Moqtada al-Sadr’s Religious Training

In February 2007 Moqtada al-Sadr fled Iraq for neighboring Iran. At first, his movement denied that he had left, but eventually they said that he had gone to Iran for religious training. Who he studied under seems to be under contention, but all of the figures named believe in Khomeini’s clerical rule, and have tied Sadr closer to Tehran.

Reports said that Sadr had gone to Iran in 2007 to study in Qom, one of the centers of Shiite religious studies. Sadr supposedly was going for weekly classes there to become a mujtahid, a learned scholar. If he attained that rank he would have the power to issue religious decrees. Many believed that Sadr was striving to become an ayatollah, which would give him greater religious and political standing when he returned to Iraq.

Ayatollah Haeri (Al-Shahed)

The Sadr Trend initially claimed that Moqtada was studying under Ayatollah Kadhem al-Hussein al-Haeri. Haeri is an Iraqi born cleric that lives in Qom. He was a follower of Sadr’s uncle Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr. After Sadr’s father, Ayatollah Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr, was killed by Saddam Hussein in 1999, many in the Sadr movement argued that Haeri should be his successor. He became Moqtada’s spiritual leader, and after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in April 2003, Haeri appointed Sadr his representative in Iraq. That meant Sadr could collect religious taxes from Haeri, which became the main source of funds for the movement in 2003. The two had a falling out in 2004, but patched up their relationship when Sadr came to Iran in 2007. 

Ayatollah Shahroudi (Reuters)

Besides Ayatollah Haeri, several other prominent clerics in Iran have been tied to Sadr’s training there. The Associated Press mentioned Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, the former head of Iran’s judiciary. Shahroudi was born in Najaf, Iraq where he attended religious studies, including classes given by Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Shahroudi was a member of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council in Iraq, before returning to Iran to help establish the Islamic state after the 1979 Iranian revolution. He later ascended to be the chief justice, but after the disputed 2009 Iranian elections, Shahroudi went back to full time teaching in Qom. The Washington Post recently reported that Sadr spent more time in Tehran under Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazidi. Yazidi, an ultra conservative, is the spiritual adviser to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadenijad, is close to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and is a member of the Assembly of Experts, which can elect and remove the country’s supreme leader. A senior Sadrist in Najaf also claimed that Sadr was studying under a cleric close to Iran’s  Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

All of the mentors mentioned for Sadr are followers of Ayatollah Khomeini’s version of clerical rule, many of them are close to the hardliners in Iran, and have followed Iran’s foreign policy towards Iraq. Ayatollah Haeri for example, came out against Sadr’s April 2004 uprising, opposed Iraq signing the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the U.S., and came out for Maliki’s second term in office after the March 2010 elections, all of which mirrored Iran’s stance. Yazidi on the other hand is an adviser to President Ahmadenijad. Shahroudi has been called a moderate conservative in Iran, and seemed to be dissatisfied with the 2009 elections there, but he was a student of Ayatollah Khomeini, and took part in the Iranian Revolution.

While in Qom, Sadr was inculcated in Khomeini’s theology, which is different than the Shiism prevalent in Najaf. Both schools believe that ayatollahs should play a leading role in society and politics. Khomeini however advocated the direct supervision of the government by clerics. Sadr has now transferred his studies to Najaf. If he hopes to become an ayatollah and join the religious hierarchy there, the marjaiya, he would traditionally have to gain the support of powerful clerics. On the other hand, he could try to force his way in rather than integrate into the establishment. With a militia and his movement’s new political standing after the March 2010 elections Sadr could be a serious threat to the marjaiya in the coming years. If he were successful that would also be a coup for Tehran because Sadr has grown closer to its leadership, and it sees Najaf, as a rival. Sadr has to make the right decisions for this to happen however, and that has always been a problem for him. 

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Shiite militia may be disintegrating,” 3/21/07

Beaumont, Peter, “Battle for Iran shifts from the streets to the heart of power,” Guardian, 6/28/09

Cochrane, Marisa, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009

Dareini, Ali Akbar, “Cleric in Iran issues fatwa against US-Iraqi pact,” Associated Press, 10/22/08

Faith World, “Former Iranian chief justice rises to senior Shi’ite rank, eligible to be next leader,” Retuers, 9/24/10

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Aide: Iraq’s al-Sadr may stay in Iran for years,” Associated Press, 8/22/08

Kagan, Kimberly, “Iran’s Proxy War against the United States and the Iraqi Government,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/20/07

