Security Slightly Improved In Iraq In 2011

2011 just came to a close, and the end of the year statistics for deaths and attacks in Iraq showed a slight improvement from the previous year. The number of casualties, attacks, and averages all went down from 2010 to 2011. Baghdad and the surrounding provinces remained the center of violence in the country, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were the weapons of choice for militants. All of this showed the changed security situation in Iraq. No longer is the country in the middle of a civil war. In fact, it’s barely an insurgency anymore, but more of a major terrorist threat. The situation may improve even more this coming year, as some groups appear willing to give up their arms now that the United States has withdrawn its forces.

Death statistics in Iraq were lower in 2011 compared to the previous two years. In 2011, there was an average of 299 deaths per month, and 9.8 per day. That was down from 350 per month and 11.5 per day in 2010 and 347 a month in 2009 and 11.4 in 2009. The three main agencies that track Iraqi casualties had divergent totals for the year. Iraq Body Count had deaths slightly up from 4,045 in 2010 to 4,125 in 2011. The other two groups, the United Nations and the Iraqi ministries saw declines. The U.N. recorded 4,855 deaths in 2010, going down to 4,056 in 2011. The Iraqi ministries’ deaths were cut in half from 3,713 in 2010 to 1,591 in 2011. The Iraqi government’s figures have been consistently lower than other counts. Whether that’s because officials had not finished their tallies by the time they had to report at the end of each month, or they were told to keep their numbers down for political reasons is unknown. Despite the large number of bombs that went off in Baghdad on December 22, which gave the impression that the security situation in Iraq was deteriorating, it was actually getting better overall. The averages for casualties by month and by the day were down nearly 15% from 2010 to 2011.

Comparing Deaths In Iraq 2009-2011

Month	Iraq Body Count	Iraqi Ministries	United Nations	Avg. Monthly Deaths	Avg. Daily Deaths
Jan.	387	259	265	303	9.7
Feb.	250	167	267	228	8.1
Mar.	307	247	268	274	8.8
Apr.	285	211	279	258	8.6
May	378	177	319	291	9.3
Jun.	385	271	424	360	12.0
Jul.	305	259	381	315	10.1
Aug.	398	239	455	364	11.7
Sep.	394	185	405	328	10.9
Oct.	355	258	416	343	11.0
Nov.	272	187	264	241	8.0
Dec.	409	155	313	292	9.4
TOTALS	4,125	1,591	4,056	-	-
2011 Mo. Avg.	343	217	338	299	9.8
2010 Mo. Avg.	337	309	404	350	11.5
2009 Mo. Avg.	392	291	358	347	11.4

There was also a reduction in attacks in Iraq in 2011. According to the United Nations, there were a total of 5,470 security incidents in 2011, for an average of 455.8 per month. In 2009, there were a total of 8,909 attacks, and a monthly average of 742.4, while in 2010, there were 9,213 incidents, breaking down to 742.4 per month. For 2011, the main device used in these operations was the improvised explosive device (IED). IEDs were used 3,624 times last year, 66% of all attacks. After that the other means were far less frequent with small arms fire being second with 892, 16% of the total, followed by 530 indirect fire incidents using rockets and mortars, 9%, 259 sticky and car bombs, 4%, 135 grenades, 2%, and 30 rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), 0.5%. The use of IEDs has been the modus operandi of militants for the last two years. Before that, car bombs and small arms fire played a larger role in their operations. That shows a change in tactics, as insurgents and militias are using smaller bombs, and more indirect tactics. The overall numbers for attacks, also showed a rough correlation with the number of deaths the country has faced, as both went down in 2011. Security incidents on average dropped 311 per month from 2010 to 2011, a 40% decline.

Total Number Of Attacks In Iraq 2009-2010

2009: 8,909 attacks, avg. 742.4 per month

2010: 9,213 attacks, avg. 767.7 per month

2011: 5,470 attacks, avg. 455.8 per month

Most of 2011’s attacks were concentrated in central Iraq, with far fewer in the rest of the country. Baghdad had 1,801 attacks, accounting for 32% of the total. Ninewa was second at 803, then Salahaddin with 695, Diyala with 551, Anbar with 419, followed by Tamim 417, Babil 283, Basra 125, Wasit and Qadisiyah with 83, Maysan with 70, Dhi Qar with 68, Karbala with 33, Sulaymaniya with 18, Najaf with 14, Muthanna had 4, Irbil had 3, and Dohuk 1. The southern and northern governorates accounted for just over 7% of attacks. Baghdad has always been at the center of the conflict in Iraq as it has the largest population, and is the seat of government. The surrounding provinces, Ninewa, Salahaddin, Diyala, Anbar, Tamim, and Babil either have mixed populations of Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds like Ninewa and Diyala, which militants are trying to exploit, or had large number of Baathists and former soldiers such as Salahaddin and Anbar. These elements are still playing out it in the country, although at lower levels than before as already noted.

