Intentions Of Iraq's Displaced

On June 1, 2009 the International Organization for Migration (IOM) released a report on the intentions of Iraq's internal refugees. The IOM is the main non-governmental organization working with Iraq's displaced. They work as partners with the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration, and have done extensive polling of Iraqis. Their main focus is upon the estimated 1.6 million people who lost their homes after the February 2006 Samarra bombing, which set off the sectarian war. While this report finds that the majority of Iraqis wish to return to their homes, they are finding problems doing so.

The majority of displacement in Iraq happened after February 2006. Of those surveyed, only 4.5% said they had lost their homes before 2006. In contrast, 67.8% were displaced in 2006, followed by 25.6% in 2007. Only 2.0% reported that they were displaced in 2008. Sulaymaniya and Tamim were the only two provinces that broke that pattern with the 49% or more being displaced in 2007 instead of 2006.

Date of Displacement

Province	Before 2006	2006	2007	2008
Iraq	4.5%	67.8%	25.6%	2.0%
Anbar	0.5%	87.2%	9.9%	1.9%
Babil	7.4%	85.0%	7.3%	0.3%
Baghdad	1.4%	75.4%	22.5%	0.7%
Basra	1.1%	70.9%	27.9%	0.0%
Diyala	1.9%	54.1%	42.7%	1.1%
Dohuk	5.5%	53.5%	35.4%	5.7%
Dhi Qar	2.1%	90.6%	6.7%	0.1%
Irbil	9.3%	49.0%	39.8%	1.3%
Karbala	0%	85.2%	14.5%	0.0%
Maysan	1.0%	94.8%	4.0%	0.1%
Muthanna	19.5%	46.3%	33.8%	0.1%
Najaf	23.0%	63.1%	13.9%	0%
Ninewa	1.0%	67.5%	23.7%	7.7%
Qadisiyah	1.6%	92.9%	5.6%	0%
Salahaddin	18.2%	56.0%	25.6%	0.1%
Sulaymaniya	4.5%	41.7%	50.1%	3.2%
Tamim	8.6%	22.9%	49.3%	19.2%
Wasit	1.3%	50.5%	48.1%	0.1%

63.2% of the internal refugees came from Baghdad, which was ground zero for the sectarian war. Central, western, and northern Iraq were the other violent areas where people were forced to leave. Southern Iraq was a distant third since it was mostly Shiite. The fighting there largely revolved around disputes between Shiite militias, such as the Badr Brigade and the Mahdi Army.

Origins of Displacement By Province

Baghdad	63.2%
Diyala	18.7%
Ninewa	6.0%
Salahaddin	3.3%
Tamim	3.0%
Anbar	2.6%
Basra	1.6%
Babil	1.0%
Irbil	0.2%
Wasit	0.2%
Dhi Qar	0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion of Displaced

Shiite Arab	56.8%
Sunni Arab	30.8%
Sunni Kurd	4.1%
Assyrian Christian	2.9%
Chaldean Christian	1.8%
Shiite Turkmen	1.2%
Sunni Turkmen	0.9%
Shiite Kurd	0.6%
Armenian Christian	0.1%
Arab Yazidi	0.1%
Kurd Yazidi	0.1%

Displacement in Iraq followed a broad pattern. 56.8% of Iraq's internal refugees are Shiite. The majority of them were displaced either within Baghdad or moved south to Babil, Basra, Karbala, Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiya, Dhi Qar, or Wasit. 34.9% of the displaced are Sunni, either Arab or Kurd. They tended to move west to Anbar or north to Irbil, Salahaddin, Sulaymaniya, or Tamim. Finally, the northern provinces of Diyala, Dohuk, and Ninewa have a mixed population of Iraqi refugees. In Diyala, the majority, 57.9%, are Sunni Arabs, but almost a third of the rest, 31.7% are Shiite Arabs. 50% of Dohuk's displaced are either Sunni Kurds, 39.3%, or Chaldean Christians, 30.6%. Finally Ninewa was one of only two provinces where the largest displaced group was not Arab. There 40.4% were Assyrian Christians, followed by Sunni Arabs, 24.4%, Sunni Turkmen, 12.3%, and Chaldean Christians, 11.2%. That province is known for its large minority population.

