a no confidence vote, but it was apparent from the beginning that his list was almost alone. The other parties could see that Maliki was just attempting to take over the commission so that he could control future elections. There was no reason for any other party to allow that as it would’ve threatened their own political futures.

Prime Minister Maliki was defeated in his attempt to unseat the Election Commission’s leadership, and take control of it. State of Law is still pushing the matter, accusing the parliament of lacking integrity and standing for corruption, but that will only earn Maliki more enemies, something that he can little afford as he is only in power due to the good favors of the Kurdish Coalition and National Alliance, both of which voted against the no confidence push. More importantly, the premier has shown increasingly autocratic tendencies in the past few years, and this was the latest example. He has steadily moved to increase his powers at the expense of others. This was one of his more open attempts, and was so bold that it was doomed to failure, so much so that one could question whether Maliki was ever serious about this effort, or whether he simply wanted to run the Commission through the wringer to punish it for not following his orders. Either way, his attempt was not a good sign for Iraq’s fledgling democracy. Institutions are still weak, and they need to be supported and nurtured rather than manipulated as the prime minister attempted to.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “State of Law: Parliament does not have the right to talk about corruption anymore,” 7/30/11

Aswat al-Iraq, “State of Law to vote no confidence on Election Commission,” 7/27/11

Brosk, Raman, “Iraqi Federal Court standstill about independent bodies,” AK News, 3/9/11

Buratha News, “Falawi: we have enough to withdraw confidence from the Electoral Commission in the meeting of the House of Representatives tomorrow,” 7/27/11

Ibrahim, Haidar, “Kurds to oppose Electoral commission no confidence,” AK News, 7/27/11
- “MP deems support for electoral commission “a violation,”” AK News, 7/19/11
- “SLC deputy rejects renewed confidence vote for electoral commission,” AK News, 7/28/11

Independent Press Agency, “Iraqi white regrets for not withdrawing confidence from the Electoral Commission,” 7/28/11

Kareem, Karzan, “MPs vote down ‘no confidence’ in electoral commission,” AK News, 7/28/11

Al-Mada, “State law: dismissal of the election commission next week .. Haidari and critical questioning,” 7/19/11

Al-Nashmi, Fadel, “fears that iraqi pm grabbing power, becoming a ‘democ-tator,’” Niqash, 7/5/11

National Iraqi News Agency, “Buffy: Some parties tried to dismiss the IHCE members after politicized questioning rather than a regulatory,” 7/5/11
- “Leading member of IS political goals behind attempts to withdraw confidence from IEHC,” 7/4/11
- “MP for SLC announce formation of a tripartite committee to investigate financial issues for the Electoral Commission,” 7/23/11
- “MP for SLC ,demands withdrawal of confidence from IHEC for financial and administrative corruption,” 7/23/11
- “MP for the Center Coalition : most deputies consider questioning of IHCE targeting its head Alhaydari,” 7/24/11
- “Mutlaq: not to withdraw confidence from the electoral commission restore prestige of Parliament,” 7/28/11
- “Parliamentary sources: sacking of IHEC aiming at formation of subjected alternative,” 7/7/11
- “A parliamentary source; vote to dismiss the IHCE on Thursday,” 7/25/11
- “The political body of the Sadrist movement: the withdrawal of confidence from the electoral commission a step towards the return of dictatorship,” 7/29/11

Saadi, Ahmed, “Faraj al-Haidari: Results of the elections and refused to interventions targeting behind Maliki and the Commission,” Shatt al-Arab, 7/14/11

Schmidt, Michael and Healy, Jack, “Maliki’s Broadened Powers Seen as a Threat in Iraq,” New York Times, 3/4/11

Al-Shammari, Yazn, “MP: SLC will call for no confidence of electoral commission,” AK News, 7/23/11

Sowell, Kirk, “Inside Iraqi Politics No, 18,” 7/14/11

Taha, Yaseen, “electoral commission may not survive as kurdish mps split,” Niqash, 5/12/11

