Anti-Government Protests In Both Southern and Northern Iraq

In two separate incidents in Karbala in southern Iraq and Pirmargrun in northern Kurdistan Iraqis protested against the government in late-December 2009.

First, on December 23, the town of Pirmargrun in Sulaymaniya province in Kurdistan spontaneously erupted into street protests that quickly turned to rioting. The cause of the disruptions was a speech given by the town’s mayor on TV the day before who complained that inhabitants of Pirmargrun didn’t appreciate the local improvements that he was responsible for. The next day people began gathering in the streets and shouting slogans against government corruption and the lack of services. Half the town allegedly has no water supply, and the other part only receives water for one hour ever couple days according to a local policeman. The protestors went to government buildings and began throwing rocks at them, and eventually blocked off entrances to the town with barricades. The head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in the town and the district chief were both assaulted. Police were called in from the neighboring city of Sulaymaniya, but they were not enough, so the Asayesh security forces and riot police had to be deployed. Seventeen policemen were eventually sent to the hospital, and two armored personnel carriers were destroyed.

On December 24, the mayor apologized for his comments on the air, but that only led to another street protest to his office, which was again struck by rocks and other objects. That march was broken up by gunfire from the PUK headquarters across the street. Pirmargrun was built in 1988 as a refugee camp for Kurds expelled by Saddam’s Anfal campaign in northern Iraq. The inhabitants have been unhappy with their situation for quite some time, and overwhelmingly voted for the Change List in the 2009 Kurdish elections, a new political party that promised better services, and an end to the cronyism and corruption of the two ruling Kurdish parties. These were the largest protests in Kurdistan since 2006 when rioting erupted in Halabja that was also about a lack of services.

A few days later on December 26, around 5,000 Shiite pilgrims to the holy city of Karbala organized protests against the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Thousands of Shiites were coming to the city for the Ashura ceremony. They were greeted by a march, slogans, and signs complaining about corruption in Baghdad, and complaints about the Iranian takeover of a oil well in the Faquil field in Maysan province. The government allegedly tried to block these protests from being broadcast on TV.

Both demonstrations may be a sign of things to come as Iraq heads toward the March 2010 parliamentary elections. Better governance and ending corruption were key issues in the 2009 provincial elections, and many Iraqis seem upset with their current leaders who have done little to address these issues. The likely result is a wide range of parties getting votes in 2010, which will make it all the harder to put together a new ruling coalition.

SOURCES

McDermid, Charles and Rath, Tiare, “Kurdish Town Swept by Day of Rioting,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 12/23/09

Mizher, Qais, “Anti-government protests held in Iraq,” Washington Post, 12/27/09

Najm, Kamaran, “Focus on Kurdish Riots,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 12/24/09

Roads To Iraq, “Thousands of Shiite pilgrims chanted Anti-Iraqi government slogans,” 12/26/09

Islamist Terrorists Return To Sectarian Attacks

Beginning in August 2009 Al Qaeda in Iraq began attacking government institutions. On August 18 they bombed the Foreign Affairs and Finance ministries, killing 101 and wounding 1,023. On October 25 they attacked the Ministry of Justice and the Baghdad provincial council building resulting in 135 casualties. Finally, on December 8 the federal appeals court, a technical college, the headquarters of the state-run Raifdain Bank, and the new offices of the Finance Ministry were all targeted, leading to 127 dead, and around 500 wounded. These spectacular operations grabbed the world’s headlines, as they were the deadliest since the sectarian war of 2006-2007. It also led to reports that the Islamists  were changing their tactics from attacking Shiites to trying to undermine the government, and specifically Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who has been running on improved security for the upcoming March 2010 parliamentary elections. At the end of December 2009 however, Al Qaeda  returned to their old ways attacking both Shiites and Christians during the Ashura ceremony and Christmas holiday.