Provinces With Predominately Displaced Shiites

Babil	94.8% Shiite Arab, 81.5% from Baghdad
Baghdad	72.4% Shiite Arab, 83.2% from Baghdad
Basra	99.7% Shiite Arab, 52.4% from Baghdad, 26.0% from Salahaddin
Dhi Qar	99.5% Shiite Arab, 65.5% from Baghdad, 14.0% from Salahaddin
Karbala	98.5% Shiite Arab, 57.0% from Baghdad, 27.6% from Diyala
Maysan	99.9% Shiite Arab, 83.4% from Baghdad
Muthanna	99.5% Shiite Arab, 69.6% from Baghdad, 13.6% from Diyala
Najaf	97.8% Shiite Arab, 84.1% from Baghdad
Qadisiyah	99.6% Shiite Arab, 77.7% from Baghdad
Wasit	98.3% Shiite Arab, 66.8% from Baghdad

Provinces With Predominately Displaced Sunnis

Anbar	98.4% Sunni Arab, 74.9% from Baghdad
Irbil	39.4% Sunni Kurd, 34.4% Sunni Arab, 15.3% Chaldean Christian, 50.3% from Baghdad, 43.1% from Ninewa
Salahaddin	96.7% Sunni Arab, 50.1% from Baghdad, 14.6% from Tamim, 11.9% from Basra, 10.6% from Diyala
Sulaymaniya	60.1% Sunni Arab, 24.7% Sunni Kurd, 46.9% from Baghdad, 44.9% from Diyala
Tamim	53.5% Sunni Arab, 19.5% Sunni Kurd, 16.0% Shiite Turkmen, 24.4% from Diyala, 23.7% from Tamim, 15.8% from Salahaddin, 15.4% from Ninewa, 14.8% from Baghdad

Provinces With Mixed Displaced Populations

Diyala	57.9% Sunni Arab, 31.7% Shiite Arab, 92.8% form Diyala, 16.1% from Baghdad
Dohuk	39.3% Sunni Kurd, 30.6% Chaldean Christian, 52.5% from Baghdad, 46.0% from Ninewa
Ninewa	40.4% Assyrian Christian, 24.4% Sunni Arab, 12.3% Sunni Turkmen, 11.2% Chaldean Christian, 47.5% from Baghdad, 42.5% from Ninewa

The major point of the June 2009 IOM report was to note the intentions of Iraq's displaced. 58.0% said they wanted to return to their place of origin. 21.4% said they wanted to stay where they were, 19.1% wanted to settle in some new location, either within Iraq or in another country, while 1.4% said they didn't know yet. This varied across the country however. Najaf, 94.1%, Diyala, 81.7%, and Anbar 81.3%, had the most responses for people that wanted to go back to their homes. Basra, 5.5%, and Wasit, 5.8%, had the least. 82.9% of the displaced in Basra said they wanted to stay there, while only 2.3% of the people in Anbar wanted to do so.

Intentions Of The Displaced

Province	Integrate into Location of Displacement	Settle in New Location	Return to Place of Origin	Waiting to Make Decision
Iraq	21.4%	19.1%	58.0%	1.4%
Anbar	2.3%	13.8%	81.3%	2.0%
Babil	26.2%	28.6%	44.5%	0.6%
Baghdad	8.2%	11.3%	79.1%	1.2%
Basra	82.9%	11.1%	5.5%	0.3%
Dhi Qar	57.6%	11.3%	30.7%	0.2%
Diyala	7.3%	10.9%	81.7%	0.0%
Dohuk	57.0%	23.1%	19.7%	0.2%
Irbil	18.3%	13.5%	67.4%	0.1%
Karbala	26.3%	26.6%	46.4%	0.6%
Maysan	28.1%	28.0%	40.7%	3.1%
Muthanna	34.8%	18.1%	45.1%	1.9%
Najaf	4.5%	0.1%	94.1%	1.0%
Ninewa	7.0%	33.0%	59.2%	0.7%
Qadisiyah	40.9%	35.3%	23.7%	0.1%
Salahaddin	12.5%	39.0%	43.5%	4.7%
Sulaymaniya	27.1%	8.3%	64.4%	0.2%
Tamim	22.2%	3.5%	71.3%	3.0%
Wasit	54.4%	37.8%	5.8%	2.0%

