Iraq's Trade Ministry Still Corrupt?

Iraq’s Trade Ministry is considered one of the most corrupt in the country. The Integrity Committee, one of three anti-corruption agencies within Iraq, said that they have evidence that between $4-$8 billion has gone missing from the Ministry over the last four years. The former Trade Minister Abdul al-Falah al-Sudani is currently in prison awaiting trial for corruption, even though one of the two cases against him was recently dropped. Amongst that news, the Karbala provincial council claimed that the Ministry is still misspending its funds and cheating the public out of its food rations.

On April 25, 2010 the Karbala council accused the Trade Ministry of buying expired foods, and not providing the 5 basics promised within the ration system. The council said they had found un-edible sugar, old tea, and other decaying goods in March 2010. Karbala officially complained to the Trade Ministry about it, but they never responded. Of the five basics supposed to be included within the rations, Karbala claims only 2-3 are provided, and that the Ministry blamed it on a lack of money. If true, the Karbala case would just be another example of the on going corruption within Iraq. Despite the removal of the minister and having three other officials imprisoned, the process of stealing money from the Trade Ministry and the government in general continues in the country.

SOURCES

AK News, “Karbala council accuses Trade Ministry of corruption,” 4/25/10

Why Nothing Is Going To Be Done About Abuse In Iraq’s Prisons

On April 19, 2010 the Los Angeles Times broke the news about a secret prison at the Muthanna airport in Baghdad. 431 prisoners were being held there, around half of which had been tortured. Iraq’s Human Rights Ministry investigated the matter, leading to the facility being shut down, and most of the prisoners being transferred to the Justice Ministry. This was just the latest example of the systematic abuse that occurs in Iraq’s jails and prisons. It not only happens to those accused of terrorism, but common criminals as well. Since the Iraqi justice system is based upon confessions, beating one out of a suspect is usual procedure.

After the prison was exposed, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said that he was against torture, but he and other officials have issued statements since then showing little effort will be made to actually end it. First, Maliki said that if there were any torture in Iraqi prison it was due to his political rivals. He also said that secret prisons were necessary to secure the country. After Human Rights Watch interviewed some of the prisoners to record their abuses, Maliki then claimed that their stories were faked. He said, “They had given themselves scars by rubbing matches on some of their body parts,” and that “These are lies, a smear campaign by some foreign embassies and the media. There are no secret pr,isons in Iraq at all.” He went on to state that the United States used tough measures at Abu Ghraib to deal with the insurgency, and that the Iraqi government was now doing the same so what was the problem. A week later, the head of the Federal Relations Committee in parliament denied that there were any secret prisons in Iraq, and that although the detainees at Muthanna had no specific charges against them, the Defense Ministry had evidence against all of them. 

There have been various reports by international organizations of the abuses and lack of due process in Iraq’s detention facilities and justice system over the years.  Nothing has been done to fix the problems however. The statements by Maliki and others like the head of the Federal Relations Committee are signs that this is not going to change. After the most public example of torture in the country rather than demanding to hold people accountable for what went on, the Prime Minister said that nothing wrong happened, and that if it did, it was necessary for security. That’s why the Muthanna case is likely going to lead to nothing substantive except for a brief period of bad press, and then things will continue on as they had before.

SOURCES

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, And Labor, “2009 Human Rights Report: Iraq,” U.S. State Department, 3/11/10

Human Rights Watch, “Iraq: Detainees Describe Torture in Secret Jail,” 4/27/10
- “The Quality of Justice, Failings of Iraq’s Central Criminal Court,” December 2008

Parker, Ned, “Secret prison revealed in Baghdad,” Los Angeles Times, 4/19/10

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Lawmaker Says Secret Prison Reports ‘Exaggerated,’” 5/4/10

Sengupta, Kim, “Secret Iraqi government prison was ‘worse than Abu Ghraib,’” The Independent, 4/29/10

United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, “Human Rights Report 1 January – 30 June 2009,” 12/15/09

Iraq's Outlawed Baathists Try To Kiss And Make Up

At the end of April 2010, the banned Baath Party of Iraq held a conference in Damascus, Syria. The meeting was hosted by Mohammed Yunis al-Ahmad, the former governor of Ninewa under Saddam Hussein’s regime, who leads a Syrian faction of Baathists. In mid-2009 Ahmad was blamed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki for masterminding the August bombings of Iraq’s Foreign and Finance Ministries in Baghdad. One goal of the conference was to try to re-unite with Ibrahim al-Duri, Saddam’s vice president, who operates within Iraq and is an insurgent leader. Duri refused to attend however. Azzaman newspaper reported that he might be afraid that Ahmad was only interested in infiltrating his faction, and trying to take it over.