Wanan, Jaafar, “MPs sign to withdraw confidence from IHEC,” AK News, 7/2/11

Update On Nominees For Iraq’s Defense Minister

On March 29, 2011 Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki named Khalid Mutab Obeidi as his nominee to head the Defense Ministry. Almost immediately the Accountability and Justice Commission, which replaced the DeBaathification Commission, announced that Maliki had to withdraw Obeidi because of his Baathist past. Obeidi was a general in Saddam Hussein’s air force. Obeidi ended up pulling his name from the fray himself at the beginning of April because of disputes over his nomination. The premier was playing politics with him all along anyway. Obeidi was originally the top candidate of Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement. It then backed away allegedly because Obeidi said he would not resign if the National Movement decided to go into the opposition instead of being part of the ruling coalition. When Maliki then put forth his name anyway, a member of Allawi’s list said that 95% of its members rejected him. The premier might have been trying to put the blame for a lack of a Defense Minister on Allawi since Maliki knew that the National Movement would not accept Obeidi.

The issue of finding a suitable Defense Minister is now back up in the air. The National Movement has put forth two names, Salim Dalli and Hisham al-Darraji. Some other people have been floated by the National Coalition, but Maliki’s State of Law and the Sadrist-Supreme Council led Iraqi National Alliance are just as divided as they are with the National Movement. 

It’s been just over a year since Iraq held national elections. It took until December 2010 to come up with a working coalition, which left several ministries, including all three security ones, vacant. The problem as ever is that Iraq’s leaders are caught up in personal rivalries, and want to get their own people into the security slots at the expense of the others. It looks like it will take several more months before all of the differences are overcome, and some kind of consensus emerges over who will take over these important positions.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Iraqiya candidate declines Iraq Defense Minister nomination,” 4/4/11

Aswat al-Iraq, “95% of Iraqiya members reject Obaidi for defense,” 4/2/11

Rudaw, “No Security Minister for Iraq,” 4/6/11

Sowell, Kirk, “The Political Struggle for Security Control in Iraq,” Global Security, 3/29/11

Partial Iraqi Cabinet Approved By Parliament (REVISED)

On December 21, 2010 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki walked into parliament, rattled off the names of 29 minister nominees, who were then elected by a hand vote by lawmakers. The group then posed for pictures, and the event was over. In those few minutes Iraq took its first step towards having a new acting government.

13 of the 42 ministries still don’t have heads. These include some of the most hotly contested positions such as Defense, Interior, National Security, and Electricity. Maliki is running the security ministries, while newly elected officials are in charge of the rest. The premier has promised to fill all of the posts before the December 25 deadline to form a new government. This was similar to Maliki’s first coalition announced in 2006 when the security ministries were also not filled until almost a month after the initial cabinet was put together.

Despite the Prime Minister’s calls for qualified and competent nominees for each ministry, his new cabinet was cobbled together in just a few hours before they were announced publicly. Maliki later said he didn’t even know anything about some of the officials.

The positions in the new government were distributed by the size of each winning list. The State of Law-Sadrist led Iraqi National Coalition walked away with the most positions as they were the largest bloc. It received the premiership, deputy premier for energy, deputy speaker of parliament, and 21 ministries, seven of which are temporary. Within the list, Maliki’s State of Law got 13 offices, five of which are temporary, the Sadrists received seven posts, two of which are temporary, Fadhila two, and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and Hezbollah Iraq won one each. Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement was next with eleven, followed by nine for the Kurdish Coalition, three of which are temporary, two for the Centrist Alliance, and one for the Assyrian Democratic Movement, a Christian party. Allawi is also going to head the new National Council for Strategic Policy, but it has to be created by new legislation passed by parliament.

Along with ministries, the major Kurdish parties also walked away from the day with a promise by Maliki to fulfill their 19 demands. The prime minister signed onto the 19-points just before the cabinet was made public. The list includes implementation of Article 140 that will determine the future of Kirkuk and other disputed areas and resolving the Kurds’ oil deals. Later the Kurdish Coalition claimed that Maliki pledged to follow through with Article 140 within two years. The previous two administrations made the same deal with the Kurds, but never followed through. Whether Maliki will this time around is one of the most important decisions he will be making because it involves such divisive topics that it could derail his entire government.

