Were Iraqi Police Involved In Recent Raids Against Christians In Baghdad?

While there are reports that the Iraqi police are improving in professionalism, capabilities, and cutting down on the corruption and connections to militias, there are still plenty of others that point out the remaining problems. On January 15, 2011 for example, the New York Times reported on raids against Christians that involved the Iraqi police. 

The offices of the Christian Ashurbanipal Cultural Association in Baghdad after the January raid (New York Times)

In mid-January, the Christian Ashurbanpial Cultural Association in Baghdad was vandalized, had its equipment stolen, and members beat by eight men carrying guns and pipes. During the attack they were told Iraq was an Islamic country. The Assyrian Christian group claimed they were singled out because they ran a club that served alcohol. The government has recently been shutting down nightclubs and liquor stores, which are mostly run by Christians, on moral grounds. The association claimed that just before the raid, three police vehicles blocked off the street. Local authorities were accusing each other about the event. A police major claimed that the men responsible for the attack were working for the provincial council, while the head of the Baghdad council said that they were police officers in civilian clothes. The Times also interviewed two alcohol shops who said that their establishments were raided as well with police complicity.

If these stories prove to be true, it would come as no surprise. Early on when the Iraqi police were being put together, many political parties, insurgents, and gangs were able to place their followers within its ranks. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council for example, got one of their militia commanders Bayan Jabr to be Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s Interior Minister. He went on to place Badr Brigade members throughout the police and ministry. The police have always been the most open to political influence as well because they are locally recruited. Therefore Iraqi police working as part of an Islamist party or just corrupt officers looking to take advantage of the government crackdown on alcohol for their own personal gain are plausible scenarios for these recent raids against Christians.

SOURCES

Iraq Business News, “Kidnap in Iraq,” 1/11/11

Jones, General James, “The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq,” Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, 9/6/07

Leland, John, “Baghdad Raids on Alcohol Sellers Stir Fears,” New York Times, 1/15/11

Wasit Joins Ranks Of Iraqis Not Paying New Electricity Bills

Wasit has refused to pay new power bills (Wikimedia)

The southern province of Wasit announced on January 13, 2011 that it would not be paying the Electricity Ministry’s new power bills. According to a local official, the prices were too high for many of the poor citizens of the governorate. In June 2010 the Electricity Ministry began a new program to double the costs of electricity use, and base the bills upon usage. That same month Iraqis took to the streets in spontaneous demonstrations against the lack of power. The first protests were in Basra, but then spread to Dhi Qar, Anbar, Diyala, and Wasit. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was forced to respond, by first, firing the Electricity Minister, and then secretly ordering the Interior Ministry to ban any further outbursts. At the same time the government said that it would be unable to change the situation anytime soon.

Iraq is stuck between a rock and hard place over its power production. In the third quarter of 2010 Iraq reached a new all time high in output since the 2003 invasion at an average of 6,540 megawatts per day. However that continued to be outstripped by demand that stood at an estimated 12,605 megawatts per day for that period. After the protests Maliki said that it would take up to two years to fix the power system, while a U.S. general in charge of reconstruction projects in the Middle East speculated that it might be three. An Electricity Ministry official warned that supply might continue to increase even after the electricity supply was increased. That’s largely due to the fact that Iraqis continue to buy consumer goods such as air conditioners and refrigerators, which were limited during the decade of international sanctions.

In the meantime, with security greatly improved, services have now become the top priority for Iraqis. According to a June 2010 survey by the International Republican Institute, 66% of those polled said services were the most pressing issue facing the country. 60% nationwide felt that electricity had gotten worse over the last year, and that number went up to 68% in the southern provinces where Wasit is located.

Wasit has also not been alone. In October 2010 Karbala’s provincial council rejected the new pricing plan, saying that no one should pay them until service improved. In November, the Electricity Ministry announced that it was owed roughly $450 million in unpaid electricity bills. Iraqis hardly paid them to begin with because supply was so spotty, and the higher rates did not change their attitudes.

