Iraq’s Pro-Iran Resistance Continue Attacks Upon Neighbors

  

New Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has promised to bring all weapons under state control but the pro-Iran Resistance is not only being defiant but threatening Iraq’s relations with its neighbors.

Iran War Day 37: Paradox Of Iraqi Oil Passing Through Strait Of Hormuz While Oil Sites Attacked

  

The weekend marked a paradox in Iranian strategy towards Iraq. On the one hand there were a series of attacks upon the Iraqi oil industry and on the other a tanker with Iraqi petroleum passed through the Strait of Hormuz after Tehran said Baghdad would be exempt from its blockade.

Iran And Its Iraqi Allies Have A Strategy For The War Where Is America and Israel's?

   

As the Iran War enters its second month Iran and its allies’ strategy has become apparent. They are focusing upon Iraq’s oil industry, the Kurds, the Baghdad Airport and neighboring countries. The Americans and Israel on the other hand don’t appear to have any plan.

Iraq’s Resistance Claims Multiple Attacks Upon Jordanian Bases

  

Plenty happened in Iraq over the past three days due to the Iran War. That included multiple attacks upon Jordanian airbases by the pro-Iran Resistance to the U.S. or Israel hitting members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) again.

Iraq Running Out Of Money Due To Iran War

  

The Financial Times reported on the economic crisis that the Iran War is causing for Iraq. It said that Baghdad has lost around $5.4 billion since the start of the conflict and it only has 1-2 months worth of cash to cover government salaries. The Central Bank on the other hand said its reserves could cover 12 months worth of oil exports. The problem is by law the bank can’t cover the government’s budget so it has to issue bonds or some other means to provide money. Government salaries and benefits are the largest part of the budget because adding public workers is the main means that the ruling parties have to maintain their support. Before the war Baghdad was running into problems meeting its obligations because of low oil prices. Now it is barely making any money with the Strait of Hormuz closed.

Review Cairo 1921, Ten Days That Made the Middle East

Faught, C. Brad, Cairo 1921, Ten Days That Made the Middle East, Yale University Press, 2022

 

The 1921 Cairo conference held by British Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill helped create the modern Middle East. Borders were drawn, kings were installed, and a new policy of neo-colonialism was created. That’s what C. Brad Faught’s Cairo 1921, Ten Days That Made the Middle East focuses upon.

Review Martyrs’ Day, Chronicle of a Small War

Kelly, Michael, Martyrs’ Day, Chronicle of a Small War, New York: Vintage Books, 2001

 

Michael Kelly was a journalist who traveled throughout the Middle East during the Gulf War. His book, Martyrs’ Day, Chronicle of a Small War reads like a travel journal. It is full of all the places he went from Iraq to Jordan to Israel to Egypt to Saudi Arabia to Turkey, the people he met and the adventures he had. There are some interesting parts like his interviews with Kuwaitis right after the Gulf War and Iraqis during the sanctions, but it is not essential reading. It’s more of a deep background book or for someone who wants a light read.

Iraq’s Electricity Minister Doesn’t Seem To Know What Self-Sufficiency Means

After signing deal to import electricity from Saudi Arabia Iraq's Electricity Min said Iraq might become self-sufficient in energy in a few years (Al Mada)

The Iraqi government has a history of overpromising and underdelivering. In July Electricity Minister Adil Karim provided the latest example. He said that Iraq might become self-sufficient in electricity by 2025 provided money and natural gas to fuel power plants was provided. He went on to say that Iraq might export energy to the Gulf States and Europe.

Review Iraq Under General Nuri, My Recollections of Nuri al-Said, 1954-1958

Gallman, Waldemar, Iraq Under General Nuri, My Recollections of Nuri al-Said, 1954-1958, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964

 

Iraq Under General Nuri, My Recollections of Nuri al-said, 1954-1958 was written by Waldemar Gallman who was the United States Ambassador to Iraq. The book covers the last years of Nuri al-Said who was the prime minister of Iraq thirteen times and a brief overview of the 1958 coup that overthrew his government and led to his death. Gallman has nothing but praise for Said. It’s interesting because this came at the height of the Cold War when America said it was fighting for freedom against the spread of Communism. Said didn’t really believe in democracy however and used authoritarian methods to rule and yet the ambassador thought that was fine because he considered Said a strong leader and a friend of Washington’s.

Review Hawker Hunters At War, Iraq and Jordan, 1958-1967

Cooper, Tom and Salti, Patricia, Hawker Hunters At War, Iraq and Jordan, 1958-1967, West Midlands: Helion & Company, 2016

Hawker Hunters At War not only covers the British Hawker Hunter in Iraqi and Jordanian service, but the history of the two air forces, and their involvement in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Like others in Hellion’s Middle East at War series there are tons of pictures and first-hand accounts that bring the stories alive.

PATHE VIDEO: Emir Abdullah of Transjordan Visits Iraq 1941

VIDEO: Israel During Gulf War Operation Desert Shield 8/17/90

Despite Ups And Downs Iraq’s Oil Industry Sees Large Growth In 2012

Like every year Iraq’s oil output was up and down throughout 2012. Despite that, the country saw large gains overall. That included the highest production and exports in 30 years, and a huge increase in revenues. This was the result of the work of foreign companies operating in southern Iraq, the opening of two new mooring points that allowed for greater foreign sales, and continued tension in the Middle East that kept petroleum prices high.

