Review Sam Faddis, The CIA War In Kurdistan, The Untold Story Of The Northern Front In The Iraq War, Casemate, 2020

Faddis, Sam, The CIA War In Kurdistan, The Untold Story Of The Northern Front In The Iraq War, Casemate, 2020

 

Sam Faddis was the head of a CIA team sent into Iraqi Kurdistan to help prepare for the 2003 invasion. His experience was a microcosm of how dysfunctional the entire U.S. effort was to depose Saddam Hussein. Both the White House and CIA headquarters had their set ideas about how the war was going to go and ignored what Faddis and his team were reporting. He believed this set the stage for the failed U.S. occupation of Iraq.

 

In January 2002 Faddis was told that President Bush was going to invade Iraq that year and that he was going to Kurdistan to garner Kurdish support. The White House wanted a CIA presence in Iraq by March 2002 and some officers had already talked with the two main Kurdish leaders Massoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The U.S. wanted to arm the KDP and PUK and send in special forces to work with them to set the stage for a large U.S. conventional force which was to land in Kurdistan for a northern front which would distract the Iraqis from the main invasion coming from the south. Faddis thought it was a good plan but in practice it was nothing but headaches.

 

Most of the book goes through the major obstacles the U.S. faced in achieving these goals. First, the White House thought Turkey would support the war because it was a NATO ally. It had no knowledge of the long history of Turkey attempting to suppress its Kurdish population and how that made Ankara look towards Saddam as an ally to keep his own Kurds down. The Turks therefore were diametrically opposed to the CIA working with the Kurds. Washington and the Agency pushed ahead anyway despite constant signs Turkey wouldn’t budge. For Faddis this meant all kinds of problems like the Turks demanding they send in military personnel with his CIA team which made the Kurds suspicious and blocking supplies for his unit in Kurdistan.

 

Second, the Bush administration wanted an Arab force to fight alongside the American troops. Faddis’ superiors assigned him the task of training and arming a group of opposition fighters called the Scorpions. He objected saying the Kurds were already armed and organized and could do whatever tasks the CIA wanted. He was told the Scorpions were the priority because they were Arabs. They were completely unqualified and when it came down to doing operations they refused and went home. Faddis warned his superiors about their faults the entire time but was ignored.

 

Third, the U.S. promised the Kurds they would be armed with modern weapons and never delivered. This was because the Turks blocked supplies going to Kurdistan. Again, Faddis blamed DC for not listening to him about how much Ankara was against working with the Kurds.

 

Last, when the U.S. military arrived for the 2003 invasion they were told by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld not to work with Faddis and his CIA operatives. In one instance an Iraqi corps commander and the governor of Ninewa province were ready to surrender to the CIA and the Kurds but Rumsfeld said that the Iraqis could only give up to the military. The U.S. officer in charge in the north met with the Iraqis and insulted them leading them to walk out. Faddis thought this was a strategic mistake because the Americans could have used the Iraqi troops to secure Ninewa but instead a very small U.S. force was left to do the job which proved impossible. Rumsfeld’s decision also came out of his anger that the CIA was behind the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan with the military only playing a supporting role.

 

Faddis’ conclusions are deeply critical of the Bush administration. He thought the White House had set ideas about how the invasion was to play out and refused to listen to anyone with a different opinion. That also meant it wasn’t willing to change its policies when they failed like with Turkey. This hubris continued into the occupation of the country which turned out to be a disaster as U.S. officials never took the time to talk to Iraqis or even Americans out in the field. The author believed this showed a larger structural problem with the American government which always thinks it can solve problems but likes to impose ideas from the top ignoring those on the ground.

 

Link to all of Musings On Iraq’s book reviews listed by topic