While 58.0% of displaced Iraqis want to return to their homes, the previous May 2009 report by the IOM worried that many of them may never have this opportunity. According to the United Nations' latest estimates, only 600,830 displaced Iraqis have gone back so far from 2003 to 2008. Almost 200,000 of these were Iraqis that had lost their homes during Saddam, the U.S. invasion, or subsequent fighting in places like Fallujah. That would mean only about 400,000 of the 1.6 million that lost their homes after the Samarra bombing have returned so far. The plight of the displaced in Iraq is an important indicator of the general situation within the country. So few displaced coming back, shows that Iraq is still an unstable country. There is still violence, although at much lower levels than before. The 2009 Iraqi elections did not settle much politically, but instead marked a new struggle for power between Maliki, his former allies, and independents. The government is still unable to provide many basic services, and the economy is especially bad for young people and women. All together this has given only a small fraction of Iraq's displaced a reason to go back home, even though a majority want to. The IOM and other groups are increasingly fearful that Iraq's refugees may become a permanent class of displaced people if things do not progress inside Iraq.

SOURCES

International Organization for Migration, "IOM Emergency Needs Assessments Post February 2006 Displacement In Iraq 1 June 2009 Monthly Report," 6/1/09

- "IOM Monitoring And Needs Assessments of Iraqi Return, May 2009," May 2009

United Nations High Commission for Refugees, "UNHCR Iraq Operation Monthly Statistical Update on Return – March 2009," UNHCR, March 2009

Baghdad-Kurdistan Divide Could Lead To Break Up Of Iraq Argues Journal Piece

In the Spring 2009 edition of the journal Middle East Policy, Professors Gareth Stansfield and Liam Anderson in their article “Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” argue that the growing conflict between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) could bring down the government, and possibly lead to the break-up of Iraq. Many commentators have pointed out the seriousness of this issue, but still think that the sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shiites is more important. Stansfield and Anderson believe that no other problem is as central to the future of Iraq. The oil law, the constitution, Kirkuk and other disputed territories, and federalism are all tied to the differences between the central government and Kurdistan. The relations between the two sides has only grown worse since 2008 as both have become distrustful of the others’ intentions. That leaves little room for compromise, and increases the chance for violence.

Many western views of Iraq are based upon past experiences, which makes analysis of newer ones sometimes difficult. For example, many believe that reconciliation between Sunnis and Shiites is the most important issue due to the sectarian war of 2006-2007. If that’s not resolved many believe that Iraq will fall back into civil war. Iraqi nationalism is also making a comeback, which some hope will unify the country and balance outside influences like Iran’s. Commentators do note the conflict between Baghdad and Kurdistan, but think its secondary to sectarianism. They also think that because Turkey and Iran are opposed to Kurdish independence, that it will never happen. Stansfield and Anderson counter that no other issue as important as this one.

After the 2005 provincial and parliamentary elections the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the two main Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) emerged as the dominant forces in Iraqi politics. The two had been allies since the Iran-Iraq War when both joined with Iran to fight against Saddam Hussein. The U.S. also played a role, supporting the Kurds after the Gulf War, and selecting the SIIC as their main Shiite partner after the 2003 invasion. Together the SIIC and Kurdish parties became the backbone of the Ibrahim al-Jaafari premiership. They were also the main authors of the 2005 constitution, which included federalism, an issue dear to both, and Article 140 that created a process to annex Kirkuk. Later they helped put Nouri al-Maliki in power.

Maliki was considered weak and ineffectual at first, but after the Surge took care of his main rivals, Al Qaeda in Iraq, the Sunni insurgency, and Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia, the state was strengthened, and the Prime Minister began flexing his muscle in 2008. In the process he began moving away from the SIIC, KDP and PUK to assert his independence. He has now fashioned himself as an Iraqi nationalist that wants to stop the Kurds from annexing the disputed territories, including Kirkuk, and amend the constitution to strengthen the central government. Sunni Arabs, Turkmen, and independent Shiites have supported Maliki’s efforts. This has led to increasing tensions with the Kurds, who feel threatened by Maliki’s actions.

