Sadr’s Leadership Or Lack Thereof

Could Sadr Have Lost His Support?

Figuring out the intentions of Shiite leader Moqtada al-Sadr can be as difficult as cracking the secrets of the Kremlin during the Soviet era sometimes. Russian experts in the West use to study who walked out with the Premier during public events to try to decipher who was in and who was out in the communist hierarchy. Analysis of Sadr is sometimes just as arcane. What is in the immediate future for his followers, especially after the government’s operations in Basra, Sadr City, and Maysan province is the newest topic of debate. It appears that the Mahdi Army is in tatters, and that Sadr’s lack of leadership may have put his entire movement in jeopardy.

A Divided Camp…

Even before the government’s offensive, many were unhappy with the direction of the Sadr trend. Sadr had become reclusive, not being seen in public since May 2007. When the Surge was announced, he moved to Iran for religious training in the holy city of Qom. He was also afraid that he might be arrested. Sadr removed himself from the day-to-day running of the movement. Maintaining the organization was passed to a committee that was divided between older and younger followers. Many elements of his militia also began working for Iran in the Special Groups, turned towards crime and protection rackets that preyed on fellow Shiites, and running their own fiefs. A movement that was never well organized in the first place, seemed to be even more divided.

A major point of contention was the cease-fire Sadr ordered in August 2007, and then renewed in February 2008. Many of Sadr’s militiamen and younger aides wanted to return to the streets and confront the U.S. and the Iraqi security forces they accused of persecuting them. The older leaders and some of Sadr’s bloc in parliament wanted to maintain the cease-fire and focus upon politics. This divide was increased when Prime Minister Maliki launched his crackdown against the Mahdi Army in March 2008. The militants took to the streets across Baghdad and southern Iraq, ignoring the cease-fire. There were some reports that Sadr supported this faction and wanted to confront the government. On the other hand, there were others that said Sadr provided no leadership at all during the fighting, and seemed to be disinterested.

An Unclear Leader…

Another major problem was Sadr’s seemingly contradictory directives. Sadr’s wishes were delivered to his top aides, who then had them read aloud during prayers. Without his actual presence in Iraq, it was up to his aides and followers to interpret his intentions, which often could be taken any number of ways. For example, in early March 2008 he said that the Mahdi Army had the right to defend itself just after he renewed his cease-fire the month before. At the same time he said that his movement would act peacefully and focus upon politics. Militiamen could take this anyway they wanted, either attacking U.S. and Iraqi forces, and their arch rival the Supreme Islamic Iraq Council’s (SIIC) Badr Brigade claiming self-defense against raids, or continue standing down.

A Divided Sadr…

Sadr himself seemed conflicted before Baghdad moved against him. In 2007, he allegedly went to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani asking for advice about what he should do with his movement. Sistani told him that he could either face the Shiite masses or pull away. Afterwards Sadr left Iraq for religious training in Iran. This could have been to enhance his religious standing by becoming an ayatollah that would allow him to issue fatwas and challenge established leaders like Sistani. On the other hand, it could have been to get away from the inter-Shiite power struggles he was entangled in.

Sadr’s mixed signals continued in early March 2008 when he sent a letter to his followers about why he hadn’t been seen for so long. He replied that he was staying out of the public eye because he felt like he had failed to achieve his goals. The Mahdi Army had not kicked out the Americans, and failed to establish an Islamic state. He also felt betrayed by some of his followers who had left his movement. This didn’t seem like a message by a leader that wanted to continue on with these struggles. This came just after Sadr had renewed his cease-fire in February.

And A Government Crackdown…

After ordering the fighting to stop in Basra and Sadr City with government forces, Moqtada continued on with his contradictory announcements. In June 2008, he said that he was disbanding his militia. He ordered most of his followers to focus upon social and religious goals, while a brand new and elite unit would be formed to just fight the U.S. At the same time, he said that Sadrists would not run in the provincial elections. Instead they would support independents, technocrats, and friendly political parties. This was to get around a threatened ban on voting by political parties that had militias. Again, the interpretations were many. By saying that he still opposed the Americans, he could be signaling to his followers to continue on with their attacks. It also might be a sign of the weakened positions of the movement. Many of his commanders and other leaders had been killed, arrested, or were on the run. It was said that most of his militia did not fight the government forces, and were laying low to fight another day. On the other hand, many of his fighters could have been eliminated, and saying that he was going to form a small, elite unit, was a way to give the image of continued resistance, while not having the means to actually carry it out. The same things, both pro and con were said about his pronouncement about the upcoming elections.