Iraq’s electricity network has suffered from twenty years of neglect and war. During the 1991 Gulf War, the system was extensively bombed, and has never recovered. After the 2003 invasion, the U.S. spent almost $5 billion on the industry. The supply of power has greatly improved as a result, but it has never been able to catch up with demand. The government eventually needs to institute a workable billing program that will not only generate revenues, but will also act to curb consumption. The problems with output however need to be fixed before the public is probably willing to accept any such plan. That is still years away, and until then many Iraqis won’t be paying for the service.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraq unable to meet current power demand until 2013: US,” 9/7/10

Ashour, Muhammad, “electrical storm,” Niqash, 7/5/10

Al-Haffar, Hassoun, “Karbala Council rejects new electricity tariffs,” AK News, 10/26/10

Al-Hamdani, Karim, “Unpaid electricity bills in Iraq amount to more than half a billion dollars,” Azzaman, 11/15/10

International Republican Institute, “Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion, June 3 – July 3, 2010,” 9/16/10

Juhi, Bushra, “Electricity-starved Iraqis’ obsession: generators,” Associated Press, 6/26/10

Al-Shayeb, Nabil, “Wasit citizens will not pay electricity bills pending revision,” AK News, 1/13/11

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/10

Russia Today VIDEO: Trashed In Iraq

Iraqi Security Forces Can’t Sustain Themselves

How many of these tanks and helicopters will the Iraqi military be able to maintain?

In November 2010, the Defense Department’s Inspector General released a report, “Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Iraq Security Forces.”

This was the third paper on Iraq’s attempt to build an enduring logistics system. Since the last two reports that came out in 2007 and 2008, the Inspector General found lots of progress. The Iraqi Defense, Interior, and military command have all developed some good leaders who are focusing upon sustainment of their forces. There are more classes available to Iraqis on those subjects than ever before. The problem is that the U.S. withdrawal is happening before Iraq has a working maintenance and supply system. That is threatening all of the accomplishments made in recent years.

The Inspector General found that the U.S. withdrawal is having a negative affect upon Iraq’s security forces and ministries. That begins with the number of American personnel working on logistics with the Iraqis. In September 2009 there were 659 in the country. By April 2010 that had gone down to 502, and in August there were only 300. The U.S. logistics team that worked with the Federal Police withdrew in the summer of 2010. The advisers at the Taji maintenance depot left at the end of the summer. The Americans were also working with the Iraqis to help them develop a strategic plan for logistics. The Interior Ministry has come up with a basic idea for supporting its forces, but the Defense Ministry has not. With U.S. forces drawing down, they may not be able to finish this work.

That will cause major problems down the road, because by December 2011, the date set for all U.S. troops to be out of Iraq, the nation’s military and police will not be able to sustain themselves. They still have issues with planning, programming, budgeting, and execution. They will need training and support on all of those issues, probably for several more years, but that may not be available to them with the withdrawal.

The reason why Iraq is just now developing its logistics system is due to American policy. From 2003-2008 the U.S. focused upon pumping out as many soldiers and police as possible to fight the insurgency. The Americans didn’t start giving supply and maintenance serious consideration until just the last few years. When they finally did get around to the matter, the U.S. never came up with an integrated plan for how to develop those capabilities for the Iraqis. Now the U.S. is leaving, and Baghdad may not have the know how or motivation to finish the task.

That brings up one major barrier on the Iraqi side to achieving their goals; they have not shown much appreciation for the matter or how the existing system works. The Inspector General found some shocking examples. For one, Defense Ministry officials don’t know who comes up with the requirements for logistics, what the process is to make proposals, and then how to send them up the chain of command. In another case, the officer in charge of maintenance at Defense said he wasn’t consulted about parts requirements when orders were made, which led to huge waste. 80% of the repair parts on hand with the Iraqi Army didn’t go with any equipment they had. The government overall also had a bad record of assessing its needs. When it did find one, it couldn’t adequately budget or contract to meet it. Finally, the Defense and Interior Ministries tended to only plan short-term, year-to-year, rather than long-term. This has all led to a chronic shortage of equipment, weapons, and parts. An American adviser suggested that the Iraqi logistics system was broken.