On the other hand, the Kurdish opposition group the Change List, ended up leaving the new government. They demanded two service ministries and a deputy premiership, but were only offered one. Disappointed, they decided to go into the opposition instead, claiming that the Iraqi National Coalition tried to marginalize them, while the Kurdish Coalition was pressuring them to rejoin their list. This marked the first time a winning party in post-2003 Iraq has not wanted to partake in the spoils of power.

Overall, Maliki’s new ruling coalition is a mixed bag. Unlike his 2006 government, Allawi, Sunni, and nationalist parties, will have a much larger role this time around. At the same time, there are so many entities involved that they had to create new positions just to satisfy all of them. The major blocs also come with competing agendas over Iraq’s major issues such as oil, federalism, security, and the disputed territories. That will mean the new government will act much like the last one with deadlock, indecision, and procrastination on the problems that beset the country. That may also allow the premier to continue to consolidate his hold on power as he did last time. The near future in Iraq, may look a lot like the recent past.

New Iraqi Government

Top Posts

• Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Dawa, State of Law, Iraqi National Coalition, and acting Minister of Defense, Interior, and National Security
• President Jalal al-Talabani, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Kurdish Coalition
• Speaker of Parliament Osama Nujafi, Iraqi National List, Iraqi National Movement

Deputies

• Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq, Iraqi National Dialogue Front, Iraqi National Movement
• Deputy Premier Roj Nouri Shaways, Kurdistan Democratic Party, Kurdish Coalition, and acting Minister of Trade
• Deputy Premier for Energy Hussein al-Shahristani, State of Law, Iraqi National Coalition, and acting Minister of Electricity
• Deputy Speaker of Parliament Qusay Abdul Wahab Suhail, Sadr, Iraqi National Coalition 
• Deputy Speaker of Parliament Aref Tayfour, Kurdistan Democratic Party, Kurdish Coalition

Cabinet

• Minister of Agriculture, Izz al-Din al-Dawla, Iraqi National List, Iraqi National Movement
• Minister of Communication Muhammad Tawfaq Allawi, Iraqi National List, Iraqi National Movement
• Minister of Culture Sadoun Dulaimi, Unity of Iraq, Centrist Alliance
• Minister of Education Muhammad Tamim, Iraqi National Dialogue Front, Iraqi National Movement
• Minister of Environment Sargon Sliwa Lazar, Assyrian Democratic Movement
• Minister of Finance Rafi Issawi, National Future Gathering, Iraqi National Movement
• Minister of Foreign Affairs Hoshyar Zebari, Kurdistan Democratic Party, Kurdish Coalition, and acting Minister for Women Affairs
• Minister of Health Muhammad Amin, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Kurdish Coalition
• Minister of Higher Education Ali al-Adeeb, State of Law, Iraqi National Coalition, and Acting Minister of National Reconciliation
• Minister of Housing Muhammad Darraji, Sadr, Iraqi National Coalition, and acting Minister of Public Works
• Minister of Human Rights Muhammad Shaia’a Sudani, State of Law, Iraqi National Coalition 
• Minister of Immigration and Displacement Dindar Shafiqq, Kurdistan Islamic Union, Kurdish Coalition, and acting Minister of Civil Society
• Minister of Industry Ahmad Nasser al-Dali Karbuli, Renewal List, Iraqi National Movement
• Minister of Justice Hasan Shammari, Fadhila, Iraqi National Coalition
• Minister of Labor Nassar Rubaie, Sadr, Iraqi National Coalition, and acting Minister Of Planning
• Minister of Oil Abdul Karim Luaibi, State of Law, Iraqi National Coalition
• Minister of Science and Technology Abdul Karim al-Samarraie, Renewal List, Iraqi National Movement
• Minister of Sports Jasim Muhammad Jaffar, State of Law, Iraqi National Coalition
• Minister of State Salah Muzahim Darwish, Iraqi National Dialogue Front, Iraqi National Movement
• Minister of State Abdul al-Mahdi al-Mutayri, Sadr, Iraqi National Coalition
• Minister of State Salah Jabouri, Iraqi National Dialogue Front, Iraqi National Movement
• Minister of State Hassan al-Sari, Hezbollah Iraq, Iraqi National Coalition
• Minister of State Bushra Hussain Saleh, Fadhila, Iraqi National Coalition 
• Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ali al-Sajri, Unity of Iraq, Centrist Alliance
• Minister of State for Government Spokesmanship Ali al-Dabbagh, State of Law, Iraqi National Coalition
• Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs Safi al-Din al-Safi, State of Law, Iraqi National Coalition
• Minister of State for Provincial Affairs Turan Matthaw Hassan, Iraqi Turkmen Front, Iraqi National Movement 
• Minister of State for Tribal Affairs Jamal Batikh, Iraqi National Movement
• Minister of Tourism Lewaa Smisam, Sadr, Iraqi National Coalition
• Minister of Transportation Hadi al-Ameri, Badr Organization/Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, Iraqi National Coalition