Iraq ended on a down note in December. For the month, it exported an average of 2.35 million barrels a day. That was an 11% drop from November’s 2.62 million barrels. The southern pipeline exported an average of 2.022 million in December, down from 2.122 million the previous month. The northern pipeline saw a larger decline going from 426,600 barrels in November to 325,800 in December. 11,000 barrels was also trucked to Jordan a day. December’s decline was due to two main factors. First, bad weather again hit the port in Basra, which delays tankers from docking and loading their cargos. Second, the Kurds cut off their exports for the second time in 2012. Just like the last time, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) accused Baghdad of refusing to pay the companies that operate there for their costs. The central government was due to make a second payment of $296.6 million, but failed to deliver. Deputy Prime Minister Hussein Shahristani said that Kurdistan was not meeting its export quotas, which it was not, but the main issue was the unresolved conflict between the two over who has the authority to sign oil deals. In September, the two sides came to a new export deal, but it quickly broke down just as the previous two did, because of the outstanding issues between Baghdad and Irbil. The Kurds ended up stopping exports on December 21 as a result. Until those differences are resolved more of these short-term agreements will come and go. The problem of bad weather in the south has afflicted Iraq for decades, and requires a large investment in new infrastructure to overcome. Baghdad has that on its to do list, but has not done anything concrete about it yet.

To go along with the decrease in exports, Iraq’s oil also declined in price last month. For December, a barrel of Iraqi crude went for $103.72, down from $104.32 in November. This was part of a three-month decline in prices. As a result, Iraq earned $7.551 billion in December, compared to $8.2 billion in November, making it the fourth lowest monthly total for 2012.

Iraq Oil Exports And Profits 2011-2012

Month	Avg. Exports (Mil/ Bar/ Day)	Avg. Price Per Barrel	Revenue (Bil)
Jan. 11	2.16	$90.78	$6.082
Feb.	2.20	$98.44	$6.064
Mar.	2.15	$107.13	$7.167
Apr.	2.14	$114.26	$7.342
May	2.22	$108	$7.45
Jun.	2.27	$105.17	$7.173
Jul.	2.16	$108.79	$7.311
Aug.	2.18	$104.91	$7.124
Sep.	2.10	$104.89	$6.619
Oct.	2.08	$104.04	$6.742
Nov.	2.13	$106.59	$6.833
Dec.	2.14	$106.18	$7.061
2011 Avg.	2.16	$105.00	$6.913
Jan. 12	2.10	$109.08	$7.123
Feb.	2.01	$112.92	$6.595
Mar.	2.31	$117.99	$8.472
Apr.	2.50	$116.79	$8.795
May	2.45	$103.03	$7.831
Jun.	2.40	$90.09	$6.487
Jul.	2.51	$97.14	$7.577
Aug.	2.56	$106.22	$8.445
Sep.	2.59	$107.59	$8.371
Oct.	2.62	$105.51	$8.578
Nov.	2.62	$104.32	$8.200
Dec.	2.35	$103.72	$7.551
2012 Avg.	2.41	$106.20	$7.835

Oil Exports Through Basra 2012
January 1.711 mil/bar/day

February 1.639 mil/bar/day

March 1.917 mil/bar/day

April 2.115 mil/bar/day

May 2.086 mil/bar/day

June 2.085 mil/bar/day

July 2.216 mil/bar/day

August 2.252 mil/bar/day

September 2.178 mil/bar/day

October 2.172 mil/bar/day

November 2.122 mil/bar/day

December 2.022 mil/bar/day

Oil Exports Through Kirkuk 2012

January 393,500 bar/day

February 375,800 bar/day

March 400,000 bar/day

April 393,300 bar/day

May 364,500 bar/day

June 316,600 bar/day

July 300,000 bar/day

August 312,900 bar/day

September 420,000 bar/day

October 451,600 bar/day

November 426,600 bar/day

December 325,800 bar/day

In December, Iraq and Jordan also agreed to a new pipeline that would connect Iraq’s southern fields with the port of Aqaba on the Red Sea. At the same time, Baghdad said it would increase its exports to Jordan from 10,000 barrels a day to 15,000. That petroleum is used for domestic use in Jordan, and is extremely important to the local economy there. It is also sold at below market value to maintain good relations between the two countries. The plan for a new pipeline is part of Iraq’s attempt to decrease its dependence upon the port in Basra for the majority of its exports. The potential for conflict between the West and Iran remains high, and that could cut off shipping through the Persian Gulf, which could strangle Iraq’s economy. Baghdad is exploring other possible export routes as well.