In a more specific case, the Inspector General found that the Defense Ministry hardly budgets any money for sustaining the Navy. It provides no maintenance support. That meant that for the last five years the Navy has only gotten a small budget to buy parts, most of which are purchased at local markets, and are of poor quality. In one example, an Iraqi patrol boat ran aground in 2009. The sailors didn’t have the money to fix it right away, but instead had to buy the parts one by one from Iraqi suppliers. One year later the Navy still didn’t have all the necessary pieces to fix the boat.

This same experience was repeated throughout the Iraqi military. Only the equipment bought through the American Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program received maintenance packages. Those include the C-130 transport plans and the M1A1 Abrams tanks. The problem is 75-80% of the Iraqi vehicles, weapons, etc. were purchased outside of the FMS.

Overall, by the end of 2011 the Ministry of Defense will have around $10 billion worth of equipment. American advisers estimate that it will take between $300-$600 million a year to maintain them. In 2009 however, the military command only asked Baghdad for $200 million for maintenance, only got $53 million in the budget, and then spent just $16 million of that. A senior Iraqi officer told the Inspector General he didn’t think Defense had the capability to spend much more. Another logistics officer said that the result would be that the military would be short spares, maintenance capabilities, and repair parts in 2011 because it hadn’t budgeted for them.

The U.S. has been trying to help the Iraqis with the Asset Management Program software. It is the only automated system within the Iraqi military. It is supposed to keep track of parts, orders, stocks, etc. It is only as good as the information entered into it, which is a major issue. The contract for the software also expires in January 2011 and the Americans don’t know whether Baghdad will renew it.

Iraqi forces have problems with reporting overall, not just inputing data into the Management Program. Iraqi commanders regularly overstate the operational readiness of their units, especially with vehicles and weapons. Officers would routinely state that 90% of their Humvees were operational, when the true number was usually between 50-75%. That was because commanders didn’t want to send their broken equipment to workshops. Often, when they did, they never got it back. Another factor was that the Defense Ministry had a fuel quota based upon the number of vehicles on hand. If a unit turned in the broken ones, they would not get as much gas. Battalions, brigades, and divisions also didn’t list all the parts they had in stock, many of which were the wrong pieces for what they had, and they didn’t re-order after they used anything. Like the Navy, soldiers were often told to go find comparable parts at local markets, which were often low quality and broke quicker.

Maintenance depots for the Iraqi Army were found lacking as well. The Taji workshop didn’t have equipment and trained personnel for certain tasks. It received $1 million per month for refurbishing and rebuilding T-72 tanks for instance, but not one had been completed. The Al Asad and Numaniyah location commands were also not being used effectively. Al Asad had no supplies, no fuel, and its warehouse was empty. Numaniyah on the other hand, was fully stocked, but the division it was supposed to support didn’t use it because the chain of command and paper work necessary were a deterrent.

The one major positive of the report was that the Interior Ministry was farther ahead than Defense. Interior had come up with a basic maintenance doctrine. It had also improved its planning, budgeting, and strategies. It still couldn’t adequately plan and contracts for vehicle parts however.

Based upon the Inspector General’s investigation it doesn’t seem likely that the Iraqi security forces will have a workable logistics system up and running by the time U.S. troops are expected to exit the country at the end of 2011. There are too many problems within the Defense Ministry, with the supply system, reporting, and orders. To fix the problem, the Iraqi command needs to realize that logistics is the key to keeping their forces ready and operable for the long-term. The Inspector General found some dedicated officers in Baghdad working on this issue, but obviously there are not enough of them. The generals at the top have to be convinced of the importance of maintenance and supply, and then there needs to be a lot more training about how the supply, planning, and budgeting system works from the top to the bottom. The chain of command and orders also need to be changed so that commanders have incentives to send in their equipment for repairs, that they report their stocks, and that the right pieces are ordered. This will be a very long process, which the Inspector General doubts can be completed without more U.S. support. That is declining with the withdrawal however. Washington therefore needs to play its part as well by either shifting personnel to this task or finding contractors that can do the work. Otherwise the Inspector General feels that the Iraqis will never have the support necessary to finish the task. If not, much of Iraq’s current weapons and vehicles could end up on the scrap heap.