In June, when Maliki sent forces to Maysan, Sadr tried to change his approach, but the results were the same. Sadr ordered his followers to cooperate with the security forces. They complained about arrests, but not the actual offensive. The government ended up arresting many Sadrist politicians and militiamen, found dozens of weapons caches, and collected others in an amnesty program.

Equals Sadr’s Demise?

Today, the Sadrists’ weakened position is opening up opportunities for others, while the movement continues to fracture. Iraqi intelligence believes that the Mahdi Army is nearly destroyed. Up to 2,000 fighters have been killed in the battles of Basra and Sadr City, while 1,300 fled to Iran. It’s often said in the Western press that he has 60,000 gunmen, but if that number was ever true it was during the height of the sectarian fighting of 2006-2007 when hundreds of hangers-on were joining. He more likely has a fraction of that now. Sadrists continue to be arrested across the country, and many of their arms caches have been discovered. Religious leaders in Najaf like Grand Ayatollah Sistani and Prime Minister Maliki are trying to pry away Sadr’s followers. The U.S. is also creating Sons of Iraq units in the southern section of Sadr City that is walled off to take away some of his fighters. Many supporters believe that Sadr gave in to the government, when they were holding their own in the fight. Cooperating with the security forces in Maysan was seen as further capitulation. The divide between those that want to fight, and those that feel like politics is the future of the movement continues as well.

Conclusion

Moqtada al-Sadr’s standing as one of Iraq’s main political and religious figures is being threatened by his own leadership style, divisions within his movement, and the government’s crackdowns. Sadr has never been clear about his intentions, which has divided, and sometimes infuriated his followers. His decision to go to Iran has undermined his position as well, because he is not in Iraq to lead and settle disputes. Prime Minister Maliki’s operations have either destroyed much of his militia, or put them on the run. What he wants to do next is still a matter of debate both within and without Iraq, showing that he continues to confuse many. If nothing else, Sadr has proven to be a survivor. He saw the destruction of much of his militia before in 2004, only to rebuild it into one of the most powerful forces during the sectarian war period. This time, things may be different. Sadr may have discredited himself in the eyes of many Shiites, costing him his base. Other forces are actively attempting to peel away his remaining followers. Every day Sadr remains in Iran, he continues to appear as an aloof and disconnected leader. He may survive, but there may not be much left when he does return.

SOURCES

Adas, Basil, “Mahdi Army militia ‘going underground,’” Gulf News, 6/26/08

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Biddle, Stephen, Nasr, Vali, Nash, William, “Political and Security Developments in Iraq and the Region,” Council on Foreign Relations, 6/12/08

Bruce, Andrea, “Desperate for Army Aid in Baghdad,” Washington Post, 7/14/08

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Glanz, James and Farrell, Stephen, “Crackdown on Militias Raises Stability Concerns,” New York Times, 4/8/08

Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Al-Sadr shift: away from politics and favoring fight,” Associated Press, 4/24/08

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Latif, Nizar, “Elite Sadr unit hopes to vanquish US,” The National, 7/1/08

Mardini, Ramzy, “Moqtada al-Sadr’s Religious Strategy Complicates Jaysh al-Mahdi Ceasefire,” Terrorism Focus, Jamestown Foundation, 3/25/08

Missing Links Blog, “Asymmetric politics,” 6/18/08

O’Hanlon, Michael and Pollack, Kenneth, “Iraq: One Year Later,” Brookings Institution, 6/13/08