For the year, Iraq reached some impressive benchmarks. First, in March, it produced over 3 million barrels of oil for the first time in 30 years. That was surpassed in September when it reached 3.2 million barrels. Exports saw a big increase as well, hitting an average of 2.565 million barrels a day in August, again a 30 year high. That mark was passed in October and November when Iraq reached 2.62 million barrels in exports. The major cause for the impressive numbers was the opening of two new mooring stations in the port of al-Faw in March and April. The lack of onshore pumping stations and other new pipelines are still an issue. For example, the two moorings can’t operate simultaneously, so even though they have a capacity of 850,000-900,000 barrels a day each, they can only work at half of that until new lines are built. Still, exports overall went up 11% for the year to 2.41 million barrels compared to 2011’s 2.16 million. Continued tensions in the Middle East and North Africa also kept prices high at an average of $106.20 per barrel for Iraqi crude, up from $105.00 in 2011. The results were record revenues going from $82.968 billion in 2011 to $94.025 billion in 2012. The future of prices this year is more uncertain. Countries that had drops because of their internal conflicts such as Libya are starting to pump more oil. At the same time sanctions against Iran have resulted in a major decline in their exports. There is also a conflict within OPEC over whether countries are overproducing, which could result in a drop in international prices. Iraq’s plans to continue to produce and export as much as possible could run into problems as a result. They could either continue to benefit from the high prices due to problems with Iran and other countries or their policy could contribute to their decline.

Iraq is slowly, but surely recovering from the negative effects of decades of wars and sanctions. 2012 was a notable year as the country returned to its petroleum production levels of the 1980s. This year it could even surpass those figures. There is still massive work ahead, especially in terms of infrastructure before it can reach its potential. The central government’s running war of words with Kurdistan over oil contracts will continue as well, but will have little impact upon overall numbers as the vast majority of oil is located in the south. Still, Kurdish exports can be expected to come and go through the northern pipeline for the foreseeable future. The real issue facing Iraq is the world energy market. If prices drop, Baghdad might be forced to re-think some of its short-term goals. The country has already begun to re-work deals with international countries to par down its strategic production goals. Further cuts may come otherwise Iraq could end up hurting itself by pushing exports during a time when the market is being flooded with oil from other producers.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Bad weather, dispute with Kurdish region weigh on Iraq oil exports,” 1/21/13

- “Iraq agrees to extend oil pipeline through Jordan,” 12/24/12

- “Iraq oil exports highest in 30 years,” 9/1/12

Ajrash, Kadhim and Razzouk, Nayla, “Iraq Kurds Halt Crude Exports, Central Government Official Says,” Bloomberg, 12/24/12

Bakr, Amena and Mackey, Peg, “Iraq-Saudi OPEC standoff over next oil curbs,” Reuters, 12/12/12

Dow Jones, “Iraq December Oil Exports Down 11% On Month,” 1/7/13

Hafidh, Hassan, “Iraq Oil Sales Revenue Falls In November, Up On Year,” Dow Jones, 12/4/12

Hatcher, Jane, “Iraq oil exports bring in over 8bln in USD in November: statement,” Xinhua, 12/25/12

Mohammed, Aref, “Iraq south oilfields to pump 2.75 mbpd by end 2012,” Reuters, 4/20/12

Al Rafidayn, “Iraq says it obscures payments for Kurdish oil exports,” 12/22/12

Rasheed, Ahmed, “Iraq sees reaching 6 man bpd by 2017,” Reuters, 9/15/12

Republic of Iraq Ministry of Oil, “Iraq Crude Oil Exports – December 2012,” 1/21/13

Reuters, “Iraq says to withhold payments for Kurdish oil,” 12/21/12

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/12

VIDEO: Gulf War - Operation Desert Shield, 8/11/90

American Negligence In Iraq, Or How The United States Failed To Plan For Securing The Country: Part One Of A Two Part Interview With Jerry Burke, Former Advisor To The Baghdad Police And Interior Ministry

Jerry Burke in front of a destroyed Iraqi tank (Police Futurist)

In May 2003, Jerry Burke, who at the time was the head of the New England Institute of Law Enforcement Management, was asked if he would be interested in travelling to Baghdad to carry out an assessment of the Iraqi police. He took up the offer, and found a police force in utter disarray. Most of its officers had abandoned their posts, police stations were looted and burned, and the government was non-existent. The U.S. was wholly unprepared for such a situation. Instead of having a plan in place before the March 2003 invasion, Burke and his team found themselves analyzing the Iraqi police, so that a program could be put together to secure the country, which would take months to implement. The lack of adequate preparation set the stage for what Burke would face during his two tours in Iraq, first as part of a Justice Department Assessment Team in May 2003, then as an advisor to the Baghdad Police from May 2003 to June 2004, and finally as part of an assistance mission to the Iraqi Interior Ministry from March 2005 to February 2006.  During those years, he found a U.S. government that lacked the commitment to truly rebuild Iraq, which undermined the transition from a dictatorship to a democracy that Burke and others were working on. In the process, the rule of law was never fully established in Iraq. Burke later went on to work in Palestine and Afghanistan, and is currently serving as an advisor with a foreign police force in the Middle East.

1. You spent two tours in Iraq. What were the dates for those, and what were your duties?

The first tour started as an assessment, and evolved into my becoming the Senior U.S. Advisor to the Baghdad Police Chief. That tour went from May 15, 2003 to June 22, 2004. The second tour began less than a year later with an assignment as a National Security Advisor to the Iraq Ministry of Interior, specifically the Deputy Minister for Police Affairs.  That tour went from March 5, 2005 to February 22, 2006.