Attacks In Iraq By Province 2011

Baghdad 1,800 – 32%

Ninewa 803 – 14%

Salahaddin 695 – 12%

Diyala 551 – 10%

Anbar 419 – 7%

Tamim 417 – 7%

Babil 283 – 5%

Basra 125 – 2%

Wasit 83 – 1%

Qadisiyah 83 – 1%

Maysan 70 – 1%

Dhi Qar 68 – 1%

Karbala 33 – 0.6%

Sulaymaniya 18 – 0.3%

Najaf 14 – 0.2%

Muthanna 4 – 0.007%

Irbil 3 – 0.005%

Dohuk 1 – 0.001%

During the course of 2011, deaths and attack did not always correlate, because a few well planned mass casualty bombings could keep the former high. In April for instance, there was an average of 258 deaths and 486 attacks. The next month both went up to 291 deaths and 581 attacks. In June, there were almost as many incidents at 576, but deaths jumped to 360, because of four mass casualty attacks that month. On June 3, a bomb went off outside a mosque in Tikrit, Salahaddin, killing 19. When the victims were taken to a local hospital, and officials went to visit them, a suicide bomber attacked the facility killing another 17. On June 21, 27 were killed outside the governor’s residence in Diwaniya, Qadisiyah, by a number of suicide car bombs. Then two days later, a series of bombs went off in a market in Jihad Shurt al-Rabaa in southwestern Baghdad, killing 34. In July and August, attacks went down to 433 and 389 respectively, while casualties remained high at 315 and 364. Again, a few deadly bombings led to a large number of deaths in August. By the end of the year, deaths were going down from 343 in October, to 241 in November, and 292 in December, while attacks remained high at 438, 536, and 422 respectively. 

Details Of Attacks And Deaths In Iraq 2011 (Deaths: Iraq Body Count/Attacks: U.N.)

January 2011
 Deaths, Attacks, Types

	Deaths	Attacks
Anbar	8	34
Babil	3	15
Baghdad	125	180
Diyala	36	45
Dohuk	3	-
Irbil	1	1
Karbala	89	8
Maysan	2	6
Ninewa	34	53
Salahaddin	74	31
Tamim	8	13
Wasit	3	1
Qadisiyah	0	19
Basra	0	5
Dhi Qar	0	4
Muthanna	0	1
TOTAL	386	416
Type		Number
IEDs		246
Small Arms Fire		67
Sticky/Car Bombs		48
Indirect Fire		45
Grenades		6
RPGs		4

February 2011

Deaths, Attacks, Types

	Deaths	Attacks
Anbar	41	38
Babil	6	13
Baghdad	24	107
Basra	2	8
Diyala	22	36
Irbil	3	-
Karbala	1	2
Ninewa	36	49
Qadisiyah	4	5
Salahaddin	67	52
Sulaymaniya	10	3
Tamim	28	33
Wasit	4	4
Dhi Qar	0	6
Maysan	0	2
TOTAL	249	358
Type		Number
IEDs		199
Indirect Fire		57
Small Arms Fire		57
Stick/Car Bombs		36
Grenades		5
RPGs		4

March 2011

Deaths, Attacks, Types

	Deaths	Attacks
Anbar	28	60
Babil	24	22
Baghdad	63	229
Basra	10	9
Dhi Qar	1	6
Diyala	23	52
Maysan	2	7
Najaf	2	2
Ninewa	60	76
Qadisiyah	1	13
Salahaddin	79	43
Sulaymaniya	2	-
Tamim	11	37
Wasit	1	8
Muthanna	0	1
TOTAL	305	565
Type		Number
IEDs		381
Small Arms Fire		78
Indirect Fire		68
Grenades		24
Sticky/Car Bombs		12
RPGs		2

April 2011

Deaths, Attacks, Types

	Deaths	Attacks
Anbar	43	45
Babil	13	14
Baghdad	60	170
Dhi Qar	1	5
Diyala	75	32
Maysan	2	11
Ninewa	46	61
Qadisiyah	1	6
Salahaddin	13	41
Sulaymaniya	1	1
Tamim	25	50
Wasit	4	12
Basra	0	14
Najaf	0	8
Karbala	0	4
Muthanna	0	2
TOTAL	193	486
Type		Number
IEDs		335
Small Arms Fire		68
Indirect Fire		63
Grenades		9
Sticky/Car Bombs		6
RPGs		5