The first real confrontation between Baghdad and Kurdistan occurred in the summer of 2008. In July Maliki launched Operation Promise of Good in Diyala. It was supposed to target insurgents and Al Qaeda in Iraq, but quickly turned into a political move by the Prime Minister. In August 2008 he sent the Iraqi Army into the Khanaqin district in northern Diyala. That area had been under Kurdish control since March 2003, and was home to about 4,000 peshmerga. Kurdistan considered it a disputed territory, which they wished to annex. On August 10, the Iraqi Army told the peshmerga they had 24 hours to leave the area, and a week later began forcing out Kurdish parties from government owned buildings. Finally, on September 27 Iraqi police and peshmerga got into a shoot out in the town of Jalawlaa. Things seemed headed for a military confrontation until KRG President Massoud Barzani flew to Baghdad to hold talks with Maliki. With the assistance of the Americans they came up with a deal where the peshmerga and Iraqi security forces would withdraw from the town of Khanaqin, turning over duties there to the local police, while the Iraqi Army would take up patrolling the Arab areas to the south, and the peshmerga the Kurdish areas of the north.

This was the opening shot in changing the dynamic between Baghdad and Kurdistan. After Khanaqin, Maliki went on to confront the Kurds across the disputed territories that stretch from Diyala to Ninewa, to Tamim to Salahaddin. In Mosul, Maliki ordered the Interior Ministry to take over responsibility for security from the peshmerga in November 2008, and began reaching out to the Arab population by offering them reconstruction money. He also set up tribal support councils across all four provinces, and began transferring predominately Kurdish units and Kurdish officers out, and replacing them with Arab ones. This was not only a way to push the Kurds, but for Maliki to build up his own independent power base and armed supporters independent of both the government and the SIIC and Kurds.

The major disputed territory of course is Tamim province, home of Kirkuk. The Kurds claim that Kirkuk is historically theirs, and was Turkified under the Ottomans. When Iraq gained independence the Arab governments, and especially Saddam went on to Arabize the area. Since 2003 the Kurdish leadership has promised their constituency that they would annex the area. During the U.S. invasion they occupied Kirkuk, and then handed it over to the Americans when local Arabs and Turkmen complained about their presence. In 2004 they set up a process of normalization, a census, and then a referendum on the future of Kirkuk in Article 58 of the Transitional Administration Law created by the Coalition Provisional Authority. Then the Kurds had the same measures included in the 2005 constitution in Article 140. The Kurds claim this was a huge sacrifice for them because they could have just kept Kirkuk after 2003. Instead they have tried to work within Iraq’s new political system to legally annex it. The referendum on Kirkuk was supposed to happen by December 31, 2007, but didn’t. It was then extended until June 2008 but with nothing done again. Now the United Nations is supposed to handle Tamim’s future.

The Kurds say the solution to Kirkuk is for Article 140 to be implemented, but other groups in the province would not be happy with that. If there were a referendum, Kirkuk would assuredly be annexed. The problem is that Arabs and Turkmen there would object. They favor equal power sharing amongst the three main groups in the provincial council, and making Tamim an autonomous region. They have become increasingly angered by the Kurds’ expansionist ideas, and treatment by the Kurdish peshmerga and security service the asayesh. Rather than gaining friends to support their aims, the Kurds have created enemies with their policies in the province.

Maliki has inserted himself into this process as well. He has come to the side of the Arabs and Turkmen to frustrate the Kurds’ aspirations for Kirkuk. Like the other disputed areas, the Prime Minister began setting up tribal support councils and Sons of Iraq units in Tamim. This especially angered the Kurds because the councils included many Arab tribes that had fought alongside Saddam’s troops during the Anfal campaign in the 1980s where the government tried to ethnically cleanse the Kurds from northern regions. To drive the point home even more, Maliki helped orchestrate a demonstration of Arabs in two of Tamim’s districts in November 2008 where they chanted an old Baathist slogan replacing Saddam’s name with Kirkuk, “With our souls, with our blood, we sacrifice for you, Kirkuk.” The result of Maliki’s actions has been to ignore Article 140.