Baghdad, Karbala, and Mosul have seen over a dozen sectarian attacks in recent days. On December 26, three separate bombings in Baghdad left four Shiite pilgrims heading to Karbala for the religious festival dead, and nineteen wounded. The previous day a bomb went off in the capital killing three more pilgrims and wounding seven. December 24 saw over 31 casualties in Karbala. Nine other bombs were discovered north of the city and defused, while a Christian man was gunned down in the northern city of Mosul. Finally, on December 23, four bombs went off in Baghdad targeting pilgrims leaving 6 dead, and 44 wounded, while two Christian churches in Mosul were attacked resulting in two dead and five wounded. Iraqi nationalist insurgent groups have tried to minimize civilian casualties in recent years, having been turned off by Al Qaeda’s indiscriminate killing of Iraqis. They also do not stress sectarian attacks, which means the Islamists are the main culprits for these terrorist incidents.

Despite the turn towards targeting public institutions in recent months, it seems that the Islamists still hate Shiites and Christians who they see as apostates and symbols of the West. In fact, Al Qaeda tried to legitimize the bombings of government buildings by saying that they were run by Shiites. While the attacks have weakened the standing of Maliki, they remind the public of the extremism of the Islamists. It is exactly these types of sectarian attacks on civilians that led to the majority of the insurgency and the Sunni population to turn on Al Qaeda in Iraq, reducing them from being in the vanguard of the fight against the U.S. and Baghdad to a terrorist organization. Unfortunately, they still get some domestic and foreign support, which will mean these attacks will continue into the foreseeable future.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “2 pilgrims killed, 11 wounded in Baghdad blasts,” 12/26/09
- “2nd attack on Shiite mourners leaves 2 dead, 7 wounded,” 12/23/09
- “9 bombs defused in north of Karbala,” 12/24/09
- “22 pilgrims killed or wounded in Karabala,” 12/24/09
- “31 pilgrims killed, wounded in Baghdad blast,” 12/23/09
- “Attack on Shiite procession leaves 3 killed, 7 wounded in Baghdad,” 12/25/09
- “Bomb targets group reviving Shiite rituals in Baghdad,” 12/23/09
- “Christian killed in eastern Mosul,” 12/24/09
- “ED explodes inside restaurant in Karbala,” 12/24/09
- “IED targeting Shiite procession leaves 10 casualties,” 12/26/09
- “Karbala blast wounds 9 people,” 12/24/09
- “Mosul attack’s casualties up to 7,” 12/23/09

Londono, Ernesto, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq regaining strength,” Washington Post, 11/22/09

Siegel, Pascale Combelles, “Militant Iraqi Nationalists Struggle with Approach to al-Qaeda’s Islamist State of Iraq,” Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 12/23/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” - Chapter 6 Charting A New Course

Chapter 6 of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” report on the American effort to rebuild Iraq focuses upon the first days of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The appointment of Paul Bremer as the new head of the occupation of Iraq would turn out to a fateful one. The lack of coordination and consultation between the different government agencies in charge of Iraq would continue, and Bremer’s first decisions would turn a large segment of the populace against the United States.

In April 2003 Vice President Dick Cheney’s office contacted Paul Bremer about whether he would like to serve in Iraq. Bremer was a former State Department official with no experience in the Middle East, with civilian-military operations, or reconstruction. By the end of that month he had accepted the job, and on May 6 President Bush announced that Bremer would by the U.S. envoy to Iraq. The White House told the press that they wanted to transition Iraq from military to civilian rule, and that this was a first step, but the real reason was that Washington had lost confidence in the head of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) retired General Jay Garner.

At the time, ORHA and Garner had only been in Iraq for one month, and were being overwhelmed by the amount of problems they were facing. There was no government, no electricity, no security, and mass looting was still going on. As reported before, America’s pre-war planning for Iraq had been haphazard, disorganized, and based upon best case scenarios. The U.S. thought that it could go in quick and leave just as fast. The ORHA had neither the staff nor the know how to deal with a country that suddenly found itself with a political and security vacuum after the toppling of Saddam. This led the Bush administration to panic, and make a dramatic about face in strategy from a short stay in Iraq to a long-term occupation symbolized by the replacement of Garner and the ORHA by Bremer and the CPA.