May 2011

Deaths, Attacks, Types

	Deaths	Attacks
Anbar	51	57
Babil	41	24
Baghdad	101	229
Basra	1	16
Dhi Qar	12	3
Diyala	27	38
Irbil	1	1
Karbala	3	-
Muthanna	1	-
Ninewa	51	68
Qadisiyah	4	9
Salahaddin	25	65
Sulaymaniya	1	-
Tamim	49	45
Wasit	1	9
Maysan	0	17
TOTAL	371	581
Type		Number
IEDs		398
Small Arms Fire		81
Indirect Fire		74
Grenades		12
Sticky/Car Bombs		9
RPGs		7

June 2011

Deaths, Attacks, Types

	Deaths	Attacks
Anbar	33	41
Babil	31	34
Baghdad	116	202
Basra	2	35
Diyala	34	53
Ninewa	80	79
Qadisiyah	27	12
Salahaddin	55	54
Tamim	10	31
Wasit	1	12
Dhi Qar	0	18
Maysan	0	4
Sulaymaniya	0	1
TOTAL	384	576
Type		Number
IEDs		365
Small Arms Fire		95
Indirect Fire		74
Sticky/Car Bombs		22
Grenades		18
RPGs		2

July 2011

Deaths, Attacks, Types

	Deaths	Attacks
Anbar	22	28
Babil	8	25
Baghdad	52	122
Dhi Qar	1	14
Diyala	49	64
Dohuk	1	1
Karbala	14	9
Maysan	3	5
Ninewa	55	53
Salahaddin	59	29
Tamim	33	42
Wasit	1	16
Basra	0	14
Qadisiyah	0	8
Sulaymaniya	0	3
TOTAL	300	433
Type		Number
IEDs		273
Small Arms Fire		86
Indirect Fire		36
Sticky/Car Bombs		28
RPGs		6
Grenades		4

August 2011

Deaths, Attacks, Types

	Deaths	Attacks
Anbar	14	28
Babil	23	28
Baghdad	49	103
Basra	4	5
Diyala	75	63
Irbil	1	-
Karbala	8	1
Najaf	8	3
Ninewa	37	51
Salahaddin	11	36
Sulaymaniya	3	3
Tamim	11	55
Wasit	41	7
Maysan	0	3
Qadisiyah	0	2
Dhi Qar	0	1
TOTAL	305	389
Type		Number
IEDs		253
Small Arms Fire		66
Indirect Fire		31
Sticky/Car Bombs		29
Grenades		10

September 2011

Deaths, Attacks, Types

	Deaths	Attacks
Anbar	71	20
Babil	31	24
Baghdad	71	60
Diyala	56	36
Irbil	3	-
Karbala	18	5
Ninewa	42	63
Qadisiyah	5	5
Salahaddin	51	30
Sulaymaniya	2	2
Tamim	19	18
Maysan	0	8
Wasit	0	5
Dhi Qar	0	4
TOTAL	389	280
Type		Number
IEDs		171
Small Arms Fire		71
Grenades		16
Sticky/Car Bombs		11
Indirect Fire		11

October 2011

Deaths, Attacks, Types

	Deaths	Attacks
Anbar	24	30
Babil	5	20
Baghdad	175	114
Diyala	28	63
Karbala	1	4
Ninewa	92	75
Qadisiyah	2	2
Salahaddin	12	59
Tamim	6	28
Wasit	3	5
Basra	0	15
Maysan	0	7
Dhi Qar	0	3
Irbil	0	1
Najaf	0	1
Sulaymaniya	0	1
TOTAL	348	428
Type		Number
IEDs		258
Small Arms Fire		118
Indirect Fire		26
Sticky/Car Bombs		19
Grenades		7

November 2011

Deaths, Attacks, Types

	Deaths	Attacks
Anbar	23	21
Babil	10	11
Baghdad	69	89
Basra	35	2
Diyala	27	34
Ninewa	54	119
Salahaddin	37	229
Tamim	8	25
Dhi Qar	0	2
Qadisiyah	0	2
Sulaymaniya	0	1
Wasit	0	1
TOTAL	241	536
Type		Number
IEDs		451
Small Arms Fire		44
Indirect Fire		26
Sticky/Car Bombs		12
Grenades		3