Positions By List

• Iraqi National Coalition: Prime Minister, Deputy Premier for Energy, Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Ministries of Defense (temp), Education, Electricity (temp), Housing, Human Rights, Interior (temp), Justice, Labor, National Reconciliation (temp), National Security (temp), Oil, Planning (temp), Public Works (temp), Sports, State x3, State for Foreign Affairs, State for Government Spokesmanship, State for Parliamentary Affairs, Tourism, Transportation - 21 ministries total, 7 temporary

1. State of Law: Prime Minister, Deputy Premier for Energy, Ministries of Defense (temp), Education, Electricity (temp), Human Rights, Interior (temp), National Reconciliation (temp), National Security (temp), Oil, Sports, State for Government Spokesmanship, State for Parliamentary Affairs - 11 ministries total, 5 temporary
2. Sadrists: Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Ministries of Housing, Labor, Planning (temp), Public Works (temp), State, Tourism - 6 ministries total, 2 temporary
3. Fadhila: Ministries of Justice, State - 2 ministries total
4. Hezbollah Iraq: Ministry of State - 1 ministry total
5. Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: Ministry of Transportation - 1 ministry total

• Iraqi National Movement: Speaker of Parliament, Deputy Premier, Ministries of Agriculture, Communication, Education, Finance, Industry, Science and Technology, State x2, State for Provincial Affairs, State for Tribal Affairs - 10 ministries total

1. Iraqi National List: Speaker of Parliament, Ministries of Agriculture, Communication - 2 ministries total
2. Iraqi National Dialogue Front: Deputy Premier, Ministries of Education, State x2 - 3 ministries total
3. National Future Gathering: Ministry of Finance - 1 ministry total
4. Renewal List: Ministries of Industry, Science and Technology - 2 ministries total
5. Iraqi Turkmen Front: Minister of State for Provincial Affairs - 1 ministry total

• Kurdish Coalition: President, Deputy Premier, Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Ministries of Civil Society (temp), Foreign Affairs, Health, Immigration and Displacement, Trade (temp), Women Affairs (temp) - 6 ministries total, 3 temporary

1. Kurdistan Democratic Party: Deputy Premier, Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Trade (temp), Women Affairs (temp) - 3 ministries total, 2 temporary
2. Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: President, Ministry of Health - 1 ministry total
3. Kurdistan Islamic Union: Ministries of Civil Society (temp), Immigration and Displacement - 2 ministries total, 1 temporary

• Centrist Alliance: Ministry of Culture, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs - 2 ministries total
• Assyrian Democratic Movement: Ministry of Environment - 1 ministry total

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “A lone woman in Iraq’s new cabinet,” 12/21/10

Alaadin, Ranj, “#Iraq names cabinet – finally,” Ranj Alaaldin Blog, 12/21/10

Ali, Yaser, "KBC: Maliki signs agreement to Kurdish conditions," AK News, 12/21/10

Ali, Saman, "Maliki signed to implement article 140 in two years," AK News, 12/21/10

Ashur TV, “Ashur t.v. Interview with Mr. Sargon Lazar, of Foreign the Assyrian Democratic Movement,”  Christians Of Iraq, 2/29/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “Nejeifi named parl. Speaker, Suhail and Tayfour deputies,” 11/11/10
- “The new cabinet line-up announced by al-Maliki,” 12/21/10
- "North Iraq Kurdistan's "Change" Bloc withdraws from new cabinet," 12/21/10

BBC, “Iraqi parliamentary approves new government,” 12/21/10

Chulov, Martin, "Iraq names cabinet after nine-month power struggle," Guardian, 12/21/10