At the end of the meeting in early May, a statement was issued trying to appeal to the people of Iraq. It said that the Baath party should not be blamed for the mistakes of its leaders, but rather be remembered for what it accomplished. It went on to say that the party should apologize to Iraq’s citizenry for its transgressions. The announcement also claimed that Ahmad was willing to participate in Iraq’s political process. His faction has been known to hold talks with the Americans in Syria about reconciliation, and joining the new Iraq. The problem was the meeting didn’t seem to think that the Baathists had made any mistakes as a speech by Ahmad and others portrayed Saddam Hussein as a martyr, praised his leadership, and said that their armed resistance was legitimate. All of these drew applause from the audience.

The conference failed to achieve any of its goals. First the Ahmad and Duri factions are still split. Ahmad seems to only curry favor with Baathist exiles, and is willing to compromise with the Americans and Baghdad to return to Iraq, while Duri is more militant and holds sway with insurgent groups within the country. The conciliatory statement at the end of the meeting is also not likely to win any friends, as the Baath Party did not actually apologize, speakers talked again and again about Saddam as a great leader, and they celebrated the insurgency. Overall, the Baath party is no longer a threat to the new Iraq. Many Iraqis however, are still fearful of its return since the wounds are still fresh from years of Saddam’s rule, the insurgency still includes former regime members, and Baathism is used by the country’s leading parties to rally support as is currently happening with the banning of candidates from the March 2010 parliamentary elections. Attempts at reconciliation were actually going on with talks conducted by both the Americans and Maliki’s government in 2009, but those were derailed by the on-going deBaathification controversy. In the end, some sort of peace deal with the Baathists may not even be necessary as they may fade away of their own accord as Iraqi politics continue to develop and the insurgency follows its steady decline.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraq’s banned Baath holds first public meeting in Syria,” 4/29/10

AK News, “Al-Dori denies holding “reconciliation” meeting with Yunis Al-Ahmad,” 5/2/10

Aswat al-Iraq, “Baath made mistakes, should apologize to Iraqis – Baathist,” 5/4/10

Sands, Phil, “Iraq’s banned Baathists bring little to the party but bluster,” The National, 5/7/10

Al-Shawfi, Mundhir, “Former Baath party chief wants ‘united front’ in Iraq,” Azzaman, 4/26/10

Small Iraqi Town May Be Warning For Country’s Housing Plans

Map of Wasit province

Iraq’s government has announced a massive program this year to build one million housing units by 2014. That will go a long way to meeting the country’s needs if completed successfully. The small town of Aziziyah in Wasit province however, provides an anecdotal warning about the problems authorities may face in accomplishing their goals.

Aziziyah is a small town in southern Iraq that was once plagued by Shiite militias, but today faces struggling farmers, and a lack of services such as education, health care, and electricity. The government has ambitious redevelopment plans that include building a new school, hospital, park and apartments. The problem is that planning rules and the division of power between the province and central government are unclear, there is a lack of technical know how and coordination, and a need for foreign assistance. First, the development project was started in Baghdad with no involvement by the town itself. There are no population statistics for the area either, which could complicate what to build and how much to provide to meet the people’s needs. The town’s top urban planner also said that the government lacks the know how to complete the project without help from foreign companies. Russian, Spanish, and Chinese companies have all expressed interest in doing business in Wasit, but are put off by the lack of security, corruption, and obtuse regulations. Some of the projects that have already been started are stalled because no one knows who has the authority to continue on with them because the separation of powers between the provincial council in Wasit and the central government in the capital is so unclear. Finally, the mayor of Aziziyah warned that there might not be enough money for all the plans. He said that money for projects had been cut in 2009. The town was allotting 20% of the city’s budget to reconstruction this year to try to make up the difference, but it was not stated whether that would be enough.

Housing is one major need Iraqis have been lacking for years now due to the successive wars and sanctions the country has faced. The government’s housing plan comes as a welcomed announcement then. The problem for Iraq is whether it can accomplish its lofty goals or not. As with many things, the bureaucracy is a major impediment. Iraq has a mix of laws and regulations that date from the Saddam era to the Coalition Provisional Authority to the current government, many of which contradict each other. There is also a lack of trained officials, as well as corruption that threatens to skim off millions from any large project started in the country. These are all daunting challenges the government has to face as it embarks on this huge development program.

SOURCES

Sands, Phil and Latif, Nizar, “Aziziyah’s realities hard to pave over,” The National, 4/24/10

Election Controversy In Iraq Does Not Have Affect On Violence

In April 2010, the four groups that track monthly deaths in Iraq, Iraqi Body Count, icasualties.org, Iraq's ministries, and the Associated Press once again had divergent patterns for the second month in a row. Since January 2009 all four followed the same general trend of deaths going up and down each month, although the actual numbers between them varied. Icasualties and the Associated Press have continued on with that pattern into 2010. The Associated Press for example found 383 deaths in December 2009, 177 in January 2010, 255 in February, 230 in March, and 321 in April. Iraq's ministries had two months of deaths going up in 2010 with 196 in January, 352 in February, 367 in March, before dropping to 328 in April. Iraq Body Count on the other hand, saw deaths go up since the beginning of the year with 258 in January, 296 in February, 311 in March, and finally 364 last month.