December 2011

Deaths, Attacks, Types

	Deaths	Attacks
Anbar	28	17
Babil	31	43
Baghdad	156	195
Basra	2	2
Diyala	45	35
Dohuk	1	-
Ninewa	77	56
Salahaddin	22	26
Sulaymaniya	2	3
Tamim	22	40
Wasit	0	3
Dhi Qar	0	2
TOTAL	387	422
Type		Number
IEDs		294
61		71
Sticky/Car Bombs		27
Grenades		21
Indirect Fire		19

With the United States having withdrawn its ground forces in December, some militant groups are coming forward to join the political process, which could continue the improvement in the country’s security situation in the new year. At the end of December, an adviser to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said that two of the largest Iranian-backed Special Groups, the League of the Righteous and the Hezbollah Brigades were ready to join the reconciliation process and politics. (1) Just a few days later, the head of the League, Qais Khazali announced that with the United States forces out of Iraq, there was no longer a need for armed resistance. He went on to state that his group was ready to join politics, but that they may not lay down their weapons right away. Then just before the end for the year, the Reconciliation Minister went on to tell the press that six insurgent groups were also giving up their fight after the U.S. withdrawal. That included the Islamic Army and members of Ansar al-Sunna. That left a few other small insurgent groups left, and Al Qaeda in Iraq and the Baathist Naqshibandi group, which Baghdad refuses to negotiate with. With the groups coming forward to talk with the government there could be another decline in violence in 2012.

Overall, security was better off in Iraq in 2011 compared to the previous years. Both attacks and deaths saw a steady decline from 2010. It’s important to look at the overall trends in security going on within the country, because Al Qaeda will continue with their media grabbing attacks at least once a month. That often gives the impression that Iraq is unraveling, but taking those events in context, shows that the insurgents are actually in the decline. Hopefully, with the departure of the U.S., more militants will lay down their arms, and join politics, as happened during the 2009 provincial elections, and Iraq can be even more secure in the coming years. 

FOOTNOTES

1. Radio Nawa, “Hezbollah Brigades and the League of the Righteous Andon today under the banner of national reconciliation,” 12/24/11 

SOURCES

Zahra, Hassan Abdul, “Iraqi Shiite militia ‘ready to lay down arms,’” Agence France Presse, 12/26/11

Gutman, Roy and Issa, Sahar, “Car bombs kill 65 in Baghdad, worsening crisis,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/22/11

Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Security in Iraq,” United Nations

Iraq Body Count

Al-Mawsawi, Ali, “Six armed groups lay down arms in Iraq,” Azzaman, 1/1/12

National Iraqi News Agency, “Sadr accuses “Asa’ib Ahil al-Haq” of being ‘Seat lovers’, describes them of being killers,” 12/27/11

Radio Nawa, “Hezbollah Brigades and the League of the Righteous Andon today under the banner of national reconciliation,” 12/24/11

Reuters, “Iraqi civilian deaths in December lowest level in 2011,” 1/1/12

Yasin, Nazim, “Outcome of the violence in Iraq for 2011 show declining numbers of victims,” Radio Free Iraq, 1/1/12

Zahra, Hassan Abdul, “Iraqi Shiite militia ‘ready to lay down arms,’” Agence France Presse, 12/26/11

December 22, 2011, Deadliest Day In Baghdad Since Beginning Of The Year

On December 22, 2011, a series of bombs went off across Baghdad early in the morning as people were going to work. The blasts lasted for two hours, and hit different parts of the city. Only one was near a government building, with the rest concentrated in civilian areas. Al Qaeda’s front group the Islamic State of Iraq took responsibility for the attacks that left nearly 275 casualties. That was the deadliest day in the capital since the very beginning of the year.

In a short two-hour period in mid-December, seventeen explosions rocked Iraq’s capital Baghdad. It all started at 6:30 am, as people were heading to their jobs. A total of 10 improvised explosive devices (IEDs), five car bombs, 1 sticky bomb, and a katyusha rocket devastated parts of the capital. Two IEDs went off near a garage in central Baghdad, two more were planted near a primary school in Abu Disheer, southwestern Baghdad. A fifth IED went off in the Bayaa district in central Baghdad. The sixth struck a vegetable market in the Amin district of eastern Baghdad. There was an additional IED near the Diyala Bridge in southeastern Baghdad, two more in the Shula district of eastern Baghdad, and the tenth was aimed at the motorcade of the deputy governor of the Central Bank of Iraq as he travelled through northern Baghdad’s Wahiriya. A sticky bomb attached to a car detonated in Bab al-Maotham, and a katyusha rocket fell on a battery factory in northern Baghdad’s Adhamiya. The car bombs were the deadliest, with two going off near the Tabaqayn Bridge in the center of the city, one in the Amil district of southern Baghdad, a fourth in the Shab district in the north, and the bloodiest one placed near the Christian Nuns Hospital and the Integrity Commission’s headquarters in the Karrada district of central Baghdad that left at least 49 casualties. The security forces found an additional six other booby-trapped car bombs that were either disarmed or had controlled detonations. Early totals had 75 dead, and 182 wounded in the wake of this carnage. All of these areas were civilian ones, with the exception of the bombing outside the Integrity Commission building. That shows that, while militants wanted to make an audacious statement with the width of their operations in a short period of time, they were careful not to go after heavily guarded areas where security would be much tighter. Instead, they targeted a series of soft targets meant to maim and kill as many innocent bystanders as possible. The press also played up the fact that most of these areas were Shiite, but Sunni areas were bombed as well, showing that civilians, regardless of sect, were the intended victims.