Healy, Jack, "Cleric's Anti-U.S. Forces Poised for Gains in Iraq," New York Times, 12/19/10

Ibrahim, Haider, “No minister assigned without my consent says Maliki,” AK News, 11/27/10

Katzman, Kenneth, "Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks," Congressional Research Service, 4/22/09
- "Iraq: Reconciliation and Benchmarks," Congressional Research Service, 5/12/08

Kazmi, Haider, "Maliki spoke frankly and undermine his confidence: I am not convinced I do not know anything about some ministers," Al-Aalem, 12/21/10

Long, Austin, “Why Anbar voted for Allawi,” Foreign Policy, 4/5/10

Omaima, Younis, “Iraqiya got 9 ministries and the Sadrists 8, and 6 for the Kurds, and only 4 of the State of Law,” Al-Aalem, 12/21/10

Surk, Barbara and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, "Iraq finally has a new government," Associated Press, 12/21/10

Visser, Reidar, “Change Inside Iraqiyya?” Iraq And Gulf Analysis, 11/14/10
- “Parliament Approves the Second Maliki Government,” Historiae, 12/21/10

Wikipedia, “Rafi al-Issawi”

Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council Finally Comes Out For Maliki

On December 16, 2010 it was reported that Ammar Hakim, the head of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), had finally come out in favor of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s second term. Hakim made his announcement in a speech in Baghdad marking the beginning of the celebration for the Imam Hussein Bin Ali. The Supreme Council was the last major party to support the premier, marking their decline in Iraq’s political system.

The SIIC followed a bewildering, and ultimately self-defeating path before and after the March 2010 election. The party’s problems began with the 2009 provincial balloting. The Supreme Council faced a devastating series of losses, going from controlling most of the south and Baghdad to only Muthanna. That was a foreshadowing of its showing in 2010, as the SIIC was seen as being sectarian, too close to Iran, and having mismanaged the governorates. They didn’t seem to learn their lesson however as they joined the Iraqi National Alliance along with the Sadrists in August 2009, which was pushed by Iran to unite all of the Shiite parties. Within days the leader of the SIIC Abdul Aziz al-Hakim passed away, leaving a power vacuum, as his son Ammar took charge of the organization. The National Alliance failed to convince Prime Minister Maliki to run with them. The Supreme Council then decided to back the Accountability and Justice Commission’s banning of dozens of members of Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement for alleged ties to the Baath Party. After the voting in Mach 2010, the National Alliance and Maliki’s State of Law joined together into the National Coalition. Hakim felt threatened however because Maliki and the Sadrists had all done better than the SIIC in the balloting, and it had become a minor party as a result. That led Hakim to become one of the strongest opponents to Maliki, then reverse course and try to align with Allawi, but nominate its own candidate for prime minister, Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi, in September 2010. Since Allawi was set on becoming Iraq’s leader this was a non-starter for Hakim. To make things worse, when Sadr came out for Maliki on October 1, the Badr Organization did so as well, effectively splitting the SIIC in two. When Allawi finally gave in, and agreed to Massoud Barzani’s power sharing agreement in November that kept Maliki in power, the Supreme Council was left out in the cold.

Hakim and his party lucked out because the new Iraqi regime will be a national unity government. That means all of the major parties will be included, even the SIIC. Now that the discussion has shifted from who will be Iraq’s next leader to controlling ministries, the Supreme Council has finally come around and backed the premier to try to partake in the spoils. It’s likely to only get 2-3ministries, reflecting its decline.

The SIIC went from one of the leading parties in the country, and being a backbone of the Jaafari and Maliki governments, to now being a medium sized organization that was unable to shape any of the major negotiations over the new ruling coalition. It is now an afterthought when posts are being distributed, and its decision to support the prime minister hardly gained any attention. This means some of the party’s ideas such as federalism and a Shiite autonomous region in the south are likely dead. On the other hand, exile and anti-Saddam opposition lists like the SIIC still run Iraq, occasionally wielding sectarian issues to stay in office. The party is not going to disappear, and still holds 20 seats in the new parliament, but its fall from grace hopefully means that more nationalist and domestic lists are coming to the fore, which would be a major development in Iraq’s politics.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Hakim pledges support for PM Maliki’s govt.,” 12/16/10