Paley, Amit, “Aides to Sadr Refine Stance On Elections,” Washington Post, 6/16/08
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Paley, Amit and Sarhan, Saad, “Powerful Iraqi Cleric Recalibrates Strategy,” Washington Post, 6/15/08

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Roggio, Bill, “Coalition, Mahdi Army clash over cease-fire,” Long War Journal.org, 2/6/08
- “Maysan operation continues to target Sadrist leaders,” Long War Journal.com, 6/20/08

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Sly, Liz, “Sadr takes break from politics, cites failures,” Chicago Tribune, 3/8/08

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Yates, Dean, “ANALYSIS – Iraq’s Sadr avoiding fight with government,” Reuters, 6/16/08

Youssef, Nancy, “Sadr backers seethe over Iraqi army but avoid violence,” McClatchy Newspapers, 7/18/08

Zahra, Hassan Abdul, “Iraq’s Sadr plans new armed group to fight US forces,” Agence France Presse, 6/13/08

British Forces Staying Or Going?

British forces withdrawing from Basra in Sep. 07, creating a vacuum that Shiite militias filled

On July 14 there were three articles about Britain’s presence in Iraq with seemingly contradictory stories. The Voices of Iraq had a headline reading in part, “Brit forces not to stay long – coalition commander.” The Associated Press ran a similar title that day, “Britain plans to downsize Iraq forces.” The Times of London on the other hand, said “Major-General Barney White-Spunner: troops to have a long-term Iraq role.” That was followed by a story the next day in the Independent that said, “Brown ends hopes of withdrawal from Iraq.” England is the other major component of the Coalition of the Willing remaining in Iraq. They have 4,000 troops in the southern city of Basra. This year they were planning on cutting their forces, but that was cancelled when Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki launched a crackdown against the Mahdi Army. The articles pointed to England’s determination to lesson their footprint in Iraq, while maintaining a presence there.

For all intents and purposes, England was the Coalition of the Willing when the U.S. went into Iraq. The British sent in 26,000 troops as part of the invasion force in March 2003. By July 2003 they were down to only 9,000. The U.S. gave them responsibility for the southern provinces of Basra, Maysan, Dhi Qar, and Muthanna. At first, the British were praised for their interactions with the Shiites. It was claimed that because of their experience in Northern Ireland, they were better judges of how to interact with a population than the U.S. were. That proved to be a false perception, and an internal British Army review from 2006 said that they had failed to win over hearts and minds in the south.

Eventually the British were based solely in Basra, the center of Iraq’s shipping and oil industry. The city was teeming with new Shiite political parties, that each had their own militia. These included the Fadhila Party, the Badr Brigade, the Mahdi Army, Iraqi Hezbollah, Thar Allah, and others. Instead of fighting them, the British tried to integrate them into the security forces. This only allowed the political parties that controlled them to steal, smuggle oil, and kill their opponents under official cover. At the same time, as the Shiite groups grew in power their attacks on the British increased. In October 2005, they claimed that many of these attacks were supported by Iran that was providing Explosively Formed Projectiles (EFPs) that could penetrate tanks. In September 2006, the British launched Operation Sinbad that was aimed at reforming the local police that had been taken over by the political parties, and then moved onto try to clear the cities of militias. The British didn’t have the numbers to make this successful. By 2007, they had withdrawn to the Basra Palace, and later to the airport outside of the city, claiming that they were only making the situation worse. This created a power vacuum in the city that the Shiite parties were only too happy to fill. That same year, the British started another round of withdrawals that the U.S. tried to slow down because of fears of the militias and Iranian influence in Basra. By December the English turned over control of the province to the Iraqis claiming that they were ready for the task, and said they planned on reducing their troops to 2,500 in 2008. Early that year, the Iraqi forces drew up a campaign to retake Basra city, and this began to change Britain’s plans. By March, the English said they wouldn’t withdraw any forces because they needed them to train Iraqi forces for their Basra operation.

On March 25, 2008 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki unexpectedly jumped started Iraqi operations and started Knight’s Charge to clear Basra of militias. During the fighting, the British provided support to the Iraqi forces. Afterwards, England announced that it would send troops back into the city to help train Iraqis. General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker also met with the British Defense Secretary Browne and the Chief of the Defense Staff Sir Stirrup and convinced them into maintaining England’s 4,000 troops. Agence France Presse reported that 120 specialists were being flown in to help with the training recently.