The appointment of Bremer would make the situation little better. First, his arrival continued the disconnected chain of command in Iraq. Bremer reported to President Bush through Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, but Bremer felt he was directly under the President. The Multi-National Forces in Iraq were a separate entity as well. This led to little coordination with both the Defense Department, and the U.S. military, and ultimately with the White House as well, as Bremer would make many decisions on his own without any higher consultation or authorization.

The first problem that occurred was that officials were working at cross-purposes. When Bremer arrived in Iraq in May 2003 Garner, Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. envoy to the Iraqi opposition, and the U.S. military were still thinking in terms of the old policy to create an Iraqi interim government and withdraw. Garner and Khalilzad were consulting with Iraqi leaders, and the head of the Central Command (CENTCOM), General Tommy Franks had issued orders in April to have most U.S. troops home by the end of July 2003. Bremer on the other hand, said that the transition to Iraqi control would take a lot longer than expected. Washington officials would say the same thing such as Rumsfeld telling the press in May that the U.S. could be in Iraq for more than a year. Undersecretary of Defense Doulgas Feith captured this confusion when he told Congress that the U.S. was committed to remaining in Iraq and leaving. In fact, the creation of the CPA was the beginning of an open-ended commitment to stay in the country.

That was implied by Bremer’s political plan that he announced on May 22. He said that the Iraqis would form a governing council, then a constitution, and then hold elections for a permanent government, which could take 1-2 years. As a further sign of the change in policy, in July, the new head of CENTCOM, General John Abizaid halted the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

Bremer than set about issuing a series of orders that would come to haunt the United States’ occupation of Iraq. First CPA Order Number 1 started deBaathification. The idea originally came from Washington where many officials were enthralled with comparing the occupation of Iraq with the post-World War II occupation of Germany. Bremer also liked that analogy, and felt that the deBaathification was a sign that the old Iraq was dead. The order banned the top four ranks of the Baath party from office. It also did away with the top three ranks of management in any government institution. Garner and the CIA Chief in Baghdad both objected to the decree saying that it would create new enemies. Since the state ran everything in Iraq, deBaathification decapitated the already struggling government. Afterward, U.S. officers such as the new commander in Iraq General Ricardo Sanchez and General David Petraeus, who at the time was leading the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul, questioned the entire process, believing that it did more bad than good by turning people against the new Iraq.

Bremer than issued CPA Order Number 2 that disbanded the military in Iraq. It got rid of the Ministries of Defense, Information, and State for Military Affairs, the intelligence services, the National Security Bureau, the Directorate of National Security, and the Special Security Organization. In one fell swoop, Bremer had put 500,000 Iraqis out of a job. This was another reversal from previous plans that envisioned the Iraqi army helping with security and reconstruction after the war. U.S. soldiers and members of the ORHA were even consulting with Iraqi officers to reconstitute their units. Bremer’s national security adviser Walt Slocombe drafted the order, and believed that the Iraqi military had already disbanded itself during the invasion. The idea was sent to Washington where Rumsfeld, the Defense Department, and President Bush okayed the plan. Like CPA Order Number 1, this one caused even more resentment amongst Iraqis. Riots quickly broke out in Baghdad, Mosul, and other cities as unemployed soldiers demanded pay and pensions, and ten days later, Bremer was forced into agreeing to cover those costs. General David Petraeus would later say that this decision helped create a nationalist backlash against the Americans, and fuel the insurgency.

When Bremer was appointed the head of the CPA, the U.S. was already struggling with the situation in Iraq. The country was a collapsed state, and the Bush administration lacked the planning or manpower to handle it. The idea of American officials in Washington and Baghdad was to get out as soon as possible, and turn things over to the Iraqis. Bremer ended all that, and turned the U.S. presence into a prolonged occupation. This angered many Iraqis who had been told that they would soon regain their sovereignty. On top of that, Bremer made a series of fateful decisions that would only make things worse. With deBaathification and demobilizing the military, he turned thousands of Sunnis against the U.S. They simply had no place in the new Iraq, and this dissatisfaction led to militancy. The Americans and Baghdad are still struggling with these orders to this day, as the Iraqi military is a work in progress, and former Baathists and soldiers continue to try to find their place in society.