Despite these differences, average deaths have not changed, and casualties have dropped overall with time. The average killed per day has stuck with the up and down pattern. 6.1 died a day in January 2010, 10.1 in February, 8.7 in March, and 10.6 in April. Iraq Body Count, icasualties, and the Associated Press also saw monthly average deaths for the first four months of 2010 go down from the previous four months, while Iraq's ministries showed an increase for that period. Iraq Body Count for instance, had 333.2 deaths from September to December 2009, compared to 307.2 from January to April 2010. Iraq's ministries reported an average of 275.5 dead per month in the last third of 2009, and 310.7 deaths in the beginning of this year.

What hasn't changed is the casualties from mass casualty bombings. The number of dead and wounded from such attacks has continued to go up and down each month. In January 2010 there were 10 such bombings causing 100 deaths and 407 wounded. That was followed by 11 bombings in February with 160 deaths and 492 wounded, 12 attacks in March with 142 deaths and 314 wounded, and finally 11 bombings in April leading to 172 deaths and 460 wounded.

Overall, the most important piece of information conveyed by the monthly counts is that the 2010 elections have not affected deaths in Iraq. It's been eight weeks since the March vote, and politicians are no closer to forming a ruling coalition. Many commentators were worried that the political limbo could lead to increased violence as the different factions battle it out for power. That has not happened. Even Iraq Body Count that had three consecutive months of deaths going up did not have numbers markedly different from the previous period. Despite some high profile bombings in April, Al Qaeda in Iraq faced some crippling loses with the deaths of their top two leaders, and the capture of their governor in Baghdad and their commander for northern Iraq. That could decrease attacks overall in the long-run as the Islamist group has been on the decline since 2005, and probably doesn't have the resources to fill its loses right now. Even before that Iraq has seen the fewest deaths and attacks beginning in 2009 since the U.S. invasion, and that does not appear to be changing anytime soon.

Monthly Death Counts

Month	Iraq Body Count	Icasualties	Iraqi Ministries	Associated Press	Avg. Deaths Per Day
Jul. 09	395	240	275	309	9.8
Aug.	585	439	456	425	15.3
Sep.	298	158	203	238	7.4
Oct.	404	320	410	364	12.0
Nov.	205	106	122	93	4.3
Dec.	426	287	367	383	11.7
Jan. 10	258	135	196	177	6.1
Feb.	296	236	352	255	10.1
Mar.	311	183	367	230	8.7
Apr.	364	259	328	321	10.6
Avg. Last 4 Months 2009	333.2	217.7	275.5	269.5	10.2
Avg. 1st 4 Months 2010	307.2	203.2	310.7	245.7	8.8

Mass Casualty Bombings

Months	Bombings	Deaths	Wounded
Sep. 09	13	70	263
Oct.	22	241	887
Nov.	10	43	136
Dec.	25	246	851
Jan. 10	10	100	407
Feb.	11	160	492
Mar.	12	142	314
Apr.	11	172	460

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, "Iraq death toll in April almost same as last year," 5/1/10

Associated Press, "Iraq: Key figures since the war began," 5/3/10

Aswat al-Iraq, "2 car bombs kill 5, injure 17 in Baghdad," 4/28/10
- "9 killed, 10 wounded in blasts in Ramadi," 4/23/10
- "24 killed, injured in Mosul suicide attack," 4/12/10
- "Baghdad blasts casualties up to 234," 4/23/10
- "Baghdad blasts toll reaches 35 dead, 140 wounded," 4/6/10
- "Baghdad's toll reaches 30 dead, 168 wounded persons," 4/4/10
- "Blast in Baghdad kills 8, wounds 20," 4/29/10
- "Casualties from Mosul blast reach 40," 4/4/10

Concord Monitor, "6 killed by blasts in western Baghdad," 4/25/10

Fordham, Alice, "At least 41 killed as triple car bomb hits Baghdad," Times of London, 4/5/10

icasualties.org

Iraq Body Count

Issa, Sahar, "Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 15 April 2010," 4/15/10

Reuters, "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 21," 4/21/10
- "Iraq civilian death toll rises sharply in April," 5/1/10

Times of London, "Homemade bombs kill 39 in Baghdad," 4/6/10

Grand Kurdish Alliance Next Step In Forming A New Iraqi Government

In April 2010 it was announced that all of the winning Kurdish lists would join together in a grand alliance called the Kurdish Coalition. While some of the internal dynamics of the new list have yet to be worked out, they are likely the next partners with the new Shiite partnership made up of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law and the Sadrist-Supreme Council led Iraqi National Alliance to form a new Iraqi government.