Even with all these changes, London continues to hold onto their plan to withdraw more troops, while maintaining a long-term presence in Iraq. England still wants to withdraw the 2,500 troops, but now in 2009. At the same time, the British General in charge of the South said that his forces would remain in the south to help support and train Iraqi troops. Underreported is the fact that the English also need to sign a status of forces agreement (SOFA) with Baghdad by the end of the year to keep forces in Iraq past 2008. British authorities said they were going to follow America’s lead, and that now looks like a one-year memorandum of understanding rather than a long-term security arrangement.

During their five years in Iraq, the British have run into some unique problems in the south. They quickly drew down their troop levels, while coming under increasing attack by militias. Despite operations like Sinbad, they were never able to effectively deal with the Shiite gunmen. By 2007 they largely abdicated their security duties and withdrew from Basra just as the U.S. was sending in more troops under the Surge. The move outside of the city, and its consequences led to Prime Minister Maliki’s offensive in March 2008. Now the English are back in Basra helping Iraqi troops, just as they were before their retreat. The British are still planning on having a long-term arrangement with Iraq through a status of forces agreement, just with fewer troops. Overall, the British suffered from both a lack of troops, and an effective strategy to deal with the militias. They were also partly responsible for the mess in Basra due to their policies. Now that Iraqi forces are being more assertive, hopefully the British can play a more helpful role supporting them.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “MoD to send 120 more troops to Iraq,” 7/14/08
- “US wants Britain to lead ‘surge’ in southern Iraq,” 3/23/08

Alsumaria, “Britain to delay withdrawal from Iraq,” 3/20/08

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BBC, “Iran ‘behind attacks on British,’” 10/5/05

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Norton-Taylor, Richard, “British troops to stay in Basra ‘for the long term,’” 5/2/08

Rayment, Sean, “Iraq war was badly planned, says Army,” Telegraph, 11/5/07

Roggio, Bill, “Mahdi Army taking significant casualties in Baghdad, South,” Long War Journal.org, 3/29/08

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Sevastopulo, Demetri, and Barker, Alex, and Fidler, Stephen, “UK takes flak from Basra flare-up,” Financial Times, 4/2/08

Spiegel, Peter, “British tout Basra model,” Los Angeles Times, 12/14/07

Strobel, Warren and Youssef, Nancy, “Paltry results of Iraqi offensive silence U.S. withdrawal talk,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/1/08

Susman, Tina, “Al-Sadr and rival Shiite leader reach truce,” San Francisco Chronicle, 10/7/07

Voices of Iraq, “British army: units deployed in Basra,” 4/5/08
- “Iran has legal interests in Iraq, Brit forces not to stay long – coalition commander,” 7/14/08

Anbar Dispute Between Sunnis Growing

Political disputes are heating up in western Iraq’s Anbar province, while security forces are worried about a surge in violence. In June 2008 Anbar was suppose to be handed over from U.S. to Iraqi control, but a bombing at a meeting of tribal sheikhs that were part of the Awakening movement, a sandstorm, and political arguments now have that on indefinite hold. Anbar was the first province to change the dynamic in the war in Iraq when Sunni tribes turned against Al Qaeda in Iraq, it’s believed that it will continue to transform once provincial elections are held that could usher in a new political leadership. Recent events show that this could be a bumpy ride.

At the end of June, Anbar was suppose to be the tenth province handed over to Iraqi forces, but that is now on hold. On June 27 a suicide bomber blew himself up at a council meeting of sheikhs from the Anbar Awakening movement killing twenty people, including three U.S. Marines, the local mayor, and several sheikhs. The attack happened two days before the scheduled hand over ceremony. A dusty storm hit, and the U.S. postponed the event. Now it has become a political football between Anbar’s vying factions.