SOURCES

Inspector General United States Department of Defense, “Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Iraq Security Forces,” Department of Defense, 11/17/10

Why Sadr Left Iraq

In February 2007 Moqtada al-Sadr fled to Iran. Several reasons have been given for his departure. Those range from Sadr running from U.S. forces, to his falling out with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, to losing control of his militia. It’s impossible to say which factor was the most important, but it seems feasible that a combination of all of them played a role in Sadr’s decision.

In 2006 U.S. commander in Iraq Gen. Casey said that most of the violence was due to Shiite militias like the Mahdi Army (ABC News)

The U.S. military began focusing upon Sadr’s Mahdi Army once again in mid-2006. In August, the American commander in Iraq General George Casey said that 60% of the violence in the country was due to Shiite militias. Most of that was being committed by Sadrists. That was a reflection of the exploding sectarian civil war that had hit full throttle after the February bombing of the Shiite shrine in Samarra, Salahaddin. As a result, the U.S. was increasingly putting pressure on Maliki to allow them to crackdown on Sadr’s forces. The premier would let the Americans conduct a few raids over specific events, but otherwise the prime minister protected the Mahdi Army. When a senior Sadrist was arrested in October, Maliki ordered his release. Maliki was afraid that his coalition would unseat him. He was therefore leaning on the Sadrists, who put him into office in the first place in early 2006, for support and protection.

(Global Security)

At the same time, the Mahdi Army was splintering and growing out of control. The militia had already been breaking apart as early as 2004, and as the sectarian war took off, hundreds of Shiites joined their ranks. Some of them were part of gangs that used the chaos for their own gain. By October 2006, the U.S. military estimated that around one-third of the Mahdi Army had split off, and were no longer following Sadr. That same month he fired 40 militia commanders in an attempt to assert his control, but the Mahdi Army had no real organization. Rather they were a collection of fighters under the individual control of local leaders. Sadr could only make pronouncements and hope that his followers were listening. The problem was fewer and fewer were as the civil war intensified.

In November, things fell apart politically for Sadr. At the end of the month, Maliki met with President Bush, and Sadr ordered his 30 parliamentarians and five cabinet ministers to withdraw in protest. Sadr was hoping that this move would strengthen his nationalist credentials, but instead it opened up the possibility for Maliki to move away from him.

From late-2006 on, the White House was pressuring Maliki to form a new ruling coalition without Sadr. The Kurds, the Iraqi Accordance Front, and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council were all on board with Washington’s agenda, but Maliki was hesitant. Again, he was afraid that the other parties would replace him, and therefore did not want to give up on his alliance with Sadr. With the Sadrists withdrawal however, the prime minister began to reconsider his position.

In January 2007 the Americans announced the beginning of the Surge, and Maliki ended his protection of the Mahdi Army. Sadr ordered his politicians to return to their positions to fend off the move, but it was too late. Not only did the prime minister let the U.S. target the Sadrists, he allowed the Supreme Council to do so as well, whereas before he tried to mediate between the two rival Shiite parties. The next month Sadr departed for Iran where he would stay for nearly four years. 

In around six months Moqtada al-Sadr’s fortunes took a dramatic turn. At the beginning of 2006 Sadr helped put Maliki into office, gained five ministries, while in the streets Shiites were increasingly turning to his militia for protection during the sectarian fighting. Sadr could not manage his success. His militia grew out of control, and splintered more and more. At the same time, as the Mahdi Army went on the offensive the U.S. began singling them out for more and more attention. Maliki was protecting him up to that point, but when Sadr decided to withdraw from the government he undermined everything he had achieved. The premier could no longer fall back on the Sadrists for support, and decided to try his luck with the Americans. That led to Sadr’s departure for Iran where he tried to regroup, reform his image, and gain new status through religious studies. Now he’s back trying to see whether he can do a better job this time around. 