Scenes Of December 22's Violence In Baghdad

Shula district in eastern Baghdad (Reuters)

Central Baghdad bombing (Reuters)

Car bomb in central Baghdad (Reuters)

Another car bomb in northern Baghdad's Shab (Reuters)

Another scene from Shab (Reuters)

The deadliest bombing was in the Karrada district (AP)

Map of the bombings (BBC)

Al Qaeda’s front organization, the Islamic State of Iraq eventually took responsibility for all of this death. On December 27, they issued a statement on an Islamist website saying that they were behind all the bombings. The organization said that they were striking against the Shiite led government, while the Baghdad Operations Command said that the militants were trying to re-ignite the sectarian war. A few days before Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki accused members of the security forces of being involved. Allegedly four officers were arrested. It’s widely believed that the Islamists have thoroughly infiltrated the Iraqi police and army, and use these undercover agents to assist their operations. It was also no surprise that Al Qaeda was accountable since they are the only militant group that carries out these types of attacks.

This was the deadliest day in the capital since January. On January 27, 72 people were killed by five bombs that occurred in many of the same neighborhoods as December’s attacks. Those included one death by a roadside bomb targeting an army patrol in Bab al-Maotham, one killed by a roadside bomb aimed at a Finance Ministry convoy in Washiriya northeast Baghdad, two deaths from a roadside bomb going after a police patrol in southern Baghdad, two killed on a bus with a sticky bomb attached in al-Jihad southwest Baghdad, topped off by 65 deaths at a funeral in Shula, northwest Baghdad. Like the December 22 events, all of these bombings took place in civilian areas, although the security forces and public officials were targeted.

Looking back over the entire year, Al Qaeda usually carries out at least one of these media grabbing, mass casualty attacks each month. In January, they had three assaults, killing 65 police recruits in Salahaddin, and 79 Shiite pilgrims heading for Karbala in two separate bombings. In February, a suicide bomber killed 37 Shiite pilgrims in a bus heading for the shrine in Samarra, Salahaddin. In March, an Al Qaeda assault team attacked the Salahaddin provincial council building in Tikrit leaving 71 dead. When the summer came, the Islamists picked up their activity as they have done each year. They began with two attacks in May against a police headquarters in Hilla, Babil, and a triple bombing in the government center in Kirkuk. That was followed by two more in June with a suicide car bombing outside the Qadisiyah governor’s house in Diwaniya killing 27, and 34 killed by bombs in a market in Baghdad’s Jihad Shurt al-Rabaa area. The militants than re-grouped until August when they struck a market in Kut, Wasit, leaving 40 dead, and then a Sunni mosque in Ghazaliya, western Baghdad that killed 32. The next month, 22 pilgrims were executed in Nikhaib, Anbar. On October 12, four separate bombs hit Baghdad with 25 casualties. Finally, on October 27, 34 were killed by an IED in Ur, Baghdad. Once again, Al Qaeda was silent for two months until the December 22 events. The pauses were likely the result of the organization having to plan, gather intelligence, and re-supply for their next wave of attacks. The group was also more active in the first six months of 2011, when it carried out nine major operations leaving behind 383 dead, compared to just six in the second half with 228 killed. Over the course of the year, Al Qaeda also varied their targets between bold assaults upon government offices, brazen attacks on Shiite pilgrims, and bombings of markets and other places where civilians would congregate.