For previous chapters in Hard Lessons see:

Preface

Part I Planning for Postwar Iraq September 2001 to May 2003

Chapter 2 The Agencies Engage

Chapter 3 The Department Of Defense Takes Charge

Chapter 4 Staging In Kuwait

Chapter 5 ORHA In Baghdad

SOURCES

Foreign Policy, “Seven Questions: The De-Bremerification of Iraq,” January 2008

Gordon, Michael, “Fateful Choice on Iraq Army Bypassed Debate,” New York Times, 3/17/08

Harkavy, “Paper Trails in Iraq,” Village Voice, 9/5/07

Loeb, Vernon and Gellman, Barton, “Rumsfeld foresees year in Iraq,” San Francisco Chronicle, 5/10/03

New York Times, “Bush appoints new overseer to run Iraq,” San Francisco Chronicle, 5/7/03

PBS Frontline, “Interview L. Paul Bremer,” Truth, War and Consequences, 10/9/03
- “Interview Maj. Gen. David Petraeus,” Beyond Baghdad, 2/12/04

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09

Tyler, Patrick, “Big step toward a new Iraq,” San Francisco Chronicle, 7/8/03

More Questions Than Answers On Iran-Iraq Oil Field Dispute

On December 18, 2009 eleven Iranian soldiers stormed Well Number Four in the Fauqi oil field that straddles the Iran-Iraq border, and chased off Iraqi workers who were there. Two days later the Iranians withdrew, although Iraqi officials claim they are still on Iraqi territory. The Iranian action led to protests in Karbala and Anbar, and a tribal council in Basra threatened to retake the oil well by force if Baghdad wasn’t able to reclaim it. Tehran on the other hand, said it was all a misunderstanding that was being blown out of proportion by Iran’s enemies. There are still several unanswered questions as the incident is coming to an end.

First, why were Iraqis at Well Number Four? A sheikh from Maysan’s tribal council said that the Iranians had been acting belligerently around the Fauqi field since the beginning of December, harassing both Iraqi civilians and members of the security forces. Well Number Four is also dormant, and a spokesman from the Oil Ministry said no Iraqi workers had been there to extract oil before the Iranian take over. The two countries have an unwritten agreement not to work on disputed parts of the oil field as well. Given this situation, it would seem a provocative action for Iraqi oil workers to go to Number Four last week, and put up the Iraqi flag. Were they there for some routine maintenance, or did they go there on purpose as part of a tit for tat game the two countries had been playing recently at disputed oil fields along the border?

Second, why has Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki been completely silent on the issue? Iraq’s Interior Minister said it was not a big deal, while the Foreign Ministry said Iraq and Iran would meet soon to work on the border, but Maliki has said absolutely nothing. This seems like an odd thing, especially because the country is in full election mode for the 2010 vote, and the Prime Minister has been running on his nationalist credentials. This has raised questions about Iran’s role in Iraqi politics amongst some.

Despite these questions, this incident is likely to go down as a minor event. It’s not going to change the larger political, economic, and cultural relationship the two countries have forged since the overthrow of Saddam, but it does show there are underlying tensions between the two. It will also provide fodder for nationalists who would like to see that be more of an equal exchange between the two, and who want Tehran’s influence in the government to end.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iran troops still on Iraq’s soil: Iraqi politician,” 12/21/09

Alsumaria, “Hashemi calls on Iran to withdraw from Iraq,” 12/23/09
- “Iran: Iraq border incident misunderstanding,” 12/23/09
- “Iraq awaits Iran troops exit from oil well,” 12/23/09
- “Iraq tribal council forms combat brigades in face of Iranian troops,” 12/23/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Joint committees to determine Fakka oilfield’s fate – amb.,” 12/23/09
- “Parliament to host FM on Iranian violation,” 12/23/09

Lando, Ben, “The Iranian invasion,” Iraq Oil Report, 12/18/09

Latif, Nizar, “Iraq-Iran oil well tensions simmered ‘for weeks,’” The National, 12/21/09

Al-Rafidayn, Al-Sumarianews, Al-Mada, Al-Zaman, “Iranian Occupation of Oil Field in Iraq Unleashes Widespread Anti-Iran Reactions,” MEMRI Blog, 12/23/09

Rao, Prashant, “Iraq protests against Iranian takeover of oil well,” Agence France Presse, 12/18/09

Williams, Timothy and Adnan, Duraid, “Iran-Iraq Standoff Over Oil Field Ends,” New York Times, 12/20/09

Will New Oil Deals Provide Jobs For Iraqis?