Haugh, Maj. Timothy, “The Sadr II Movement: An Organizational Fight for Legitimacy within the Iraqi Shi’a Community,” Strategic Insights, May 2005

Los Angeles Times, “Sadr aides deny the cleric is in Iran,” 2/14/07

O’Connell, Barry, “Biography of Ayatollah Shahrudi,” Leaders of Iran12/22/04

Rahimi, Babak, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr Seeks Regional Influence with Visit to Ankara,” Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 5/26/09
- “The Rise of Ayatollah Moqtada al-Sadr,” Foreign Policy, 7/27/09

Sarhan, Saad and Davis, Aaron, “Cleric Moqtada al-Sadr returns to Iraq after self-imposed exile,” Washington Post, 1/6/11

Visser, Reidar, “The Sadrists of Basra and the Far South of Iraq,” Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, May 2008

Wong, Edward, Fathi, Nazila, “The Reach Of War: Looming Presence; Iran Is in Strong Position to Steer Iraq’s Political Future,” New York Times, 7/3/04

2010 Ends With A Slight Drop In Iraqi Casualties (REVISED)

December saw the fewest Iraqi deaths of 2010. Iraq Body Count recorded 215 killed in December,  Iraq’s ministries reported 151 deaths, while icasualties had 128. For all three organizations those were the lowest numbers of the year. Iraq Body Count’s previous low for example was 248 killed in September. When all three groups’ statistics were averaged out there were 165 deaths, and 5.3 casualties per day compared to 215 in November and 7.1 killed per day. Again December’s averages were the lowest of the year, surpassing January when there was an average of 197 and 6.3 casualties per day.

2010 Iraqi Death Counts And Averages

2010	Iraq Body Count	Icasualties	Iraqi Ministries	Avg. Monthly Deaths	Avg. Daily Deaths
Jan.	260	135	196	197	6.3
Feb.	297	236	352	295	10.5
Mar.	334	183	367	294	9.5
Apr.	380	259	328	322	10.7
May	377	279	337	331	10.6
Jun.	368	176	284	276	9.2
Jul.	430	534	535	499	16.1
Aug.	517	363	426	435	14.0
Sep.	252	174	273	233	7.7
Oct.	311	185	293	263	8.4
Nov.	300	174	171	215	7.1
Dec.	217	128	151	165	5.3

Total Iraqi Deaths 2003-2010

	Brookings Institution	Iraq Body Count	U.S. Military	Icasualties	Iraqi Ministries	Avg. Daily Deaths
2003	7,298	4,661	N/A	N/A	N/A	16.3
2004	16,894	10,834	8,993	N/A	N/A	28.8
2005	20,163	15,031	8,993	8,225	N/A	35.8
2006	30,514	27,850	31,253	18,655	N/A	74.1
2007	23,550	24,677	28,041	18,938	N/A	65.2
2008	6,360	9,245	8,310	5,929	N/A	20.4
2009	3,000	4,681	2,891	3,119	3,492	9.4
2010	2,405 to Nov.	4,043	N/A	2,826	3,713	8.8
Totals	110,184 (to Nov. 10)	101,022	83,300 (2004-2009)	57,692 (2005-2010)	7,205 (2009-2010)

Click on image for larger view

Click on image for larger view

Iraq Body Count and icasualties noted a slight decrease in annual deaths from 2009 to 2010, while the Iraqi government actually had an increase. Iraq Body Count went from 4,681 deaths in 2009 to 4,043 in 2010, and icasualties dropped from 3,119 to 2,826. Iraq's ministries on the other hand, had a rise. There were three different figures attributed to Baghdad. By adding up the monthly reports it gave to the press there were 3,492 killed in 2009, going up to 3,713 in 2010. The Associated Press said the government told them were 3,525 killed last year. Reuters counted 3,605 fatalities based upon official releases in 2010, up from 3,481 in 2009. The authorities attributed the increase to the number of soldiers and police killed going up from 204 in 2009 to 215 last year.

What the statistics reveal is that violence in Iraq has hit a plateau since 2009. From 2003 to 2006 the war in Iraq dramatically increased from an average of 16.3 killed per day in 2003 to 28.8 in 2004, 35.8 in 2005, before reaching a high of 74.1 in 2006 as the civil war hit full throttle. Since then fighting has steadily decreased as the sectarian conflict ended, dropping to an average of 65.2 killed in 2007, to 20.4 in 2008, and then hitting an all time low of 9.4 in 2009 and 8.8 in 2010. The averages were calculated using numbers provided by the Brookings Institution, Iraq Body Count, icasualties, the U.S. military, and the Iraqi government. The actual numbers are likely much higher because the U.S. military from 2004-2005 was only casually collecting data on Iraqi violence, resulting in very low numbers for those first two years, while icasualties only uses Western sources for its statistics, and notes that it misses many fatalities. Both tend to drag down the averages. In 2004 for example, if only Brookings and Iraq Body Count are used, and not the U.S. forces’ numbers, there would be an average of 37.9 killed per day instead of 28.8. Likewise, at the height of the fighting in Iraq in 2006, icasualties only recorded around two-thirds as many deaths as Brookings, Iraq Body Count, and the Americans.