On April 18, 2010 the Kurdish Alliance, consisting of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), that won 43 seats, the Change List that won 8 seats, the Kurdistan Islamic Union with 4 seats, and the Kurdistan Islamic Group that took 2 seats in the March election announced that they would be joining together in a new Kurdish Coalition. Together they would have 57 seats in the new parliament. Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Massoud Barzani was instrumental in putting the new list together through in a series of meetings he held with Kurdish leaders. The point of the Kurdish Coalition is to provide a united front for Kurdish demands vis a vis the central government in Baghdad. The Kurds are likely to ask for a full and immediate implementation of Article 140 that calls for a census and then referendum on the future of the disputed areas like Kirkuk, the right of the Kurds to export their own oil that has been by the Oil Ministry, the election of Jalal Talabani for a second term as Iraq’s president, to have the government pay the salaries of the Kurdish militia the peshmerga, and 25% of all the top posts in the new government, including control of key ministries such as oil, defense, and finance.

In order to form the new coalition, the ruling KDP and PUK needed to make some concessions to the Kurdish opposition. One important move was an agreement to hire back supporters of the Change List who were fired from government jobs after the July 2009 Kurdish parliamentary elections. The Change List and the two Islamic parties have consistently complained of harassment, arrests, and firings of their followers by the KRG. The smaller parties also demanded a real say in the new alliance, not just to be under the leadership of the KDP and PUK.

The next step is to negotiate with the other winning parties in forming a new Iraqi government. After the two leading Shiite lists recently came together, they immediately said that they would hold talks with the Kurds next. Although the KDP and PUK have had running feuds with Prime Minister Maliki over the last few years, he has tried to make up with them, and they have a longstanding relationship with the Supreme Council, which should ease negotiations between them. Most importantly, the Shiite and Kurdish parties are interested in holding onto power, which outweighs any political or ideological disputes the various politicians might have with each other. When the Shiites and Kurdish Coalition come together, that will be one more step towards a new regime in Baghdad that will look a lot like the old one that was formed after the last elections in 2005.

SOURCES

AK News, “Kurdish lists build unified parliamentary bloc in Baghdad,” 4/18/10
- “Kurdish lists demand 25% share in new Iraqi govt,” 5/3/10

Dagher, Sam, “Election Victories Help Kurds in Iraq Push for More Sovereignty,” New York Times, 5/2/10

England, Andrew, “Iraqi Shia groups form alliance,” Financial Times, 5/5/10

Taha, Yaseen, “kurds unite,” Niqash, 4/15/10

Kurds Withdraw Re-Count Requests In Tamim and Ninewa

Amongst all the troubling news about Iraq’s political parties inability to form a ruling coalition to govern the country nearly two months after parliamentary elections, one positive story has emerged. The Kurdistan Alliance, made up of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, has withdrawn its requests for manual re-counts in Ninewa and Tamim provinces.

The Kurdistan Alliance won 43 seats overall, including eight in Ninewa, and six in Tamim. After the election in March 2010, the Alliance filed over 100 complaints about irregularities they found. In Tamim for example, they claimed the Arab parties had manipulated the votes there to pull a tie between the Kurdish Alliance and Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement. When Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki successfully got a court order for a re-count in Baghdad in April, the Kurdish Alliance applauded it saying that would lead the way to other re-tallies in the provinces they wanted. In turn, that led to protests like by the Arab Group in Tamim who said any change in the vote there would lead to public demonstrations, and the undermining of the public’s will. 

The demands of the Kurdish Alliance could’ve opened the door to an endless array of court cases, and officials going through ballots that would’ve dragged out the certification of the election even more, but that has now been averted. On May 3, the Kurdish Alliance said that they were withdrawing their complaints about Ninewa and Tamim. The Election Commission said that they still may have a recount in the town of Hawija in Tamim however. That is one small hurdle removed in the way of forming a new government in Iraq. Unfortunately, the larger problem of who will become the next prime minister is still deadlocked.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Iraq panel postpones manual votes recount,” 4/28/10

Al-Iraq News, “Member of the Kurdistan Alliance: Re-count in Baghdad to pave the way for the rest of the provinces,” 4/20/10

AK News, “KA may call for recount of votes in Kirkuk if Baghdad recounts show difference,” 4/24/10
- “kirkuk: Arab Group in the province council rejects manual re-tally,” 4/28/10
- “Kurdistan Alliance withdraws its complaints about Kirkuk electoral results,” 5/3/10

Associated Press, “Baghdad Vote Recount to Take About 2-3 Weeks,” 4/29/10