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Iraqi leader drops protection of militia,” 1/22/07
- “Shiite militia may be disintegrating,” 3/21/07

Burns, John, “Precarious Cease-Fire in Amara Holds,” New York Times, 10/22/06

Glantz, Aaron, “Iraqi Health Ministry Severs Ties With US Over Raid,” AntiWar.com, 8/15/06

Kazimi, Nibras, “Where Things Stand in Iraq,” Talisman Gate Blog, 10/20/06

Michaels, Jim, “Shiites Redefine Battle in Baghdad,” USA Today, 8/10/06

Murphy, Dan and al-Talee, Awadh, “Moqtada al-Sadr’s followers have clashed with US and Iraqi forces in the past week,” Christian Science Monitor, 10/23/06

Parker, Ned, “Hard-line Iraqi clerics group shut down,” Los Angeles Times, 11/15/07

Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Sadr Casts a Shadow Over Bush-Maliki Meeting,” Washington Post, 11/30/06

Tavernise, Sabrina, “Influence Rises but Base Frays for Iraqi Cleric,” New York Times, 11/13/06
- “Many Iraqis Look to Gunmen as Protectors,” New York Times, 10/21/06

Wagner, Thomas and Yacoub, Sameer, “Al-Sadr Loyalists Boycott Iraq Government,” Associated Press, 11/29/06

Wong, Edward, “Iraqis Consider Ways to Reduce Power of Cleric,” New York Times, 12/12/06

Report Finds Iraq A Hybrid Democracy

In December 2010 the Economist Intelligence Unit released a report on the state of democracy in the world. This was the third edition by the group. The first was in 2006 and the second was issued in 2008. The new one includes 165 countries and two territories. Each was compared using five categories: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, governance, political participation, and political culture. Those were given a score of 0-10, and then averaged out. The states were then placed within four categories: full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes, and authoritarian ones. Iraq was one of three hybrid governments in the Middle East and North Africa, which was the least democratic region of the world according to the Intelligence Unit.

The Economist Intelligence Unit found a decline in democratic governments since 2008. In 2010 the report ranked 26 countries, 15.6% of the total as full democracies, 53 countries as flawed democracies, 31.7%, 33 countries as hybrid democracies, 19.8%, and 55 countries, 32.9%, as authoritarian. What the Unit found alarming was that the average scores between 2008 and 2010 declined for 91 countries out of the 167 in its Democracy Index. 48 countries saw an increase, and 28 stayed the same.

In the Middle East and North Africa the Intelligence Unit ranked twenty nations. None of them were full democracies, one was flawed, three were hybrids, and 16 were authoritarian. Israel was the one flawed government with an average score of 7.48, and was ranked 37 overall. Lebanon, score 5.82, Palestine, score 5.44, and Iraq, score 4.00, were the three hybrid democracies. Kuwait, Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain, Algeria, Egypt, Oman, Iran, Libya, Qatar, Tunisia, Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia were all ranked authoritarian in that order. The average score for the region was 3.43 compared to 4.23 in Sub-Saharan Africa, 5.53 in Asia and Australia, 5.55 in Eastern Europe, 6.37 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 8.45 in Western Europe, and 8.63 in North America, firmly placing the Middle East and North Africa as the least democratic region in the world.