This has increasingly frustrated the Kurdish leadership. The KRG has run an extensive public relations campaign in Kurdistan assuring their constituency that Kirkuk would be annexed, and to a lesser extent the other disputed areas. Beginning with Khanaqin, then the other disputed territories, and finally Kirkuk, the Kurds came to distrust Maliki. They openly compared him to Saddam, and said the Prime Minister could no longer be trusted since he wasn’t following the constitution and Article 140. At one meeting, President Barzani even told Maliki, “You smell like a dictator.” As a form of protest, the Kurds held up major legislation in parliament like the provincial election law, the oil law, and amending the constitution. The Kurds were eventually successful in making Maliki back off, but the relationship between Baghdad and Kurdistan, especially between the Prime Minister and President Barzani were ruined in the process. By December 2008, ties between the two sides were at an all time low.

The other major conflict is over politics. Beginning in 2008 Maliki began calling for revisions to the constitution that would strengthen the central government vis a vis the provinces and the KRG. He claims that the constitution reflects the sectarian divide and instability of 2003-2005, and should therefore be amended to reflect the new status quo in Iraq. Maliki would especially like to curtail the Kurds’ oil policy, where they have passed their own law and signed over 20 independent contracts. For the Kurds’ part, they and their allies the Supreme Council were able to dominate the drafting process, and include provisions in it to ensure federalism and Article 140. They claim that this was a major sacrifice because they agreed to a legal framework to annex Kirkuk, rather than take it by force, and shows that they wish to remain part of Iraq in a federal system.

It seems unlikely that Maliki and the Kurds will be able to reconcile on any of these issues. The Prime Minister has pushed and shoved the Kurds over the disputed territories, and allied himself with many of the anti-Kurdish forces in the north, including ones that evoke a dark memory for the Kurds. This has allowed Maliki to create an independent base as well that he used well in the provincial elections. He is also challenging the Kurds’ autonomy by calling for amending the constitution. It’s believed that the 2010 parliamentary elections will only strengthen the Prime Minister more. The question then is what will happen next?

Many believe that Maliki has time on his side. Eventually the central government will have the power to force the Kurds out of the disputed areas for example. Stansfield and Anderson write that ironically, in fashioning himself as the nationalist leader of Iraq, calling for the unity and strength of his country, Maliki may actually lead to its break-up. The Kurds have repeatedly said that they want to stay part of Iraq, but if they are losing on every front, then what motivation will they have to remain part of the country? They will only take losing out on their aspirations and power for so long. Add to this the fact that the conflict could lead to violence. Iraqi forces and the peshmerga have faced off several times since Khanaqin. So far, nothing has come of it, but each time the two sides practice brinkmanship it increases the likelihood of something going wrong.

This is an obvious situation where the United States could play a mediating role. The U.S. has tried to calm nerves in military situations, but on the political side there’s little evidence of much pressure to resolve this growing dispute. On Kirkuk for example, the Americans are now deferring to the United Nations, but they have no hope of bringing the various sides together without the U.S. The policy seems to consist of keeping a lid on possible flashpoints, while letting the Iraqis try to solve their own problems. If something is not done, this feud will only grow in intensity until it reaches the breaking point, and that could either lead to the fall of the Maliki government, or worse, the secession of Kurdistan from Iraq.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Kurdish official condemns Iraqi army raid on Peshmerga HQ,” 8/24/08
- “Military units should be under central govt. control,” 8/19/08

International Crisis Group, “Iraq After The Surge II: The Need for a New Political Strategy,” 4/30/08
- “Shiite Politics In Iraq: The Role Of The Supreme Council,” 11/15/07

Jakes, Lara, “Key UN report to suggest power-sharing plan in Iraq’s divided Kirkuk,” Associated Press, 3/29/09

Paley, Amit, “Strip of Iraq ‘on the Verge of Exploding,’” Washington Post, 9/13/08

Parker, Sam, “Guest Post: Behind the Curtain in Diyala,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 8/20/08

Peterson, Scott, “US referees Iraq’s troubled Kurdish-Arab fault line,” Christian Science Monitor, 10/21/08

Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009

Stansfield, Gareth Anderson, Liam, “Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” Middle East Policy, Spring 2009

Britain Withdraws Combat Troops But Trainers Remain, Could This Be A Blueprint For The U.S.?