2. How did you end up being contacted to work in Iraq?

I was working as the Director of the New England Institute of Law Enforcement Management at Babson College under a contract with the New England Association of Chiefs of Police. A retired chief, working on a Security Sector Reform (SSR) project in Latin America, called and asked if I would be interested in going to Baghdad as part of the first U.S. Government combined Department of State/Department of Justice Assessment Team. 

3. Before you went to Iraq were you aware of any of the pre-war planning for the Iraqi police?

Before accepting the first assignment I was only casually aware of any pre-war planning from U.S. TV news. I had no knowledge of any Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) or Security Sector Reform (SSR) planning until after I accepted the contract offer.

4. Richard Mayer of the Justice Department came up with one plan to bring in 5,000 international police to help with the Iraqis. The White House vetoed that idea, because it didn’t want responsibility for running post-war Iraq. Do you think that sort of set the stage for the problems that the U.S. would later face when it did end up occupying Iraq for the next several years, and had to rebuild the police?

I met Dick Mayer during some of the pre-deployment meetings, and became somewhat familiar with his plan. During the run-up to deployment there wasn't enough time to become thoroughly familiar with it. The Mayer Plan was based on, and an extrapolation, of the Civilian Police missions in the Balkans with consideration of the Iraqi situation as it was understood. Subsequently, during the first months of deployment I became more familiar with the Mayer Plan. In my opinion, the Mayer Plan would have been an excellent plan to start with. The Mayer Plan would have been expensive, and at the time, Spring 03, there was no funding in either the State Department or Justice Department for any DDR or SSR programs. Our first contract was only a two-month contract as funds were found and transferred from other State and/or Justice programs. If I recall correctly, I had 5 or 6 small contracts during my first, thirteen month, tour. The Mayer Plan would have required hundreds of millions of dollars that simply were not available. In the long run however, the Mayer Plan may have been cheaper and more effective.

5. You arrived in Iraq just after the government had fallen. What did Baghdad physically look like at the time? Was there still looting going on? What was the mood of the Iraqis that you met with?

Most of the major looting was over by the time I got there. The looting that was still going on was mostly for scrap metal and used office furniture. Most of the combat damage was very localized and limited to the targets themselves. The accuracy of our cruise missiles and guided bombs is amazing. One interpreter told me stories of going up on his roof to watch cruise missiles fly by and then turn toward their targets.

Most of the Iraqis I met - most of whom were police, government employees, and Iraqis who came to work for Coalition components - were cautiously optimistic to skeptical. Most had a wait and see attitude even while cooperating with us. Most were confused by the obvious lack of a post-war plan. 

For the first few months, May through August 2003, the city was relatively quiet, and we had complete freedom of movement in Baghdad. I was able to visit many police stations, visited many Iraqi homes for dinner, and ate at many restaurants across the city. In August 2003, the Jordanian embassy was bombed twice, and then the United Nations HQ at the Canal Hotel in East Baghdad. Those were the first significant bombs of the insurgency.

6. How many people were in your team?

The US Criminal Justice Assessment Team consisted of 3 corrections executives, 6 police executives, about a dozen judicial officials such as former judges and prosecutors, and then some project managers, and office personnel. Through the course of the Summer and Fall of 2003, those numbers dwindled as individuals’ contracts expired. By October/November 2003, there were only 2 U.S. Police Advisors left in Baghdad. Additional Police Advisors did not arrive until December and January 2004. By June 2004, there were still less than 100 U.S. Police Advisors in country. At first, the Iraqis couldn't imagine how 6 police executives were going to reform the entire Iraqi Police Service in a country of 25 million people. Neither could we!

7. What were the major findings and recommendations of your assessment team?

I frequently joke, and say the Executive Summary of our assessment could simply have stated that, "the Iraqi Police need everything." Almost all of the police facilities including the eleven story Ministry of Interior building had been looted, ransacked, stripped of all doors, windows, furniture, electrical fixtures, and set on fire. In many places entire new facilities would need to be built. Almost all the former police vehicles had been stolen, often by the police themselves or destroyed. Almost all of their training under Saddam had been designed to defend and support the regime. Entire new recruit, supervisory, leadership, and specialized training curricula would need to be designed, developed, and delivered to thousands of policemen across the entire country. 

8. Were you happy with that early report?

Yes, I thought the report was professional and thorough, especially for the harsh and dangerous conditions under which it was written, and I am proud to have contributed to it.

9. How much of that report was acted upon?

The most important recommendation of the report, the size of the international police advisory mission was totally ignored. Everything else was dependent upon having the human assets available to do the work. Whether the decision not to follow that recommendation was made by Paul Bremer, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld or President George W. Bush himself is irrelevant - the administration failed to fulfill its responsibilities.

10. Do you think sending in an assessment team rather than trainers and advisers right away was a problem for the U.S. plans for Iraq’s police?

Sending just an Assessment Team was simply a delaying tactic for political inaction. The Assessment Team produced a report very similar to the Mayer Plan. Paul Bremer and others dramatically slashed the Assessment Team’s recommendations, down to a total recommended advisory contingent of 1,500 people. No more than 1,000 were to be Americans. The revised Assessment then formed the basis of a budget request sent to Congress. A supplemental budget to fund these advisors was passed by Congress in October 2003 five months after the Assessment Team arrived in Baghdad. The first group of 15 advisors arrived in December and another 24 in January 2004. By then we were so far behind the curve of the insurgency and Coalition mismanagement that it was impossible to catch up.

