A History Of Violence In Iraq Through Iraq Body Count’s Archives

Iraq Body Count is a unique source, because it keeps record of individual attacks in Iraq. Using its archives, one can discern the trends in violence that have taken place since 2003. In the months after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the country fell into an anarchic state full of murders, revenge killings, and a few terrorist attacks. The next year, the insurgency took off, followed by the civil war in 2005. That was shown in the increasing number of people killed by gunfire. By 2006, things went into overdrive after the bombing of the Shiite shrine in Samarra, Salahaddin with the highest death toll during the entire conflict. In 2007, the U.S. Surge started just as the security situation was beginning to change as the Shiite forces were overwhelming the Sunni militants. From 2009 to the present, violence is characterized by terrorism as shown by the increasing use of bombs. Last year, militants were carrying out more attacks, but were less efficient. That trend appears to be continuing into 2013. Iraq remains a violent country, but the insurgents are still largely marginalized, and are unable to change the current status quo.

The bombing of the U.N. headquarters in August 2003 was the first headline grabbing attack made by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq (U.N.)

The fall of the Baathist regime in May 2003, led Iraq to descend into chaos. There was a wave of murders and revenge killings, especially of Baathists. For example, in May alone, 265-280 bodies showed up at the Baghdad morgue, all of which met violent deaths. On May 18, two Baathist officials were shot down in Sadr City. Later in the year, sporadic terrorist attacks started, mostly perpetrated by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi and his organization, Tawhid wal Jihad, Unity and Jihad. (1) On August 18, the United Nations compound in Baghdad was bombed killing 22 including U.N. Special Representative Sergio de Mello. On August 29, there was a bombing of a rally outside the Imam Ali mosque in Najaf that killed the head of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim and 93-95 others. On October 27, 10-12 were killed at a bombing of the Red Cross headquarters in the capital, and 14-15 died in a car bombing at a police station in Baghdad as well. On November 12, 12-13 civilians and Italian Carabinieri were killed in a bombing in Nasiriyah. Finally, on December 14, 23-25 people lost their lives when a police station in Anbar was blown up. For the year, 1.5 people died a day due to suicide or car bombings showing how rare they were. In comparison, there were an average of 15 killed per day from gunshots, which proved how shootings were far more prevalent. From May to December, there were 4,138 Iraqi casualties for an average of 19.1 deaths per day. The United States went into Iraq with no real post-war plan. When the looting and killings started after Saddam was removed, the Coalition forces did nothing. That led to a period of lawlessness, which was reflected in the type of violence seen after the invasion.