On December 23, 2008 Iraq’s parliament passed a bill allowing England and several other members of the Coalition of the Willing to stay in the country until July 2009. The English command set May 31, 2009 as the date they would actually have all combat troops out, and began a quick turnover of facilities to the Iraqis and Americans. With that achieved, London went on to sign an agreement with Baghdad to allow trainers to stay for one more year. Could this be what the U.S. will do when its deadline for withdrawal comes?

Beginning in January 2009, Britain began its pull out from Iraq. Originally 26,000 British took part in the 2003 invasion. That was quickly drawn down to 18,000 by the end of May 2003. A year later there were 8,600, and then 5,500 by May 2007. At the end of 2008 there were around 4,000 English troops still in Iraq. On January 1, 2009 Britain turned over Basra airport to the Iraqis. English troops would remain on the military side of the facility however. By the middle of February it was announced that all of its heavy equipment had been shipped back to England. On March 31, England handed over command of Basra to the Americans. 7,000 U.S. soldiers also moved into Basra to take over many of the jobs the British had previously been doing. At the end of April the English announced that all their combat operations were over. Finally May 31 arrived and all combat troops were pulled out. Within two days London negotiated a deal with Baghdad to allow just under 100 British sailors and five ships to remain in Basra to train the fledgling Iraqi Navy for one-year past the withdrawal deadline.

The Iraq Navy is a small, undermanned, and under equipped force. As of January 2009 there were only 1,898 in the Navy. They are authorized to have 3,596. At the beginning of this year they received 44 small craft, but they lack the personnel, knowledge, and leadership to man all of them. They also have no major ships, although they are to receive two from Italy this year. The British are the main advisors to the Iraqi Navy. Besides the troops in Basra, they have also taken Iraqis to England for further training.

Could the Americans repeat England’s recent experience in Iraq? The British drew down their troops, declared combat operations over, met their deadline to be out by May 2009, and then signed a new agreement to keep trainers in the country for another year. Like the British, the U.S. has also set the end of 2011 as the date that it will be out of Iraq. As reported before, by that time the Iraqi security forces will not be ready to protect the country from external threats. The Iraqi Navy is a perfect example of that as it lacks the personnel and ships to carry out that task right now. When December 31, 2011 approaches then, it’s very likely that both the U.S. and Iraqi military will put pressure on the Obama administration to maintain some kind of U.S. presence in Iraq. It will be up the President then to decide whether keeping perhaps several thousand American advisors in Iraq will break his promise to be out of the country in sixteen months of taking office.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraq and Britain agree draft naval deal,” 6/3/09

Ashton, Adam and Hammoudi, Laith, “What are ‘combat troops’? Iraq withdrawal depends on answer,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/23/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “Britain hands over Basra airport to Iraqi authorities,” 1/1/09

Cordesman, Anthony, “How Soon Is Safe? Iraqi Force Development and ‘Conditions-Based’ US Withdrawals,” 4/20/09

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2009

Evans, Michael, “Basra gets better beds and burgers as US takes over from the British,” Times of London, 2/16/09

The National, “British military operations end in Iraq,” 4/30/09

Robertson, Campbell and Cowell, Alan, “U.S. Takes Over as Britain Begins Basra Pullout,” New York Times, 4/1/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09

Times of London, “Q&A: Iraq inquiry,” 3/26/09

No Decrease In Violence For Mosul In May 2009

As reported before, the number of Iraqis killed declined in May 2009 compared to the previous month. According to Iraq’s ministries 165 people died in May. In April the government said 355 lost their lives. Other organizations that keep track of violence in Iraq had higher numbers, but also noted a drop. That could not be said for Mosul, which is the second deadliest city in Iraq. Last month the number of attacks and deaths went up, with only the wounded decreasing.