11. Just after you got to Iraq, Bernard Kerik, the former New York City police commissioner was placed in charge of rebuilding the Iraqi police. Did he achieve anything or was that all for show?

Bernie arrived a few weeks after we did and, from my perspective of working the streets of Baghdad and visiting several police stations every day, his impact was minimal. At first, his image as the "Police Commissioner of 9-11" grabbed everyone’s attention. What influence he had on Paul Bremer (CPA Administrator) I don't know, but things didn't get better during his brief three months in Baghdad. The few times I encountered him in the Republican Palace in the Green Zone he was accompanied by a New York Times reporter. The impression I got was that his time in Baghdad was just to pad his resume. 

12. What was the state of the Iraqi police under Saddam before the U.S. invasion?

The Iraqi Police Service was a typical military style organization with enlisted men and an officer corps. The officers were very proud of their heritage going back to a British style constabulary with a British Commissioner seconded from England prior to Saddam and the Ba'ath Party. Under Saddam and the Party, the police were gradually relegated to a lesser and lesser role as a variety of security agencies were created to protect the regime. Eventually, there would be nearly twenty such security agencies. During the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi Police became a refuge from military service against Iran for educated and politically connected Iraqis. All of the officers I met had the equivalent of at least a bachelor's degree.  Many had been educated or trained outside Iraq especially in former communist countries in Eastern Europe. By the time of the invasion in the spring of 2003, fear of encounters with other more powerful security agencies had led the police to adopt somewhat of a Fire Department attitude. That is, they were reluctant to leave the police stations unless directed by a judge or called by another agency for support. 

When we first visited the Police Academy in east Baghdad’s Rusafa District it had been totally looted and ransacked. Among the debris in some of the buildings, nearly a foot deep in some places, we found copies, English language copies, of FBI Law Enforcement Bulletins, a monthly official FBI publication. As we talked with the commanders in Baghdad we found they were eager to try to return to what they considered the 'glory days' of policing circa 1940s and 50s. 

13. Were former police officers allowed to return to their jobs?

In the early days, thousands of men arrived at the Baghdad Police Academy to return to duty. There was no way we, nor the U.S. Military Police (MP) could confirm that any of these men had been police officers before the war. There were no rosters of former policemen, and even if there were, they would have been in Arabic. The MPs had only a few Iraqi-American translators that could not be spared to review scattered documents and our team came in without any translators with the expectation of hiring local English speaking Iraqis. There simply were not enough American soldiers or civilian advisors to properly sort through the chaos. Remember, our original and primary mission was to conduct an assessment of the police and the criminal justice system, not to stand up a new Iraqi Police Service at that point in time. 

A few English speaking Iraqi men we believed (hoped) were former policemen helped sort through the confusion of thousands of former policemen returning to work. Under Saddam, the police wore military uniforms where only the rank insignia was a different color.  Transfers between the military, the police, and other uniformed agencies were common under Saddam. Undoubtedly, some former military or intelligence officers returned to work as police without our knowledge. Gradually, the remnants of the Baghdad Police returned to work, and a semblance of a police department began to form. Credit for this in Baghdad goes solely to the 18th Military Police Brigade and its Commanding Officer, Colonel Teddy Spain.

(An interview with Col. Ted Spain can be read here)

14. Was their any vetting of these returnees? Why or why not?

Very little vetting of the returning police was done. The priority was to stand up a new Iraqi Police Service (IPS), and let the Iraqis sort out the problems later. We were forced to rely upon Iraqis we learned to work with and to trust. There were no official documents that survived the looting and burning. Men returning presented old, poor quality identification cards, with old faded photographs, presumably of them when they were perhaps ten years younger. Occasionally, some officers would approach us and identify other men who they claimed were not real policemen. Whether these were legitimate complaints or personal vendettas was difficult to determine. 

Iraqi police at a graduation ceremony in Feb. 2012 (Reuters)

15. How about for the new recruits, was their background checks, etc.?

Again, the priority was to stand up a new national IPS consisting of thousands of policemen.  The initial goal in Baghdad was a force of 18,000 policemen. We, and by that I mean mostly the U.S. military across Iraq, would be forced to rely upon local, trusted Iraqis to verify and vouch for new recruits. Some recruitment standards such as height and weight were easy to verify, but other standards such as criminal background check, educational qualifications, and even someone's age were nearly impossible to verify. Local, sometimes self-identified community and religious leaders were used to help with this process. One story that I never had the time to confirm was that a new recruit sent to the Baghdad Airport to be sent to Jordan for training was discovered to have an artificial leg. Again, the attitude was to stand up a new IPS, and let the Iraqis sort it out later. 