On July 13 the New York Times reported that the Islamic Party that controls Anbar’s provincial council, wanted to delay the handover until after the provincial elections. The Islamic Party said the local security forces that are controlled by the Awakening movement, was not ready to take over the province. Two tribal leaders of the Awakening, Sheikh Ali Hatam al-Sulaiman and his ally Shiekh Hameed Farhan al-Hayes, agreed to the postponement. The dispute is now over who will command the security forces once the handover has been made. The Islamic Party thinks that the council should be in control, while the Awakening movement wants the military.

At the same time, the two sides are battling over the leadership of the local security forces as well. In May 2008, the provincial council demanded that the provincial police chief, who is a member of the Awakening, resign. He has refused, saying that he answers to the Interior Ministry in Baghdad, not to the provincial authorities. The Islamic Party is suing the Interior Minister to force them to fire the police chief, while he has said his officers would never allow him to be removed and they would only answer to his authority. Sheikh Abdul Jabbar Abu Risha, has said that the Awakening now controls Anbar and there is nothing the Islamic Party can do about it. All the police and Awakening fighters in Anbar are actually paid for by the U.S., not Baghdad, adding another dimension to the dispute.

The Islamic Party came to power in Anbar in 2005. The Sunnis boycotted the January elections, while the Islamic Party was the only one to run. They were swept into office with only 2% of voters taking part. They have no real popular base, and have been criticized for not providing jobs and services to the population. When provincial elections are held, the Awakening, based upon their tribal base, are expected to win. The two sides are increasingly coming into conflict. Sheikh Hayes has threatened the Islamic Party. There have also been reports that the Islamic Party is trying to get the government to weaken the Awakening movement before the vote.

The upcoming provincial elections are supposed to be a panacea for Iraq’s political problems. New groups like the Anbar Awakening can participate and run for office to gain power, while the established parties will have more competition. The events in Anbar show that this may not be a peaceful nor smooth transition. Baghdad might be picking sides with the Islamic Party, which may drag the United States in as the mediator between the two sides. It shows that the country’s politics are still not developed, and are in a rough state of flux.

SOURCES

Abu Aardvark Blog, “Dissolving the Sons of Iraq… ?” 7/3/08

Garcia-Navarro, Lourdes, “Tensions Simmer In Anbar As U.S. Handoff Nears,” Morning Edition, NPR, 7/4/08

Ibrahim, Waleed, “Iraq Sunni Arab dispute may delay Anbar handover,” Reuters, 7/16/08

Oppel, Richard and Hameed, Ali, “Province Leaders Call Iraqis Unready to Handle Security,” New York Times, 7/13/08

Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Rise of Awakening Groups Sets Off A Struggle for Power Among Sunnis,” Washington Post, 7/4/08

Voices of Iraq, “Anbar Salvation Council announces 4-member alliance,” 6/9/08

Yacoub, Sameer, “US: Arrest made following attack in Karmah, Iraq,” Associated Press, 6/27/08

Last Of Surge Brigades Leaves Iraq

The last of the five extra brigades sent to Iraq as part of the Surge is finally coming home. The overall Surge strategy remains. That includes operating outside of large forward operating bases in small joint Iraqi operating posts throughout Iraqi cities aimed at policing and protecting the public, providing basic services, mediating conflicts, setting up community councils, training Iraqi forces, carrying out offensives, and supporting local Sons of Iraq units, to name just a few. There are still more troops in Iraq, about 150,000, than before the change in strategy. When some older units switch out with new ones, it’s believed that the total will go down to around 142,000. That’s roughly 10,000 more than before. While the Surge has had dramatic and unpredictable consequences, the challenges ahead are just as complicated.