Iraq recently completed the second round of bidding on its oil fields, which will hopefully usher in the return of international petroleum companies to Iraq that will bring in much needed investment and know how. This round went much better than the first with deals for seven of the ten fields up for auction. Iraq’s Oil Minister Hussain Shahristani believes that Iraq could reach 12 million barrels a day in capacity in six years as a result, which would make it a rival to the world’s largest producer Saudi Arabia. With such high expectations, many Iraqis, especially in southern Iraq where most of the oil resides, are hoping that this wealth will trickle down in the form of jobs and better services.

Currently southern Iraq has some of the poorest sections of the country despite the huge petroleum reserves. A recent report by the government’s Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology, found that 49% of the population in Muthanna and 41% in Babil lived in poverty, the highest rates in Iraq. Residents of Dhi Qar told Agence France Presse that they didn’t expect much from the new oil deals, feeling that the best jobs would go to those that had political connections or paid bribes. In contrast, the Italian head of Dhi Qar’s Provincial Reconstruction Team, U.S.-funded groups that are aimed at improving the political and economic development of Iraq at the local level, believed that there would be plenty of job opportunities, and the complaints about corruption were overblown. Provincial officials in Basra also expressed similar optimism.

If jobs do appear, they will have to be from spin-offs such as construction and services, because its estimated that Iraq will only need 40,000 new oil workers by 2015. That’s a drop in the bucket when compared to the 250,000 young Iraqis who enter the job market each year. In Wasit for example, the sole foreign petroleum company currently operating in Iraq, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), only hired 450 Iraqis since it started working there in late-2008. They have also been accused of damaging farmland that has set off a wave of protests and small-scale sabotage against the corporation.

The problem as ever is that petroleum is not a labor-intensive industry. There will be a flurry of construction early on to improve the oil fields, which could offer opportunities to Iraqis. After that, probably in the best case, the increased revenues from higher exports will give Baghdad the necessary funds to improve services to placate the public. Otherwise the new oil deals will just give people another excuse to complain about their government.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Southern Iraq town hopes for jobs boom after oil auction,” 12/17/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “COSIT: Unemployment, poverty drop in Iraq,” 12/13/09

BBC, “Iraq oil capacity ‘to reach 12m barrels per day,’” 12/12/09

Gunter, Frank, “Liberate Iraq’s Economy,” New York Times, 11/16/09

Al Jazeera, “Iraq’s oil wealth eludes the poor,” 11/4/09

Yackley, Ayla Jean, “Iraqi oil deals mean reams of steel, miles of pipes,” Reuters, 12/10/09

United Nations Human Rights Report On Iraq

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) released its latest human rights report for Iraq covering the first half of 2009. The U.N. noted the decrease in violence in Iraq, but that there were still deaths everyday in the country. More importantly, it recorded continued institutional abuses in the justice system, and reminders of the old regime.

The number of deaths and unidentified bodies found are down greatly. In the last half of 2008 for example, 434 people were found dead in the streets, compared to 210 in the first six months of 2009. There were still daily attacks, but the U.N. made an important observation that it is becoming increasingly difficult to tell political violence from ones involving crime, especially because many gangs also work as militias and insurgents. The major targets in Iraq are the security forces, government officials, professionals, Sons of Iraq (SOI) members, and tribal leaders. Two generals were killed and one escaped a car bombing during the first half of 2009, along with four SOI leaders killed or wounded in four areas in Diyala.

Iraq’s minorities are also targets. Yazidis, Sabeans, Shabaks and Christians claim that their numbers have been drastically reduced because of the violence, with many becoming refugees. Yazidis say their population went from 500,000 before the war to 300,000 now. Sabeans reported 35,000 followers in 2003, and 7,000-8,000 now. There were 1.4 million Christians in the 1987 census, and they now believe there are only 500,000-800,000. All of these groups complain about being arrested by the Kurdish security forces, and being pressured to vote for pro-Kurdish parties.