16. Do you have any rough numbers on how many Iraqi police were on duty by the end of 2003?

I don't recall exactly, and the answer would depend on the definition of "on duty." There were probably 7,000-9,000 officers on the payroll in Baghdad. Who they were, where they worked, if they worked at all, was an Iraqi responsibility. The U.S. and Coalition military did not have enough men to conduct roll calls of the Iraqis. It almost sounds racist, but we were dealing with a homogeneous population of men with olive complexion, black hair, and a mustache. There were reportedly some men who were on the payroll under multiple names in different locations, and giving kickbacks to officers to keep their names on the payroll. Undoubtedly, there was a lot of nepotism, cronyism, and ghost employees throughout the IPS, but we did not have the resources or the time to investigate. 

17. When the Iraqi police returned to their jobs they were facing an almost insurmountable situation in the country with the growing insurgency and the emergence of the militias. Can you give any first hand accounts of what that early period was like for the police?

At the beginning in the spring of 2003, the violence was scattered, and relatively low level.    Sniping at U.S. and Coalition military, and Iraqi Police was common. There were some revenge and honor killings, kidnappings, torturing, and disappearances. Some police and government officials returning to work were assassinated. One colonel that worked with us was at a restaurant having coffee with friends when a man walked up to him, called him by name, and shot him three times killing him. During our first week in Baghdad, our hotel was the target of almost nightly harassing sniping. One afternoon while working on the mezzanine level of the hotel, I learned that I could still do the low crawl as our hotel was shot at around 2 o'clock in the afternoon. By September 2003, almost every Iraqi Police station had been the target of a serious attack by either small arms fire (AKs usually), rockets, mortars or car bombs. This would continue during the winter and into the spring and summer of 2004, and on into the insurgency in 2005 -2007.

18. Your group recommended 6,600 foreign advisers and trainers for the Iraqi police, but that never happened, why?

I suspect the reasons were several. First, the costs would have been very high. In 2003, there was very little money available for anything other than the military. The reputed dispute between Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell was also a significant factor. It appeared to us 'outsiders', civilian contractors, that career State Department officials were not going to 'play' in Iraq, and perhaps even wanted the Defense Department to fail. Even if the Assessment Report had been accepted in its entirety, it would have taken perhaps two years to fully implement. Recruiting, vetting, training, and deploying a contingent that large is no easy task. The political decision to transfer sovereignty to the Iraqis by June 2004, while very shortsighted, was a political expediency. The U.S. was not prepared - militarily, politically, strategically, tactically or psychologically for the commitment to rebuild Iraq as a true democracy. This was blatantly obvious with the structure of the Interim Iraqi Government drawn along sectarian lines by the Coalition under Bremer. We aided and abetted the ethnic tensions that emerged during the insurgency.

19. At most there were around 900-1000 American trainers for the Iraqi police, what were their main duties?

Most of the U.S. trainers functioned as Mobile Training Teams visiting police stations and other facilities, and conducting short in-service training programs. Others were assigned directly to a regional police academy. In many areas, the Mobile Teams lived on military Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), and were under the direct control of the U.S. military commander. For a variety of reasons, including operational security, most teams were outside the wire only 2 or 3 days a week, and limited to visiting 1 or 2 stations per day. A Mobile Team might have 20 or more police stations assigned to it, which meant they might only be able to visit a given police station once or twice a month. Especially, when you factor in individual's leave, Fridays as the Muslim equivalent of Sundays as a day off, various U.S. and Christian holidays (there are Iraqi Christians), and various Islamic holidays. Ramadan itself is 28 days long, and very few Iraqis or Muslims work more than a few hours in the daytime. There are two Eids or multi-day feasts, Eid al Fitr, immediately following Ramadan, and Eid al Adha that are sort of a combination of Easter, Thanksgiving, and Christmas. Then every meeting begins with an extended period of pleasantries and obligatory cups of chai, coffee or occasionally, an orange soda. It is considered rude to immediately begin talking about professional issues. For security reasons, most visits were unannounced to avoid ambushes, and attacks if the meeting was scheduled in advanced. With unannounced visits, you never knew who, if anyone, was going to be at the police station when you arrived. Some teams would go into lock-down for a week or two after a series of attacks in their area. Much of the training was uncoordinated and improvised, depending upon the situation-on-the-ground where each Team operated. In some situations, Mobile Teams would be pulled from their primary duties to provide security for other Teams. 

20. How did the lack of trainers affect the overall program to rebuild the Iraqi police?

In my opinion, after nearly eight years in the region, the Mobile Teams were effective when properly deployed - unfortunately, that was a rare occasion. That being said, the Mobile Teams were much more effective on a one-for-one basis than the military. What the military had, that the civilian trainers didn't have, was seemingly unlimited manpower. If necessary, the military could dedicate a squad or platoon into an area or to solve a problem. For example, there were more Military Police, not counting other military personnel, in Baghdad, at times by a factor of 2 or 3, than there were civilian trainers in all of Iraq. While many of the enlisted military personnel were young and inexperienced they made up for it in quantity. 

6,000 civilian trainers would have been much more effective than 20,000 - 30,000 military personnel.

21. Did these trainers have any knowledge of Iraq and the situation they were heading into? How did that affect their work?