The results of the Surge have been greater than most expected. Attacks are down 70% and deaths are down 80% to 2004 levels. The sectarian civil war is over due to a combination of factors including the extra U.S. troops that improved security and combat capabilities, blast walls that were built throughout Baghdad to divide battling communities, the Shiite militias winning the battle for the capitol, and the Sunnis largely turning against Al Qaeda in Iraq because of their harsh policies. That change amongst Sunnis started in Anbar province in the west as early as 2005, but the various other ex-insurgents and tribes in central Iraq probably wouldn’t have switched sides if not for the increase of troops that would protect them, and help them in the fight against their former comrades. Finally, the extra troops also allowed the U.S. to put pressure on Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army. Sadr fled the country to Iran when the Surge started, and by late 2007, the U.S. was starting to focus many of their military operations against his followers. These operations played a role in Sadr’s decision to call a cease-fire and maintain it for several months. The Surge in U.S. troops also coincided with a surge in Iraqi forces. They went from 440,000 in June 2007 to 566,000 by May 2008. U.S. training and assistance also helped improve the professionalism of the Iraqi Army, and the National Police finally started to get cleaned up. These advances helped lead to the offensives that were carried out in 2008 beginning in Basra, and then spreading to Sadr City, Mosul, and Maysan province. The Surge was part good strategy, part luck, and part hard work.

The job is not done yet. The dramatic turn around in Iraq has just presented a brand new set of issues that are just as daunting. Iraq needs to create a government that can actually function, spend its money, and provide basic services to the public, along with building up a business environment that will provide jobs. Outside of paying salaries and using the military, Baghdad is deficient in all these. Corruption is still a huge problem, but there are other intrinsic difficulties like a lack of trained and competent staff, a slow paper based government, vestiges of the top down Saddam era bureaucratic system, and lack of communication between the capitol, the governors, provincial councils, and the towns. Many new small businesses have developed, but most of these are based upon getting U.S. contracts, something that can’t last forever. The larger state-owned industries barely function, and the government is now trying to turn them into joint ventures in an attempt to lure foreign investors. There’s also the question of millions of refugees and how they return. They too will need jobs. Iraq also has 100,000 mostly Sunni Sons of Iraq local security forces that have cut deals with the U.S., but not Baghdad that need to be dealt with. This is another group that will need work. Pressure also needs to be maintained upon Al Qaeda in Iraq, the other insurgents, the Shiite militias, and Iran to maintain security. The disputed city of Kirkuk and other northern regions that the Kurds lay claim to need to be resolved. This is one of the main sticking points holding up passage of the new election law. Claiming victory is premature. There is a lot more hard work to be done that will probably take years, and there’s still no guarantee that Iraq will come out to be the state that the Bush administration envisions. There is a new status quo in Iraq that is based less upon violence, but it is far from the end of the road.

SOURCES

Allam, Hannah and al Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Marine-led Campaign Killed Friends and Foes, Iraqi Leaders Say,” Knight Ridder, 5/17/05

Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Shiite militia may be disintegrating,” Associated Press 3/21/07

Baldor, Lolita, “Military surge in Iraq ends; 150,000 troops remain,” Associated Press, 7/16/08

Fairweather, Jack, “Business wanes as Baghdad takes over,” Financial Times, 6/4/08
- “Iraqi state enterprises warily reopen,” Financial Times, 6/16/08

Levinson, Charles, “U.S. troop deaths in May near lowest level of war,” USA Today, 5/29/08

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Defense Analyst Sees ‘Enormous Progress’ In Iraq Security Situation,” 7/1/08

Tharp, Mike, “More Sunnis joining Iraq’s National Police,” McClatchy Newspapers, 5/29/08

Tyson, Ann Scott and Eggen, Dan, “U.S. General: Iraqi Forces to Be Fully Ready in ’09,” Washington Post, 7/10/08

Zavis, Alexandra, “Iraq works to clean up national police,” Los Angeles Times, 2/6/08
- “Iraqi election law still incomplete,” Los Angeles Times, 7/14/08

Election Law Update

Debate on the provincial election law was supposed to begin on Thursday July 17, but when the bill was introduced on Tuesday, the Kurds stormed out in protest. The main sticking point is how to deal with Kirkuk. Kurds claim the city, but there is a sizeable minority of Arabs, Turkoman, Christians, and others. Parliament will now deal with the bill next week. It seems most likely that voting will be postponed in Kirkuk until its future status is worked out, and the rest of the law will be voted on.