Overall, Iraq has hit what some U.S. officers have called the “irreducible minimum.” That means most of the militias and insurgents have been disbanded, disbursed, killed, arrested, or turned, leaving only the most irreconcilable to continue on with the fight. It would require political compromises to change this current status quo. Iraq Body Count, in an end of the year report “Iraqi deaths from violence in 2010,” came to a similar conclusion, predicting that violence in Iraq would continue at the same level for the foreseeable future. While many Iraqis are moving on with their life, and the security situation has dramatically improved with the end of the civil war, several thousand Iraqis will continue to die each year until the political and economic situation improves in the country.

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Iraq: December the least deadly month of the year,” 1/1/11

Cordesman, Anthony, “Victory And Violence In Iraq: Reducing the ‘Irreducible Minimum,’” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2/25/08

Dunlop, W.G., "2010 Iraq death toll tops 2009: government," Agence France Presse, 1/1/10

icasualties

Iraq Body Count, “Iraqi deaths from violence in 2010,” 12/30/10
- “Monthly table”
- “Recent Events”

O’Hanlon, Michael Livingston, Ian, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 12/9/10

AL-SABAH CARTOON: "You are accused of integrity"

Source: Al-Sabah, 1/7/11 via MEMRI Blog

Iraq’s Parliament Approves Creation Of Three Vice Presidencies

On January 9, 2011 Iraq’s parliament passed a new law creating three vice presidencies. The positions will be funded from President Jalal Talabani’s office, rather than having their own budget. A member of the Kurdish Coalition said that Talabani will now have the power to select his deputies. It’s assumed that former Vice Presidents Tariq al-Hashemi of the Renewal Party, which is part of Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement, and Adel Abdul Mahdi of the Iraqi National Coalition’s Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) will retain their positions. Who will be the third vice president is still up in the air. As reported before, the Turkmen Front from the National Movement is demanding that they receive the office. Both Kurdish President Massoud Barzani and Iraqi President Talabani have voiced support for this idea, so it may be just a matter of finding the right politician to fill the spot.

Unlike previous governments, the president and vice presidents will have no powers this time around. In 2004 the outgoing Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) created the three person Presidential Council to represent Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. Mahdi, Hashemi, and Talabani filled those slots respectively. Each member had veto power over any legislation. The Council has now been dissolved, and the presidency will revert to a symbolic head of state as is common in many other countries. The vice presidents are completely unnecessary however, and are simply being created to maintain the ethnosectarian quota system within the new government, and reward all the parties in the national unity coalition. The third presidency specifically is being created just to give the image that a minority is in a leading position in Iraq. This is part of the government inflation process that has gone on since Maliki won his second term. Probably the best that can be said about this situation is that each vice president isn’t going to have their own independent budget, which would be an added cost to the state, but will rather be funded from existing monies allotted for Talabani.

SOURCES

Ali, Saman, “Parliament voted for 1-3 presidential vices,” AK News, 1/9/11

Alsumaria, "Iraq Parliament to approve 3 Vice Presidents," 1/10/11

Collier, Robert, “Iraqi constitution in danger of being undone by factions,” San Francisco Chronicle, 3/9/04

Al-Ziyadi, Kholud, “Parliament passes bill permitting 3 Vice Presidents,” AK News, 1/9/11

Sadr’s Return To Public View

On January 5, 2011 Moqtada al-Sadr returned to Iraq. It was not the first time he’d come back since his self-imposed exile in 2007. It was also not his first public appearance. Sadr had increasingly been making trips outside of Iran since 2009. In fact, Sadr had been building up to this event for quite some time.