Al Jazeera, “Iraqi Shias form new alliance,” 8/24/09

Ramzi, Kholoud, “after months of negotiations, maliki holds on to power,” Niqash, 12/15/10

Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009

The Limits Of Iran’s Power In Iraq

Included in the recent Wikileaks release of thousands of United States diplomatic cables was one by the former American Ambassador to Iraq Christopher Hill. Hill’s report was entitled “Iran’s Efforts In Iraqi Electoral Politics,” and was dated November 13, 2009. In it, he claimed that Iran’s main concern at that time was ensuring continued Shiite rule in Iraq after the 2010 elections. They were especially concerned about Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s nationalist tendencies, which would lesson sectarian politics and divide the Shiite vote. Hill’s memo pointed out the leading role that Iran plays within Iraq, but the events surrounding the recent vote there shows the limits of its influence as well.

In order to achieve its goals, Tehran was using its ties to Iraq’s political leaders and cash. Ambassador Hill wrote that Iran’s point man on Iraq, Iranian Revolutionary Guards Qods Force commander General Qassim Suleimani had relationships with Iraq’s Shiite, Kurdish, and even some Sunni parties. Individually, he had contacts with Prime Minister Maliki, President Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, former Premier Ibrahim al-Jaafari of the Reform List, and ex-speaker of parliament Iyad Samarraie of the Iraqi Accordance Front. Hill also claimed that Iran was providing $100-$200 million a year to its political allies. The Supreme Council and its militia the Badr Brigade seemed to be the largest recipient with $70 million annually. There were other reports that Moqtada al-Sadr’s party was getting $8 million per month to campaign in the 2010 election. 

Iran undoubtedly played a leading role in Iraq’s recent elections, but they did not always get what they wanted. Before the balloting Tehran was able to get the Supreme Council, Sadrists, and other smaller Shiite parties to create the Iraqi National Alliance. At the same time, they did not convince Maliki to join as he went with his nationalist State of Law just as Iran had feared. With this split in the Shiite vote, Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement was able to win the most seats. That helped convince Maliki to rejoin with his Shiite brethren in the new Iraqi National Coalition in May with a healthy nudge from Iran. However both Sadr and the Supreme Council objected to Maliki returning as premier, which made the new group a coalition in name only. The Supreme Council even nominated Vice President Mahdi in September as their candidate for prime minister. Then suddenly the Sadrists reversed course in October and backed Maliki. The general consensus was that this was done at the behest of Iran, and that they had ultimately come out victorious amongst the regional powers and the United States who were all attempting to influence the outcome of the 2010 elections. However, the fact that it took nearly seven months for Sadr to change his mind, points to internal factors within the Sadr Trend playing a large role, not just Iran’s influence. The Supreme Council still hasn’t come out in favor of Maliki even though it is the biggest recipient of Tehran’s largesse.

Conventional wisdom in the West is increasingly pointing to Iran as the biggest winner not only of the recent election, but post-war Iraq overall. As Ambassador Hill pointed out, Tehran is undoubtedly a major player in Iraqi politics. That being said, they do not give orders and the Iraqis comply. Iran’s main goal is being able to shape events in Iraq to their liking, not having direct control. Increasingly Iran is having problems at doing that as Iraqi nationalism has re-emerged and average citizens are becoming weary of their neighbor interfering in their affairs. That’s something that Ambassador Hill also mentioned in a later cable. The actions of the Iraqi parties point to the limits of Iran’s power. The Shiites did not unite before the vote, and it took them months to agree upon Maliki afterward, and some still refuse to do so. The Iraqi parties were caught up in their own power struggles and rivalries, and that ultimately played a larger role in their decisions than Iranian pressure.

