In February 2013, Foreign Affairs published an article, “Back in Black The Return of Muqtada al-Sadr” by Eli Sugarman and Omar
al-Nidawi. It covered Moqtada al-Sadr’s attempt to transform himself from a
militia leader to a politician. Sadr’s list did well in the 2010 elections, and
he has been meeting with other political leaders, and challenged Prime Minister
Nouri al-Maliki since then. Below is an interview with Omar al-Nidawi about his
thoughts on Sadr’s attempt to remake himself.
Sadr has tried to change his image from a militia leader to
a political leader in recent years by conducting meetings such as these with
Iyad Allawi (Al Jazeera)
1. In the last few
years Moqtada al-Sadr has gone through quite a transformation. After the 2003
invasion he was known as being a staunch opponent of the U.S. occupation, and a
militia leader whose forces were responsible for much of the cleansing of
Baghdad of Sunnis. In your article you wrote that Sadr bragged about being able
to kill Sunnis during the civil war. Can you explain what he said and meant?
I think what Sadr
meant at the time was that there was a growing Sunni militant threat and that
he was ready to exterminate Sunnis if that was necessary. In the article we
were referring to a specific remark Sadr made during the times of sectarian
violence, and can be seen on YouTube, in which said that he was ready to kill
the “Nawasib”, a term loosely used in Shiite literature to refer to Sunni
Muslims, and that he had the religious cover to do so. Of course at that time
there were also radical Sunni clerics who said the same about killing Shiite
Muslims. Perhaps if you confront either side today they would claim that their
rhetoric was directed only against Al-Qaeda or Iran’s agents, respectively and
that they never wanted to harm ordinary Sunni or Shiite Iraqis. But we all know
that in fact it was the ordinary innocent civilians who paid the highest price
in that war.
2. Today Sadr is
trying to transform his image into being a politician. In 2010, his Ahrar bloc
did quite well winning 40 seats in parliament. Who would be his greatest rivals
in the upcoming elections in April 2013 and the parliamentary vote in 2014?
Sadr is still
competing exclusively for Shia votes. On the national level, in light of the
decline of other Shia parties like Fadhila and Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq
(ISCI), the latter also fragmented and its Badr wing is now aligned with Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the main competition will be Maliki’s Dawa party and
its allies, including the political wing of the Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH). On the
provincial level ISCI and Fadhila could still pose a challenge to Sadr in their
traditional strongholds in the provinces of Najaf and Maysan, and to some
extent Basra too.
3. After the 2010
vote, Sadr became the kingmaker in Iraqi politics when he threw his support
behind Nouri al-Maliki allowing him to remain premier for a second term. Since
then the two have had a rough relationship with Sadr often criticizing the
prime minister’s rule. Has Sadr taken any substantive actions against Maliki or
is he just taking verbal jabs at him?
I think Sadr’s
decision to join with Massoud Barzani and Ayad Allawi in spring-summer 2012 in
calling for a vote of no confidence against Maliki was more than just rhetoric.
Sadr also worked with Iraqiya and the Kurds against Maliki in Parliament,
including preventing Maliki from dissolving the Election Commission in late
2011, and passing a term-limiting bill in January that in theory prevents
Maliki from running for office again.
4. What is Sadr
attempting to achieve with these attacks upon the prime minister?
Sadr’s relationship
with Maliki has always been turbulent and fraught with sharp shifts in
attitudes from all-out armed confrontations to uneasy alliances. They don’t
trust each other, and because they both seek to be #1 Maliki will continue to
see Sadr as a threat, while Sadr will continue to view Maliki as an obstacle. I
believe that Sadr sees in the current crisis between Maliki on one hand, and
Iraqiya and Kurds on the other an opportunity to pile on the pressure and
present himself and his party to Kurds and Sunnis as an alternative partner
that can replace Maliki as the Shiite component in a new government.
5. Do you think such
an alliance is possible given Sadr’s past militia activities, etc.?
I think it’s theoretically possible, but also quite
unlikely. The three can try to work together and they might even be able to
maintain a working alliance until the point Maliki is removed, which is quite a
task, but beyond that point it will be very difficult for the Kurds, Sunnis and
Sadrists to work together to form a new government. The problem here is that
these three groups are united only by their mutual opposition to Maliki, but
have very little in common aside from that. Each one of the three groups wants
the help of other two to get rid of Maliki, but they are all quite suspicious,
and have good reasons to be, of each other’s view of what the replacement
should look like.
6. What has been
Sadr’s position on the protests now occurring in Anbar, Salahaddin, Ninewa,
Diyala, and parts of Baghdad, and how does it play into his larger political
strategy?
Sadr has been
cautiously supportive of the protests and Sunni demands. The expression of
support is a typical ‘enemy of my enemy is my friend’ situation. Sadr couldn’t
possibly care about Sunni prisoners or other forms of discrimination against
Sunni provinces and their residents. Supporting the protests, however, gives
Sadr a chance to find new, and unlikely allies against Maliki. Sadr has been
cautious though, and had to politely object to some Sunni demands, particularly
when it comes to the deBaathification and counter-terrorism laws. These are
sensitive issues for his platform and constituency, and supporting Sunni
demands in this area could be very damaging to his image among Iraq’s Shia.
7. Maliki took on
Sadr in 2008 when he went after his militia in Basra, Maysan, and Baghdad. Do
you think the premier could once again take on Sadr if he feels threatened by
him?
I actually do not
think Sadr can pose a military threat to Maliki at this stage. While Sadr’s
militia shrank considerably since 2008, national security forces, which Maliki
commands, have become substantially stronger and more capable.
8. Do you believe
that Maliki is currently playing on the League of the Righteous to cut into Sadr’s
base?
This appears to be
one important purpose that relations with AAH serve. But encouraging AAH to
join politics and lower its military profile also means Maliki and Iraq’s
security forces have one less security threat to worry about.
9. Does Sadr think he
has a chance to move up and join the marjaiya, the Najaf ayatollahs?
The succession
process has standards and requirements that have been followed for centuries,
and I doubt Sadr could compete for the top Ayatollah position that Ali Al-Sistani
currently holds. For a cleric to assume this position he needs to be recognized
by his peers and the public as the most knowledgeable. Sadr can challenge the
mainstream establishment, but it would be very difficult for him to overtake
it.
10. Ultimately, what
is Sadr’s vision of how Iraq should look?
Sadr is a radical
Shia Islamist, so for him Ideally Iraq would be a theocracy roughly similar to
Iran’s in which he would have a role not so dissimilar to Khamenei’s. But since
in reality this is very unlikely given Iraq’s demographics, Sadr would perhaps
settle for a role similar to or slightly more robust than Hezbollah’s in
Lebanon.
SOURCES
Sugarman, Eli and Al-Nidawi, Omar, “Back in Black The Return
of Muqtada al-Sadr,” Foreign Affairs, 2/11/13
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