In February 2007, Moqtada al-Sadr left Iraq for Iran. Sadr was afraid that the U.S. was going to target him as part of the Surge, and he was also losing control over his militia, the Mahdi Army, which had grown exponentially since the start of the sectarian civil war far beyond anything he’d imagined. He thought religious training in Iran would reform his image, and give him greater standing amongst the public. That same month, Sadr actually tried to go back to his hometown, Najaf, but turned around and went back to Iran when he heard that U.S. checkpoints had been established along the road to the city. In May, he did make it back, and even gave a sermon on May 15 in Kufa, Najaf. Sadr might have actually been in the country for several months before that. General Ray Odierno, who was then General David Petraeus’ number two in Iraq, said that Sadr was in Iraq to re-organize his movement that was increasingly fracturing. 

On March 29, 2008 Sadr was seen again, this time in an interview with Al-Jazeera because his movement was in crisis again. At the time, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had launched an offensive against the Sadrists in Basra, which spread to the rest of southern Iraq and Baghdad. Sadr was asked by Al-Jazeera whether the Mahdi Army was still under his control, and he said that the majority was. He then went on to call for Arab governments to support him as the legitimate opposition to the U.S. occupation in Iraq. The next month there was a report that he came back to Iraq temporarily, probably to assess Maliki’s offensive. What ended up happening was that the government crushed most of his militia, hundreds of his fighters were killed or arrested, and the Mahdi Army leadership went into hiding or fled to Iran like Sadr himself.

Sadr’s March 2008 interview with Al-Jazeera

After those setbacks, Sadr began rehabilitating his image. That came in preparation for the March 2010 parliamentary elections. First, in April 2009 Sadr traveled to Turkey where he met top officials, and members of his own movement. Those included Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Recept Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul, along with 70 top leaders from the Sadr Trend. Sadr told the press that he had given up on the armed struggle against the United States, and that his followers would be concentrating upon politics. One member said that Sadr would be returning to Iraq soon. In July, Sadr was seen again, this time visiting Syrian politicians in Damascus. He went back a year later to meet with President Bashar al-Assad, and Iyad Allawi to talk about forming a new government after the March 2010 election. All of those meetings were meant to show the new Sadr. One who was not only an influential man in Iraq, but a regional figure as well, capable of having high level discussions with men like President Assad and Premier Erdogan.

Sadr meeting with Allawi in Damascus, July 2010. It was meetings like these that were meant to show Sadr in a new light as a political leader in Iraq (New York Times)

The Sadrists’ surprising showing in the 2010 vote, and their role as kingmakers in assuring Prime Minister Maliki of a second term in office, led to Sadr’s return to Iraq. 2007-2008 were years of crisis for the Sadr Trend, with militiamen breaking away and preying upon their own people, Iran trying to co-opt his movement and control Sadr, while Maliki went from an ally to an enemy. Rather than making a dramatic return during those periods, Sadr is now coming back when his movement has proven itself to be a force in Iraqi politics. Part of the reason why he left in 2007, was to rehabilitate his image and movement. That played a role in his 2009 appearances where he met with regional leaders in Turkey and Syria. He probably feels that this endeavor now has to be done in person, rather than from Iran, which is why he is back. Whether he can stick to politics is his next challenge. Iraq does have a new status quo where most parties are focusing upon parliament, the premier, and the cabinet, which offers many opportunities for Sadr, but he could also fail unless he and his followers show more discipline and maturity than they did in the past. That breakdown was why he left the country in 2007, and whether he stays this time may be determined by whether he is successful or not.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraq radical cleric meets fellow Shiites,” 5/2/09
- “Iraqi cleric Sadr visits Syria from exile in Iran,” 7/17/10

Associated Press, “Shiite militia may be disintegrating,” 3/21/07

Baker, Peter, DeYoung, Karen, Ricks, Thomas, Tyson, Ann Scott, Warrick, Joby, and Wright, Robin, “Among Top Officials, ‘Surge’ Has Sparked Dissent, Infighting,” Washington Post, 9/9/07

Cobanoglu, Cagri, “Al-Sadr asks Ankara to play bigger role in Middle East,” Today’s Zaman, 5/4/09

DPA, “Iraqi cleric Moqtada al-Sadr arrives in Syria,” 7/20/09

Fayad, Ma’ad, “Iran Ordered Muqtada al-Sadr to Return to Al-Najaf – Iraqi Sources,” Asharq Alawsat, 4/14/08

Al-Jazeera, “Al-Sadr calls for support of Arab states – 29 Mar 08,” 3/29/08

Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Thu: The Convention,” IraqSlogger.com, 5/6/09

Myers, Steven Lee, “Sadr Calls for New Iraqi Government,” New York Times, 7/19/10

Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Sadr Casts a Shadow Over Bush-Maliki Meeting,” Washington Post, 11/30/06

Rahimi, Babak, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr Seeks Regional Influence with Visit to Ankara,” Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 5/26/09