SOURCES

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

Hanna, Michael Wahid, “Iran Has Less Power in Iraq Than We Think,” Atlantic, 10/14/10

Harari, Michal, “Status Update: Shi’a Militias in Iraq,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/16/10

Hill, Christopher, “Iran/Iraq: The View From Najaf,” U.S. Embassy, Baghdad, 12/14/09
- “Iran’s Efforts In Iraqi Electoral Politics,” U.S. Embassy Baghdad, 11/13/09

Iraqi National Alliance Splits Over Nominating Maliki, New Iraqi Government Still On Hold

Source: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 
Moqtada al-Sadr and PM Nouri Al-Maliki seen together in 2006. Sadr just went from one of Maliki’s greatest opponents to his main supporter to form a new Iraqi government

On October 1, 2010 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki got the support of half of the Iraqi National Alliance to stay in power. The Sadrists, the Badr Organization, the Iraqi National Congress, and Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Trend came out for Maliki. That gives the premier 139 seats in the new parliament, 24 short of the 163 necessary for a majority, and the right to form a new government. State of Law came in second in March with 89 seats, the Sadrists won the most in the National Alliance with 39, while Badr got nine,  and the National Trend and Iraqi National Congress have one apiece.

The Sadrists hinted at their about face towards Maliki at the end of September. First, a letter from Moqtada al-Sadr addressed to his followers included a question about what the movement should do if Maliki won a second term in office. Sadr replied that politics was about give and take, and that Sadrists needed to go along with whatever the leadership decided upon. There was also a fatwa by Ayatollah Kadhem al-Hussein al-Haeri, Sadr’s mentor in Iran, calling for Maliki to be supported. Coming out for the prime minister was a dramatic change for Sadr who was previously one of the greatest opponents of Maliki, having called him a liar and hypocrite. This could cause internal dissension within the movement, but at the same time provide them with huge opportunities. The Sadrists are asking for six of 34 ministries, including the Trade Ministry and either the Defense or Interior Ministries. This would mark their return to government after they left the original Maliki coalition in November 2006, giving up 5 cabinet positions in the process. Ministries mean patronage, and a way to expand their base.

The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the Fadhila Party did not attend the National Alliance vote. Instead, they met with Deputy Prime Minister Rafi Issawi of Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement to discuss how to counter Maliki. That means the effective split of the National Alliance. An adviser to Allawi said that the National Movement was now hoping to form a counter coalition made up of the Supreme Council and the Kurdish Alliance. If that were to come to fruition they would have 163 seats with the National Movement’s 91, the Kurdish Coalition’s 57, the Supreme Council’s eight, and Fadhila’s seven, enough to have a majority.

There are major barriers to this happening. First, the Supreme Council is hoping that allying with the National Movement will keep them relevant as they have lost most of their support in both the 2009 provincial and 2010 parliamentary elections compared to the 2005 votes when they were the largest Shiite party in Iraq. That means they will be pushing Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi as premier, putting them at odds with Allawi who also wants the position. The Kurds are also weary of the Al-Hadbaa component of the National Movement, which controls Ninewa province. Not only that, but in August the Kurdish Coalition issued a 19-paragraph paper outlining their demands which included the presidency, the creation of a National Security Council and Federal Council, which would require new laws, a number of ministries, the implementation of Article 140 to determine the fate of the disputed territories, the passage of an oil and gas law, the federal government paying for the peshmerga, and the right to bring down any government that did not follow its program. The Kurds might also be afraid that the Sunni component of the National Movement will be less likely to agree upon Article 140. On the other hand, the Kurds have said they would not join any government that did not include Allawi and the Supreme Council.

The Kurds will be in the driver’s seat now that the Sadrists have made their choice. The Kurdish Coalition are now the largest uncommitted bloc, and can determine whether the National Movement or State of Law will achieve a majority. That will give them the upper hand in negotiations.

A new Iraqi government is still weeks, possibly months away. Allawi, Maliki, the Supreme Council, and the Kurds all have long days ahead of them trying to win over others to their positions. What the course of events so far points out is that Maliki has been the main focus of talks. His rise to power after being a weak and compromise candidate back in 2006 has worried all of the other parties about what he might do if he stays in office. Foreign powers such as the U.S., Iran, Syria, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia only have limited influence in these negotiations. Tehran for example, put together the National Alliance before the March vote, then got Maliki to join them afterward, and many believe their pressure led to Sadr's about face on the premier. At the same time, the Supreme Council has now split from the Badr Organization, which use to be its militia, and divided the Shiite vote in the process, which Iran spent so much time trying to unite. That shows other countries can help shape events, but Iraqis will ultimately decide on the future of the next government. The problem as ever is that very few are willing to compromise. That’s the reason why a new ruling coalition is still a long way off.

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