Many of the civilian trainers (40-50%?) had previous international training experience in the Balkans, East Timor or Haiti. But almost none of them had any experience in an Arab/Muslim country. And, again, almost none had any experience in a hostile, non-permissive, combat environment. A stateside training program was developed, but it focused more on medical exams and firearms qualifications. Specific knowledge of Iraq was rare and came mostly from U.S. television or an individual's own initiative to Google it.

22. Were the Iraqis consulted about the American plans for the police?  How do you think that affected things?

At the beginning, and for quite awhile, there was no American plan, so, "No", the Iraqis were not consulted about "The Plan.” Much of the "Plan" came from individual's initiative (whether military or civilian) to adapt their prior training, education and, mostly, their experience to the Iraqi situation. A training program implemented at the Baghdad Police Academy might be totally different than programs implemented elsewhere in the country. For the first year or so, the Iraqi Police Commanders were gracious, understanding and even, sympathetic to the uncoordinated chaos in the whole reconstruction effort. By the time of the Transition to the Iraqi Interim Government in June 2004, the Iraqi Ministry of Interior was beginning to implement its own ideas of what the new police should look like.  Unfortunately, most of these new government officials had no frame-of-reference for policing in a democracy. Their only concept of policing came from Saddam-era Iraq, or their time in exile in totalitarian countries like Iran and Syria.

23. The U.S. Institute of Peace issued a report in August 2003 that said there needed to be reform in Iraq’s legal system. Did the Americans ever attempt that, and how successful were they?

At the beginning, in May 2003, the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training, sent an assessment team along with us. The Judicial Team continued in Iraq, and formed a joint Iraqi-International Regime Crimes Liaison Office to prosecute Saddam and others. The Judicial Team was hampered by a lack of properly trained, educated, and qualified Iraqi lawyers and judges. Most - nearly, all - lawyers and judges had been compromised by the Saddam regime and were complicit in the regime's excesses. Furthermore, the new government wanted to install its prosecutors and judges most of whom were equally unqualified and willing to commit its own excesses in the name of justice - or at least, in the name of revenge.

24. Robert Perito from the Institute of Peace did an interview with PBS’ Frontline that aired in Oct. 03. He said that he didn’t think the U.S. was really committed to training the police. Did you feel that way yourself?

I know Bob Perito, and admire his work. The vast majority of the individuals that I met, whether military, U.S. government employees or civilian contractors, were dedicated and committed to their missions. The most frequent refrain that I heard was, "Is this the best that the American government can do?" To that point, the U.S. government, or more correctly, the Administration at that time was not committed to the police training mission or any other aspect of the reconstruction effort.

25. The training mission was originally supposed to be a civilian affair, but was taken over by the military. Why did that happen?

Neither the State Department nor the Justice Department had the inherent resources for a mission on the scale of Iraq. Neither had the management resources to plan, organize, and coordinate such a project. Neither had the life support capability or experience, not the air or ground transportation assets or even the communications capability to communicate in-country. All of these responsibilities would have to be contracted out, as some were, through normal U.S. government contracting procedures. For better or worse, the U.S. military is able to deploy thousands of personnel and hundreds of pieces of equipment and be operational in 24-48 hours. 

26. You were deeply critical of this move, can you explain why.

The U.S. military did not, and still does not, have the capability and capacity or expertise to train, educate, and monitor a civilian, Rule-of-Law, ministerial (i.e., national) level criminal justice program. But, the military was on the ground in Baghdad early. State and Justice were not able to effectively deploy a significant number of civilian advisors and trainers for almost a year. There was a programmatic leadership vacuum, and the U.S. military does not tolerate leadership vacuums.

27. Jordan was eventually brought in to help as well. What was their role, and were they effective?

The impact of the war on Jordan was almost immediate and significant. Early in 2003, the increase in traffic to and from Jordan was dramatic. It seemed like dozens of auto-carrier trucks were coming into Baghdad from Jordan every day. The floodgates of commerce brought all kinds of modern consumer goods that had been previously banned. Particularly, electronic goods like mobile phones, satellite dishes, and computers. Traffic going into Jordan was mostly former regime officials fleeing from the Coalition, and the Shia militias. Even regular Iraqis who had been denied permission to leave Iraq were now leaving. 

The security situation in Iraq became too dangerous to conduct police recruit training in-country so Jordan was selected. Jordan became the site of a large construction project to build an International Police Training Center known as JIPTC. Thousands of Iraqi recruits were in training at this facility at any one time for a period of about four years. I believe the capacity was about 4,000 recruits at one time. Today, JIPTC is still in use training other Arab recruits. A professional quality Jordanian police training cadre has been developed over the nearly ten years JIPTC has been operational.

28. In 2004, General Petraeus took over the Iraqi training mission.  What did you think about his job?

General Petraeus was a larger than life figure during his tours in Iraq. Although he is not a trainer or educator by military specialty, he is a generalist, and an exceptional leader and manager to motivate others to perform to his expectations. Other generals, equally qualified by training, education and experience, failed in much less demanding positions.

29. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction recently issued an audit of the U.S. police training mission, and said one of the problems with the military running it was that each time a new unit rotated into Iraq they would basically start from scratch, which led to no consistency. Was that apparent while you were in Iraq?