Reuters, “Iraq’s Sadr back in Iran – U.S. military sources,” 7/8/07

Ricks, Thomas and Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Sadr Back in Iraq, U.S. Generals Say,” Washington Post, 5/25/07

Roggio, Bill, “Attacking Sadr’s Mahdi Army,” Long War Journal.org, 5/26/07

Sadr’s Return To Iraq May Be Permanent

On January 5, 2011 Moqtada al-Sadr returned to Iraq. He flew into his hometown of Najaf from Iran. Initial reports were unsure whether this was a short-stay or whether Sadr was moving back to Iraq for the long haul. The Washington Post quoted a spokesman for the Sadrists office in Najaf that Sadr was back for good. His arrival in Iraq set off all kinds of speculation about what it means for his movement and Nouri al-Maliki’s newly seated government.

Sadr comes back to Iraq on the coattails of his party’s accomplishments in the 2010 parliamentary elections. The Sadr trend won the most seats within the Iraqi National Alliance, walking away with 39 out of 70 seats. The Sadrists had proposed the National Alliance back in August 2009 to try to re-unite the fractured Shiite parties that had run together as the United Iraqi Alliance in the 2005 balloting. The list would eventually include the Sadrists, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), the Fadhila Party, the National Reform Trend, and independents. They were not successful however, in convincing Maliki and his State of Law to join them. After the March election, the Sadrists became one of the strongest opponents to a second term for the premier. Sadr went as far as to call Maliki a liar in April. Then suddenly, the party made an about face and came out for the prime minister on October 1. That made the Sadrists kingmakers as they assured Maliki that he would stay in office. In return, the premier has released an estimated 1,500 Sadrists from jail, given the movement six ministries, the deputy speaker of parliament, and the governorship of Maysan. Being in the ascendancy, Sadr decided it was the right time to end his self-imposed exile in Iran so that he could lead his movement in person, rather than by proxy and through statements.

Sadr’s return also shows the new alliance with Maliki. Sadr still has an arrest warrant hanging over his head for the murder of Ayatollah Abdul al-Khoei. Al-Khoei was a moderate Shiite cleric who the U.S. was hoping would help them in Iraq. (1) In early April 2003 he flew into the country from exile in England. A few days later, Sadrists stabbed him to death inside the Imam Ali shrine in Najaf. The move was an attempt to assert themselves as the upstart Shiites against the establishment clergy. An Iraqi court quickly issued an arrest warrant for Sadr, along with two of his lieutenants, Mustafa al-Yacoubi and Riyad al-Nouri. Yacoubi was later arrested by U.S. forces, which set off the first Sadrist uprising in southern Iraq in April 2004. The case is still pending, but a newly elected Sadrist parliamentarian dismissed it, saying that it was made by a previous government that was out to get the Sadr movement, and deny them a role in post-Saddam politics. A lawmaker from State of Law also said that the government had no intention of following through with this issue. This quid pro quo could cause problems for Maliki later on. The prime minister built most of his current standing upon his crackdown on the Mahdi Army in early 2008. His list is called State of Law, which he claimed brought security and stability to the country. Now the premier is ignoring the law, by not arresting Sadr, and letting him return to Iraq as payoff for backing him in the government formation process. It shows that politics trumps justice in the new Iraq.

What Sadr does next is the big question. He’s supposed to make his first address after arriving in Najaf on January 8, to lay out his program. Some early targets for the Sadrist camp are probably finding jobs for their followers through the ministries they control, asserting themselves in parliament, and building up patronage systems to bring in new recruits. Sadr can only hope to build upon his success, as he definitely aspires to be a national leader. He could become a rival to Maliki without holding any official office. That will only happen if the Trend continues to focus upon politics and services. That’s always been a problem for Sadr. In 2005 when he tried to join the new government after the U.S. handed over sovereignty, his movement split, and he ended up turning his back on politics to try to win back the street. That backfired as well as his followers became predators on their own people after they’d purged many Sunnis from various neighborhoods across central Iraq. Whether his movement will have more discipline this time and remain focused upon building up their standing through legitimate means is what needs to be closely monitored and analyzed.

FOOTNOTES

1. Collier, Robert, “Iraq’s Shiites show strength on once-banned pilgrimage,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/23/03

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraqi cleric implores followers to show discipline,” Associated Press, 1/6/11

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AL-SABAH CARTOON: Corruption In Iraq: "Personal privileges" sucking dry the "public budget"

Source: Al-Sabah, 1/5/11 via MEMRI Blog