At the end of 2007 there was suppose to be a census and vote on Kirkuk, but that never happened. The United Nations is now trying to mediate, but none of its proposals have gained acceptance by the different sides. A State Department official from Kirkuk’s Provincial Reconstruction Team said that in the best case scenario, resolving the disputes over the area could take up to three years. That would leave the elections there in limbo, but would also be to the advantage of the Kurds who already control the provincial council, and are consolidating power. They are already moving in Kurds and trying to make Arabs leave by offering cash for example. They are also not above trying to fix any elections once they happen. During the last voting in 2005, monitors found 82,000 Kurds with no documents proving their residence in Kirkuk trying to vote. Kurdish officials threatened to boycott the entire election process unless they were counted.

Another dispute has also arisen over a provision to give a quota of seats on provincial councils to women. A member of former prime minister Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List told the Voices of Iraq, that his party walked out of parliament on Wednesday July 16 when they found the article not in the election bill.

Even without an election law, voting officials are trying to move ahead. They have set up 563 voting registration centers across the country. The voting commission is going to allow displaced Iraqis to register, and they have thirty days to do so. That’s an important step because Iraq has over two million internal refugees.

These arguments are just a harbinger of what is to come. Political parties are positioning themselves over all kinds of issues like the displaced, political symbols, control of provinces and regions, etc. It is hoped that the vote will usher in a new wave of political parties, and a new status quo, but it seems like the groups in power are doing their best to hold on and fix the system to benefit themselves.

SOURCES

Voices of Iraq, “95 lawmakers criticize the U.N. recommendations over disputed districts,” 6/7/08
- “IHEC opens 563 voter registration update centers,” 7/15/08
- “MP withdraws from parliament in protest of cancellation of article 50,” 7/15/08
- “Parliament postpones provincial elections law in Kirkuk – MP,” 7/15/08
- “Parliament postpones vote on provincial elections law until Mon.,” 7/16/08
- “Parliamentary session put off, UIC in closed session with KC,” 7/15/08
- “UIC proposes postponing Kirkuk elections for 6 months – MP,” 7/15/08

Warden, James, “Disagreements over Kirkuk’s status could sideline voters,” Stars and Stripes, 7/14/08

Iraq Gains Control of Diwaniyah Province

9. Diwaniyah Province

Today, July 16, the U.S. turned over the tenth province, Diwaniyah, formerly known as Qadisiyah, to Iraqi control. Originally the handover was supposed to happen on June 30, but that was postponed because of logistical problems between the U.S. and Baghdad. Iraq now controls the provinces of Dahuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniyah, Basra, Thi Qar, Maysan, Karbala, Muthanna, and Najaf. Iraq’s national security advisor Muwaffaq al-Rubaie said the country hopes to have control of all 18 provinces by the end of the year. Originally, when President Bush announced the surge in January 2007, he said that Iraqis would control all of their territory by November 2007. That obviously has been delayed. Like much of the south, Diwaniyah’s major problem has not been with the insurgency, but with different Shiite factions.

The province has been divided between followers of Moqtada al-Sadr and the Supreme Islamic Iraq Council (SIIC). The SIIC controls the provincial government, while the local security forces are split between the two. The rivalry between them has often turned violent. In August 2007 for example, a roadside bomb killed the province’s governor and police chief. Both were members of the SIIC, and the Mahdi Army was suspected as the culprits. That was followed by clashes between the two at the end of the month when Sadrists attacked SIIC offices and mosques, as part of a power struggle over the holy city of Karbala In October, the two sides signed a truce to end their disputes in the province, but it didn’t hold. In April and November 2007, U.S. and Iraqi forces launched Operations Black Eagle and Lion’s Leap to clear out Mahdi Army fighters. Poland was also involved as it has up to 900 soldiers in the province. The Americans also created some of the first Shiite Sons of Iraq units in Diwaniyah, to counter the Sadrists. In March 2008 tensions escalated again, when the head of the Sadrist office in the province was arrested, leading to shootouts between the two sides. When the government launched Operation Knight’s Charge in Basra, the fighting spread to Diwaniyah as well. Just a few days ago in July, security forces arrested a Sadrist cleric for criticizing the prime minister and governor of Diwaniyah.