With the dramatic decrease in militant activity, cultural and institutional abuses are gaining more prominence. UNAMI has been focusing upon women’s issues for the last year or two, concentrating upon the Kurdistan region. The U.N has found continued honor killings and suicides due to abuses there. Few of these cases are ever reported to the police, as they are considered family matters. Journalists also say they face regular harassment by the security forces and politicians’ bodyguards. One NGO reported 64 cases of abuse in 3 days in Baghdad, Basra, Babil, and Anbar. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has also arrested and convicted journalists for criticizing the authorities.

Most importantly the U.N. reports that Iraq’s justice system remains overwhelmed by the number of detainees, and its reliance upon confessions leads to widespread abuses. From January to June 2009 the number of prisoners held by the government increased from 27,466 to 29,871. Detainees are regularly held for long periods of time without charges or seeing a lawyer. Torture and beatings are common, and this includes against children held. That led to a series of protests by prisoners in June 2009 against corruption, lack of trials, and abuses in Maysan and Qadisiyah provinces. That same month, the Interior Minister announced that 43 police officers were going to be prosecuted for abuses. Similar conditions and treatment are also prevalent in Kurdistan. UNAMI interviewed people who were held for 5 years or more in the region without charges or trials, while noting that the KRG has begun a program to renovate and improve conditions in its prisons.

Finally, the authorities are finding remains of the Saddam era. In May and June 2009 dozens of mass graves were found in Qadisiyah, Najaf, Basra, Karbala, and Tamim. Most of those contained hundreds of Kurdish victims of Saddam’s Anfal campaign, while two sites were found in Karbala that had Kuwaiti prisoners of war that were killed during the Gulf War. The Ministry of Human Rights believes that they may be 270 unopened mass graves throughout the country.

Iraq remains a troubled nation. The insurgency has been largely defeated, but there are still terrorist attacks everyday that continue to take a human toll. With the fighting largely over, other problems are coming to the fore including overcrowding and abuses in Iraqi prisons and the justice system, lack of rights for women, and limits on press freedom. This shows that Iraq remains a fragile, developing state, with a large terrorist threat.

SOURCES

United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, “Human Rights Report 1 January – 30 June 2009,” 12/15/09

Disputed Oil Field Leads To Flare Up Between Iraq And Iran

Today, December 18, 2009, around ten Iranian border guards stormed oil well number four at the Fauqi oil field in Maysan, after some Iraqi workers started work there last week. Well number four is on the Iraqi side of the border, but the field straddles both countries. There is an unofficial agreement between the two that neither will work on the disputed parts of the Fauqi. According to a U.S. officer in southern Iraq however, the two countries often provoke each other. He said every couple of months one side will go to a well, work there for a few days, put up their flag, and then as soon as they leave, the other country will do the same. He said the last time this happened was in September 2009. Today’s event was definitely an example of this as well number four is dormant.

While Iraq officially called on the Iranians to withdraw from well number four, they are trying to keep the event low key. Interior Minister Jawad Bolani for example, said it was not a major incident. The National Security Council and the Maysan provincial council both had emergency sessions over the incursion. There is a joint Iran-Iraq committee to settle the disputed border, but it has done little since the U.S. invasion in 2003.

SOURCES

Allam, Hannah, “Iraq accuses Iran of sending troops to seize disputed oil well,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/18/09

Associated Press, “Iraq Accuses Iranian Troops Of Seizing Oil Well,” 12/18/09

Al Jazeera, “Iraq-Iran in oilfield dispute,” 12/18/09

Lando, Ben, “The Iranian invasion,” Iraq Oil Report, 12/18/09

Rao, Prashant, “Iraq protests against Iranian takeover of oil well,” Agence France Presse, 12/18/09

Williams, Timothy and Schmitt, Eric,  “Iraq Says Iran Occupied a Border Oil Field,” New York Times, 12/18/09