Deaths/Attacks By Day And Month 2003-2012

Month	Deaths	Deaths Per Day	Attacks	Deaths Per Attack
May 2003	547	17.6	32	17.0
Jun 2003	594	19.8	39	15.2
Jul 2003	651	21.0	36	18.0
Aug 2003	796	25.6	36	22.1
Sep 2003	561	18.7	52	10.7
Oct 2003	520	16.7	66	7.8
Nov 2003	488	16.2	57	8.5
Dec 2003	528	17.0	57	9.2
2003	4,685	19.1	N/A	N/A
Jan 2004	597	19.2	82	7.2
Feb 2004	652	22.4	91	7.1
Mar 2004	992	32.0	109	9.1
Apr 2004	1,306	43.5	88	14.8
May 2004	657	21.1	82	8.0
Jun 2004	898	29.9	138	6.5
Jul 2004	816	26.3	127	6.4
Aug 2004	863	27.8	140	6.1
Sep 2004	1,028	34.2	176	5.8
Oct 2004	1,002	32.3	185	5.4
Nov 2004	1,605	53.5	176	9.1
Dec 2004	1,023	33.0	186	5.5
2004	11,439	31.3	N/A	N/A
Jan 2005	1,176	37.9	331	3.5
Feb 2005	1,268	45.2	258	4.9
Mar 2005	854	27.5	218	3.9
Apr 2005	1,114	37.1	189	5.8
May 2005	1,323	42.6	255	5.1
Jun 2005	1,296	43.2	248	5.2
Jul 2005	1,520	49.0	274	5.5
Aug 2005	2,261	72.9	297	7.6
Sep 2005	1,414	47.1	298	4.7
Oct 2005	1,294	41.7	274	4.7
Nov 2005	1,461	48.7	275	5.3
Dec 2005	1,134	36.5	281	4.0
2005	16,115	44.1	3,198+	3.9
Jan. 06	1,543	49.7	325	4.7
Feb. 06	1,565	55.8	352	4.4
Mar. 06	1,935	62.4	411	4.7
Apr. 06	1,767	58.9	474	3.7
May 06	2,247	72.4	539	4.1
Jun. 06	2,541	84.7	535	4.7
Jul. 06	3,266	105.3	639	5.1
Aug. 06	2,818	90.9	592	4.7
Sep. 06	2,535	84.5	619	4.0
Oct. 06	2,961	95.5	589	5.0
Nov. 06	3,024	100.8	636	4.7
Dec. 06	2,824	91.0	803	3.5
2006	29,026	79.5	6,514+	4.4
Jan. 07	2,925	94.3	759	3.8
Feb. 07	2,590	92.5	589	4.3
Mar. 07	2,675	86.2	760	3.5
Apr. 07	2,486	82.8	754	3.2
May 07	2,799	90.2	943	2.9
Jun. 07	2,168	72.2	755	2.8
Jul. 07	2,658	85.7	901	2.9
Aug. 07	2,400	77.4	732	3.2
Sep. 07	1,292	43.0	583	2.2
Oct. 07	1,244	40.1	547	2.2
Nov. 07	1,084	36.1	492	2.2
Dec. 07	959	30.9	435	2.2
2007	25,280	69.2	8,250	2.9
Jan. 08	817	26.3	384	2.1
Feb. 08	1,030	35.5	323	3.1
Mar. 08	1,610	51.9	492	3.2
Apr. 08	1,262	42.0	384	3.2
May 08	792	25.5	319	2.4
Jun. 08	696	23.2	268	2.5
Jul. 08	607	19.5	374	1.6
Aug. 08	614	19.8	226	2.7
Sep. 08	557	18.5	269	2.0
Oct. 08	547	17.6	244	2.2
Nov. 08	519	17.3	205	2.5
Dec. 08	575	18.5	184	3.1
2008	9,626	26.3	3,672	2.5
Jan. 09	342	11.0	158	2.1
Feb. 09	375	13.3	154	2.4
Mar. 09	425	13.7	151	2.8
Apr. 09	505	16.8	162	3.1
May 09	339	10.9	155	2.1
Jun. 09	498	16.6	141	3.5
Jul. 09	403	13.0	176	2.2
Aug. 09	614	19.8	198	3.1
Sep. 09	332	11.0	184	1.8
Oct. 09	434	14.0	155	2.8
Nov. 09	225	7.5	131	1.7
Dec. 09	475	15.3	168	2.8
2009	4,967	13.6	1,933	2.5
Jan. 10	263	8.4	199	1.3
Feb. 10	304	10.8	112	2.7
Mar. 10	335	10.8	117	2.8
Apr. 10	382	12.7	112	3.4
May 10	379	12.2	126	3.0
Jun. 10	379	12.6	161	2.3
Jul. 10	426	13.7	148	2.8
Aug. 10	516	16.6	205	2.5
Sep. 10	254	8.4	161	1.5
Oct. 10	312	10.0	135	2.3
Nov. 10	306	10.2	138	2.2
Dec. 10	217	7.0	210	1.0
2010	4,073	11.1	1,824	2.3
Jan. 11	389	12.5	123	3.1
Feb. 11	252	8.1	105	2.4
Mar. 11	310	10.0	157	1.9
Apr. 11	289	9.6	153	1.8
May 11	381	12.2	187	2.0
Jun. 11	386	12.8	184	2.0
Jul. 11	307	9.9	160	1.9
Aug. 11	401	12.9	172	2.3
Sep. 11	397	12.8	177	2.2
Oct. 11	366	11.8	185	1.9
Nov. 11	278	9.2	129	2.1
Dec. 11	388	12.5	184	2.1
2011	4,144	11.3	1,916	2.1
Jan. 12	524	16.9	205	2.5
Feb. 12	356	12.2	185	1.9
Mar. 12	376	12.1	178	2.1
Apr. 12	392	13.0	224	1.7
May 12	304	9.8	160	1.9
Jun. 12	529	17.6	205	2.5
Jul. 12	466	15.0	182	2.5
Aug. 12	422	13.6	181	2.3
Sep. 12	396	13.2	188	2.1
Oct. 12	290	9.3	119	2.4
Nov. 12	238	7.9	109	2.1
Dec. 12	275	8.8	243	1.1
2012	4,557	12.4	2,179	2.0