The Shiite messianic group the Soldiers of Heaven has also had a presence in the province. In January 2008 when the Soldiers of Heaven clashed with government forces, there was fighting in Diwaniyah.

It is in provinces like this that the power-struggle between the two major Shiite factions, the SIIC and Sadrists, has played out. The SIIC has always had the upper hand with control of the government, much of the security forces, and the backing of the United States. Sadr was hoping to make inroads in Diwaniyah and other southern provinces in the up coming elections, but after the government’s crackdowns that’s unlikely to happen. Transfer of the province to Iraqi control will continue on with the SIIC’s consolidation of power there.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Deal between key Iraqi Shiite figures collapses,” 2/17/08

Battat, Abed, “Security worsens in three southern provinces,” Azzaman, 1/21/08

Bowman, Tom, “A Year Later, Surge’s Impact Seen in Some Areas,” Morning Edition – NPR, 1/7/08

Farrell, Stephen, “50 Die in Fight Between Shiite Groups in Karbala,” New York Times, 8/29/07

Francke, Rend Al-Rahim, “Political Progress in Iraq During the Surge,” United States Institute of Peace, December 2007

Freeman, Sholnn, “Iraqi Shiites Given Grim Warning,” Washington Post, 3/22/08

Gulf News, “US postpones handover of control of Iraq’s Diwaniya province,” 7/1/08

International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, The Sadrists And The Surge,” 2/7/08

Raghavan, Sudarsan and Freeman, Sholnn, “Sadr Followers Protest Security Crackdown,” Washington Post, 3/27/08

Reuters, “Roadside bomb kills Iraqi governor and police chief,” 8/11/07

Robertson, Campbell, “Iraqi Forces Raid Mosque With Links to Sadrists,” New York Times, 7/12/08

Roggio, Bill, “Iraqi security forces take on the Mahdi Army in Diwaniyah,” Long War Journal.org, 11/19/07

Voices of Iraq, “2 gunmen killed, 3 captured in Diwaniya,” 3/26/08

Zein, Qassem, “Iraq takes control of Shiite province from US-led forces,” Agence France Presse, 7/16/08

Kurds Walk Out Over Provincial Election Law Debate

The Voices of Iraq reported yesterday July 14 that parliament had agreed to postpone the vote on the election law from Tuesday July 15 to Thursday July 17. Today, when parliament opened, the election law was still on the floor, and the Kurds walked out in protest. Their allies, the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance met with them afterwards to try to smooth things over and allow the session to go forward. The Kurds are unhappy about how the law deals with Kirkuk.

Currently there are two proposals on voting in the disputed region. One is to divide the city up amongst the three major groups in the city, Kurds, Arabs and Turkoman. Each would get 32% of the provincial council seats, while the rest would go to other minorities such as Christians. The other idea is to have the city count as one district. The Arab and Turkoman parties from Kirkuk, along with 110 members of parliament support the former idea, while the Kurds have advocated for the latter because they believe there is a Kurdish majority in the city. In May 2008, the Kurds stormed out of parliament over the exact same dispute, and they have called on delaying voting in Kirkuk until the city’s future is resolved in the past as well. This argument remains the major stumbling block to passing the election law, and one that does not have an easy solution. The whole process could be held up indefinitely until it is resolved.

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraqi politicians squabble over election law,” Associated Press, 5/26/08

Alsumaria, “Iraq Kirkuk proposal on elections debated,” 6/7/08
- “New alliance ahead of Kirkuk elections,” 6/27/08

Jam, Kawa, “Delay of provincial council elections sought,” Kurdish Globe, 5/23/08

Voices of Iraq, “Disputes hamper provincial council elections law passage – MPs,” 7/14/08
- “MP calls to adopt dividing Kirkuk into 4 constituences,” 6/5/08
- “Parliamentary session put off, UIC in closed session with KC,” 7/15/08

Zavis, Alexandra, “Iraqi election law still incomplete,” Los Angeles Times, 7/14/08