2011’s Deadliest Al Qaeda In Iraq Attacks

• Jan. 18 65 police recruits killed by suicide bomber in Tikrit, Salahaddin
• Jan. 20 56 Shiite pilgrims killed by car bombs in Karbala
• Jan. 24 33 Shiite pilgrims killed in two separate bombings outside of Karbala
• Feb. 12 37 Shiite pilgrims killed heading to Samarra mosque, Salahaddin
• Mar. 29 71 killed during assault upon Salahaddin provincial council building in Tikrit
• May 5 30 killed by suicide bomber outside Hilla police headquarters in Babil
• May 19 30 killed by triple bombing in Kirkuk government center in Tamim
• Jun. 21 27 killed by suicide car bomb in Diwaniya by Qadisiyah’s governor’s house
• Jun. 23 34 killed by bombs in market in Jihad Shurt al-Rabaa, southwest Baghdad
• Aug. 15 40 killed by bomb in freezer and car bomb in market in Kut, Wasit
• Aug. 28 32 killed by suicide bomber in Sunni mosque in Ghazaliya, western Baghdad
• Sep. 22 22 Shiite pilgrims headed for Karbala executed in Nikhaib, Anbar
• Oct. 12 25 killed in four bombs across Baghdad
• Oct. 27 34 killed by roadside bomb in Ur, Baghdad
• Dec. 22 75 killed by 16 bombs and one rocket across Baghdad

In the United States, December’s events were immediately jumped upon by the press, pundits, and politicians to claim that Iraq was unraveling. Many newspapers for example, linked the attacks to the on-going political crisis between Prime Minister Maliki and the Iraqi National Movement. Politicians such as Senator John McCain of Arizona blamed the Obama administration, claiming that its decision to withdraw troops left Iraq vulnerable to coming apart. These statements ignored those made by Iraqi officials, and Al Qaeda’s modus operandi. First, the Islamists might have planned something to mark the end of the U.S. military presence in Iraq, but they have carried out these large operations nearly every month anyway. The head of the security committee in Baghdad’s provincial council thought that the attacks had nothing to do with the Americans, but was rather meant to show that Al Qaeda was still active in the country. He also noted that the U.S. had not stopped these bombings from happening before. Finally, the day’s events took weeks of planning before there was any crisis between Iraq’s leading parties. The two have been disagreeing since the December 2009 parliamentary elections. Whether America had kept troops in Iraq or not, and whether Maliki and the National Movement were arguing or getting along, the country would still face this serious terrorist threat.

Despite all of these large-scale attacks that have occurred this year, Al Qaeda in Iraq is not what it use to be. It no longer holds any territory, and its standing amongst Iraqis has dramatically fallen off. Rather than an insurgent group, it is now more of a terrorist group that has increasingly become a criminal organization similar to the mafia to keep itself afloat. These major operations are aimed at not only undermining the government, but to keep its name in the press so that it can remain relevant, and hope to gain donations from Islamists within and without Iraq. While they are still capable of taking a deadly toll within the country, it is still not as bad as it was a few years ago when the country was in the middle of a sectarian civil war, Baghdad was being ethnically cleansed, and the government was nearly incapable of operating because of the violence. Al Qaeda is still hanging on, but it is definitely on a steady decline.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Baghdad’s Karrada district’s victims reach 13 killed, 36 injured,” 12/22/11

- “Four civilians seriously injured in New Baghdad explosion,” 12/22/11

- “SECURITY:At least 33 civilians killed or injured in series of explosions in Baghdad Thursday,” 12/22/11

- “Security situation under control, Thursday explosions, preplanned, Iraqi official says,” 12/22/11

- “Three civilians killed, 9 others injured, in booby-trapped car blast in east Baghdad,” 12/22/11

- “URGENT: Two civilians killed, 6 others injured in Aadamiya district, after series of Baghdad attacks,” 12/22/11

Gould, Martin, “McCain: Iraq ‘Unraveling’ Under Obama Withdrawal,” Newsmax, 12/22/11

Gutman, Roy and Hammoudi, Laith, “Iraq arrests four security officials following Baghdad bombings,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/24/11

Healy, Jack, Schmidt, Michael, and Arango, Tim, “Explosions Rock Baghdad Amid Iraqi Political Crisis,” New York Times, 12/22/11

Iraq Body Count

Issa, Sahar, “Bomb assaults throughout Baghdad kill at least 63,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/22/11

Al Jazeera, “Dozens killed in Baghdad blasts,” 12/22/11

Kadim, Karim, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq says it was behind Baghdad blasts,” Associated Press, 12/27/11

Morse, Dan and Alwan, Aziz, “Baghdad explosions kill at least 63 in first major violence since U.S. departure,” Washington Post, 12/22/11

Wanan, Jaafar, “CBI official survived blast,” AK News, 12/22/11

- “Coordinated Baghdad bombings,” AK News, 12/22/11

Wanan, Jaafar and Shamari, Yazin, “UPDATE: Baghdad blasts kill 49, wound 169,” AK News, 12/22/11