In 2004, the insurgency took off, and militias began asserting themselves. A sign of that was how bombings became more common and deadly. On January 18 for example, 30-31 Iraqis were killed as they lined up to gain access to the Green Zone in Baghdad. That was followed by a group of suicide bombers setting off their devices outside the offices of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Irbil on February 1 that left 107-109 dead. Then there were 55 fatalities from a truck bomb outside a police station in Iskandiriya, Babil on February 10. 47 army recruits blown up by a car bomb at the Muthanna Airport in Baghdad the next day. Three days later, 23 police officers were shot and killed by small arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades at the police headquarters in Fallujah, Anbar. That torrid pace of death and destruction would continue throughout the rest of the year. At the same time, the murders and revenge killings continued with 259-269 bodies showing up at the Baghdad morgue in January. The result of all this was an average of 5.4 people killed per day from suicide and car bombings for the year, and 19 a day from shootings. In total, there were 11,439 casualties in 2004, for an average of 31.3 per day. Militants had almost free reign throughout Iraq that year. Despite the fighting in Fallujah and against the Mahdi Army, there was no real strategy to confront the fighters. The plan was to withdraw U.S. forces, but that was postponed due to the escalating violence.

Aftermath of the bombing of the Samarra shrine, Feb. 2006, which sent the civil war into overdrive (AP)

The civil war in Iraq started in 2005, but really took off the next year. In 2005, when the Shiite religious parties took power after elections, they began placing their militiamen within the security forces. Bayan Jabr, a commander in the Supreme Council’s Badr Brigade became the Interior Minister, and immediately began recruiting entire units of his militia into the police. They began abducting, torturing, and killing Sunnis. Despite over 100,000 Coalition forces in Iraq there was a complete security vacuum in the country. The U.S. and its allies were more concerned about protecting themselves then Iraqis, and the result was that Shiite militias took matters into their own hands to protect their communities, and go after the insurgents. That was the origin of the civil war. The Shiites had the advantage of being the majority in Iraq, and running the government. In February 2006, things became worse in the aftermath of the bombing of the shrine at Samarra. Around 1,300 people were killed in the next four days. The result was that the number of casualties by shootings jumped from 30 per day in 2005 to 59 in 2006, the highest rate of the entire war. In 2005, a total of 16,115 people were killed, averaging out to 44.1 per day. That shot up to 29,026 the following year, for an average of 79.5 per day. Casualties peaked in July 2006 with 105.3 per day. Deadly attacks recorded by Iraq Body Count doubled from over 3,198 in 2005 to more than 6,514 in 2006. The devastation the Shiite forces were able to deal to Sunnis actually led to deaths declining by the end of 2006. This occurred before the United States Surge, and was a sign of the militias, army, and police overwhelming the Sunni militants.