That was a serious problem especially with the U.S. military more so than other nations. From discussions with U.S. military and civilians it appears that an Officer's Evaluation Report (OER) has a lot to do with it. Officers seem to get higher ratings if they initiate, innovate, create or otherwise show some leadership or more accurately, pseudo-leadership. This problem went right to the top of the military as each general tried to implement his ideas. This is further complicated by the aggressive, Can-Do military attitude where actions are often impulsive and not well thought out. No on in the U.S. military ever says to a superior officer, “No, we can’t do that,” even if that task is immoral, foolish, or just plain wrong.

A classic example of this was the police training in late 2003, especially police recruit training. There were less than 50 U.S. civilian police trainers in the country - most having arrived in December 2003. Recruiting standards and procedures were still being developed. Repairs had just begun at police academies around the country. The political decision had been made, ready or not, to transition governmental control to the Iraqis in June 2004, yet there was no functioning Ministry of Interior, and a barely functioning police department in Baghdad. Police academies were targets of frequent attacks, and the decision was made to train new recruits outside of Iraq in a controlled and safe environment. The decision was to build a new training center in Jordan. Construction began around October 2003, and the facility was barely functioning at a minimal capacity by January 2004. The Coalition Provisional Authority and the Department of Defense were frustrated with the slow pace of the police training program. 

The U.S. military, then under the command of Lt. General Ricardo Sanchez, announced a plan to hire 30,000 new police recruits in 30 days. This plan was so impractical as to be ridiculous. It would be impossible to even forcibly round up 30,000 Iraqi men in 30 days. It would have been impossible to implement any recruitment standards at all. Even worse, there would have been no way to screen out potential insurgents and saboteurs.

Then it got even worse when they ran the number for the 30,000, the recruit training would still fall short of the military's goal. So they raised the numbers to 60,000 in 60 days! Double the foolishness.

30. Was the military the one that pushed for the creation of the paramilitary Iraqi National Police?

The Iraqi Police had always been a national force with standards, training, policy, and funding coming from the central government. But in reality there was decentralized control with provincial governors and mayors of larger cities exercising substantial local autonomy, as long as it didn't interfere with the regime's (Saddam's) plans. In one city, al-Hillah I believe, where the U.S. military appointed a new police chief, and the local mayor using his legal authority appointed a different police chief. Local officials, civic and police were reluctant to cooperate with the U.S. military beyond their local jurisdiction. The U.S. military needed a police force that it could deploy regardless of municipal or provincial boundaries.  The response was to create two new police forces along European and U.S. models.  The European model was a third force (special police) concept of an Iraqi gendarmerie or carabinieri along a more paramilitary and less civil, rule of law model. The U.S. model was an Iraqi Highway Patrol. The Highway Patrol was original designed to assist U.S. military units with convoy escort duties that crossed provincial boundaries. 

Neither force fit within the Iraqi concept of policing nor within the Iraqi legal code. These two police forces would be problems for years.  Of the two, the Special Police were the worst.

31. You were very critical of that move at the time, what was the basis of your complaints?

My opposition to these two new police forces was that they were accountable only to the U.S. military, and were often counter-productive to establishing a Rule-of-Law, criminal justice system in Iraq.

32. In 2004 the insurgents and Sadrists launched several major offensives. During each one of those there were reports that the Iraqi police abandoned their posts in several cities throughout the country.  What was the reaction in Baghdad to that?

No civil, Rule-of-Law police agency anywhere is prepared for combat. The proper agency for that in the Iraqi context would have been the Iraqi Army, but we all know what Bremer did with the Army.  The Iraqi Police were not trained or equipped for combat. 

33. The response in the U.S. seemed to be that this was a sign of the failure of the U.S. to rebuild the Iraqi police. Did you agree with that?

No. Even in Northern Ireland, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was not prepared for a military counter-insurgency role. The RUC would frequently assign one or two officers to patrol with a squad or more of British soldiers. No police should be prepared for a military counter-insurgency role. The failure was not in rebuilding the Iraq Police, the failure was the decision to disband the Iraqi Army - an overt political decision.

34. What was your impression of how the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) did things?

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was an unmitigated disaster. Many of the people in the CPA came with neo-conservative political agendas. I can't tell you how many times in military, police, and security briefings I heard the phrase, "To create a free market economy,” as one of the goals. The irony was that many CPA officials would have been for small, decentralized, states rights style government back home, but were trying to build a large, strong centralized government in Iraq. Also, many of the, I don't know what else to call them, young kids in their 20s, came with recommendations from the Heritage Foundation, and other conservative organizations. Many were just out of college or were taking a gap year to have an adventure in Baghdad. Most of them would have been doing unpaid internships if it weren't for Iraq. 

35. The CPA came up with a plan to disband Iraq’s militias and integrate them into the security forces. Did you know about those? Do you have any ideas for why that plan failed? 

I think you're referring to CPA Order 91 that was issued in June 2004, just before the transition of control to the Iraqi Interim Government. Order 91 was issued on June 7, 2004, and the Transition took place on June 28, 2004. The Order appeared to be an afterthought, and a form of plausible deniability. At best, it served as guidance for the new Iraqi government, at worst, as proved the case, the new Iraqi government essentially ignored it except when it was to their internal domestic political advantage against Muqtada al-Sadr or Sunni groups.

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