Iraq’s Feuding Parties Move Towards Negotiations To End Political Crisis

In December 2011, Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki decided to pick a fight with his main rival, the Iraqi National Movement (INM). The INM won the most seats in the 2010 parliamentary elections, but was out maneuvered by Maliki to hold onto power. Since then the two sides have been in a constant war of words over a power sharing deal negotiated by the Kurds known as the Irbil agreement that has never been fully implemented. In December, Maliki escalated that situation by calling for a no confidence vote against Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq, and issuing an arrest warrant for Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi on terrorism charges. Both are leading members of the INM. The premier then tried to raise the stakes by going after the National Movement’s ministers and lawmakers who were boycotting the government, because of the current crisis. All of this now appears to be winding down, as almost all the other major lists are trying to mediate, and a national conference is to be held soon to try to bring a negotiated settlement to this latest blow-up between the ruling parties.

Maliki’s attempts to escalate the on-going political crisis have failed. First, the Kurds have stood by Vice President Hashemi who is currently in Kurdistan avoiding his arrest warrant. He is under the protection of Iraq’s President Jalal Talabani. The Supreme Judicial Council also announced on December 25, 2011, that it was going to re-investigate Hashemi. When the Interior Ministry, which is controlled by Maliki, originally announced his warrant it claimed that it had been issued by a five judge panel. The Council later revealed that only one judge looked at the matter, which is why it is being reconsidered. Second, the prime minister was thwarted in his attempt to replace the Iraqi National Movement’s (INM) boycotting ministers. Maliki cited Article 78 of the constitution, which states that the premier can replace ministers, but it says that it must be approved by the parliament as well. During a cabinet meeting on December 27, he tried to find substitutes for absent members. He offered Finance Minister Rafi Issawi’s position to the Sadrist Communication Minister Mohammed Tawafak Allawi, and the Education Minister Mohammed Tamim’s spot to Higher Education Minister Ali al-Adeeb of the prime minister’s own State of Law list. That move was rejected by the attending ministers. Third, Maliki’s attempt to hold a no confidence vote and replace Deputy Premier Mutlaq has also been blocked. Maliki charged Mutlaq with leading the boycott of the cabinet and neglecting his duties, and claimed the right to appoint an alternative in his place. The Deputy Premier has said that Maliki does not have the power to do so, and the Sadrists, who have been the prime minister’s staunchest allies, told the press they opposed the move against Mutlaq. Finally, a member of the National Alliance, which is the other major Shiite party in government, and allied with Maliki, said that they wanted the National Movement in the government rather than having them kicked out as the prime minister has also hinted at. On all fronts then, Maliki has been stymied. He has found little to no support for his attacks upon the INM, and the other parties have called for calm instead. That’s because they want to maintain the status quo, rather than upset the fragile balance between the major lists. They also do not want Maliki to gain more power as many of them feel threatened by his increasingly autocratic ways. These have all put limits on what Maliki can do.

The Kurds and the United States have been trying to play the role of moderators during this current blow-up, and are organizing a meeting of the major parties. On December 27, Speaker of Parliament Osama Nujafi and President of Iraq Jamal Talabani met in Sulaymaniya. The next day, they called for a national conference on January 3, 2012 to resolve the government crisis. The United States has been pushing Talabani to play this role of middle-man. Vice President Joe Biden has called Maliki, Speaker Nujafi, and President Talabani about this matter, and CIA Director David Petraeus and the U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Ray Odierno both went to Baghdad as well. So far it appears that the major lists will attend. A State of Law parliamentarian said that it and the National Alliance will both go. The INM does not want Hashemi’s case to be discussed however, as they are insisting that it go to court. On the other hand, it is demanding a set of principles be agreed upon before hand. So far, the attempts at coming up with some kind of talks look to be successful. Both the INM and Maliki have been hearing it from all sides to come together, rather than continue their rhetorical clashes with each other. As with so many issues that arise in Iraqi politics, leaders play brinkmanship with one another until everything looks like it will collapse, and then at the last minute some kind of deal is struck. That’s where the current events appear to be heading.

To add pressure upon the leaders, there has been talk about new parliamentary elections as well. The head of the Sadrist bloc in parliament Bahaa Hussein Ali Kamal Araji first voiced the idea to the press, but then quickly reversed himself claiming that it was just his own personal opinion. It then took on a life of its own as other parties including the National Movement and Kurdish President Barzani both said that new balloting might benecessary if negotiations didn’t work out. Actually following through on this would be disastrous. The last time there was voting it took nine months to put together a partial government, and how to complete it has led to the current crisis. A new round of balloting would not resolve these problems as the same major parties would still end up winning. Rather, this idea appears to be floating around to press the politicians to understand what chaos could come from a continuation or escalation of the current crisis.