In 2007, the Surge started, and the Americans were able to take advantage of the changing security situation in Iraq. U.S. commanders realized that many Sunni militants were ready to switch sides to try to save themselves from the onslaught of the Shiites. This led to the supporting of the Anbar Awakening, and the formation of the Sons of Iraq. The arrival of more U.S. troops, and increased operations against the insurgency and militias led to an uptick in violence initially, but deaths were already heading downwards. From January to August there were around 90 to 70 people killed per day. By September that dropped to 43.0, and by December there were an average of 30.9 deaths per day. Likewise, the number of people killed by suicide and car bombings went down to 22 per day and 42 per day due to shootings. For the year, 25,280 were killed, 69.2 per day, but the civil war was subsiding with the Shiites having thoroughly won. The United States Surge helped precipitate its end.

2008 marked the conclusion of the civil war, and the assertion of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s newfound authority. The premier launched a campaign against the Sadrists in Basra, Baghdad, and Maysan provinces. He then went after insurgents in Ninewa and Diyala. That showed that the Sunni militants were no longer an existential threat to the Shiite community. The prime minister could therefore take on his one-time supporter Moqtada al-Sadr, and kill and arrest hundreds of his militiamen. The actions in Ninewa and Diyala were to show that he was attempting to assert law and order over the country, hence the name of his new political list State of Law. Casualties went down to 9,626 killed for the year, an average of 26.3 per day. 10 were killed per day from suicide and car bombings, while 15 died from gunshots.

From 2009 to the present the remaining insurgent groups are conducting a terrorist campaign against the government. That’s shown by the fact that bombings have now surpassed shootings as the main cause of death in the country. In 2009, 8.4 people died a day from suicide and car bombings, compared to 4.7 from shootings. That trend continued for the next three years. In 2012, there were 7.3 casualties from suicide and car bombings and 5 from gunshots. Militants at first were able to increase their deadliness by turning to more explosions, which caused far more victims than small arms fire, RPGs or grenades. In 2008 for example, Iraq Body Count recorded 3,672 violent incidents, which led to an average of 2.5 deaths each. The next year, there were only 1,933 deadly attacks, but the average remained the same at 2.5 fatalities. Last year, the insurgency attempted to pick up the pace of their operations, but ironically they became less efficient. In December 2012 for instance, 275 people were killed, up from 238 in November. Militants launched 109 deadly attacks in November, with an average of 2.1 deaths per incident. In December, they carried out 243 fatal operations, but the average went down to 1.1 killed per attack.

Total Deaths In Iraq 2003-2012

May-December 2003 4,138

2004 11,439

2005 16,115

2006 29,026

2007 25,280

2008 9,626

2009 4,947

2010 4,073

2011 4,144

2012 4,568

Causes of Death Per Day 2003-2012

2003: 1.5 suicide and car bombs, 15 shootings

2004: 5.4 suicide and car bombs, 19 shootings

2005: 10 suicide and car bombs, 30 shootings

2006: 16 suicide and car bombs, 59 shootings

2007: 22 suicide and car bombs, 42 shootings

2008: 10 suicide and car bombs, 15 shootings

2009 8.4 suicide and car bombs, 4.7 shootings

2010: 7.3 suicides and car bombs, 4 shootings

2011: 6.6 suicide and car bombs, 4.8 shootings

2012 7.3 suicide and car bombs, 5 shootings

The U.S. invasion of Iraq led to the undoing of society. The occupying forces were not ready to secure the country, and the ensuing chaos opened the door to foreign terrorists, insurgents, and militias to fill the void. That quickly led to a civil war from 2005-2008 with the Shiites coming out victorious. Today there are still random shootings and improvised explosions, but the majority of deaths come from car bombings or suicide attacks. That represents the terrorist campaign that the insurgency is carrying out in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the government and restart the sectarian war. While they are picking up their deadly work they have largely failed to change the status quo. The Shiite and Sunni political parties are more concerned about their on-going rivalries over control of the government than fighting each other, and the Sunni community is in no rush to go back to war after they were already defeated. At the same time, the growing dissatisfaction with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is allowing the militants the space to continue on with their operations. That means the current security situation with increasing bombings will continue into the foreseeable future.