Ballot box after 2010 Iraqi election

Of the hybrid regimes in the area, Iraq had the lowest score, and was barley above some of the authoritarian ones. A hybrid democracy has irregularities in elections, opposition parties and the media are often intimidated by the government, there is a weakness in political culture, government, participation, rule of law, corruption is common, and the judiciary is not independent. Iraq’s overall score was 4.00. It did best in political participation at 6.11. That was followed by 5.00 in civil liberties, 4.33 in electoral process and pluralism, 3.75 in political culture, and 0.79 in governance. The country did best in participation probably because of its relatively high voter turnout in the recent elections. It did worse in functioning government since Baghdad is largely dysfunctional. It has not dealt with any of the major issues facing it such as oil, the disputed territories, Arab-Kurdish relations, etc., and misses just about any deadline that it sets for itself, which can be seen in the fact that ten months since the parliamentary vote Iraq still does not have a full cabinet. Even so, Iraq is doing relatively better than it did before because of the greatly improved security situation allows the government to function better. In 2008 for example, it was ranked 116 overall, and in 2010 it was 111. As the Economist Unit points out, voting is not all that democracies are about. Iraq has had three elections since 2009, but the other elements of Iraq’s politics have some deep flaws. That’s why its score was only slightly above the 3.88 of Kuwait, the 3.79 of Morocco, and the 3.74 of Jordan even though they are ranked as authoritarian ones.

Governments In The Middle East/North Africa (Avg. Score/Rank Overall)
Israel: 7.48 #37
Lebanon: 5.82 #86
Palestine: 5.44 #93
Iraq: 4.00 #111
Kuwait: 3.88 #114
Morocco: 3.79 #116
Jordan: 3.74 #117
Bahrain: 3.49 #122
Algeria: 3.44 #125
Egypt: 3.07 #138
Oman: 2.86 #143
Iran: 1.94, #158
Libya: 1.94 #158
Qatar: 3.09 #137
Tunisia: 2.79 #144
Yemen: 2.64 #146
UAE: 2.52 #148
Sudan: 2.42 #151
Syria: 2.31 #152
Saudi Arabia: 2.31 #152

Iraq is one of the few anomalies within the Middle East and North Africa. Despite its problems, it is one of only three hybrid democracies in a region that is thoroughly authoritarian. Iraq really needs to improve upon its governance however, if it wants to move up the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index. That will be hard to accomplish with this group of political elites. Too many are leaders from the Saddam era who were suppressed and sometimes cajoled by the former regime, which fostered a culture of secrecy and distrust. Many went into exile, came under the influence of the neighboring dictatorships, and are divided by sometimes decades long rivalries. That makes finding compromises difficult. That was on full display when Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and former premier Iyad Allawi could not agree upon a government after the 2010 elections even though they had the most in common ideologically. Instead their personal differences were what dominated their negotiations, as neither was willing to let the other have power. These disagreements have wide ranging affects upon all kinds of issues throughout Iraq, and are a major barrier to further democratization.

SOURCES

BBC, “Iraq election voter turnout ‘62%,’” 3/8/10

Economist Intelligence Unit, “The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2010,” December 2010

Knights, Michael, “Iraqi Election Success? Not So Fast,” Foreign Policy Online, February 2009

How Many Iraqi Refugees Are There?

The United Nations used to say that Iraq was one of the worst refugee problems in the world. Most of the displacement came after the February 2006 bombing of the shrine in Samarra, Salahaddin that accelerated the civil war to its highest point. By 2007, many aid groups were claiming that 60,000 Iraqis were being displaced a month. Thousands of people fled throughout the conflict, but the exact amount is unclear. From 2006-2009 the most common number given was 2.5 million. Almost 2 million of those were said to reside in Syria and Jordan. Many experts now think those numbers were far too high.

Iraqis registering at a Syrian immigration center (UNHCR)

Syria and the United Nations have said that between 1.2 million to 1.5 million Iraqis came to the country from 2003-2009, but that’s now disputed. From February 2006 to October 2007 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) claimed that up to 600,000 Iraqis entered the country. From 2003-2010 however, the UNHCR had only registered around 260,000. Damascus has also always acknowledged a constant flow of people back and forth between the two nations. In February 2007, the UNHCR for example, reported that a Syrian immigration official told them that 1,200 Iraqis had entered Syria in January, but around 700 went back at the same time. In 2010 that led the United Nations to revise its number of Iraqis refugees in the country. People that didn’t contact the UNHCR offices for four months or did not pick up food vouchers for two months were dropped from its rosters. That led to 58,000 being eliminated. By April 2010 the U.N. only had 165,493 Iraqi refugees on its books in Syria. Returns, deaths, and moves to other countries were reasons given for the decline. The United Nations and other aid agencies believe that there are more Iraqis in the country than are registered, but not many more. In a March 2008 survey, the UNHCR found that 86% of refugees had signed up with them. Despite the changes in the U.N. numbers, the Syrian government has stuck with its own figures.