The remaining issue now is whether Maliki and the National Movement can come to a compromise from this national conference. On one hand, a Kurdish lawmaker said that the prime minister’s State of Law has been unwilling to budge on any issue in talks with other parties. That’s shown in Maliki’s hardball stance with his opponents. The INM on the other hand, has demanded that all of Iraq’s major leaders attend the meeting, that a committee be formed to look into any court that deals with Hashemi’s case, that the vice president’s bodyguards be released, and that the no confidence vote against Mutlaq be withdrawn. That’s a haughty list to be asking in return for them showing up at the conference. They’ve already had talks with State of Law and the National Alliance about some of these, and been rejected. In fact, their list of items should be the basis for the up coming talks, not a requirement before they begin. State of Law also needs to show more flexibility instead of rejecting everything. So far, Maliki has been able to play divide and conquer to great success with the INM, and looks to be doing the same now. With all the ruling parties at the meet, perhaps he will be convinced to give a little, but nothing is assured.

Iraq’s current government is just a year old, but it is completely dysfunctional. All the leading politicians distrust each other, and tend to see everything as a zero sum game. Maliki has been able to use these divisions to maintain his power, and played the parties off of each other. In December however, he decided to go on the attack, trying to replace two of his major opponents the vice president, and one of his deputies. That united most of the other lists, and led to the planned national conference to air all of these differences, and hopefully end the current crisis. Some kind of deal is most likely to come about as that’s how Iraqi politics operates. At the same time, the prime minister is likely to come out feeling the victor, because he was able to show off his strength. That means this will not be the last blow up between these parties as any talks will not solve the root problems of power sharing nor address the mistrust. They will simply lead to the continued factionalism within the government with each official running his own part of the bureaucracy, while very little gets done nationally.

SOURCES

AIN, “Kurdish MP accuses SLC of obstinacy,” 12/31/11

AK News, “Hashemi rejects any political mediation to resolve the charges against him,” 12/26/11

- “Talabani says Hashimi will appear before “just” court,” 12/24/11

Aswat al-Iraq, “Call to dissolve the parliament is personal, MP,” 12/26/11

Brusk, Raman, “Leaders won’t discuss Hashemi’s issue in meeting,” AK News, 1/1/12

Cooper, Helene and Thom Shanker, “U.S. Embraces Low-Key Plan as Turmoil in Iraq Deepens,” New York Times, 12/24/11

Gwertzman, Bernard, “Potential ‘Political Chaos’ in Iraq,” Council on Foreign Relations, 12/28/11

Ibrahim, Haider, “Maliki to tackle absent minister issue soon, advisor says,” AK News, 12/29/11

- “Procedures for national congress of political leaders began,” AK News, 12/28/11

- “SLC won’t interfere in Hashemi’s case,” AK News, 12/29/11

Mardini, Ramzy, “Iraq’s Post-Withdrawal Crisis, Update 3,” Institute for the Study of War, 12/30/11

National Iraqi News Agency, “Allaq: NA will attend conference called for by Talabani to solve political crisis,” 12/30/11

- “BREAKING NEWS Sarraj: Jafari’s meeting with Iraqiya failed because of conditions set by Iraqiya,” 12/24/11

- “BREAKING NEWS Talabani, Nijafi agree on solving Hashimi’s case through judicial procedures, holding conference for political forces,” 12/27/11

- “IS calls for a set of principles before holding the national conference,” 12/28/11

- “IS spokesperson hails the Supreme Judicial Council’s position to re-investigate Hashimi’s case,” 12/25/11

- “Mulla: Iraqiya rejects any political out of court settlement to Hashimi’s case,” 12/28/11

- “Salim al-Joboori : parties in National Alliance want Iraqiya to stay in the government,” 12/28/11

Radio Nawa, “Talabani is preparing to hold a round table meeting after a request from the U.S.,” 12/25/11

Sullivan, Marisa Cochrane, “Iraq’s Post-Withdrawal Crisis, Update 2,” Institute for the Study of War, 12/23/11

Al-Tayyeb, Mouhammed, “Ahrar bloc opposes sacking Mutlaq,” AK News, 12/27/11

-“SLC refuses reconciliation over Mutlag,” AK News, 12/29/11

Al-Yousef, Mortadha, “No talks without Barzani and Sadr, says Allawi,” AK News, 12/28/11

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