FOOTNOTES 

1. Debat, Alexis, “Vivisecting the Jihad: Part Two,” National Interest, October 2004

SOURCES

Debat, Alexis, “Vivisecting the Jihad: Part Two,” National Interest, October 2004

Iraq Body Count, “10-12 by car bomb at Red Cross HQ, Baghdad,” 10/27/03

- “12-13 incl. children and Italian civilians, Nasiriyah,” 11/12/03

- “14-15, car bomb at al-Baya’a police stn., Baghdad,” 10/27/03

- “22 in bombing of UN HQ Baghdad,” 8/19/03

- “23 at police HQ in Fallujah,” 2/14/04

- “23-25 in car bomb attack on police stn., Khalidiyah,” 12/14/03

- “30-31 outside US HQ, Baghdad,” 1/18/04

- “47 army recruits by car bomb, Muthana Airport, Baghdad,” 2/11/04

- “55 killed by truck bomb in Iskandariyah,” 2/10/04

- “83-95 at Imam Ali mosque, Najaf,” 8/29/03

- “107-109 by suicide bombers in party offices in Irbil,” 2/1/04

- “259-269 additional violent deaths recorded at Baghdad morgue,” 1/1-31/04

- “265-280 additional violent deaths recorded at Baghdad morgue,” 5/1-31/03

- “Baath Party official shot dead in Sadr City, Baghdad,” 5/18/03

- “Baath Party official shot dead in Sadr City, Baghdad,” 5/18/03

- “Incidents”

- “Monthly Table”

Ollivant, Douglas, “Countering the New Orthodoxy,” New America Foundation, June 2011

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09

Wing, Joel, “From Bad To Worse, How Militias Moved Into the Iraqi Police Force, And The United States Failed At Nation Building. Part Two Of An Interview With Jerry Burke, Former Advisor To The Baghdad Police And Interior Ministry,” Musings On Iraq, 2/13/12

Iraq Tries To Deal With Unemployment By Creating More Government Jobs Again

Officially, Iraq’s government has committed itself to diversifying its economy away from being dependent upon oil, and wants to create a vibrant private sector. In practice however, Iraq’s politicians always turn to the state to solve any problems. That is seen in how the central and regional governments have dealt with the high unemployment rate in the country. With Iraq having one of the youngest populations in the Middle East and North Africa there is constant pressure to create new jobs. The authorities have responded to this dilemma by creating more and more government positions each year. The fact that many of these workers do little to nothing is not a concern, because politicians are more worried that they may lose votes if they don’t give their followers part of the ever-expanding state pie, and that the public may turn against the government if the jobless rate were to increase. This has an adverse affect upon Iraq’s future, because not only does it draw away workers from private companies, but takes away money that needs to be invested into infrastructure and diversification.

One of the main goals of the 2013 draft budget is to create more jobs. A government official said in February that the bill includes100,000 new positions. He said these would mostly be offered to university graduates, and families that had lost loved ones to terrorism. Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq complained that since so many ministries and government offices lacked trained staff, and around 500,000 university graduates were unemployed, the budget should offer even more chances to work. He suggested 130,000 jobs in the second half of the year. Overall, Baghdad has plans to create 5 million new jobs by 2017 as part of its development plan. This is supposed to come from a combination of public and private sources, along with foreign companies. In practice, almost all new work opportunities have come from the state. As Labor Minister Nassar Rubaie pointed out last year, the private sector is too small in Iraq to solve the labor problem. He said that only the government had the means to address the issue. That’s exactly what it has done in every budget since 2005. In 2012, for example, Baghdad wanted to create 100,000 new jobs. In Kurdistan, the government hired 25,000 people in 2011, and was supposed to add an additional 40,000 in 2012. This was supposed to help with the 16% unemployment rate, which Labor Minister Rubaie said the government wanted to cut in half. 