According to English-language press reports in May 2009 64 Iraqis were killed in Mosul. That made an average of 2.06 deaths per day. 146 were also wounded, for an average of 4.7 per day. These were the result of 95 attacks and incidents, an average of 3.06 per day. There were two mass casualty bombings that month, one on May 24 that wounded 34, and another on May 1 that killed five and wounded six. There were also a series of deadly home invasions where gunmen stormed houses and killed women and children. In April 53 died, 1.76 per day, and 191 wounded, 6.36 per day, due to 79 attacks and incidents, 2.63 average. From May to April then, the number of security incidents and killed went up, while the wounded went down.

The recent rise in violence has also been occurring while a major joint Iraqi-U.S. military operation has been going on in the city. In February 2009, Baghdad launched Operation New Hope. There are now 36,000 Iraqi soldiers and police, along with 5,000 U.S. troops in the city, in what some think might be the last major U.S. military operation before the withdrawal. The Iraqi units however, are said to be undermanned and underequipped, and the Iraqi Army commander does not think they can do the job without American support. For that reason, U.S. combat troops are expected to stay in the city past the June 30, 2009 deadline for them to be removed from all Iraqi cities. There is also a major U.S. base outside of Mosul that is not expected to be shut down either. This offensive so far, has not had its intended effects as the casualty numbers show.

Like the rest of the country, the number of attacks and casualties in Mosul declined towards the end of 2008 reaching a low in January 2009 as the provincial elections neared. In 2005 the Sunnis boycotted the vote, allowing the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan to take power in Ninewa. The Sunni Arab majority in the province was eager to reverse this turn of events in 2009, and the insurgents seemed to have accommodated them. Since then the number of casualties has been creeping back up in Mosul as the balloting did not end the Arab-Kurdish divide, the major source of violence in the city, but actually seemed to increase it with the election of the al-Hadbaa party to power and the subsequent boycotting of the provincial council by the two major Kurdish parties.

Attack Statistics In Mosul Based Upon Press Reports

May 2009
83 Attacks/Incidents – 3.06 attacks & incidents/day
64 Deaths – 2.06 deaths/day
164 Wounded – 4.70 wounded/day

April 2009
79 Attacks/Incidents – 2.63 attacks & incidents/day
53 Deaths – 1.76 deaths/day
191 Wounded – 6.36 wounded/day

March 2009
86 attacks/incidents – 2.77 attacks & incidents/day
69 deaths – 2.22 deaths/day
169 wounded – 5.45 wounded/day

February 2009
81 attacks/incidents – 2.89 attacks & incidents/day
58 deaths – 2.0 deaths/day
111 wounded – 3.96 wounded/day

January 2009
52 attacks/incidents – 1.67 attacks & incidents/day
56 deaths – 1.80 killed/day
85 wounded – 2.74 wounded/day

December 2008
65 attacks/incidents – 2.09 attacks & incidents/day
68 deaths – 2.19 deaths/day
181 wounded – 5.83 wounded/day

November 2008
65 attacks/incidents – 2.16 attacks & incidents/day
53 deaths – 1.76 deaths/day
249 wounded – 8.3 wounded/day

October 2008
92 attacks/incidents – 2.96 attacks & incidents/day
112 deaths – 3.61 deaths/day
188 wounded – 6.06 wounded/day

SOURCES

Abass, Ali and Dolan, Jack “Grenade hits U.S. convoy in Iraq,” St. Agustine Record, 5/10/09

Agence France Presse, “Iraq Suicide Bomber Wounds 34 in Mosul Shopping Street,” 5/24/09

Ahmed, Hamid, “Iraqi leader calls for anti-corruption campaign,” Associated Press, 5/9/09