Iraqis at aid agency offices in Amman, Jordan (New York Times)

Jordan’s experience with Iraqi refugees has been almost the same as Syria’s. Amman claimed that around 500,000 Iraqis had fled to their country, but the UNHCR only registered 65,000. In 2007, the Norwegian Institute Fafo conducted a survey of Iraqis in Jordan and estimated that 161,000 were there. The Jordanian government disagreed with the findings, delayed the release of the paper, and when it did finally come out, had the government’s official number of 450,000-500,000 included in it. In 2007 Jordan opened its schools to Iraqi students and expected 50,000 to show up. Instead, less than 12,000 arrived, and in 2008 the Jordanian Education Ministry issued a report saying that the actual number was even less than that. Just like Syria, Amman continues to claim that around half a million Iraqi refugees are still in their country.

There are a couple reasons offered for why Syria and Jordan have stuck with the high numbers, but the main culprit appears to be that both governments have used the refugees crisis for their own benefit. When both countries have asked for assistance with Iraqi refugees, they have included the demands of their own publics within the requests. The governments claim they need to provide something for their own people so that they don’t turn on the Iraqis. Jordan for example has received around $400 million to help Iraqis. Most of that went directly to the Jordanian government who spent it on schools, hospitals, water and sanitation projects. With far fewer Iraqis in the country than the government claims however, that means most of this aid went to poor Jordanians rather than refugees. To maintain this aid Amman and Damascus have refused to revise their estimates for Iraqi refugees in their countries.

The state of Iraqi refugees has changed over the last couple years. Many have returned to Iraq, while others have moved on to Western Europe, the United States and other industrial countries. Host countries in the region continue to claim that there are around 1.5 million refugees, but Refugees International recently estimated that there may be only 500,000. Originally, the international community and aid groups were caught by surprise by the flood of Iraqis out of the country due to the civil war. Without adequate studies of the event, the U.N., aid groups, and the media began calling it a crisis. Syria, Jordan, and others took advantage of the situation by claiming hundreds of thousands of refugees had come to them. They requested and received huge amounts of aid as a result that they mostly spent on their own people rather than Iraqis. Not wanting to loose that assistance, they have continued to talk of the costs Iraqis impose on them. The question now is whether aid will shift to be more targeted towards Iraqis or whether it will eventually wither as world attention focuses on other crisis points because there are still large communities of Iraqis throughout the Middle East that need help.

SOURCES

Cohen, Robert, “Iraq’s Displaced: Where To Turn?” American University International Law Review, Fall 2008

Dagher, Sam, “In quieter Baghdad, perils still lurk,” Christian Science Monitor, 12/24/07

International Crisis Group, “Failed Responsibility: Iraqi Refugees In Syria, Jordan and Lebanon,” 7/10/08

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, “Middle East: Population Displaced from Iraq,” 4/29/10

IRIN, “MIDDLE EAST: Iraqi refugees – interpreting the statistics,” 12/28/10
- “SYRIA: Number of Iraqi refugees revised downwards,” 6/20/10

Refugees International, “Iraq: Preventing the Point of No Return,” 4/9/09

Seeley, Nicholas, “In Jordan, aid for Iraqi refugees is often redirected,” Christian Science Monitor, 7/2/08
- “The Politics of Aid to Iraqi Refugees in Jordan,” Middle East Report, Fall 2010

UNHCR Briefing Notes, “Iraq: Latest return survey shows few intending to go home soon,” UNHCR, 4/29/08

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Syria Update on Iraqi Refugees,” February 2007

United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1770 (2007),” 1/14/08

United States Government Accountability Office, “Iraqi Refugee Assistance Improvements Needed in Measuring Progress, Assessing Needs, Tracking Funds, and Developing an International Strategic Plan,” April 2009