The government is already the largest employer in Iraq. There are around 5 million public workers, half of which are in the security forces. The state provides 60% of full time work. The number of public employees has more than doubled since 2003. State workers as a percentage of overall employment went from 28% in 2005 to 43% in 2008, which is one of the highest rates per capita in the world. This huge increase in positions has been paid for by oil revenue. (1) At the same time, the growth in pay and pensions for all these workers has become the largest expenditure in the budget. A parliamentarian pointed out that the 2013 draft budget is for 138 trillion dinars, 83 trillion of which would go to past and present public employees. This cuts into spending for more important things like diversifying the economy. The problem is Iraqi politicians are worried about the political repercussions if they don’t hire more people. 64% of the country is younger than 24 years old, and they are the fast growing part of the population. They have the highest unemployment rate, at 30% according to the United Nations. Around 250,000 new people entered the labor market each year from 2007-2011, and that’s expected to increase to 290,000 each year from 2012-2016. The leadership is afraid that if they don’t get all these young people jobs it could lead to instability. They also want their votes. The result is that the government ends up hiring far more people than it actually needs, and many do little to nothing as a consequence. This ends up hurting the long-term health of the economy in two ways. First, every new public employee, pay increase, and pension takes money away from investment in infrastructure and other needed capital outlays. Second, it distorts the labor market. Since government jobs are more secure and pay higher, they attract people away from the private sector, and retard its growth. That contradicts the stated goals of the National Development Plan, which is to create a healthy market economy. The problem is that Iraq’s elite thinks short-term too often, and makes political rather than economic decisions.

Iraq’s leaders have all grown up under command economies, and have maintained that system since 2003. They give lip service to developing the private sector, but in practice they think about what might happen politically if they don’t create more jobs each year, and turn to the government as a result. With such vast oil wealth, they think the easiest solution is to simply create more public positions each year in the budget. They don’t think what Iraq’s economy needs long-term, which is to move away from the state-centric model. Instead, their policies distort the economy, and make it harder for reforms to be implemented. Politicians’ short-term thinking is leading to long-term development problems. There appears to be little political will to break this pattern, and the result will be a continued reliance upon oil to fund a state-run economy.

FOOTNOTES

1. Niqash, “iraq’s unemployed youth: dream jobs turn to nightmares in Baghdad,” 3/8/12

SOURCES

Ibrahim, Haider, “Finance Ministry discusses adding 42,000 jobs to the 2012 budget,” AK News, 1/16/12

Jawad, Laith, “Iraqi government to create 40,000 new jobs,” Azzaman, 7/4/12

Kadhem, Adel, “Iraq to reduce unemployment by half by 2014,” Azzaman, 2/18/12

Mohammed, Fryad, “Labor Ministry: Unemployment will be down to zero by 2016,” AK News, 8/5/12

Niqash, “iraq’s unemployed youth: dream jobs turn to nightmares in Baghdad,” 3/8/12

Al-Qaisi, Mohammed, “Iraqi government announces creation of 100,000 jobs,” Al-Shorfa, 2/1/13

Al Sayegh, Hadeel, “Iraqi in plan for 5 million jobs in next five years,” The National, 9/23/12

Al-Shaher, Omar, “Five Million State Employees Drag Down Iraqi Economy,” Al-Monitor, 1/9/13

Tashan, Sleman, “Graduates have a hard time finding jobs,” Kurdish Globe, 5/21/12

Tijara Provincial Economic Growth Program, “Assessment of Current and Anticipated Economic Priority In Iraq,” United States Agency for International Development, 10/4/12

Wasty, Sulaiman, “Private Sector Development in Iraq: Continuing Constraints,” Middle East Institute, 7/26/12