Associated Press, “Iraqis fear U.S. pullout of volatile Mosul,” 3/9/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “2 brothers wounded in gunfire in Mosul,” 5/21/09
- “2 civilians killed, injured in Mosul,” 5/25/09
- “2 soldiers wounded in blast in Mosul,” 5/20/09
- “3 civilians wounded in Mosul blast,” 5/30/09
- “3 injured in explosion in Mosul,” 5/28/09
- “3 wounded in car bomb blast in Mosul,” 5/3/09
- “4 wounded in Mosul blast,” 5/8/09
- “Armed attack injures 3 in Mosul,” 5/21/09
- “Baghdadiya TV correspondent dies from blast wounds,” 5/31/09
- “Car bomb defused in Mosul,” 5/8/09
- “Child killed by U.S. fire in Mosul,” 5/7/09
- “Civilian corpse found in Mosul,” 5/19/09
- “Civilian killed, 2 bombs defused in Mosul,” 5/19/09
- “Civilian wounded by bomb blast in Mosul,” 5/5/09
- “Civilian wounded in explosion in Mosul,” 5/12/09
- “Contractor shot down by gunmen in Mosul,” 5/14/09
- “Cop injured, 2 gunmen busted in Ninewa,” 5/5/09
- “Cop killed, civilians wounded in Mosul attack,” 5/9/09
- “Cop killed, gunman wounded in Mosul,” 5/15/09
- “Corpse of abducted Christian child found in Ninewa,” 5/11/09
- “Five wounded in car bomb blast in Mosul,” 5/13/09
- “Gunmen kill cop in Mosul,” 5/4/09
- “Gunmen kill former army officer in Mosul,” 5/11/09
- “Gunmen kill soldier in Mosul,” 5/1/09
- “Gunman wounds 3 female students in Mosul,” 5/25/09
- “IED injures 2 cops in western Mosul,” 5/26/09
- “IED kills cop, injures 6 in central Mosul,” 5/22/09
- “IED wounds 2 civilians in Mosul,” 5/13/09
- “IED wounds 4 civilians in Mosul,” 5/19/09
- “Mosul blast leaves officer killed, 2 wounded,” 5/31/09
- “Mother, daughter killed in Mosul copycat,” 5/28/09
- “Ninewa police defuse 4 IEDs,” 5/23/09
- “Officer wounded by IED in Mosul,” 5/23/09
- “TNT explosives found under bridge in Mosul,” 5/24/09
- “URGENT/ Mosul suicide blast leaves 5 killed, 6 wounded,” 5/1/09
- “Traffic cop wounded by IED in Mosul,” 5/4/09
- “Woman, daughter shot down by gunmen in Mosul,” 5/21/09
- “Woman injured in western Mosul,” 5/22/09

DPA, “Suicide bomber targets Iraqi governor’s house,” 5/18/09

Druzin, Heath, “Coalition forces fight in insurgent stronghold while residents urge U.S. troops to leave Mosul,” Stars and Stripes, 3/8/09

Hammoudi, Laith, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 5 May 2009,” 5/9/09

Hammoudi, Laith and Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 25 May 2009,” 5/25/09

Issa, Sahar and Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 11 May 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 5/11/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 28 May 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 5/28/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 6 May 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 5/6/09

Israel News, “Prison officer gunned down in northern Iraq,” 5/17/09

Kadhim, Hussein, “Roundup of Daily Violence in Iraq-Monday 4 May 2009,” 5/4/09

KUNA, “Car bomb blast kills three civilians in northern Iraq,” 5/3/09

Loyd, Anthony, “US withdrawal from Mosul leads to fear of Iraqi insurgent attacks,” Times of London, 6/1/09

Press TV, “American soldier kill civilian in Iraq,” 5/19/09

Reid, Robert, “Iraq civilian deaths fall after April spike,” Associated Press, 6/1/09

Reuters, “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 4,” 5/4/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 5,” 5/5/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 9,” 5/9/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 11,” 5/11/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 13,” 5/13/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 14,” 5/14/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 15,” 5/15/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 16,” 5/16/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 23,” 5/17/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 23,” 5/23/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 24,” 5/24/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 27,” 5/27/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 29,” 5/29/09
- “Iraq rules out extension of U.S. withdrawal dates,” 5/3/09

Xinhua, “2 policemen killed in Mosul violence,” 5/17/09